The Pascagoula Democrat-Star.

BY P. K. MAYERS & M. A. DEES. "PEACE, GOOD WILL AND PROSPERITY TO ALL MANKIND." TERMS—$2 00 a Year, in Advance.

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A LEGAL QUESTION.

"Fathers on the Bench and Sons at the Bar."

Editor Democrat-Star.

England, the grand source of American law, seems, just now, to be waking up from a long night, upon a question involving important principles of *law* and *equity*, as embraced in the above heading: "Fathers on the Bench and Sons at the Bar."

It is stated, in a leading American law journal, to-wit: the Albany *Law Journal*, that the London *Law Times* says:

"An incident in the Bristol county court, raises a question which we think is of the utmost moment to the bench and the bar. A son of the judge appeared as counsel before him, and the counsel on the other side declined to go on with the case, as we gather, on that ground alone. We think the judge was wrong in suggesting that this step could in any sense be an insult to him."

Also that the London *Law Journal*, in commenting upon the same incident, says:

"In the United States, the impression has taken so deep a hold that an attempt has actually been made to pronounce a father disqualified on the ground of interest, to try a cause in which his son is engaged as counsel."

The Albany *Law Journal*, commenting upon the practice which gave rise to the incident in the Bristol county court, England, and most emphatically condemning the practice of fathers presiding in cases in which their sons are counsel, quoting largely from the said English journals, says: "Both journals, (the London *Law Times* and the London *Law Journal*) agree in the conclusion that the constant practice of fathers presiding in cases in which their sons are counsel is highly improper." "To say that a barrister should never appear in a court presided over by his father, may be unreasonable, but we must emphatically condemn the practice of barristers adopting a court in which to practice, over which their fathers do preside, or may preside alone."

This is the deliberate though cautiously expressed opinion of eminent legal authority of England, where it has ever been almost an adage that a judge, like the king, "can do no wrong." And the position of these eminent English authorities upon the merits of the issue involved in the Bristol county court, England, is endorsed by the leading law journals in the United States.

In the United States, the current of public sentiment in reference to those in authority, and more especially in reference to matters and principles pertaining to the judicial department of the government, is quite different to that entertained in England. In this country, it is the prevalent sentiment of the people, with whom, and in whom all power, politically, is lodged, that the highest functionaries in the government may err in the discharge of their official duty, and hence the constitution of the United States has limited the official term of the president, the highest office in the government, to four years, so that, if the president should prove unfaithful to his trust, or wanting in capacity, he may be retired at the end of his term, by the people, who have in all things, politically, supreme authority in the government.

In the United States, the judges, like all other functionaries, are amenable to the people for their official conduct. The judges of the supreme court of the United States, though appointed for life, or during good behavior, are, nevertheless, subject to impeachment, and to be removed from office.

"Honesty is the best policy," and when an officer proves himself to be dishonest, and corrupt, it is the right, and the duty, not to say policy of the people, to remove him from office, in the way provided by the constitution.

There can be no good government in a State in which the people hold a loose rein upon the conduct of men who have been chosen, for a time, to administer the laws. Corruption, in high places, is the bane of all governments, and the history of all civilized nations proves that misrule in government, has generally had its origin in the arbitrary rulings, and, I might say, corruption of the judges.

Probably no department of a republican government is so corrupt, and corrupting, in its arbitrary rulings, as the judiciary; and more especially, this is the case in a State where the judges are not elected by the people, nor directly amenable to the people for their conduct in office.

The judges are taken from the list of practicing lawyers, and it has never been a prevalent idea with the people of this country that lawyers, as a class, are more honest, and more conscientious in the discharge of official duty than are other classes of citizens; as farmers, mechanics, and tradesmen. The education, legally, and business of the lawyer are in conflict with the due administration of the law. The end of the law is, *certain punishment* for its violation. "*Ut pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat.*" Violations of the law are punished, that others, knowing the penalty, may be deterred from committing the same or other offenses.

The business of the practicing lawyer, very often, is to prevent the punishment of violators of the law, and to turn them loose upon the community unpunished, and, in consequence of their acquittal, encouraged, rather, to go and commit the same, or a similar, and even a greater offense. And it is to be regretted that some lawyers, especially those who have had much practice in the defense of criminals, are not very scrupulous as to the means, necessary to be employed to effect an acquittal of their clients. Certainly, however, there are many honorable exceptions to this charge of proneness in the profession to pass the bounds of professional duty, in this respect. But, as the Christian is said to grow in grace by an upright walk and a godly conversation, so may the lawyer, by an opposite walk, and much unrighteous talk, grow and harden in sin, and become callous to the commission of crime. Hence we may reasonably suppose that lawyers, to say the least of it, are as liable to be led away from the path of propriety in their professional duty, as any other class of citizens, and that *judges*, having been transferred from the bar to the bench, without any special interposition of Divine Providence, in the regeneration of their hearts and minds, are subject, still, to the same human frailties—prejudice, partiality, and even *corruption* common to lawyers and all other men.

The judges and chancellors are taken from the bar, and hence it may not be claimed that the bench is freer from corruption than is the bar. The placing of the judge upon the bench, from the members at the bar, does not make him more capable, more honest, or more conscientious, than he was when at the bar. The Ethiopian cannot change his skin, nor can the leopard dispense with his *spots*.

But, not to continue this vein of the subject further, let me revert to the subject of this communication,

"FATHERS ON THE BENCH AND SONS AT THE BAR."

The object of this communication is to bring this subject fairly and fully to the notice of the legal profession, and to the people of the State. It is a subject of much importance to the legal profession, to litigants, and to every citizen of the State.

It is a mooted question with lawyers of Mississippi, whether or not the law of the State, *as it is*, by its *letter*, or by its *spirit*, excludes a judge of the circuit court, and a chancellor from presiding in a case, and giving judgment, in which his father, brother, or son—or indeed, any other near relative is counsel in the case. The principle involved is of so much importance that it is somewhat strange that the *letter* of our constitutions, and of our statute laws have for so long a time left the matter in doubt. The constitution of 1832, put the disqualification of a judge and chancellor to preside in a case, upon the following grounds:

"No judge shall sit on the trial of any cause, when the parties, or either of them shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or when he may be interested in the same." Mark the word "interested." And the Code of 1857 puts the disqualification of a judge and chancellor upon the grounds of "Interest or other cause."

The present constitution, that of 1869, article 6, section 9, contains the same provision, *verbatim*.

The code of 1871, section 536, puts the disqualification of a "judge" to preside in a case, upon the ground of "Interest or other cause," and the "chancellor," "when he may be related to either party, by affinity or consanguinity, within the sixth degree, or shall have been counsel for either party, or be interested in the result of the suit." As to the disqualification of a chancellor, see section 995 of the code.

The present statute, that of 1880, section 2276, makes this provision:

"No judge, chancellor or justice of the peace, shall sit in any cause in which he is directly interested, or related to either party within the fourth degree, computed by the rule of the civil law, or in which he has been of counsel, without the consent of the parties entered of record."

Thus it is seen that the *letter* of the law of the State, as seen in the constitutions and the statutes, has been very *uniform* in provisions upon this subject through a long course of years. The constitution and statutes of the State have, as we see, placed the disqualification of judges and chancellors, upon three grounds, distinct in their meaning and application, to-wit: Relationship to either of the parties; having been counsel for either of the parties to the suit; and *interest* in the result of the suit.

Upon the two grounds first mentioned, the law is explicit: relationship to either of the "parties," and having been counsel for either party. Disqualification upon the ground of "interest," is what is thought by some, is left in doubt by the plain letter of the law. But, that a judge, or chancellor, who has a son engaged as counsel in a suit, is disqualified to preside and give judgment in that particular suit, upon the ground of *interest* in the suit, *as the law is*, I think there cannot be, upon just principles, and that there should not be, any doubt.

I suppose that Mississippi is one of the States to which the London *Law Journal* has reference, when it says that, "In the United States the impression has taken so deep a hold that an attempt has actually been made to pronounce a father disqualified on the ground of interest, to try a cause in which his son is engaged as counsel."

In the instance referred to by the London *Law Journal*, the counsel was so indignant at the great impropriety, as he thought, of the judge in presiding in a case in which his son was counsel, that he refused to go on with the case. If that be the sentiment of the bar of England, where the judicial robe is regarded as a sacred vestment, what should it be, and what will be the sentiment in this country, at no distant time, where the judge has no special character for purity, and for conscientious discharge of official duty, above other officers of the State, in other departments of the government?

The law of Mississippi, by its letter, disqualifies a judge or chancellor, or justice of the peace, to sit and try a case in which he is *interested* in the result of the suit. The whole thing, therefore, may be narrowed down to this simple, isolated point—that of "interest." Then, it may be well to inquire when is a judge interested, and in what way, or ways, may he be interested in a suit? I suppose the framers of the constitution, and the statute law used the perfect participle, "interested" in its usual sense and acceptation. It has no technical application, nor legal sense, different from its ordinary meaning and use. *Interest* means, simply, as the standard authors define it, "concern"—"anxiety"—"interested"—"having an interest." If, therefore, a case should come before a judge for trial, and he should be more anxious for one party to succeed than the other, he would be disqualified by the *letter*, not to say the *spirit* of the law to preside in the case and give judgment. This is more clearly so in the case of a chancellor who decides the case, upon its merits, without the intervention of a jury, but according to *his opinion* of its equity, which opinion may be produced by feelings, or *interest*, in various ways. A judge may be "interested" in a suit in several ways. He may be interested as a litigant, plaintiff or defendant; or, as having been counsel for one of the parties, litigating; or, as being related to one of the parties litigating; or, as being closely *related* to the *counsel* of one of the parties litigating. In all of these supposed instances, the judge would be disqualified to preside in the suit; and the most objectionable of all the disqualifications mentioned, is the one where *the son of the judge is counsel in the case.*

To illustrate this more clearly, let us suppose that, in the case of John Doe against Richard Roe, in the chancery court, Doe has filed his bill to settle the title to a large and valuable tract of land, claimed, also, by the said Roe. Doe has employed the son of the chancellor to bring his suit, and contracts with him to give him, as a fee for his legal services, *one half* of the land, provided he succeeds in establishing in the said Doe, a *title* thereto. The land in controversy is worth, say, *twenty thousand dollars*—the attorney's *one half* interest being *ten thousand* dollars, if he be successful in the suit. Now, let me ask any intelligent man, is not the chancellor "interested" in this suit? If he is, then, this is an end of the argument.

If the chancellor's son be a "party"—complainant or defendant, in a suit—in which there is *fifty* dollars, only, involved in the issue, then, by the *letter* of the law the father shall not preside, upon the ground, supposed, of *interest*. The law presumes that the father is interested in the interest of his son.

The Albany (New York) *Law Journal* gives *four reasons* why a *father* should not preside and give judgment in a suit in which his son is counsel:

1. "That the father will, unconsciously, it may be, be biased in favor of his son.

2. "That the father and judge may do his son's client injustice from the fear of such bias.

3. "That a judge will always be presumed by the populace to lean in favor of his son.

4. "That the son will get business from the force of this presumption."

The length of this communication, already, prevents further consideration of the subject, at this time; but I respectfully suggest to the legal profession of Mississippi, the propriety of bringing this question to the notice of the supreme court of the State, in a case made, and sent up to that court for its decision, upon this point alone, and should there not be a decision of the supreme court against the practice alluded to, upon the law *as it is*, then, I would invoke the legislature of the State to enact a law expressly and positively prohibiting the corrupt and corrupting practice of fathers presiding as judges in cases in which their sons are counsel. There are more than one district in the State, it is said, in which there is a *father* on the bench and a *son* at the bar; and the impropriety of the thing, to use a mild term, has become so *manifest*, so *notorious*, and so much the subject of comment, that further forbearance has ceased to be a virtue.

CITIZEN.

MISSISSIPPI.

Political Views of the Condition of the South--Intelligent Answers to Inquiries from the North.

The American.

In the *American* for February 5, we published the first instalment of a series of letters from Southern men in review of the Southern political situation, with reference to national affairs. These letters were elicited by questions in writing, with the sole object of bringing about a better understanding between North and South, to the end that national unity may be promoted through the obliteration of sectional lines. We close the discussion of Mississippi with the letter of Mr. Walthall.

Mr. W. T. Walthall is a Southerner who is well known in all parts of the South, and is by no means a stranger to the men of the North. He is a native of Virginia, and for many years, both before and since the war, has been actively engaged in journalism, chiefly in Mobile. He served in the Confederate army throughout the contest, first as lieutenant and captain of infantry, and afterwards as Assistant Adjutant General, with the rank of Major. He began life as a State's rights whig, but united with the democrats when the whig party was merged in the know-nothing organization. He has never abandoned his advocacy of State's rights, which he believes to be the fundamental doctrine of American politics. He is the author of several published addresses and orations, of a number of articles in the *American Encyclopædia*, and of contributions on a variety of subjects to reviews and magazines. He has never had any public office, except that of superintendent of education, and has never been a candidate. He has always been very active in promoting measures to check yellow fever whenever it has appeared, and has been presented with two gold medals for his services in this regard. He is an intimate friend of Mr. Jefferson Davis, and has rendered Mr. Davis much valuable assistance in the preparation of the first volume of his forthcoming work.

BEAUVOIR, Miss., Jan. 25, 1881.

To the Editor of the American:

Sir: Other engagements and illness have concurred to hinder the earlier reply to your letter of the 18th ult., which the interest of its subject and the courtesy of its terms would alike have prompted.

Before attempting to answer *seriatim* the questions, just pardon me the expression of some doubt or dissent as to the ground on which they are based and the purpose proposed as their object, viz., "to do away with that bar to the highest national political prosperity, known as the 'solid South.'"

I confess myself utterly unable to appreciate the force of the objections to a "solid South," *as such*, either on grounds of fact or of principle. As regards a clearly defined political issue, there are but three possible alternatives for the people for the Southern as well as for those of the Northern States. They may be right; they may be wrong; or they may be partly right and partly wrong. If right, the more *solidly* right the better; it would scarcely be commendable to change from right to wrong for the sake of a dissolution of unanimity and the creation of division. If wrong, a change to the right would, unquestionably, be desirable—not because they are "solid," but because they are wrong; indeed, they ought to be solid on the other side. The only ground to which an objection to solidity, as such, can be tenable, would be the assumption that it is better for a people to be divided—part in the right and part in the wrong,—than to be either wholly wrong—which may be true,—or wholly right—which is absurd.

I am well aware of the dangers and evils—irrespective of any considerations of abstract right or truth—of *sectional* divisions in politics, and presume that a vague and undefined sense of this is the basis of the cavils against solidity; but it is not so easy to perceive why *Southern* solidity should be the exclusive, or even the primary, object of dread or deprecation.

If there was, in the attitude of the South, or the principles on which she is supposed to be united, anything threatening the safety or welfare of the North, or the country in general, the ground for apprehension might be intelligible. But I presume no intelligent and candid person, of whatever political views, would claim that there is, or has been for some years past, any purpose of aggression, on the part of the South, with regard to the rights or interest of any other part of the Union.

We have, it is true, heard much of alleged peril to "the results of the war." If I rightly apprehend what are claimed as the results of the war, they are all readily reducible to two: (1) the abolition of African slavery, and (2) the establishment of the paramount authority of the central government, and the abrogation of State sovereignty, with its direct corollary, the right of secession. With regard to slavery only the densest and most ignorant fanaticism could imagine that the idea of its revival in any shape now exists in the South. Many of us (among whom is the writer of this letter), were in principle always opposed to it. Others thought differently, and approved of it as an existing institution; but, now that it has been abolished, no sane man would have it re-established, even if it were practicable.

As to State sovereignty, if it has not been effectually extinguished beyond all hope of reassertion or resuscitation, the fault is certainly not that of the South. During the process of what was termed reconstruction, in the years immediately following the war, the majority of the Southern States were merely passive spectators, without representation or participation in the government of the Union. That government was entirely in the hands of the North, and the North was controlled by the republican party. If the Constitution was not so amended as to secure the principle of centralization, and to preclude any future assertion of the sovereignty of the State, it was not on account of Southern opposition or recalcitrance. The South was altogether powerless to resist what was done during that period by the dominant section, under control of the dominant party, even if she had been disposed; and certainly no disposition to *undo* it has been manifested since.

But if,—whether purposely or from neglect or indifference,—the old controversy between State rights and centralism has been left still unsettled, it is now certainly not a *sectional* controversy. It was such in 1830 only from its association with the tariff question, and in 1860 with that of slavery in the territories. These *were* sectional questions; but the former has long ceased to be operative, as such, and the latter has become utterly extinct. The South has no more interest in the maintenance of State rights than the North; and if there is any likelihood of a future claim of the right of secession, there is less reason to look for it in the South than in New England (where it was first asserted), or on the distant shores of the Pacific.

The clamor against the "solid South" is therefore alike unwarranted by any spirit of sectional aggression, or by any peril to the legitimate "results of the war." Its potency as a partisan war cry is undeniable—the more unreasonable, the more potent, perhaps. Its appeal is not to reason, but to the unreasoning passions of the multitude—especially to two passions, which are always powerful when combined—fear, and sectional and sectarian animosity. In respect to substantial merit or dignity it stands, as seems to me, upon a level with the cry of "Well-Poisoners!" which animated certain mediæval persecution of the Jews, or that of "No Popery!" in the George Gordon riots in London, a hundred years ago. * * * *

7. "Has the time come, or is it near, when the white people of your State seek affiliation with new parties?"

The principles and objects of the new parties must be defined before an intelligent answer can be given. A political party must have, or ought to have, a *raison d'etre* in the convictions of its members as to certain principles, or as to the application of principles to questions arising in the course of public events. If the people are generally agreed as to these, there is no occasion for parties. Such was actually the case at one period of our history—that of the second term of Monroe's administration—when the whole country was "solid," and no complaint was made of it, nor did any harm ensue. When differences arise, parties are formed—not arbitarily, nor for the sake of divisions—not as disputants are divided in debating societies or players in a game of base ball, but as a natural outgrowth of a diversity of convictions. These convictions are, no doubt, much influenced by men's conflicting interests and passions and prejudices; but yet the theoretical basis—the only actual basis on which a party can be constituted, to possess any moral force or vitality—is still conviction and principle, whether right or wrong. I cannot understand, therefore, the proposition to create new parties merely for the purpose of dividing or destroying the old ones. It is not only illogical, but impracticable.

I do not believe that the white people of the South are influenced by any blind or superstitious attachment to existing party organizations. Agreement in general principles and the instinct of self-defense have hitherto united them in adherence to the democratic party, but in case new issues should lead to the formation of new parties, it is presumable that they would conform to the changes of circumstances. If the meaning of the inquiry is to ask whether they would *divide* among new parties, it is impossible to answer it without any knowledge of the issues on which the new are to be organized. There are questions,—those relating to finance and currency, for example,—on which there is great diversity of opinion in the South. Should these become the leading questions at issue, I presume there would be much division among us, and the *bete noire* of Southern solidity might disappear; but this would result from differences of conviction—not from division for its own sake.

8. "What have been the errors in the treatment of the South by the Northern power?"

A full answer to this question would cover a vast field. It would require a review of the history of the last sixteen years. I cannot attempt it, but will merely indicate what I conceive to have been the primary and radical error, from which all the others have sprung.

At the close of the war, two lines of policy were open to the North, either of which might have been adopted and prosecuted, at least with consistency. The subjugated States might have been regarded as conquered provinces, and governed as such at the pleasure of the conquerer, avowedly, and without disguise or the pretence of any other theory. No opposition (I think,) would have been made to this,—certainly, no resistance *could* have been made. All that could have been asked would have been that the laws and usages of conquest acknowledged by civilized nations should be applied, and that the personal rights and private property of the vanquished should be respected. The difficulty with regard to this theory was that it would imply an acknowledgment that the secession of the Southern States had been a *fait accompli*, and that they had actually been "out of the Union,"—a fact which, during the war, the government of the United States had persistently denied.

The only consistent alternative would have been the immediate recognition of the co-equal rights of the Southern States, their admission representation in congress, the withdrawal of military repression and of the paraphernalia of proconsular and provincial government, and abstention from any intermeddling with their local and internal affairs. If it was really believed that individuals had been guilty of treason, they might have been prosecuted according to law, and the question tested in the courts; but the States, *as States*, should have been left intact, and the masses of their people unmolested and in the enjoyment of all their original and constitutional rights. There would have been neither difficulty nor danger in the adoption of this policy. The avowed objects of the war on the part of the North had been fully achieved. Slavery had been pratically abolished by military force, and was legally, formally and irrevocably abolished immediately after the war by the action of State conventions. The impracticability of secession against the will of a determined majority had been demonstated. The submission of the defeated was absolute. The policy which has just been indicated would have been not only that prescribed by justice, generosity, and magnanimity, but of a wise and patriotic statesmanship. It would have bound the Union together with cords stronger than steel, and would have given the North a moral weight and influence far beyond that of mere numbers and physical and material power.

But neither of these two plans of reconstruction was adopted and put in execution. On the contrary, the worst features of each were combined,—features which would have been merely necessary evils as parts of a consistent whole, but which, as employed, became unmitigated wrongs. Theoretically, the idea of conquest was disclaimed, and that of an unbroken Union asserted, while, in fact, military occupation was maintained; State officers were replaced by functionaries of Federal appointment; the subjugated States were denied representation in congress; a supervisory power was exercised over their internal and even their local and municipal affairs; large classes of citizens were arbitarily disfranchised, and, indeed, the suffrage was extended or restricted at the will of the Federal power, without regard to the legitimate authority of the people of the respective States. Even the right to make or amend their own fundamental constitutions,—a most distinctive attribute of a free community,—was exercised only so far as permitted by the central government, and under restrictions and limitations enforced by commanders of military districts.

On the other hand, the *forms* of a constitutional government were maintained as far as possible—not, it is presumed, as a mere mockery, but with a deliberate and settled purpose. This purpose was, while virtually exercising the powers of conquest,—while prescribing, directing and controlling the action of the conquered,—to give it the semblance of proceeding from their own will, and to invest it with the garb of constitutional freedom. The case was analogous to the policy pursued by Augustus Cæsar and his successors, in retaining the Consuls, the Senate, the Tribunes of the people, and, in general, the forms, offices and processes of the Roman republic. Concurrent with this was the effort to organize upon the framework of the old State governments a new constituency, composed chiefly of the negro population, whose ignorance, ductility, and supposed hostility to their former masters, might render them facile instruments for securing and perpetuating the ascendancy of the party in power, and for promoting the ambitious purposes of its leaders. This effort achieved a temporary success; hence, the opportunity of the carpet-baggers, and the enormous mischiefs that ensued.

Moreover, while a few obscure and unfortunate individuals were sacrificed on other charges by the action of military tribunals, (after peace had been fully established,) the great question of TREASON was never brought to a judicial test. This was certainly not from "clemency," as is now absurdly alleged. The proper time and occasion for the exercise of clemency would have been after the guilt of the accused had been established. Clemency may be claimed for a refusal to execute—not for a failure to prosecute. The fact that the government of that day shrank from subjecting to this test the question whether the action of ten States was treason, as charged on one side, or a great constitutional right, as claimed on the other, admits of no reasonable explanation, except that they *dared not*. By this I do not mean that any *fear* prevented, other than moral fear, arising from consciousness of a weak or doubtful cause. And yet this stale and vapid imputation to the South of "treason" and "rebellion" continues to constitute a staple of popular declamation on the floors of congress and elsewhere, as if the highest political crime known to our laws could be fastened upon whole communities and commonwealths by the flippant or malevolent assumptions of partisans and demagogues!

This is a brief and imperfect outline of what I conceive to have been some of the most serious "errors in the treatment of the South by Northern power,"—not stated by way of complaint or accusation, but in frank response to your inquiry. The subject is not an agreeable one, and I gladly leave it.

9. "What would the South like to have from Northern politicians, the republican party, and the President-elect?"

10. "What does the South *need* from them?"

11. "What does the South *expect to get* from them?"

I have no authority to speak for the South in answer to these questions, and cannot undertake to do so. Whatever her needs, the South has certainly not asked anything in the past, and, it is to be presumed, desires nothing in the future, except fair dealing, equity and non-interference with the domestic and internal affairs of the respective States. She ought to ask nothing less, if her position is to be that of equality in the Union, and has neither the power nor the disposition (so far as I am informed,) to demand anything more.

As to her *expectations*, the experience of the past and the declarations of purpose for the future by the dominant party, would indicate that *they* ought to be still more restricted. General Garfield, the President-elect, in a speech at Cleveland, Ohio, in October, 1879, (as reported by the press,) expressed himself as follows:

"I would clasp hands with those who fought against us, make them my brethren, and forgive all the past, only on one supreme condition: That it be admitted in practice, acknowledged in theory, that the cause for which we fought and you [his hearers] suffered, was, and is, and forevermore will be, right,—eternally right; and the cause for which *they* fought was, and forever will be, the cause of treason and wrong. Until that is acknowledged, my hand shall never grasp any rebel's hand across any chasm, however small."

In other words, General Garfield requires of us, as the "supreme" and indispensable condition of his amity, not merely a frank and full submission of the results of the war, but a theoretical and practical acknowledgement that the sword is infallable in determining questions of right, as well as of might, and that truth is always on the side of the heaviest artillery. He requires us to confess that we were traitors and malefactors, either wilfully and knowingly, or else "ignorantly in unbelief," like Saul of Tarsus, and in the latter case, that we have been converted, not by reason or light from heaven, but by the logic of the bayonet and the power of numbers. This is the ultimatum proposed by the President-elect, as the condition of his fellowship. If the vote of his party is to be taken as an endorsement of it, the case may be considered as closed. If we could accede to such terms, we should be unworthy of the fellowship of freedmen.

In the past fifty years almost as many railroads have been built in the United States as in all the rest of the world. With a population of fifty millions, this country owns about 85,000 miles of railroad against a population of Great Britain and Ireland of about thirty-five millions, and 18,000 miles of railroad, and against that of all Europe, with a population of 307,000,000, and less than 90,000 miles of railroad. These approximate figures point the epigram that American progress dominates the world's future.

The grain production of this country is enormous. With only a small portion of the available lands occupied, the yield of wheat in 1880, was 480,849,723 bushels; of corn, 1,537,535,490 bushels, and of the smaller cereals, including oats, rye and barley, such as to make the grand total aggregate 2,448,079,221 bushels.

The chief justice of Vermont decided the other day that drunkenness had never been held in that State a good cause for divorce under the statute, and refused to grant one on that ground.

THE COURTS.

REGULAR TERMS.

CIRCUIT COURT—SEVENTH DISTRICT.
JAMES S. HAMM, Judge.
THOMAS S. FORD, District Attorney.

Lauderdale county, second Monday in February and August, continuing 18 days.
Kemper county, first Monday in March and September, continuing 12 days.
Clarke county, third Monday in March and September, continuing 12 days.
Wayne county, first Monday in April and October, continuing 6 days.
Greene county, second Monday in April and October, continuing 6 days.
Perry county, third Monday in April and October, continuing 6 days.
Marion county, fourth Monday in April and October, continuing 6 days.
Hancock county, first Monday after the fourth Monday of April and October, continuing 12 days.
Harrison county, third Monday after the fourth Monday of April and October, continuing 6 days.
Jackson county, fourth Monday after fourth Monday of April and October, continuing 12 days.

CHANCERY COURT—7TH DISTRICT.

GEORGE WOOD, Chancellor.

Jackson county, first Monday of March and September, continuing 6 days.
Harrison county, second Monday in March and September, continuing 6 days.
Hancock county, third Monday in March and September, continuing 6 days.
Marion county, second Monday after the fourth Monday in March and September, continuing 6 days.
Perry county, first Monday after the 4th Monday in March and September, continuing 6 days.
Greene county, fourth Mondays in March and September, continuing 6 days.
Wayne county, fourth Monday after the fourth Monday of March and September, continuing 6 days.
Clarke county, first Monday in May and November, continuing 6 days.
Lauderdale county, third Monday of May and November, continuing 12 days.
Kemper county, second Monday in May November, continuing 6 days.
Monthly Rules of Chancery Court on the second Monday in each month.

MASONIC MEETINGS.

Pascagoula Lodge A. F. and A. M. No. 202—Meets at Moss Point the third Saturday night in each month.

H. L. Howze Chapter—Meets at Moss Point the third Wednesday in each month.