THE YAZOO WHIG AND POLITICAL REGISTER.

J. A. STEVENS, Editor and Proprietor. YAZOO CITY, (MI.) FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1840. VOL. 5, No. 14.—Whole No. 222.

Yazoo City Whig and Political Register,
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BY J. A. STEVENS,
(CITY PRINTER.)
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TERMS.—The Whig will be furnished to subscribers at $5 00 per annum in advance.

ADVERTISEMENTS will be inserted at the rate of $1 00 per square for the first insertion, and 50 cents for each week thereafter—ten lines or less, constituting a square. The number of insertions required, must be marked on the margin of the manuscript, or they will be inserted till forbid, and charged accordingly. Advertisements from a distance, must be accompanied with the CASH, or good reference in town. Announcing candidates for offices will be $10 for county offices, $10 for state offices—in advance.

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For 10 lines or less, not alterable, 3 months, $10
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TO THE PUBLIC.

The rights of editors and publishers of papers have been too long neglected. Justice will never be done unless themselves assert their rights and enforce the most rigid rules, which in the end will be found alike salutary to the public and beneficial to those engaged in the press. Publishers of papers have been so long imposed upon by the community at large, that they are considered to some extent a degraded class of beings, when in fact there is no vocation in life so honorable, deserving of so high consideration, productive of so much good, a class that exerts so powerful an influence. It is known to be proverbial for the debtors to newspaper publishers to consider their demands as the last to be paid—debts to which there is attached no moral obligation, and which they can refuse to pay with justice and honor: hence, it is incumbent upon the conductors of the press to assert their own rights, and resolve, severally and jointly, to bring all *patrons* of newspapers under the same obligations that attach to other contracts, or always remain in poverty and want, with thousands due them from the most solvent men in the country.

We call upon all editors and publishers of papers who approve of the following rules, to endorse them by their signatures—place them at the head of their papers, and strictly adhere to them.

1st. *No subscription received without payment in advance.*

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3d. Advance payment will be required from all transient advertisers.

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7th. Election tickets will not be printed without order, nor delivered to any person without payment.

8th. All subscribers, without respect to persons who are delinquents, on the first of October, will be stricken from the list, and their accounts put in suit.

The above rules, we, the undersigned, pledge ourselves to abide by.

Signed by all in the State.

SUNDAY MORNING ATLAS.

THIS weekly periodical has commenced giving a series of illustrations by the best artists in New York, called

PORTRAITS OF THE PEOPLE.

These are accompanied by graphic sketches of character. The price of the Atlas is only one dollar and fifty cents per annum, and for this small price subscribers will have yearly fifty-two splendid engravings, besides all the news of the week, Tales, Criticisms, Fun, Facetiæ, Humor, Wit, Spice, &c.

The great popularity which the Sunday Morning Atlas has acquired in the space of something less than one year, has induced its proprietors to incur, at great expense, this peculiar but interesting feature.

Two subscribers joining and sending a $3 bill, or subscribers at single dollar, and they will receive the paper for eight months.

Postmasters who obtain subscriptions are allowed one fourth of the subscription.

All subscriptions to be paid in advance, as no papers will be sent until the cash is received.

Country papers exchanging with us will please copy or notice this advertisement.

Office, No. 162 Nassau street, N. York.

May 1 HERRICK, WEST & ROPES

NOTICE.

THE subscribers have entered into copartnership here and in New Orleans for the purpose of transacting a GENERAL COMMISSION BUSINESS. The firm in this city will be McALISTER, WATSON & Co. and in New Orleans, DUNCANS, McALISTER & Co.

JOHN DUNCAN,
EDWARD DUNCAN,
SAMUEL T. McALISTER,
HENRY P. WATSON.

Natchez, July 7, 1840. July 24—3-4t

☞The Natchez Free Trader, Vicksburg Whig, Southern Sun, Grand Gulf Advertiser, Yazoo Whig, Woodville Republican and Fayette Advertiser, will publish the above for one month and send their accounts to this office for payment.

JOSEPH LALLANDE,
Commission Merchant,
NEW-ORLEANS.

Is prepared to make liberal advances on Cotton to his consignment.

Reference.—P. B. Pope, Yazoo City.

July 31, 1840. 4-3m.

THE WHIG & REGISTER.

FRIDAY, OCT. 16, 1840.

☞ Below will be found a very able and argumentary address delivered by Mr. R. Abbey, in this city, on the 3d inst. We recommend it to the attentive perusal of our readers.

YAZOO CITY, OCT. 5, 1840.

Mr. R. Abbey:

Dear Sir,—I beg leave to request of you, for publication, a copy of the very able address delivered by you in Yazoo City on the 3rd inst. In making the request, I am but expressing the wishes of the Club over which I have the honor to preside, and others with whom it has been the subject of conversation. Knowing your steady zeal for the cause, I am flattered with the hope that you will allow us to make use of a copy.

Respectfully yours,
Q. D. GIBBS, Pres't Y. C. Tip. Club.

YAZOO CITY, OCT. 7, 1840.

Q. D. Gibbs, Esq., Pres't &c.

Dear Sir,—I this morning received your note requesting a copy of the address which I delivered here on Saturday last.

If any efforts of mine (an humble and retired individual, whose employment is in the cotton field and not upon the arena of politics) can, in your opinion, favor the great cause of the people, in which they are now struggling, the enclosed copy of my remarks is at your service.

The thoughts embraced in it, were thrown together in anticipation of a direct argument on the subject with some Van Buren orator, which, however, did not take place, and the remarks were called forth, as you are aware, by request, at the meeting above alluded to.

Respectfully, your obd't serv't,
R. ABBEY.

FELLOW CITIZENS.

It is the belief of a very large portion of the people of this great republic that the peculiar liberties which we enjoy as a nation, and which are secured to us by the established institutions of the land, are in danger, either of being overthrown or so perverted as to render them nearly valueless for all practical purposes. This opinion is entitled to the respect, the consideration and the careful examination of every man, whatever may be his political views or predilections upon any of the contested questions of the day, because it is entertained and avowed by a respectable portion of our citizens, and amongst whom too are found some of our most experienced and patriotic statesmen. Narrow minded prdice, which must expose and confess its error, may shrink from this examination, but a man of understanding cannot.

I appear before you to day, my fellow citizens, to endeavor to point out some of the facts and circumstances upon which this belief of our exposure to the destructive shafts of political ambition is founded. And I hope that if I shall succeed in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt, in the mind of any man present, that these apprehensions have a foundation, that henceforth his influence and his efforts will be thrown into the scale of liberty and safety. For sir, you are one of the governors of the land and if you fail to discharge your duty as such, you are a public delinquent and may justly be arraigned at the bar of the people for failing to do that which in virtue of your citizenship you have solemnly promised to do.

Those who know my humble and unpretending condition in life may perhaps consider it a degree of boldness bordering upon presumption for me to undertake to face the best talents of a great and powerful party in political controversy; but sirs, you mistake the attitude in which I stand, and you appreciate not the power of the arm upon which I rely for sustenance and for success. I have invoked not the aid, (for I know I could not obtain it,) of the strength of talents or the power of oratory, no sirs, these are not mine to wield; but, I place my reliance upon the more sure and solid basis of the unconquered and unconquerable power of plain simple truth. Sword or armour, I could not wear, were they placed upon me, for, from my manner of life and occupation, I have not proved them; but sirs, I went to the brook and choose me out five smooth stones for my weapons to day—and here they are, (exhibiting the constitution.)

I think you gentlemen that David's success depended upon the muscular vigor of his right arm? No sirs. For to slay the champion of the great oppression, gave him six cubits and a span high he would have spurn ed he did fall. The great power of Shadrach dominerized before the world the power of truth, acknowledging generations have witnessed that although error may triumph for a season yet "TRUTH IS MIGHTY AND WILL PREVAIL."

I know full well sirs, that I may be opposed by talents and oratory and laborious research of no ordinary degree, yet what are these when brought into conflict with plain convincing statements of fact? I have got the testimony—the witnesses speak in my favour and the law is on my side.

I will have the candour gentlemen however, further to remark before you, that, to a very considerable degree I am a Van Buren man. That is to say, I accord with Mr. Van Buren in at least one of the most important principles which he ever avowed. In his famous Sherrod Williams letter of 1836, he lays down this doctrine: That the people in forming their political opinions and sentiments and in drawing their conclusions and preferences ought to place less confidence in the vague declarations and opinions of politicians—pay less attention to the beauty of declamation and the tinsel of oratory, and base their sentiments more upon "*ascertained facts.*" "Ascertained facts" he said, were vastley preferable, as aids to the common sense of men in the establishment of correct political principle, and the formation of true opinions, to the uncertain teachings of professional politicians. I subscribe to the doctrine. I go for the "ascertained facts."

And in my attempt to elucidate the subjects which I shall bring before you to day, if I do not use these facts to nail down upon the broad and solid platform of the constitution, and build up with "law and evidence," a superstructure impregnable to any attacks based upon reason and truth, then I shall fail of my undertaking.

The particular subject we are to notice is a measure of the administration commonly called the "*Standing army Bill.*"

And the attitude of the question is it now stands before the public requires that we first enquire whether Mr. Van Buren is in favour of or opposed to that measure. And if we find him in favour of it, we will arraign him and examine his principles as set forth in the Standing army plan itself.

Let us look a moment at its history.

It seems that near the close of the session of congress before the last, a request was made of the Secretary of War to make examination and report as to the defences of our principal sea ports.—That the Secretary in his anual Report next thereafter complies with the request and also as connected with the subject goes on to frame "a plan for the organisation of the militia of the United States." This, like all the *anual* Reports of the secretaries, was made to the President, and by him submitted to Congress in his annual Message, with such remarks and recommendations as he thought proper to make. The Report was dated on the 30th Nov. 1839, addressed—"TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES." The following extract from it contains the plan refered to, and, as has been certified by the clerk of the House of Representaiives, is all in the report which relates to the subject.

Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War dated November 30, 1839, accompanying the Message of the President of United States to the two Houses of Congress at the commencement of the 1st session the 26th Congress.

"The solicitude felt by you at the close of the last session of Congress, on the subject of the defences of the country on our maritime frontier, led to a still closer examination into their condition. They were found, as had been before stated, unfinished unarmed, and totally inadequate to protect the harbors they are intended to guard from the attacks of a comparatively small force. This conviction, forced upon my mind by the reports of the Chief Engineer, has since been confirmed, by personal inspection, in every instance where it has been in my power to visit the works. Our principal cities on the seabord are at this time exposed to be laid under contribution, and our navy yards to be destroyed, without the posibility of defending them. When the works now in progress in Boston harbor are finished, that place will be perfectly secure; and a small addition to those at Newport will deprive an enemy of that fine roadstead: but Portsmouth is entirely defenceless; Pensacola exposed, and the important city and harbor of New York are still very ineffectively protected, and will remain so even after all the works now in progress shall be completed and armed. It is obvious that the entrance of that harbor at the Narrows cannot be defended by the works on Long Island alone; but that the opposite shore; on Staten Island, must likewise be fortified. The State of New York, in whose possession the land still remains, has erected some works there which are so entirely inefficient that their existence, in their present condition, is calculated to deceive the ignorant, who might attempt their defence, and even afford facilities to an invading force in its efforts to enter the harbor. Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savanah, and the ports on the Gulf, all require further protection to render them safe from attack. In a report, preparing in reply to a resolution of the Senate, calling for information on this subject, I shall enter into all the details connected with it; but I cannot refrain from remarking here, that a due regard for the security and honor of the country requires that an effort should be made, with as little delay as possible, to place our exposed frontiers in a perfect state of defence. Intimately connected with this subject is the organization of volunteer corps in the immediate vicinity of the forts. The policy and even necessity of this measure has been stated in my preceding reports, and is almost too obvious to need repetition. Even under the former very defective system of keeping the regular forces in garrison within the forts along our whole line of frontier, they are insufficient for their defence. But if the army of the United States is to be rendered efficient, and its discipline preserved, it must be kept together in masses, and the garrison duty be performed by small detachments, aided, in case of need, by the neighboring militia. Accompanying this report is a separate detail of the number of troops required to man the forts upon the maritime and inland frontiers. These must be drawn chiefly from the People; and, to be effective in war, they must be drilled and taught their military duties in time of peace. A plan for this purpose was submitted to Congress in 1837, and again recommended the following year, but not acted upon. Having understood that the chief objection to its adoption consists in its being limited to a comparatively small body of men, and that it meets the desire of Congress as well as of the nation that a plan for the organization of the militia of the United States should emanate from this Department, I have thought it my duty to make the attempt; and, although I entered upon the task with reluctance and great diffidence I feel confident that the project herewith submitted is practicable, and that while it will diminish the burden of personal service now exacted from the citizen, it will ensure prompt and efficient application of the national force to the national defence.

"It is proposed to divide the United States into eight military districts, and to organize the militia in each district, so as to have a body of twelve thousand five hundred men in active service, and another of equal number as a reserve. This would give an armed militia force of two hundred thousand men, so drilled and stationed as to be ready to take their places in the ranks in defence of the country whenever called upon to oppose the enemy or repel the invader. The age of the recruit to be from twenty to thirty seven. The whole term of service to be eight years: four years in the first class, and four in the reserve. One fourth part (twenty-five thousand men) to leave the service every year, passing, at the conclusion of the first term, into the reserve, and exempted from ordinary militia duty altogether at the end of the second. In this manner twenty-five thousand men will be discharged from militia duty every year, and twenty-five thousand fresh recruits be received into the service. One fourth part of the militia, under certain regulation provided for their Government, be enrolled, and be mustered at long and stated intervals; for, in due process of time, nearly the whole mass of the militia will pass through the first and second classes, and be either members of the active corps or the reserve, or counted among the exempts, who will be liable to be called upon only in periods of invasion or imminent peril. The manner of enrolment, the number of days of service, and the rate of compensation ought to be fixed by law; but the details had better be left subject to regulation—a plan of which I am prepared to submit to you."

Three weeks after this report, containing the above plan relating to the militia, was submitted (viz.) on the 24th December 1839, the President sent his annual message to congress. Whether during that time from the 30th November to 24th December, Mr Van Buren saw, had any knowledge of or examined this plan for organizing the militia, and what his sentiments were in relation to it, may be satisfactorily ascertained from the following extract from his Message enclosing it to both Houses of Congress at the latter date.

"The present condition of the defences of our principle seaports and navy yards, as represented by the accompanying report of the Secretary of War, calls for the early and serious attention of Congress; and as connecting itself intimately with this subject, I cannot recommend too strongly to your consideration the plan submitted by that officer for the organization of the Militia of the United States."

The plan thus "submitted" to the President by the Secretary, and thus endorsed by him and transmitted to Congress, it will be observed, did not include or contain a list of "*details*" intended to be appended to it. They were ready to be furnished, the Secretry said, at the time the plan was furnished to the President, but he did not then furnish them. And in following up the history we find that on the 9th March 1840 the House of Representatives passed a Resolution "That the Secretary of War be requested to communicate *his plan, in detail,* for the reorganization of the militia of the United States." Mark the expression in the Resolution—'to communicate *his plan*'—one which they well knew existed, for they had already seen it, without the details. Accordingly on the 20th of the same month Mr. Poinsett sent the plan and the "*details*" to the speaker of the House of Representatives. And again on the 8th April 1840 the Secretary furnishes a communication to the Hon C. M. Keim, Chairman of the committee on the militia of the House of Representatives, in answer to one from him requesting a fuller statement of his views upon the same subject.

This, gentlemen, is the history of the Standing Army Bill, so far as it is set forth by the official records of Congress, excepting the action and report of the two Committees upon it which were adverse to the plan. And also excepting that the same plan, details and the draft of a Bill was furnished the militia Committee of the Senate by the War department early in the session.

It is now seen that the plan for the Standing Army, which was first sent to the President and by him recommended so highly and sent to Congress was the same which was afterwards sent by Mr Poinsett to Congress, except that the latter contained "details" which were not at first sent to Mr Van Buren.

One would suppose that the argument might stop here, so far as regards the question whether Mr. Van Buren did or did not recommend the measure. But it cannot, because Van Buren orators and the Van Buren presses all over the union have asserted, and are labouring to prove, that the President did not express himself favorable to the scheme. And Mr Van Buren himself, in a recent publication, although the above extract from his last annual message in words exact, he has acknowledged to be correctly copied, says that it might as well be infered that he was in favor of a menagerie of 200,000 wild beasts as a Standing Army of 200,000 men. So these arguments must be met.

Whether "*an armed militia force of two hundred thousand men, so drilled and stationed as to be ready to take their places in the ranks in defence of the country whenever called upon,* (the language of the plan,) constitutes *a Standing Army of two hundred thousand men,* I shall not stop to argue to day. Mr. Van Buren may think that it does not. But I should call such an army a pretty clever sized army.

When this measure went out into the world and received an examination from the people it brought back sad tidings for the party. The muttering thunder of indignation coming from all parts of the country, sounded terror in the ear of the President, and soon convinced the directors of the party that for once they had mistaken the people. What was to be done? It was seen and plainly seen, that the weight of its odium upon the shoulders of the President would most inevitably sink him into the narrowest corner of the ballot box in November. And it was soon determined as the only resort now left, to endeavor to save the President at the expense of the Secretary of War. The Secretary agreed to be the sacrafice, and we now see him in a certificate against himself, using the following language.

"The President concurred with me in opinion with regard to the importance of reorganizing the militia at this time, but had no agency in preparing the plan reported to Congress, and no previous knowledge of its details. It was prepared, as has already been stated, at the request of the Committee of the House of Representatives, expressed at the close of the last session, and reported to this Congress upon a call of the House, made directly upon the Secretary of War, and, as is usual in all such cases, sent to that body without being previously submitted to the President. With it or its details, therefore, he had nothing to do."

The testimony shows to the report to the House of Representatives of the 20th March 1840, and carefully avoids any allusion to his communication of the plan, less the "details" to the President, of the 30th November 1839. The former, so far as we are explicitly informed, was not seen by Mr. Van Buren prior to the making of the report, and certainly could not have been alluded to in his Message made three months previous. But the latter, certainly was "previously submitted to the President." The President, Mr. Poinsett says, "had no agency in preparing the plan reported *to Congress*" But I would ask Mr. Poinsett if he can say the same of the plan which he previously submitted to him? He does not attempt it.

The certificates of Mr. Secretary Poinsett and ten thousand newspaper articles and Van Buren speeches would not do. No, nor the refusal of the Senate to publish the plan in connection with a Report upon it by their own committee—all—all would not do. For the people continued to send up, wafted upon every breeze, protest after protest against what *they called the high handed federal measure.* One mighty effort more must be made. Virginia is already gone, a VOTING ARMY in opposition to a Standing Army! State after State is going—something must be done!!

In this perplexing dilema it was determined that the President himself must come into the field. Accordingly a committee of his friends in Virginia, in order to give him opportunity to vindicate himself upon this awful subject, propose to him a few political interogatories, and amongst which are the following.

"*Do you approve of Mr. Poinsett's "scheme for the organization of the militia."*

A reply to this question, one would suppose might be made in a monosyllable, but Mr. Van Buren writes several newspaper columns upon; and in the course of which he remarks as follows.

"Mr. Poinsett's uncontroverted account of the origin and progress of his plan is before you. He shows that it grew out of the request made of him by the Committee on the Militia of the House of Representatives, at the close of the session before the last, in contemplation of a possible collision between this country and Great Britain, and that it was matured and drawn forth under a call made upon him by the House at the last session. Some surprise has been express, and doubts appear even to be entertained of the correctness of his declaration, that the plan was not seen by me, or submitted to my consideration, before it was communicated to congress. Those who take that view of the subject, entirely overlook the fact, that such is almost invariable the case on all similar occasions, and that in replying to calls made upon them by either branch of the Legislature, the heads of Departments act for Congress, and not for the President, except only on occasions where his acts are brought in question."

This is most extraordinary indeed. It is humiliating that the President of the United States should find it necessary, in an elaborate scheme, to descend to such palpable deception. I call it palpable deception, because in the English language that *is* the proper name of it.

The committee ask in relation to "Mr. Poinsett's *scheme.*" They do not designate between the report made to him in November and that made to Congress in March, for so far as "Mr. Poinsett's *scheme* for the organization of the Militia" is concerned they are one and the same thing, except that the latter contained "details" for the execution of the plan which the other did not. But the President like the Secretary looses sight of the plan which he recommended in his Message and looks only to the Report from the War Department to Congress of 20th March.

Well, let Mr. Van Buren have his own way in understanding and in answering the question of the Virginia Committee. We will hold him responsible, so far as the recommendation in his Message goes, not for the Report made to *him.* What was *that* report? Did that propose a Standing Army or did it not? And did Mr. Van Buren recommend that, or did he not?

The Free Trader of Natchez, the leading Van Buren Paper in Mississippi, of 10th September last informs us precisely what Mr. Van Buren did recommend. It speaks as follows.

The following extracts will show how much of the plan of Mr. Poinsett was submitted to Mr. Van Buren, and what it was that he recommended to the consideration of Congress. The attempt to prove Mr. Van Buren guilty of falsehood in stating that the report of Poinsett was not submitted to him, has signally failed. In the annual report of the Secretary of War, he speaks of the outlines of a plan which he was preparing for Congress in obedience to its call. All of the annual report referring to the subject is copied below, while the plan itself as submitted some three months afterwards would fill several colums.—Those who still doubt, we refer to the annual report of the Secretary of War, to see for themselves what it was that Mr. Van Buren recommended for consideration; and also see by the date of the plan itself that it was not reported to Congress until after the middle of March.

From MR. VAN BUREN'S *Annual Message, dated December 2, 1839.*

1. "The present condition of the defences of our principal seaports and navy yards, as represented by the accompanying report of the Secretary of War, calls for the early and serious attention of Congress; and as connecting itself intimately with this subject, I cannot too strongly recommend to your consideration the plan submitted by that officer for the organization of the militia of the United States."

2. "The reports from the *War,* Navy, and Post Office Departments, will accompany this communication, and one from the Treasury Department will be presented to Congress in a few days."

From MR. POINSETT'S *Report from the War Department, dated November 30, 1839.*

3. "It is proposed to divide the United States in eight military districts, and to organize the militia in each district, so as to have a body of twelve thousand five hundred men in active service; and another of equal number as a reserve. This would give an armed militia force of two hundred thousand men, so drilled and stationed, so as to be ready to take their places in the ranks in defence of the country, whenever called upon to oppose the enemy or repel the invader. The age of the recruit to be from twenty to thirty-seven. The whole term of service to be eight years; four years in the first class, and four in the reserve. One fourth part, twenty-five thousand men, to leave the service every year, passing, at the conclusion of the first term, into the reserve, and exempted from ordinary military duty altogether, at the end of the second. In this manner, twenty-five thousand men will be discharged from military duty every year, and twenty-five thousand fresh recruits be received into the service. It will be sufficient for all useful purposes, that the remainder of the militia, under certain regulations provided for their government, be enrolled and be mustered at long and stated intervals; for in due process of time, nearly the whole mass of the militia will pass through the first and second classes and be either members of the active corps or reserve, or counted among the exempts, who will be liable to be called upon only in periods of invasion or imminent peril. The manner of enrolment, the number of days of service, and the rate of compensation ought to be fixed by law; but the details had better be left subject to regulation; a plan of which I am prepared to submit to you."

Here gentlemen is the whole argument conceded. Here is all that I contend for, as being recommended in his Message. This is what the President calls "the *Plan submitted by that officer,* (the Secretary of War) and which he could not "recommend too strongly." This is conclusive.

But there is another feature in the argument which must be noticed. Mr. Clay of Alabama, an honorable Senator in Congress, and Chairman of the committee on the Militia, in trying to whitewash high evidence of federalism exposes a degree of stupidity, or of something less honorable that I did not believe had an abode in that august body. He says that the President's recommendation of Mr. Poinsett's plan contained in his Message, as I have twice read, was merely to the consideration of Congress, and not for their adoption. And that there is a manifest difference between the two. The one merely recommends that Congress consider the measure while a recommendation of a measure for their adoption only, would carry the President's sanction with it. (I quote from memory not pretending to give his language precisely.) And now all over the country we find here another and there an orator enough of a large organism to mount the same argument.

Let me inform these intelligent gentlemen that in this country, the President has nothing to do with legislation. To recommend a measure for the adoption of Congress would be, in any President, a gross and palpable violation of the laws of the Constitution. The kind of a recommendation which Mr. Van Buren gave this Standing Army "*Plan*" is precisely the kind authorized and directed in the Constitution, and the only kind which he dare evince of any measure.

Let us look at the Constitution and see.—Art. 2nd Sec. 3. "He (the President) shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."

Mr. Van Buren complied with the constitution, he recommended the Army "Plan" to the consideration of Congress, and intimated as high as propriety would allow, its adoption. Poinsett and Van Buren both knew that the Secretary had made a "Plan" for a Standing Army, and the solemn security of an oath from the President assures us that he did believe that the "Plan" in question, of which he then spoke, and