

DEPARTURE OF TRAINS.

Arrival and Departure of Trains. Mail from the east arrives at 4 p. m.; leaves at 11:45 a. m. ...

RAILWAY TIME TABLE.

Through passenger train leaves Devils Lake, at 11:45 a. m. ...

STEAMBOAT TIME TABLE.

Leaves Devils Lake for Fort Totten, daily at 9 a. m. ...

OFFICIALS.

County Commissioners—E. V. Barton, Chairman, H. H. Rager, A. B. Allen, J. A. ...

CHURCHES.

Wesleyan Methodist Church—Rev. C. O. Converse, Services every Sunday at 11 a. m. ...

LODGES.

Creighton Lodge No. 16, I. O. O. F. Meets every Saturday at 8 o'clock p. m. ...

ARCTIC WORK.

Brief History of Two Remarkable Expeditions.

Chief Signal Officer W. B. Hazen has made the following report to the Secretary of War on the history and progress of Arctic exploration. We are indebted to Lieut. Glas, of the United States signal corps, Fort Totten, for a copy of the report. It is interesting in being an accurate and official statement concerning the Greely expedition, which reads like the tragedy that it was.

The two Arctic expeditions, which were a part of an international series about the pole, in which many governments participated, have terminated. That at Point Barrow under Lieutenant Ray having been abandoned as directed from this office, it arrived at San Francisco, October 7, 1883. Lieutenant Ray's prescribed work during the whole two years has been efficiently performed, in exact accordance with his instructions, and he reports that he had no man sick a single day during the entire period; that their duty there was wholesome and pleasant, and without suffering from cold. His full report will soon be completed.

I will briefly outline the expedition to Lady Franklin bay. The general plan received the signature of the president the 28th of April, and the expedition was established by act of congress approved May 1, 1880. It contemplated sending one ship with a small party and three years' provisions to be left at their station, and that the ship should then be discharged.

This was to be followed by a supply ship the next season, 1882, and by a relief ship the second summer, and in case it did not reach the station, the party was to establish a depot and quarters for the winter at Littleton island, with sufficient supplies for both parties, and remain there, and not later than September 1, Lieutenant Greely, the Arctic commander, with his party, was to begin his retreat and join them for the winter. This would require sending a ship to Littleton island the fourth year.

Before Lieutenant Greely's departure from Washington I determined upon a general plan for carrying out this work, after full consultation with him, including a plan for the guidance of two proposed expeditions to sail in 1882 and 1883 respectively. His general outfit was the most complete in all respects ever sent into the Arctic seas, and was the result of very careful and comprehensive study.

After arriving at his station Lieutenant Greely wrote out what he deemed a more complete plan for his relief, and forwarded it to me, earnestly recommending its adoption. In its support he used the following language: "Such action, from advice, experience and observation, seems to me all that can be done to insure our safety. No deviation from these instructions should be permitted." I regarded that plan as authoritative, coming, as it did, from an officer possessing peculiar means of knowledge, charged with the performance of hazardous duties in an almost unknown field of operations, and prominently endowed with the qualifications that should challenge respect for his judgment in such a matter, and it had the weight of being of necessity the prearranged plan, the violation of which on my part nothing could excuse. I still hold that, in view of all probable emergencies, it was the wisest plan that could possibly have been adopted.

The steam sealer Neptune was dispatched in 1882 with a proper relief party and adequate supplies, in charge of W. M. Beebe, Jr., of the general service of the army, but failed to reach the

station because of impassable ice barriers. After watching for an opening through the solid ice of Smith's sound and Kane's sea until the navigable season in that latitude had nearly closed and discovering none, the expedition made caches of supplies at the most northerly points of land that it attained and then returned to St. Johns.

The steam sealer Proteus, of St. Johns, was chartered by me as the relief ship for 1883. The vessel had borne Lieutenant Greely to his station in 1881, and he had afterwards highly commended her and her captain as in all respects well qualified for that duty. The plan of this relief expedition was submitted by me to the secretary of war for his approval as early as November 1, 1882.

In the first paragraph of my letter enclosing the same I wrote as follows: "I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of plan for relief expedition of next year for the Arctic party at Lady Franklin bay, which plan Lieutenant Greely wished followed in the event of a failure to reach him this year. This seems to leave us only to follow his plans." That plan was returned to me without any dissent as to its essential features, but with the suggestion "that it would be much desirable to endeavor to procure from the navy the persons who are needed for this relief party."

My views as to such suggestion were requested, and as they were furnished I presumed that they were satisfactory, as it was not insisted on. As a measure of precaution the secretary of war, on my special application, requested the navy department to detail a suitable vessel of the navy to accompany the relief ship as far north as Littleton island. The steamship Yantic, Commander Frank Wildes, U. S. Navy, was accordingly assigned to that duty. She was placed in dock and heavily sheathed with oak planking, and her battery and ordnance stores landed, and it was believed that she was in all respects thoroughly equipped for that special service. In view of the possible destruction of the Proteus, Commander Wildes was ordered to proceed as far north as practicable, in order to afford succor to her officers and crew in the event of such an accident, and he was directed to proceed northward through Davis straits, in company with the Proteus if practicable, but not to enter the ice pack or proceed beyond Littleton island.

Lieut. E. A. Garlington, 7th Cavalry, U. S. Army, was assigned to the command of the relief party by order of the secretary of war, he having volunteered, and being recommended as a suitable officer for that service by the general commanding the department of Dakota, where he had been stationed for several years. Lieutenant Garlington's instructions embodied the plan of Lieutenant Greely, and he was ordered to follow it closely. He was informed that he would be accompanied by a ship of the United States navy, the Yantic, as far as Littleton island, to render him such aid as might become necessary and as might be determined by the captain of that ship and himself when on the spot.

The relief expedition, consisting of those vessels, sailed from St. Johns in company on June 29 and voluntarily separated on the same day, the Proteus on her arrival at Godhavn being five days in advance of the Yantic. They were again in company at the last named point on July 12, and remained together there until July 16, when the Proteus again proceeded northward alone, and seven days later was crushed in the ice pack of Smith's sound and sunk with nearly all her stores. At the time of the sinking of the Proteus off Cape Sabine, on July 23, the Yantic, that was ordered to be at Littleton island, if practicable, to meet just such an emergency, the designated reserve ship of the expedition, was distant from Littleton island more than 1000 miles.

Lieutenant Garlington, on the day succeeding the wreck, proceeded with the relief party to Life Boat cove, near Littleton island, and without halting to await the arrival of his reserve ship, set out at once southward in small boats, carrying off with him full rations for thirty-seven men, for forty days at least, being three-fourths of the provisions saved from the wreck, leaving less than one-fourth cached for Greely and his party of twenty-five at Cape Sabine.

Lieutenant Garlington and party boarded the Yantic at Upernivik on September 2. She had arrived at Littleton island on August 3, only five days after the relief party had left that vicinity, and started southward on the same day, without leaving one ration out of her superabundant stores for Lieutenant Greely and his party. The Yantic returned to St. Johns on September 13.

This abandonment of Lieutenant Greely and his party to probable starvation by officers whose only mission in those waters was to succor them displayed a lamentable disregard of grave responsibilities. When the convoy was met it was but three days steaming from Littleton island, fully stored with supplies out of which ample provision for Lieutenant Greely and the relieving party could have been made, supplemented by those on board, and it was comparatively in the early season. Yet the convoy did not return to leave succor, nor did the commander of the relief, Lieutenant Garlington, demand it.

Immediately upon the return of the ships to St. Johns this bureau did all in its power to have other ships at once sent from that point, but was unsuccessful, after having been assured that it would be done. It is now almost certain that had any of these steps been

taken loss of life and disaster would have been averted, and the cost of a ship from St. Johns last autumn would have been but a small part of the expense of the final relief.

This bureau endeavored to place the relief party upon the theater of action with the best possible ships and equipment, at the most timely season, so that it might be unhampered except by the necessary general plan that both parties must work upon, and with the fullest opportunity and freedom to accomplish its purpose. So far as it was possible this was done.

Lieutenant Greely carried out his instructions literally, as this board had also carried out the prearranged plan. Leaving his station within the prescribed time, he brought his party, records and instruments for final comparison to Cape Sabine, in its retreat without loss, all in sound health and under wholesome discipline.

Landing at Baird inlet on September 29th, after having been adrift for a month in the ice-pack of Kane's sea and Smith's sound, Lieutenant Greely found himself in a desperate condition; he had at that time one boat and about twenty days' rations. Upon the return of two men sent to Cape Sabine he learned of the loss of the Proteus, and ascertained that some stores were cached in that vicinity. In like manner he found one hundred and fifty pounds of English meat at Cape Isabella. Abandoning the winter quarters which had been built in the meantime he moved his party to Camp Clay, about four miles northwest of Cape Sabine, on the shore of Buchanan strait, where the cache of stores from the Proteus had been made.

This point was reached October 15, 1883, when but ten days sunlight remained. On examining the stores Lieutenant Greely found two hundred and fifty rations in the English cache at Payer harbor in bad condition (except the beef), and two hundred and fifty rations in good order at the so-called Beebe cache. In the wreck cache left by Lieutenant Garlington were found five hundred rations of bread, about one hundred rations of meat, a few canned vegetables and a large quantity of tea. At Cape Sabine, abandoned by Captain Pike, was found a quantity of tea and about three hundred pounds of bread. No other provisions of any kind were to be found. Considerable clothing was found cached both at Sabine and Camp Clay, but it had been badly damaged by foxes and bears.

By November 1 winter quarters had been built and all caches and articles gathered at Camp Clay. A hunting party was sent out after seal and camped in Rice's straits. By November 12 (at which time the sun had been gone seventeen days) the hunting party had returned with two small seals, and the party sent to Isabella for the English meat there had been brought back, having been obliged to abandon the meat and the gin in Baird inlet owing to the complete disability by freezing of one of the men. From the 1st of November the party was put on a ration of about fourteen ounces, of which less than five ounces was meat. The plan adopted by Lieutenant Greely contemplated this ration until March 1, when the remaining provisions would give an increased ration for ten days, during which he hoped to reach Littleton island. At that date his party was still intact, with the exception of one who died of scurvy in January. Lieutenant Greely had, however, learned early in February that Smith's sound was yet open, a condition of affairs which continued during the entire winter and spring. The ration being reduced still further, four of the party died from insufficient nutriment during the early part of April, while another perished in an attempt to procure the meat abandoned at Baird inlet the preceding November. Twenty-five foxes and about sixty birds were killed during the winter and spring, which materially assisted in sustaining life. In the middle of the month of April a small bear and young seal were killed, and rendered possible a slightly increased ration and prevented further immediate deaths. About the middle of May the last food was issued and deaths again commenced. From about the middle of March the ration was supplemented by minute sea shrimps, which were caught in a tidal crack, and later by saxifrage and lichens which, with seal-skin from clothes and sleeping bags, formed the supply of food from the middle of May. By June 18 but seven days of the party remained alive, the rest having perished by starvation, except Eskimo Jens Edward, who was drowned, and Private Henry, who was executed by order of Lieutenant Greely for repeated thefts of food. From the middle of April Lieutenant Greely's party looked with longing hope toward Littleton island, trusting that relief would come from that quarter. From that time forward a broad channel, free from ice, existed in Smith's sound, which could have been crossed by strong men, but was utterly impassable for Lieutenant Greely's party, enfeebled and diminished as it was by months of starvation.

Preparations for the rescue this season were timely, the plan being carefully elaborated by a board of officers of the army and navy, at which the chief signal officer presided. The expedition sailed from New York in three ships, the Thetis, Bear and Alert, the latter having been given to the United States by the queen of England for the purpose, about the 1st of May, under Commander W. S. Schley, of the navy, reaching Cape Sabine the 22d of June, effecting the rescue of the seven survivors, and returning to the United States, reaching Portsmouth, New

Hampshire, the 1st day of August, and, with the exception of weakness, all in good health. Sergeant Ellison, who was frozen in an attempt to secure the provisions cached at Isabella, died on the home passage, July 6, after suffering amputation of all his limbs. The work of rescue under Commander Schley was most praiseworthy and successful.

Up to the return of the expedition this year I had hoped there would be no occasion for raising the question of blame at this or any future time. But new light has been cast upon the subject, and with it my duty becomes plain, and the truth of history, and justice to all, calls for such impartial inquiry and authoritative judgment as a tribunal broad enough to embrace the whole question shall institute and pronounce, and the congress of the United States is manifestly such tribunal.

The international polar expedition was organized and set in motion by the direct order of the president of the United States, pursuant to the authority vested in him by an act of congress. Its progress and achievements have commanded the attention and challenged the admiration of foreign countries and reflected new lustre upon our own.

The magnitude of those achievements has only been paralleled by the disaster in which it terminated. That such disaster could have been averted, and that it was in respect due to the commander of that expedition, can be established by indubitable evidence. The causes that co-operated to produce a tragedy, that has unparalleled in the world, and the responsibility for such dire result, can be traced with certainty.

I therefore trust that this whole matter of the Lady Franklin bay expedition, and the expeditions organized for its relief, will be deemed worthy of a thorough investigation by congress—a body that will perform its duty and stand above the suspicion of being swayed by partisan considerations.

This expedition will stand among the foremost of its kind. It carried its work farther north than any other. It gained detailed geographical knowledge of greater breadth in that region than any other. It brought back more complete data upon physical problems than any other. It dispelled the myths and superstitions of Arctic living, and completed in a masterly way all the services it was sent to do, in the exact manner as it was arranged, having made a clear addition to the sum of human knowledge, and returned to the place of rendezvous intact and perfect, and it is proper that the fault of failure afterwards be fully understood. Both Lieutenant Greely, in the Arctic, and the signal bureau, in Washington, carried out their parts of the prearranged plan of rescue literally and successfully in every particular. This plan seemed to be a good one and Lieutenant Greely reiterated it after reaching his station and seeing what he wanted, and it proved to be good.

The sinking of the Proteus, which terminated this success, which to that time was complete and faultless, was an accident for which there may or may not have been blame. But means to substantially restore the losses so incurred had been provided and were at hand. The Proteus was the best ship with the best captain for the purpose to be had, both being the same employed by Lieutenant Greely in 1881, and she was very perfectly supplied and well equipped. She was sent at the exact season then believed to be the best for the fullest chances of success, and she was accustomed to Arctic navigation. But when she sank the full responsibility for what followed rested with those on the spot, and it becomes necessary, in the fuller lights, to discuss it, that censure may not be misplaced. Besides the duty that necessarily reposed in the commander present, Lieutenant Garlington's orders read: "A ship of the United States navy, the Yantic, will accompany you as far as Littleton island rendering you such aid as may become necessary and as may be determined by the captain of that ship and yourself, when on the spot." This was all any commander so situated, imbued with a just appreciation of his duties and responsibilities, could wish.

Lieutenant Garlington failed when at Cape Sabine, July 22, to replace the spoiled parts of the cache of food previously left at Cape Sabine, as he was ordered in his instructions to do. Lieutenant Greely says of this in a letter written by him for the chief signal officer, April 30, supposing himself at the point of death, "Had Lieutenant Garlington carried out your orders and replaced the 240 rations rum and 120 alcohol in English cache here, and the 210 pounds mouldy English bread, spoiled English chocolate and potatoes, mouldy sugar, and the 210 pounds rotten dog biscuit we would without doubt be saved." Lieutenant Garlington saved from the wreck about 2100 rations, they being but a part of those put upon the ice and could have been saved, which he landed at Cape Sabine. These rations for Lieutenant Greely's party were priceless; they were worth many human lives. Of these rations he left for them about one-fourth part, and of this but about 150 pounds of meat, taking the remainder away in his boats for his own use; seeming only to limit the quantity taken by the capacity of his boats, when his men were strong and well, in the summer season, had suffered no hardships, were abundantly supplied with guns and ammunition, in a region full of game and walrus, in the neighborhood of the friendly Esquimaux, and with their faces set towards plenty. A proper appreciation of a sacred duty and of his obligation to his trust and to Lieutenant Greely would have shown

high that two-thirds of these stores ought to have been left, and had this been done Lieutenant Greely says his party "would all have been saved." With one-third of the rations taken away and other resources at hand, the retreating party would have been reasonably safe. Besides, the food improvidently used and wasted, used for fuel, used to feed to repletion a dog and left to waste in his camps would have saved human lives at Camp Clay.

On reaching Littleton island it was found that its shores were literally lined with walrus, while there were in the hands of the party fifteen guns and some 4000 or 5000 rounds of ammunition; a better supply than any expedition ever before had in those regions. There is scarcely any room for doubt that in a few days the party could have killed and packed in the snow, as is often done with fresh meat in the north, walrus meat with stores in caches in the vicinity and saved from the Proteus to have supplied the combined party of Lieutenants Garlington and Greely a wholesome and abundant ration for a year.

Lieutenant Ray says that at Point Barrow, under like circumstances, his party killed walrus enough in one day to have supplied his party a year. Lieutenant Garlington reports that he left Littleton island with his party for the south for the purpose of finding the escort ship and returning with it supplies for Lieutenant Greely. But when he did reach it, only three days steaming away from Littleton island, he returned, while she had on board, as also had Governor Elborg at Upernivik, ample food available for this purpose.

The order of the secretary of the navy to the captain of the escort ship gave him latitude to remain at Littleton island until near the close of the season, about September 30, yet with a full knowledge of the distressing condition Lieutenant Greely would find himself in, and the whole plan of his rescue being familiar to him, he turned southward at once, a month earlier than required by the season, leaving nothing for Lieutenant Greely, and so intent was he to get south that he appears to have had the intention of leaving Lieutenant Garlington's party behind if not found in his path. The tone of this officer's utterances upon these subjects have impressed me with a want of efficient effort or intent on his part to perform his duties, disqualifying him for their loyal performance.

No language could be more just, and yet more severe, than that addressed by the secretary of the navy to Commander Wildes, after that officer had written a supplementary report to justify his conduct. I beg leave to cite the letter of the secretary of the navy as follows: "WASHINGTON, Nov. 2, 1883. The receipt of your letter of October 16 is acknowledged. In the present aspect of the case the department condemns (1) the agreement entered into with the captain of the Proteus for the separation of the Yantic and the Proteus until August 25; (2) the failure to accompany the Proteus from Disco Island after you had there rejoined her; (3) your unnecessary visit to Upernivik on July 25 to inquire of the Danish authorities how the ice was probably moving between yourself and the Proteus, the six days of your delay at which point would have brought you to Littleton island before the party of the Proteus went south; and (4) your failure, when you found at Littleton island that the demoralized party of the Proteus and some others in search of the Swedish steamer Sofia at Cape York, to land materials for a habitation, clothing and food for the forgotten Greely party. What action, if any, will be taken by the department has not yet been determined. Very respectfully, W. A. CRAWFORD, Secretary of the Navy. Com. Frank Wildes, U. S. Navy, Commander U. S. S. Yantic, Navy Yard, New York.

On the return of the escort ship, bringing the relief party to St. Johns, September 13, there was still time, as known from previous experience and shown by subsequent facts, to send effective relief, and my six telegrams from Washington territory, where I then happened to be, attest the earnestness of my efforts to have this done. Besides this, Captain Melville and others volunteered to go, giving their full plans for the relief.

There is scarcely a doubt that had this been done, the party would have been reasonably safe. Besides, the food improvidently used and wasted, used for fuel, used to feed to repletion a dog and left to waste in his camps would have saved human lives at Camp Clay.

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Weather Statistics.

Following is an official record of the weather from observations and readings on file at Ft. Totten for the past three years:

Table with columns: Year, Month, High, Low, Mean, Rain, etc. for 1882-1884.

Table with columns: Year, Month, High, Low, Mean, Rain, etc. for 1883.

Table with columns: Year, Month, High, Low, Mean, Rain, etc. for 1884.

The dash (-), where used above, means below zero. METEOROLOGICAL RECORD—THERMOMETERS.

Table with columns: Year, Month, Highest, Lowest, etc. for 1874-1884.

Table with columns: Year, Month, Last Below Zero, First Below Zero, etc. for 1874-1884.

The figures in the four right-hand columns indicate the degree of temperature.

The winter of 1877-78 was very remarkable. December 1 was 12° below zero, the 5th was 23° below, and it was not below again during the month. January eleven days below zero; the coldest were the 5th and 6th, 23° below; the 20th and 21st were 37° below; the 28th was 38° above and it was not below again during the winter. February 4, 5, 21 and 29 were 46° above zero.

MONTHLY SUMMARY SINCE JUNE 9, 1884.

Table with columns: Mean barometer, Highest barometer, Lowest barometer, Range of barometer, Range of temperature, etc.

Direction of wind, Prevailing direction, Cloudy or rainy days, etc.

Mustard and Love.

"Why, darling," he said, as she drew back from his proffered embrace, "what have I done that you should treat me so coldly? Have I offended you in any way?"

"No, George," she replied uneasily, "my love for you remains undiminished, but to-night, dear, I cannot occupy my accustomed seat. Do not ask me why. Have perfect faith in me, and some day, when we are married and shall have grown old together, I may tell you why I could not sit on your knee, to-night. But not now, not now."

But George wasn't satisfied. A haunting fear came over him; he dreaded he knew not what, and for a moment he wrestled mightily with his despair. "Nay, dearest," he insisted. "You must tell me why you act thus so strangely. As your future husband I have a right to know. There should be no secrets between us now."

"Ah, George," she said, blushing painfully, "if you insist upon knowing I will tell you, but I hoped that you would spare me. I was out in the wet to-day and caught a slight cold, and—and the doctor ordered a mustard plaster on my back."

LANDS AND HOMES FOR THE MILLIONS.

CITY OF DEVILS LAKE RAMSEY COUNTY, DAK.

Situated on the north shore of Devils Lake, the only salt water lake in the Northern States or Territories. The delightful climate, with its pure, invigorating atmosphere, and the medicinal qualities of the water of the lake, make it the most pleasant, and beautiful

Summer Resort

WATERING PLACE IN THE NORTH.

Over \$150,000 worth of city lots have already been sold, and notwithstanding the city continues to have a steady, vigorous and substantial growth.

THE TERMINUS OF THE

St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway

The ONLY point on Devils Lake touched by rail, and the Great Supply Depot of the Devils Lake, Turtle Mountain and Mouse River Trade. The County Seat of Ramsey County is located here, also the U. S. Land Office with

NINE MILLION ACRES

of unenclosed Wheat, Stock, Timber and Coal Lands, capable of furnishing

HEALTHFUL AND PROSPEROUS HOMES,

For Millions of Industrious and Intelligent People,

FREE TO ALL.

Being established by a steady, industrious, intelligent class of people, Churches and Schools have already been settled and the country is fast becoming a Land of Churches and Schools.

MINNEWAUKON,

THE NEW TOWN

PLATTED AT THE

West End of Devils Lake,

Being jointly owned by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and a syndicate, will be placed on sale at the office of

Nickens, Wilbur & Nichols,

JAMESTOWN, D. T.

Thursday, Oct. 25, 1883.

For prices, plats and information address

D. L. WILBUR,

TRUSTEE FOR SYNDICATE, Jamestown, D. T.

GENERAL LAND AGENT

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD, St. Paul, Minn.

Contractor & Builder.

All kinds of Work Done to Order.

Plans, Specifications, and Elevations of Public and all other Buildings furnished on short notice.

Charges Reasonable

DRAFTING A SPECIALTY. OFFICE AT THE BROOKS HOUSE.

Contractor, Carpenter

Builder.

REPAIR SHOP and CABINET FACTORY, Rear of Post Office, Corner Arnold ave. and Fourth st., Devils Lake, D. T.

B. F. SHANLEY,

Contractor and Builder, DEVILS LAKE, DAKOTA.

Plans and Specifications

Furnished on Short Notice. Leave orders at the Benham House, or address through the Postoffice.

B. F. SHANLEY,

DEVILS LAKE, DAKOTA.

SHERMAN HOUSE

ST JOHN, Turtle Mountain, D. T.

JOSEPH COUTURE, Prop'r.

The leading hotel at the east end of the Turtle Mountain. Good rooms and the table well supplied. Commercial men and tourists accommodated. Give me a trial. JOSEPH COUTURE.

G. W. JAMIESON

Has in stock a full line of

Harness, Saddles,

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