

Dec. 4. Judge Strange was elected U. S. Senator in place of W. P. Mangum resigned, by a majority of 3 votes.

Monday Dec. 5. A bill passed its third reading to emancipate the children of a freedman of color, ages 68, nos 39. A bill was reported from the committee on revised Statutes to ascertain the mode of proving book accounts.

LEGISLATURE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.—The candidates for the office of President in the Senate, were Patrick Noble and Angus Patterson. On the first ballot, there was a tie; on the second the majority for Noble was 6.

In the House of Representatives the candidates for Speaker were R. L. Wardlaw, F. W. Davis and D. J. McCord. After the first balloting McCord was withdrawn, and on the next, Wardlaw was elected.

A resolution has been passed to fit up a room in the State House for the Court of Appeals. Leave of temporary absence from the State has been granted to Judge Earle and Judge Gant. Petitions have been presented to amend the charter of Cheraw, and for a Bank in George Town.

A bill is before Senate, introduced by Col. Gregg, so to amend the judiciary act of last year, so to make a majority of the judges a quorum, and allow a judge to have a voice in deciding a case tried before him in the court below. And also a bill to transfer the jurisdiction of the Court of Ordinary to the Court of Chancery. A special joint committee has been appointed on the great Rail Road. The joint committee on printing have reported a contract with S. Weir, as printer to the House for \$1500, and with A. S. Johnston for Senate at \$1300.—A bill is before the House, which among other things, provides for making the prison limits co-extensive with the District; and for foreclosing mortgages on real estate without application to court. A petition has been presented and referred to the medical committee to legalize Thomsonian quackery.

A proposition is before the House to remove the seat of Government from Columbia to Charles on; which is said to be favored by some of the up country members, on account of the high price of board in Columbia. A bill has been reported to receive the State's share of the surplus revenue, and add it to the capital of the Bank of the State, according to the Governor's recommendation. A bill has been introduced by Mr. Thompson of Spartanburg, to give the election of Tax Collectors to the people. The committee on the judiciary are ordered on motion of Messrs. Dudley and Middleton, to inquire into the expediency of establishing a Court of Equity in Marlboro' and Chesfield. A resolution of enquiry into the expediency of remodeling the Court of Appeals has been adopted. A bill has been introduced to raise the pay of jurors to \$2.

COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE.—On Privileges and Elections—Messrs. Patterson, Gregg, Weson, Lawton, Poinsett, Pinckney, Henegan, Scott, Cannon, Chesnut, Dubose.

On Finance—Messrs. Higgins, Bryan, R. F. W. Alston, Goodwyn, Glover.

On Claims—Messrs. De Treville, Frampton, Gourdin, Koger, Smar, T. P. Alston, Ellerbe.

On the Judiciary—Messrs. Gregg, Patterson, De Treville, Bauskett, Massey, Higgins, Ellerbe.

On Roads, Bridges and Ferries—Messrs. Beatty, Koger, Walker, R. F. Simpson, White.

On the Military—Messrs. Goodwyn, Hamilton, Caughman, Peay, Norris, Bryan, De Treville.

On Accounts—Messrs. Glover, Littlejohn, Scott, Evans, Pool.

On Grievances—Messrs. Koger, Dugan, Pool, Sone, Mims.

On Internal Improvement—Messrs. Simpson, Caughman, Jenkins, Walker, Danovant.

On Incorporations—Messrs. Patterson, Pinckney, Glover, Poinsett, Frampton.

On Pensions—Messrs. Evans, Danovant, Wilson, Chesnut, Peay.

On Public Buildings—Messrs. Basket, Dubose, Jenkins, Koger, Weston.

On Schools—Messrs. Poinsett, Patterson, Cannon, White, Wilson.

On the South Carolina College—Messrs. Gregg, Goodwyn, Beatty, De Treville, Simmons.

On Vacant Offices—Messrs. Dugan, Littlejohn, Wilson, Cannon, Duran.

On Lands—Messrs. R. F. W. Alston, Bryan, T. P. Alston, Henegan, Basket.

On Religion—Messrs. Sone, Massey, Norris, Duran, Mims.

On Engrossed Bills—Messrs. Simmons, White, Evans, Smar, Norris.

On Agriculture—Messrs. Wilson, Frampton, Chesnut, Lawton, Gourdin.

On Lunatic Asylum—Messrs. Gregg, Caughman, Glover, Peay, Pool.

On Legislative Library—Messrs. T. P. Alston, Danovant, Goodwyn.

On Federal Relations—Messrs. Hamilton, Patterson, R. F. W. Alston, Pinckney, Beatty, Basket, Ellerbe.

On Medical Accounts—Messrs. Danovant, Goodwyn, Simmons, Henegan, Weston.

F. W. Symmes, Charles Edmondston, Ker Boyce, Otis Mills, P. A. Porcher, A. B. Arnold, Thos. E. Powe, John Wilson Lewis J. Patterson.

Committee on Federal Relations.—D. J. McCord, Max. Laborde, Richard Yeadon, jr. F. W. Davis, B. F. Perry, A. H. Bellin, J. H. Irby, J. L. Pettigru, J. T. Whitefield, John S. Jeter, John D. Edwards, H. H. Thomson, O. R. Broyles.

Committee on the Judiciary.—J. L. Pettigru, W. F. Colcock, H. C. Young, J. W. Toomer, D. J. McCord, J. D. Witherspoon, A. W. Thomson, B. F. Perry, Edward Frost, A. M. Smith, W. W. Harlee.

Committee on Internal Improvements.—Edward Frost, John Phillips, James Gillam, O. R. Broyles, John J. Myers, Joseph Alston, Wm. J. Bull, R. G. Mills, J. H. Adams, T. P. Brockman, James R. Richardson.

Committee on Claims.—A. M. Smith, R. W. Seymour, M. A. Moore, Henry Arthur, John Maxwell, J. W. Coachman, W. M. Dunlap, M. M. Levy, R. R. Spann, James Fair, A. Barry.

Committee on the Military.—Thomas F. Jones, Edward H. Edwards, B. T. Elmore, Thos. J. Fripp, John Huie, James Gillam, W. J. Roberts, Thomas G. Carr, W. W. Harlee, John Martin, Lemuel Boozer.

Committee on Roads, Bridges and Ferries.—J. H. Irby, R. W. Seymour, Bailey Barlow, P. P. Palmer, John D. Murray, Isaac Lenoir, J. P. Crocker, Abner Whitley, J. H. Berry, W. J. Buford, S. N. Evans, J. F. Ervin, J. C. Kerr.

Committee on Public Buildings.—A. W. Thomson, Richard Yeadon, jr., Wm. Cross, S. P. Ripley, W. R. Burgess, J. W. English, W. W. Glenn, Wm. Woods, Jno. Douglass, John Willson, James Tompkins.

Committee on Pensions.—Patrick C. Caldwell, John Buchanan, J. B. Ellis, John Crawford, John W. Duran, David Garvin, George Huggins, Joseph Scott, Timan Watson, J. H. Hoy, J. P. Neel.

Committee on Incorporations.—J. W. Toomer, David H. Means, James Moore, J. F. Kern, John B. Bowers, Benjamin P. Perry, Abraham Hardin, J. F. Murlough, H. Sheridan, John A. Wigfall, C. W. Dudley.

Committee on Education.—W. F. Colcock, C. G. Memminger, Y. D. V. Jamison, Lemuel Boozer, T. J. Goodwyn, L. J. Patterson, James A. S. Robart, Max. Laborde, A. H. Bellin, J. D. Witherspoon, H. H. Thomson.

Committee on Accounts.—David McDowell, George Gibbon, Donald Douglas, Elisha Taylor, Spartan Goodlett, J. M. Allen, B. L. McLaughlin, John Middleton, S. F. Gibson, J. H. Moffatt, Samuel Rainey, S. J. Palmer.

Committee on Colored Population.—F. A. Porcher, D. H. Means, R. R. Spann, John Maxwell, T. F. Jones, John Huie, T. J. Goodwyn, J. A. Strobbart, J. S. McParson.

Committee on Agriculture.—John S. Jeter, Charles Edmondston, J. C. Kerr, W. J. Bull, J. S. McPherson, William Reed, Jas. Fair, Isaac Lenoir, Abner Whitley.

Medical Committee.—A. B. Arnold, W. J. Buford, Thomas E. Powe, H. Sheridan, M. A. Moore, O. R. Broyles, J. B. Bowers.

Committee on Grievances.—R. G. Mills, O. Mills, J. J. Myers, W. W. Garvin, J. B. Richardson, Spartan Goodlett, Patrick C. Caldwell, L. J. Patterson, Wm. Reed.

Committee on Vacant Offices.—M. M. Levy, James H. Adams, T. P. Brockman, W. G. Roberts, S. P. Ripley, V. D. V. Jamison.

Engrossing Committee.—H. C. Young, T. G. Carr, F. W. Symmes, Edward H. Edwards, Wm. Woods.

EXTRACT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. FINANCES.

You will perceive, from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, that the financial means of the country continue to keep pace with its improvement in all other respects.

The receipts into the Treasury during the present year will amount to about \$47,691,598; those from customs being estimated at \$22,523,151, those from lands at about \$24,000,000; and the residue from miscellaneous sources. The expenditures for all objects during the year, are estimated not to exceed \$32,000,000, which will leave a balance in the Treasury for public purposes, on the 1st day of January next, of about \$11,723,959.

This sum, with the exception of five millions, will be transferred to the several States, in accordance with the provisions of the act regulating the deposits of the public money.

The unexpended balances of appropriation on the 1st day of January next, are estimated at \$14,636,062, exceeding by \$9,636,062, the amount which will be left in the deposit banks, subject to the draft of the Treasurer of the United States, after the contemplated transfers to the several States are made. If, therefore, the future receipts should not be sufficient to meet these outstanding and future appropriations, there may be soon a necessity to use a portion of the funds deposited with the States.

The consequences apprehended when the deposit act of the last session received a reluctant approval, have been measurably realized. Though an act merely for deposit of the surplus moneys of the United States in the State treasuries for safe keeping, until they may be wanted for the service of the General Government, it has been extensively spoken of as an act to give the money to the several States, and they have been advised to use it as a gift, without regard to the means of refunding it when called for. Such a suggestion has doubtless been made without a due consideration of the obligation of the deposit act, and without a proper attention to the various principles and interests which are affected by it. It is manifest, that the law itself cannot sanction such a suggestion, and that, as no new moneys, the States have no more authority to receive and use these deposits, without intending to return them, than any deposit bank, or any individual temporary

agent, possessed with the safe-keeping or appli-

cation of the public money, would now have for converting the same to their private use, without the consent and against the will of the Government. But independently of the violation of public faith and moral obligation which are involved in this suggestion, when examined in reference to the terms of the present deposit act, it is believed that the considerations which should govern the future legislation of Congress on this subject, will be equally conclusive against the adoption of any measure recognizing the principles on which the suggestion has been made.

Considering the intimate connexion of the subject with the financial interests of the country, and its great importance in what ever aspect it can be viewed, I have bestowed upon it the most anxious reflection, and feel it to be my duty to state to Congress such thoughts as have occurred to me, to aid their deliberation in treating it in the manner best calculated to conduce to the common good.

The experience of other nations admonished us to have on the extinguishment of the public debt; but it will be vain that we have congratulated each other upon the disappearance of this evil, if we do not guard against the equally great one of promoting the unnecessary accumulation of public revenue. No political maxim is better established than that which tells us that an imprudent expenditure of money is the parent of profligacy, and that no people can hope to perpetuate their liberties, who long acquiesce in a policy which taxes them for objects not necessary to the legitimate and real wants of their Government. Flattering as is the condition of our country at the present period, because of its unexampled advance in all the steps of social and political improvement, it cannot be disguised that there is a lurking danger already apparent in the neglect of this warning truth, and that the time has arrived when the representatives of the people should be employed in devising some more appropriate remedy than now exists, to avert it.

Under our present revenue system, there is every probability that there will continue to be a surplus beyond the wants of the Government; and it has become our duty to decide whether such a result be consistent with the true objects of our Government.

Should a surplus be permitted to accumulate beyond the appropriations, it must be retained in the Treasury as it now is, or distributed among the people or the States.

To retain it in the Treasury unemployed in any way, is impracticable. It is, besides, against the genius of our free institutions to lock up in vaults the treasure of the nation. To take from the people the right of bearing arms, and put their weapons of defence in the hands of a standing army, would be scarcely more dangerous to their liberties, than to permit the Government to accumulate immense amounts of treasure beyond the supplies necessary to legitimate wants. Such a treasure would doubtless be employed at some time, as it has been in other countries, when opportunity tempted ambition.

To collect it merely for distribution to the States, would seem to be highly impolitic, if not as dangerous as the proposition to retain it in the Treasury. The shortest reflection must satisfy every one, that to require the people to pay taxes to the Government merely that they may be paid back again, is sporting with the substantial interests of the country, and no system which produces such a result can be expected to receive the public countenance. Nothing could be gained by it, even if each individual who contributed a portion of the tax, could receive back promptly the same portion. But, it is apparent, that no system of the kind can ever be enforced which will not absorb a considerable portion of the money to be distributed in salaries and commissions to the agents employed in the process, and in the various losses and depreciations which arise from other causes; and the practical effect of such an attempt must ever be to burden the people with taxes, not for purposes beneficial to them, but to swell the profits of deposit banks and support a band of useless public officers.

A distribution to the people is impracticable and unjust in other respects. It would be taking one man's property, and giving it to another. Such would be the unavoidable result of a rule of equality, (and none other is spoken of or would be likely to be adopted,) inasmuch as there is no mode by which the amount of the individual contributions of our citizens to the public revenue can be ascertained. We know that they contribute *unequally*; and a rule, therefore, that would distribute to them *equally*, would be liable to all the objections which apply to the principle of an equal division of property. To make the General Government the instrument of carrying this odious principle into effect, would be at once to destroy the means of its usefulness, and change the character designed for it by the framers of the constitution.

But the more extended and injurious consequences likely to result from a policy which would collect a surplus revenue for the purpose of distributing it, may be forcibly illustrated by an examination of the effects already produced by the present deposit act. This act, although certainly designed to secure the safe-keeping of the public revenue, is not entirely free in its tendencies from many of the objections which apply to this principle of distribution. The Government had, without necessity, received from the people a large surplus, which, instead of being employed as heretofore, and returned to them by means of the public expenditure, was deposited with sundry banks. The banks proceeded to make loans upon this surplus, and thus converted it into banking capital; and in this manner it has tended to multiply bank charters, and has had a great agency in producing a spirit of wild speculation. The possession and use of the property out of which this surplus was created, belonged to the people; but the Government has transferred its possession to incorporated banks, whose interest and effort it is to make large profits out of

its use. This process need only be stated to show its injustice and bad policy.

And the same observations apply to the influence which is produced by the steps necessary to collect as well as to distribute such a revenue. About three-fifths of all the duties on imports are paid in the city of New York; but it is obvious that the means to pay those duties are drawn from every part of the Union. Every citizen in every State, who purchases and consumes an article which has paid a duty at that port, contributes to the accumulating mass. The surplus collected there, must, therefore, be made up of moneys or property withdrawn from other points or other States. Thus the wealth and business of every region from which these surplus funds proceed, must be to some extent injured, while that of the place where the funds are concentrated and are employed in banking, are proportionably extended. But both in making the transfer of the funds which are first necessary to pay the duties and collect the surplus, and in making the re-transfer which becomes necessary when the time arrives for distribution of that surplus, there is a considerable period when the funds cannot be brought in use; and it is manifest that, besides the loss inevitable from such an operation, its tendency is to produce fluctuations in the business of the country, which are always productive of speculation and detrimental to the interests of regular trade. Argument can scarcely be necessary to show, that a measure of this character ought not to receive further legislative encouragement.

By examining the practical operation of the ratio for distribution adopted in the deposit bill of the last session, we shall discover other features that appear equally objectionable. Let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the surplus moneys to be deposited with the States have been collected and belong to them in the ratio of their federal representative population—an assumption founded upon the fact that any deficiencies in our future revenue from imports and public lands, must be made up by direct taxes collected from the States in that ratio. It is proposed to distribute the surplus, say \$30,000,000, not according to the ratio in which it has been collected and belongs to the people of the States, but in that of their votes in the colleges of Electors of President and Vice President. The effect of a distribution upon that ratio is shown by the annexed table marked A.

By an examination of that table, it will be perceived that in the distribution of a surplus of \$30,000,000 upon that basis, there is a great departure from the principle which regards representation as the true measure of taxation; and it will be found that the tendency of that departure will be to increase whatever inequalities have been supposed to attend the operation of our federal system in respect to its bearings upon the different interests of the Union. In making the basis of representation the basis of taxation, the framers of the constitution intended to equalize the burdens which are necessary to support the Government; and the adoption of that ratio, while it accomplished this object, was also the means of adjusting other great topics arising out of the conflicting views respecting the political equality of the various members of the confederacy. What, therefore, disturbs the liberal spirit of compromises which established a rule of the taxation so just and equitable, and which experience has proved to be so well adapted to the genius and habits of our people, should be received with the greatest caution and distrust.

A bare inspection, in the annexed table, of the difference produced by the ratio used in the deposit act, compared with the results of a distribution according to the ratio of direct taxation, must satisfy every unprejudiced mind, that the former ratio contravenes the spirit of the constitution, and produces a degree of injustice in the operation of the Federal Government which would be fatal to the hope of perpetuating it. By the ratio of direct taxation, for example, the State of Delaware, in the collection of \$30,000,000 of revenue, would pay into the treasury \$188,716; and in a distribution of \$30,000,000 she would receive back from the Government, according to the ratio of the deposit bill, the sum of \$306,122; and similar results would follow the comparison between the small and the large States throughout the Union; thus realizing to the small States an advantage which would be doubtless as unacceptable to them as a motive for incorporating the principle in any system which would produce it, as it would be inconsistent with the rights and expectations of the large States. It was certainly the intention of that provision of the constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts and excises" shall "be uniform throughout the United States," to make the burdens of taxation *fairly* equally upon the people in whatever States of the Union they may reside. But what would be the value of such a uniform rule, if the moneys raised by it could be immediately returned by a different one, which will give to the people of some States much more, and to those of others much less than their fair portions? Were the Federal Government to exempt, in express terms, the imports, products and manufactures of some portions of the country from all duties, while it imposed heavy ones on others, the injustice could not be greater. It would be easy to show how, by the operation of such a principle, the large States of the Union would not only have to contribute their just share towards the support of the Federal Government, but also have to bear in some degree the taxes necessary to support the Governments of their smaller sisters; but it is deemed unnecessary to state the details where the general principle is so obvious.

A system liable to such objections can never be supposed to have been sanctioned by the framers of the constitution, when they conferred on Congress the taxing power; and I feel persuaded that a mature examination of the subject will satisfy every one that there are insurmountable difficulties in the operation of any plan which can be devised, of collecting revenue, for the purpose of

distributing it. Congress is only authorized to levy taxes "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." There is no such provision as would authorize Congress to collect together the property of the country, under the name of revenue, for the purpose of dividing it equally or unequally among the States or the people. Indeed, it is not probable that such an idea ever occurred to the States when they adopted the constitution. But, however this may be, the only safe rule for us in interpreting the powers granted to the Federal Government, is to regard the absence of express authority to touch a subject as important and delicate as this is, as equivalent to a prohibition.

Even if our powers were less doubtful in this respect, as the constitution now stands, there are considerations afforded by recent experience, which would seem to make it our duty to avoid a resort to such a system.

All will admit that the simplicity and economy of the State Governments mainly depend on the fact that money has to be supplied to support them by the same men, or their agents, who vote it away in appropriations. Hence, when there are extravagant and wasteful appropriations, there must be a corresponding increase of taxes; and the people, becoming awakened, will necessarily scrutinize the character or measures which thus increase their burdens. By the watchful eye of self-interest, the agents of the people in the State Governments are repressed, and kept within the limits of a just economy. But if the necessity of levying the taxes be taken from those who make the appropriations, and thrown upon a more distant and less responsible set of public agents, who have power to approach the people by an indirect and stealthy taxation, there is reason to fear that prodigality will soon supersede those characteristics which have thus far made us look with so much pride and confidence to the State Governments as the mainstay of our union and liberties. The State Legislatures, instead of studying to restrict their State expenditures to the smallest possible sum, will claim credit for their profusion and harass the General Government for increased supplies. Practically, there would soon be but one taxing power, and that vested in a body of men far removed from the people, in which the farming and mechanic interests would scarcely be represented. The States would gradually lose their purity as well as their independence; they would not dare to murmur at the proceedings of the General Government, lest they should lose their supplies; all would be merged in a practical consolidation, cemented by wide spread corruption, which could only be eradicated by one of those bloody revolutions which occasionally overthrow the despotic systems of the old world.

In all the other aspects in which I have been able to look at the effect of such a principle of distribution upon the best interests of the country, I can see nothing to compensate for the disadvantages to which I have adverted. If we consider the protective duties, which are, in a great degree the source of the surplus revenue, beneficial to one section of the Union and prejudicial to another, there is no corrective for the evil in such a plan of distribution. On the contrary, there is reason to fear that all the complaints which have sprung from this cause would be aggravated. Every one must be sensible that a distribution of the surplus must beget a disposition to cherish the means which create it; and any system, therefore, into which it enters, must have a powerful tendency to increase rather than diminish the tariff. If it were even admitted that the advantages of such a system could be made equal to all the sections of the Union, the reasons already so urgently calling for a reduction of the revenue, would nevertheless, lose none of their force; for it will always be improbable that an intelligent and virtuous community can consent to raise a surplus for the mere purpose of dividing it, diminished as it must inevitably be by the expenses of the various machinery necessary to the process.

The safest and simplest mode of obviating all the difficulties which have been mentioned is, to collect only revenue enough to meet the wants of the Government, and let the people keep the balance of their property in their own hands, to be used for their own profit. Each State will then support its own Government, and contribute its due share towards the support of the General Government. There would be no surplus to cramp and lessen the resources of individual wealth and enterprise, and the banks would be left to their ordinary means. Whatever agitations and fluctuations might arise from our unfortunate paper system, they could never be attributed, justly or unjustly, to the action of the Federal Government. There would be some guaranty that the spirit of wild speculation which seeks to convert the surplus revenue into banking capital, would be effectually checked, and that the scenes of demoralization which are now so prevalent through the land would disappear.

Without desiring to conceal that the experience and observation of the last two years have operated a partial change in my views upon this interesting subject, it is nevertheless regretted that the suggestions made by me, in my annual messages of 1829 and 1830, have been greatly misunderstood. At that time the great struggle was begun against that latitudinarian construction of the constitution, which authorizes the unlimited appropriation of the revenue of the Union to internal improvements within the States, tending to invest in the hands, and place under the control, of the General Government, all the principal roads and canals of the country, in violation of State rights, and in derogation of State authority. At the same time, the condition of the manufacturing interest was such, as to create an apprehension that the duties on imports could not, without extensive mischief, be reduced in season to prevent the accumulation of a considerable surplus after the payment of the national debt. In view of the dangers of such a surplus, and

in preference to its application to internal improvements, in derogation of the rights and powers of the States, the suggestion of an amendment of the constitution to authorize its distribution was made. It was an alternative for what were deemed greater evils—a temporary resort to relieve an overburdened Treasury, until the Government could, without a sudden and destructive revulsion in the business of the country, gradually return to the just principle of raising no more revenue from the people, in taxes, than is necessary for its economical support. Even that alternative was not spoken of but in connexion with an amendment of the constitution. No temporary inconvenience can justify the exercise of a prohibited power, or a power not granted by that instrument; and it was from a conviction that the power to distribute even a temporary surplus of revenue is of that character, that it was suggested only in connexion with an appeal to the source of all legal power in the General Government, the States which have established it. No such appeal has been taken, and, in my opinion, a distribution of the surplus revenue by Congress, either to the States or the people, is to be considered as among the prohibitions of the constitution. As already intimated, my views have undergone a change, so far as to be convinced that no alteration of the constitution in this respect is wise or expedient. The influence of an accumulating surplus upon the legislation of the General Government and the States, its effect upon the credit system of the country, producing dangerous extensions and ruinous contractions, fluctuations in the price of property, rash speculation, idleness, extravagance, and a deterioration of morals, have taught us the important lesson, that any transient mischief which may attend the reduction of our revenue to the wants of our Government, is to be borne in preference to an overflowing Treasury.

CHERAW GAZETTE. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1836.

Col. P. M. Butler has been elected Governor by the Legislature, without opposition, and Wm. Dubose, Esq. of St. Stephens, Lieut. Governor. Henry Bailey, Attorney General; J. D. Edwards, Solicitor of the Southern Circuit; T. S. Player, Solicitor of the Middle Circuit; and Jos. Black, Treasurer of the Upper Division.

On Saturday, the 4th inst. the Hon. Wm. C. Preston was re-elected, without opposition, by the General Assembly of this State, to the U. S. Senate.

Judge Strange, of Fayetteville, has been elected by the Assembly of North Carolina, to supply the vacancy caused by the resignation of W. P. Mangum, whose term would expire on the 4th of March next.

T. R. McIver has been elected Tax Collector for Darlington.

The Rev. M. Quin will preach at the following times and places, viz.

Table with 3 columns: Day, Time, Location. Tuesday, Dec. 27th, at Bethel, 12 o'clock. Wednesday, 28th, Chesterfield C. H. Thursday, 29th, Elizabeth. Friday, 30th, Methodist Church, near the North Carolina line. Saturday, 31st, Fork Creek. Sunday, Jan. 1st, Bethel on Lynch Cr. Tuesday, 3d, Macedonia. Wednesday, 4th, Mt. Zion Meth. Ch. Thursday, 5th, McFarland's Ch. Friday, 6th, Stevens' Church.

LEGISLATURE OF S. CAROLINA.—We have received the journals only down to the 5th, and have given an abstract in another column. We learn from private letters as late as the 10th, that the committee of Ways and Means have reported a bill to grant banking privileges to the great Rail Road Company, and that the subject was under discussion in the House, and daily gaining friends; the fate of the bill is doubtful. A large meeting of the stockholders was held in Columbia, on the 10th, at which it was resolved that banking privileges are indispensable to enable the Company to construct the Road; and also to appoint a committee to confer with the Legislative committee on the subject, &c.

The proposals of the Governor, to raise the salary of that officer, and render him re-eligible, have failed. Various propositions were before the House, for changes in the judiciary; none of them definitely acted upon.

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OF S. CAROLINA.—The House of Representatives passed a vote on the 6th, instructing the Electors not to vote for Van Buren, White, or Harrison.

Afterwards, the following resolution was adopted by both branches of the Legislature: "Resolved, That the Electors on the part of this State for President and Vice-President, be instructed to vote for Willie P. Mangum, of North Carolina, for President, and John Tyler, of Virginia, for Vice-President."

The Electors are D. J. McCord, Thos. F. Jones, B. K. Henegan, John Maxwell, T. L. Gourdin, Thos. Dugan, John Littlejohn, John Frampton, Patrick Noble, R. H. Goodwyn, B. T. Elmore.

INDIAN WAR.—We find in the Charleston papers a full account, derived from Col. Randall, just from Florida, of the two battles with the Indians in and near Wood Swamp, noticed in our last. They took place on the 17th and 18th, not according to our previous information, on the 18th and 19th Nov. In the first engagement the Indians, besides twenty of their warriors left dead on the field, lost all their baggage and horses. In the second battle, they left twenty-five dead on the field, and are supposed to have carried off others.—Their number was estimated at from 6 to 700 men. In these battles none but the Florida and Tennessee troops were engaged. On the 19th they joined the right division, (regulars) under Col. Pierce. On the 21st they entered the Wood Swamp again, in search of the en-

STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Committee of Privileges and Elections.—Ker Boyce, Jno. S. Jeter, J. H. Irby, Jno. D. Edwards, A. M. Smith, Joseph Scott, Wm. Reed, John W. Duran, J. B. Ellis, S. J. Palmer, John Palmer, John A. Wigfall, P. P. Palmer, Joseph Alston, Thos. E. Powe, C. W. Dudley, J. W. Coachman, T. J. Goodwyn, David McDowell, W. W. Glenn, W. W. Harlee, B. T. Elmore, F. W. Symmes, W. R. Burgess, Isaac Lenoir, Henry Arthur, John P. Neel, J. W. Witherspoon, James A. Strobbart, John M. Allen, John Murray, James Gillam, John Douglass, John Crawford, John Willson, Benjamin Perry, T. P. Brockman, V. D. V. Jamison, David Garvin, W. G. Roberts, George Moggias, Wm. J. Bull.

Committee of Ways and Means.—F. W. Davis, C. T. Elmore, C. G. Memminger,