


# The Story of Cervera's Defeat and Smashed

## ALL THAT IS LEFT OF THE OQUENDO.

From Photographs Taken Specially for the Sunday Call.


All the Pictures on This Page Are Carefully Worked Up Views of the Spanish Cruiser Oquendo, Showing in Detail the Fearful Effects of the Fire of the American Warships in the Great Battle of July 3. The Photographs Were Taken for The Call With a Special View to Showing the Destructive Effects of Modern Naval Fire.

COPYRIGHT 1898  
BY JAMES  
GORDON BENNETT




VIEW FORWARD  
FROM  
AFTER TURRET

COPYRIGHT 1898  
BY JAMES GORDON BENNETT




SINKING OF TURRET  
AFTER MAGAZINE EXPLOSION




STARBOARD BOW, SHOWING  
EFFECT OF EXPLOSION

COPYRIGHT 1898  
BY JAMES  
GORDON BENNETT



SIX- INCH SHOT HOLE IN TURRET.  
DISABLING TURRET AND KILLING CREW



STARBOARD SIDE  
SHOWING EFFECTS OF 13-INCH SHELL

COPYRIGHT 1898  
BY JAMES GORDON BENNETT

## THE STORY OF THE SMASHED FLEET OF CERVERA.

### Views of a Naval Expert Upon the Condition of the Spanish Ships and Some Pertinent Deductions Regarding New Naval Warfare.

BY A NAVAL EXPERT.

THE gun is still the supreme sea weapon.

It is true that the greatest havoc in the Spanish ships driven ashore off Santiago was caused by fire, but this conflagration was a secondary and not a primary cause.

Of the four ships examined and reported upon by the naval board three were wrecked by the explosion of their magazines. This also was a secondary, not a determining, cause. No, the main weapon was not the ram nor the torpedo, but the gun.

It is impossible yet to state what effect the American projectiles may have had upon the submerged parts of the hulls, but the above-water structure yields convincing evidence of gun power. The total number of shots fired in the action has not been made public, but we have reports of two ships, and if these be accepted as a ratio for the others the ammunition rained upon the Spaniards must have been enormous.

Captain Evans of the Iowa states that the following is an approximation of the projectiles fired from his ship: Thirty-one 12-inch semi-armour piercing shells, with full charges; 35 8-inch common shells, with full charges; 251 4-inch

common shells, 1056 6-pounder cartridges, common shells, and 100 1-pounder cartridges, common shells. Captain Cook of the Brooklyn reports that he fired 100 rounds of 8-inch shells, 473 5-inch, 1200 6-pounder and 200 1-pounder ammunition. If the other battleships made the same average as the Iowa we will get, after allowing for the respective differences in caliber, a total of about 150,000 pounds of metal, or ninety tons, discharged against the enemy.

Assuming that about 6500 shots in all were fired, and this approximation is fairly close, we find, excluding the fires from the 6 and 1 pounders, that 1500 projectiles of the larger calibers were discharged by the Oregon, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana and Texas. It will be interesting to note in this connection the number of direct hits made by these shells. This is taken from the report made by the Examining Board convened by Admiral Sampson immediately after the battle:

"Four-inch shells, fired only by the Iowa—the Infanta Maria Teresa, 1; the Almirante Oquendo, 5; the Vizcaya, 2. "Five-inch shells, fired only by the Brooklyn—the Infanta Maria Teresa, 5; the Vizcaya, 6; the Almirante Oquendo, 3 (one of which exploded a torpedo); the Cristobal Colon, 4.

"Eight-inch shells, fired by the Brooklyn, the Iowa, the Oregon and the Indiana—the Maria Teresa, 3; the Almirante Oquendo, 3; the Vizcaya, 4. As the Indiana did not follow the chase she probably had nothing to do with

the hits on the Vizcaya.

"Twelve or thirteen inch shells—Only two on the Teresa must be credited to the battleships Oregon, Indiana, Texas and Iowa, although it is quite certain that the Texas fired one.

"All the Spanish ships were riddled by the rapid fire of the one and six-pounders carried by all the American ships."

The total of forty hits applied to the projectiles fired gives about 3 per cent of successful shots. To the layman this may seem a small ratio, but it is very good, indeed, when the smoke, distance and the difficulties of a running fight are considered. The engagement started at a range of 6000 yards—that is, at a distance of about three miles. Following out an approved sea maxim and the especial instructions formulated by Rear Admiral Sampson the ships closed gradually, so that both torpedo-boats and two of the armored cruisers were destroyed when within 2500 yards. At one time the Vizcaya and the Brooklyn were engaged in close order for modern fighting, the distance estimated being just over 1000 yards.

In the special report made by the board it is stated that the Almirante Oquendo suffered more than any other of the ships, except the torpedo-boats. Her upper works were masses of distorted steel and her decks were littered with killed and wounded. She was hit on the port side four times by eight-inch shells, three times by four-inch shells, twice by six-inch guns and forty-two times by six-pounders. As will be seen in one of the illustrations, an eight-inch shell entered the forward turret at the gun embrasure. This exploded and killed every man in the turret, most of them instantly, for the officer standing in the firing hood and one man at a lever were found in these positions when the ship was examined by the board.

The Vizcaya was swept by a storm of projectiles from the rapid-fire guns. She was hit by the larger projectiles fourteen times and by the 6-pounders eleven times. The 8-inch guns of the Brooklyn and the Oregon and the 5-inch guns of the Brooklyn completely wrecked her structure above the armor belt. The 6-inch shells perforated her, and supplementing all this was the destructive work of the Iowa's 4-inch. In the Infanta Maria Teresa, the only vessel hit by 12 or 13 inch projectiles, two

of these went through her, one probably fired by the Texas and one from some other of the battle-ships. Each claims the shot. An 8-inch shell, credited to the Brooklyn, entered the side just forward of the port beam, burst and disabled the four crews manning the guns of that deck. This is the shot, Admiral Cervera says, that set fire to the ship, and, as her fire mains were cut, forced her from an inability to extinguish the flames, to surrender and seek the shore.

Of all the ships the Cristobal Colon came out best. She was struck only six times by large projectiles, and surrendered when the Oregon's thirteen-inch shells spanned her with a destructive range. One eight-inch shell, sponsor unknown, landed in the Colon's wardroom, and exploding wrecked the compartment, and a six-inch projectile, nicely placed, smashed her bow. None of these injuries was sufficient to put her out of action, and the press reports state that they were not so serious as those received by the Brooklyn. On

board the Vizcaya a projectile struck a loaded torpedo, which exploded, killing twenty men and setting fire to the forward part of the ship.

### SAVING THE WRECKED WARSHIPS

Special to the Sunday Call.

THAT friendly hand of fate which revealed to Richmond Pearson Hobson, naval constructor U. S. N., the road to undying glory by means of the Merrimac, had still another meed of fame in store for him. This young man, the personification of naval skill and intelligence, has pitted himself against a board of older officers who decided in their wisdom that the Cristobal Colon, late of Admiral Cervera's squadron, could not be raised

from its bed on the shoals of the Southern Cuban coast.

When Mr. Hobson, after a personal inspection of the wrecked ships, told Admiral Sampson that, in his opinion, both the Colon and the Maria Teresa could be saved, he was sent north at once to lay his views before the authorities at Washington. He talked so convincingly that it was not many hours before he was in consultation with a certain wrecking company, whose offices, in one of the older buildings on Wall street, are known to governments and magnates of steamship lines and millionaires whose whim is to sail the seas in floating palaces.

In a corner of one of these office rooms sits a quiet American citizen. From his desk go forth many invisible lines leading to all parts of the coast. At the end of these lines are peculiar tugs and floats and giant cranes, and a small army of men to work them. One of these lines led to an unfortunate battle-ship whose bones still lie in Havana harbor. And another line

is even now leading down to a stretch of beach on the south coast of Cuba, where six Spanish war vessels are groveling and grinding and beating as if anxious to escape from the vengeance of an outraged people. It is to save two of these craft that the wrecker has marshaled his forces at Constructor Hobson's invitation.

That the risk will be difficult is well known to those who understand the ways of the weather during these hurricane months around Cuba, but Hobson by his intelligence and bravery has earned the confidence of the Government and he is to be given a free hand in the matter.

There is another reason why the Government is anxious to float these ships—one outlined in a remark made by a high official in the Navy Department during the discussion of the question. "We must not fail to fly Old Glory over at least one of the ships of Cervera's former fleet, even if it means double the cost of the vessel," he said. "The dastardly attempt on the part of the