

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Between the ministers of France and Austria, prior to the commencement of hostilities.—(Continued.)

No. 7.—Letter from count de Metternich to count de Champagny, Minister &c.
PARIS, AUG. 3, 1808.

"SIR, MINISTER—The confidential note which your excellency did me the honor to address to me on the July 27th, from Toulouse, reached me on 1st August. Whilst employed in answering it, I yesterday received your note of the 20th July from Bordeaux.

"If the first of those papers was of a nature to make me experience and anticipate the regret that the emperor my master would feel when perusing it; I am rejoiced at the manner in which my communications of the 28th July last, were received by his majesty, the emperor Napoleon. What powerful impressions must not questions, such as those addressed to him from Toulouse, create on the mind of a sovereign whose character is eminently pacific, who is attached to the true interests of his people, and steady to those political measures which are so conformable to his true interests? The emperor cannot but regret, that the many proofs, given to France at critical moments; so many steps taken to cherish the most intimate relations with her; and the new assurances that had been given of his constant adherence to the principles which governed his continental policy, should have been given way to the first impression, which rumors created and amplified by malevolence, had evidently made upon a cabinet, with which all his inclinations led him to unite, upon a powerful ally, whose friendship never can become a matter of indifference, since it is founded upon interests reciprocal & common to both empires.

"The frank, plain, & undisguised explanations, which I believe to be alone worthy of the emperor Napoleon, have had in part, the effect I expected. Opposed to them at this time are the rumors circulated at Toplitz, Carlsbad, &c. I am without uneasiness respecting these. The reports, forged in the coffee houses of Europe, must contradict and efface themselves. I have only to remark to your excellency, that they are not the rumors of Austria. None of the inhabitants of those places are strangers, talkative because they have no attachment & settlement in a country which they only temporarily inhabit. It should be the evidence of foreign influence, if it proved to be a nuisance by the places, and by the distant frontier where it is exercised. His majesty the emperor may be assured there exists no such influence in the councils of the emperor Francis, and that all prejudice and deception are equally remote from them. The part ought to prove this, the present and the future will convince him of it.

"Your excellency has mentioned a sort of riot at Trieste, and the stoppage of two couriers in Croatia—facts, of which until now I had no knowledge. I would regret them, as I do every event contrary to the public order, & contrary to the obvious relations that should exist between neighboring states, if they did not furnish to my court a new opportunity to prove to his majesty the emperor Napoleon that he never will be deceived in his expectations of redress, for acts of this kind, to as great an extent as he himself, if would afford it if they had been committed in his own dominions. I promise your excellency the most severe punishments of the guilty.

"I hastened to transmit to Vienna the last communication from your excellency—and, having no cabinet courier at command, gave it in charge to count de Mier. The reasons for desiring an answer, which your excellency communicated to me, will greatly contribute to induce the emperor to return a prompt reply, which will be drawn up according to the amicable intentions which govern him. Those intentions are too well known, to leave any doubt but that the proof, which his majesty will furnish France, will be transmitted without any other delay than that which must of necessity take place.

"That confidence, which your excellency has so long possessed, will not allow me to conceal my wishes, that the emperor may suspend until the return of my courier, any measures calculated to confirm, more than at present, the apprehensions of a speedy rupture between France and Austria. I perfectly accord with the very just remarks, which you have made in your recent communications, respecting the imprudence of measures, which, in spite of the wishes of sovereigns, or their ministers, and the most wise among the people often produce the greatest misfortunes among mankind. Let us not, then, raise the hopes of our common enemy, by exhibiting hostile appearances, which, in Austria as well as elsewhere, can but have an unfavorable effect upon the public, deprived of all knowledge of the true state of affairs, and which, on one side as on the other, may place the courts in an attitude, as contrary to the wishes of both emperors as to those of both nations. Let us not furnish the malevolent, those who are really anxious for a war, with those new weapons, which they may covertly hurl again at us both. Nothing is more easy, and unhappy nothing is more common, than to see that offered as zealous support, which has a motion of a very different character.

"In leaving to my august master the charge of answering the overtures of his majesty the emperor Napoleon, your excellency will not

hesitate fully to convince the only wish with which I am animated, and of course the tenor of the orders I have received."

No. 8. Note from count de Champagny to count de Metternich.
PARIS, MARCH 10, 1809.

"The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has given an account, to his majesty the emperor, his master, of the communication which was made to him, by his excellency, count de Metternich, upon the return of count de Mier, and the determination of the cabinet of Vienna has taken to place its armies upon a war-footing.

"The emperor Napoleon has been afflicted at this determination. The armaments of Austria, the unfriendly conduct of its minister at Constantinople and in Bosnia the writings against France, circulate a profusely throughout the monarchy, inducing his majesty to believe that the English were not without influence at Vienna, determined him to stop on the Meurthe and Saone, the march of those divisions destined for Boulogne, Brest and Toulon. His majesty, at the same time instructed the princes of the confederation of the Rhine, to hold their troops in readiness, at all events, that they might if necessary return them, and be in a condition, if he should fail, to repel every aggressor.

"But after the declaration of M. Metternich, his majesty has given orders, to the troops posted in the interior of France, to proceed to the Rhine, to watch over the safety of his allies and confederates; and, that the troops of those states should without delay, be placed on the war establishment. Thus armies will be opposed to armies. The commencement of the disturbance, the threats and the armaments, will be made by Austria. It is for hereto say when they shall cease. As no difference exists between the two courts, and as the treaty, which was followed by the evacuation of Brannau by the French army, affords no point for dispute between the two powers, his majesty has no idea of what is pretended; but, on his part, wishes to see Europe in the enjoyment of security and peace, and his own people reaping the fruits of the economy that would succeed that event. The undersigned is charged to state those wishes to M. Metternich.

"He requests his excellency, &c.
(Signed) CHAMPAGNY.

DEFENCE
Of Mr. Jefferson's Administration.
No. II.
FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

Abolition of the Internal Taxes.

This measure was openly recommended by Mr. Jefferson. That the public sentiment was decidedly in favor of the continuance of the internal taxes cannot be doubted. It is equally clear that this hostility had eminently contributed to the elevation of Mr. Jefferson. It was therefore proposed in unequivocal terms in his first message to Congress.

Before, however, this step was taken, or contemporaneous with it, a great reduction was made in the habitual expenditures.—In the navy department 200,000 dollars and in the war department 522,000 dollars were retrenched.—To these were added various other diminutions of expenses, with the former, exceeding the annual sum of one million of dollars, and surpassing the amount of the taxes abolished about 3,000,000 dollars.

The measure was, nevertheless, pronounced unwise by the opponents of the administration, and effects, the most pernicious, predicted as likely to flow from it. A large portion of these predictions, having been falsified by experience, require at present no notice. The remaining resources have proved not only equal to every existing engagement of the government, but likewise to a more rapid discharge of the public debt than that for which the national faith was pledged.

Every one acquainted with the history of the U. States knows that after the revolutionary war, it was a general, not to say universal impression, that the great power of taxation, vested in the general government, should be over-impounded commodities. This impression arose undoubtedly from the legitimate relationship between the nature of a government federal in its structure, and a tax whose equal operation could only be secured by the general operation.—Under this impression and the most important intreaties of Congress, 12 states, a short time before the adoption of the constitution, had agreed to vest Congress with the power of laying a duty of five per cent on imported articles.—Rhode Island, not then constituting more than a sixtieth part of the union, alone resisted this measure. But for her resistance, the power would have been conferred, and the new constitution would probably never have been framed. When framed it gave Congress absolute and exclusive power over duties on foreign commodities, thereby adding another to the numerous proofs that this was considered as the appropriate resource of the general government. It gave, at the same time, a concurrent power, with the states, over every source of revenue, with the express view of enabling a government, charged with the national defence, on any great emergency to call into activity the undivided resources of the community. This was the only

reason, perhaps a fallacious one, on which this sweeping power of taxation was confided. Accordingly Congress in the first instance, confined themselves to the imposition of duties on external commerce. At a subsequent period the internal taxes were resorted to, under an alleged want of revenue. The same cause gave rise to a direct tax on lands, houses and slaves. This cause ceasing, was it not proper to repossess the states of these resources? This alone, abstracted from all other considerations, would have been a sufficient justification of the measure.

But in addition to these there were other cogent reasons. The internal revenues fostered a system of extensive patronage dangerous to a republican government. Five hundred officers were employed in their collection, and two hundred thousand dollars annually expended, amounting to twenty per cent, while the expense of collecting the external duties amounted to only five per cent, without producing any diminution in the aggregate expense by a decrease of duties. Here then is an annual saving of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. It is not practicable to estimate with precision the public injury arising from the existence of five hundred useless officers. It is within bounds, however, to say that their labor or ingenuity, if in a final degree productive would exceed a hundred thousand dollars.

Some respect unquestionably was due by the representatives of a free people to the established impression that an excise is hostile to liberty. In a state of society differing in one respect from that of all other nations, is protecting the unimolested exercise of industry in channels chosen by itself, it is certainly of importance little short of infinite, to resist the establishment of a system which gives to government the control and direction of every branch of internal manufacture; enabling them therefore to depress or elevate, according to the measure of taxation applied, the condition of every class of citizens—a power, so nearly approximated to despotism, as to have become hateful to every nation not degraded to the lowest condition.

It has been said that the repeal of these taxes operated to the local injury of a part of the union.

To exhibit the local effects of the repeal, we have drawn out the following table. The first column exhibits the number of representatives to which each state is entitled—the second specifies the sums paid in each state, in the year one thousand eight hundred and one—the third shews the quota of the whole tax, which, for that year each state would have paid, had it been assessed in the ratio of numbers—the fourth exhibits the gain, and the last the loss of each state, on that principle, arising from the repeal.

| STATES. | Reps. | Same paid. | Payable on ratio of nos. | Gain. | Loss. |
|----------------|-------|------------|--------------------------|-------|-------|
| New-Hampshire | 7 | 9607 | 3500 | 6384 | 2383 |
| Massachusetts | 17 | 173894 | 110000 | 63894 | 10273 |
| Rhode-Island | 2 | 33702 | 10000 | 21702 | 19273 |
| Connecticut | 7 | 28727 | 40000 | 11273 | 24780 |
| Vermont | 7 | 33250 | 30000 | 3250 | 24780 |
| New-York | 14 | 110070 | 110000 | 70 | 18504 |
| New-Jersey | 6 | 23486 | 43000 | 19514 | 18504 |
| Pennsylvania | 18 | 211189 | 120000 | 91189 | 9837 |
| Delaware | 3 | 7911 | 7000 | 911 | 9837 |
| Maryland | 8 | 89718 | 50000 | 39718 | 10242 |
| Virginia | 12 | 141673 | 150000 | 8327 | 10242 |
| Ohio | 2 | 34758 | 7000 | 27758 | 10242 |
| Tennessee | 1 | 15163 | 2000 | 13163 | 10242 |
| South-Carolina | 1 | 45738 | 8000 | 37738 | 10242 |
| North-Carolina | 1 | 48738 | 8000 | 40738 | 10242 |
| Georgia | 4 | 13489 | 20000 | 6589 | 14511 |

From this table it appears of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, and Vermont, ordinarily denominated the New-England states, two have gained, and three have lost

Leaving 16,150 the clear gain of the New-England states.
That of the states of New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland, denominated the middle states, four have gained and one has lost

The clear gain of the Middle states 98,375
That of the remaining states called the South and West, one has gained, and five have lost

The clear loss of the Southern and Western states, 55,976

It further appears that the only gaining states were Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio and Rhode-Island—and that Massachusetts, next to Pennsylvania, was the greatest gainer—and that the state that incurred the greatest loss was N. Carolina.

It follows from this analysis that the repeal produced an absolute gain to the Eastern and Middle, while it produced a loss to the southern and western states. If, therefore, it was unequal in its operation, the latter, instead of the former states, have reason to complain.

But the intelligent reader will before this have remarked that, if the repeal really operated unequally upon the different states, that inequality could only arise from the partial operations of the taxes repealed—which, if a fact, would con-

stitute one of the strongest arguments in favor of the measure.

The Gazette.

Wilmington, August 2, 1809.

Latest from France.—The United States' brig Syren, with Mr. Coles, the bearer of dispatches from Mr. Armstrong to our government, arrived at New-York on Saturday, and Mr. Coles proceeded immediately for Washington. Nothing has transpired relative to our affairs with France. The dispatch ship Mentor was at L'Orient, waiting the orders of General Armstrong. The Syren sailed the 18th of June from L'Orient; she brings Paris papers to the 11th, which contain nothing later from the armies on the Danube than before published. A passenger in the Syren says that the loss of the French at the battle of Ubing, on the Danube, was believed in Paris to be as follows:—15 generals killed and 6 wounded—among the former was Marshal Lasnes, and the latter Marshal Massena—besides 34 colonels, 1500 officers, and 45,000 privates, killed and wounded.

Extract of a letter from a Gentleman in Calif to the editor of this paper, dated June 1 1809.

"We yesterday received the confirmed account of the surrender of 14,000 men under Marshal Soult. A British ship of the line and two frigates, under Admiral Purves remain in the harbor; the back part of the Peninsula is now very strongly fortified—upwards of 1000 men have been for some time past at work at them; in addition to which they have cut through the Isthmus which joins it to the Main and Cadiz is now completely insular—it is therefore secure, let the event be what it may. Of the Spanish cause, however, the most sceptical have not a doubt; the French troops, in small actions in various parts, have been so completely cut up that they cannot long attempt to keep possession. The harbor contains at present upwards of 30 American vessels of all descriptions—American produce, of course, very low. Some of them are preparing to sail for England after the tenth of June."

FOR THE DELAWARE GAZETTE.

Mr. Jones,
A late number of your Gazette contains two communications respecting the Cavalry of the first brigade—the one under the signature of "System"—the other "A Trooper." If I mistake not, the Governor and the Cavalry are indebted to one writer for the sage remarks contained in both. The Governor would not have known that so experienced a person in Cavalry tactics had passed unnoticed, and the Cavalry would have been ignorant of the cause why the squadron was not organized, had not this military genius made his appearance in your paper. The statement he has given of the evolutions he has seen performed by the officers of Cavalry of the first brigade was intended, no doubt, as a self recommendation to the Governor; but if he cannot produce a better claim for the office to which he aspires, he will not, I believe, have an opportunity very soon of displaying to the officers at present commanding the two troops, his capacity of instructing them. As it is but a short time since this "System" became a Trooper, it cannot be supposed, by any person but himself, that he can be well acquainted with the evolutions of Cavalry. At the time the Cavalry were gall'ping in Indian file, as he supposes, they must have been advancing from the right or left quarter or half ranks, or from the right and left of the troop by files. In his next attempt to be a trooper I hope he will be more correct in his terms. It will be requisite for him, in case he expects to be honored with the command of Major of Cavalry (which at present he has no claim to) that he should manifest a capacity to instruct the officers in Cavalry tactics. One reason assigned by this writer, why there should be a Major of Cavalry is, that the two troops, at present, act separate, each officer exercising his own troop, & that there is no stimulus for them to excel in maneuvering; I will beg leave to differ from him in opinion, as I am inclined to believe that it excites a greater spirit of emulation than if they performed together—each officer having the training of his own troop instead of their being in a squadron, where they would of course be under the orders of a Major, and exercised by him. There is one advantage in the cavalry being organized into a squadron, and that is, that the evolutions performed should be as uniform as possible; but I believe, notwithstanding what "System" has alleged to the contrary, that the cavalry of the first brigade is as well disciplined as any other corps in the brigade; perhaps there is not a body of men in the state that deserve more the applause of their country. From the returns of the Adjutant-General last year it appears that the two troops contained near one hundred men, armed and equipped at their own expense. However pleasing it might be to "System"