

Having disclosed our detailed view of the internal measures pursued during Mr. Jefferson's administration, we are naturally brought to a consideration of the general situation of the country. Is it prosperous or wretched? The answer to this inquiry will conclusively decide, independently of every other consideration, the merits of his administration. For if it is prosperous, its prosperity must flow either directly from the measures of the government, or virtually from the government having abstained from every measure calculated to check the natural progress of the country.

Let the appeal then be carried to the conscience of every honest man by requiring a true answer to the following questions.

Is there a political right dear to free men that has been invaded during Mr. Jefferson's Administration?

Is there at present a man being who can justly affirm that he is not in the actual enjoyment of all the liberty that is compatible with a good government?

Has the right of suffrage, in any part of the union, been abridged?

Has it not, on the contrary, been greatly extended?

Have the broad principles of religious liberty in a single instance been violated?

Has the property of any one been invaded?

Is there not, at this moment, the securest enjoyment of liberty, religion and property?

Has there been any increase of public burthens?

On the contrary, has there not been a great reduction of them connected with a redemption of thirty millions of the public debt?

Has not the quota of taxes paid by each individual sensibly diminished, so much so, that at present only one dollar and sixty cents are annually paid, while at the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration two dollars and eighteen cents were annually paid by each individual?

Have not the numbers of our people increased in as rapid a ratio, as has ever before been known on the face of the earth, and is not this an unequivocal evidence of prosperity?

Has not our wealth increased in the same, if not in an accelerated ratio?

Has the labourer, during the whole of Mr. Jefferson's administration, wanted employment, or the capitalist been unable to find objects for a lucrative business?

Have not monied institutions, evincive of the great accumulation of riches, sprung up in every part of the union; and have they not all prospered?

Have not the arts that contribute to comfort risen with unexpected vigor, and those that embellish life evinced a sensible progress?

Do we not ourselves, as well as the whole civilized world, consider our national existence, liberty and prosperity as placed upon firmer foundations than were thought to support them at the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration?

Is there an American citizen, or intelligent foreigner, that will admit that our situation, compared with that of any other nation, is happy and even enviable?

Finally, is there an American, who can put his hand on his heart, and affirm that the situation of his country is less prosperous now than at the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration he expected it would be?

These various questions admit of but one reply, which proves the existence of a solid internal prosperity,

that, it may be safely pronounced, has never been the lot of any other people.

A nation thus prosperous within may bid defiance to foreign injustice. Its posterity is indeed abundant proof of its invulnerability, and, consequently (whatever delusion may temporarily prevail,) of the impotence of the folly that sports with its feelings and tramples upon its rights.

FROM THE AURORA.

SCENE OF A NATIONAL BANK.

Let an act of Congress pass, establishing one general and national bank, and assuming the stock of all private banks, with their capital and debts due.

Let the stockholders first draw 6 per cent, and then half the surplus, not exceeding 3 per cent.—the remaining surplus to go to the use of the government.

The directors to be appointed, one fourth by the president, and the rest elected by the stockholders within the states.

Every deposit of cash to draw 3 per cent, interest, whether it be private or public property, with a privilege to take stock at the end of one year, at a price to be fixed at the preceding annual term by Congress, and the profits of the sale of new stock to go to the use of the government.

[Minor details omitted.]

The benefits arising out of such an establishment are many and important. In the first place, an interest of perhaps 3 per cent, on 100,000,000 of dollars, would go to the national treasury, or 300,000 per annum.—In the next place the string of inconveniences arising from having so many different kinds of paper in circulation as there are banks, would be avoided, whilst the alarms of one bank suffering a ruin from others would cease, and all doubts about the safety and security of bank paper would soon be forgotten, and this paper become the entire medium, giving stability to government finances, and attachment to monied interests. Nor is it of small importance to bring this subject within the grasp of the general government, if only to prevent the abuse into which it will surely run from the increase of banking institutions, from rival states, towns and persons carrying the banking business to excess, and from being more difficult to detect counterfeiters, where the kinds of paper medium are so numerous and various.

Three millions annually to the treasury, with the other public and private advantages being of serious concern to the nation—it remains to enquire what are the objections to it. Will the present stockholders refuse to surrender their charters and blend their interest in hodge podge?

Without entering into the inducements which stockholders would find in a general amalgamation of bank stock, under the fostering influence of government—I shall consider the power of congress to force them to acquiesce, or cease to be stockholders; there choice would therefore be the result of necessity, or choice of the lesser evil, which, if not the most pleasant, is always the most sure ground to go upon.

It is well known that before and during the revolution, bills of credit were emitted by the states and by congress, solely for the public benefit and no such thing as banks suffered. These bills of credit supported the state and general governments, and would have supported the war, but for the excesses of the emissions, which reduced its value, and finally sunk it into no value, which though not without its advantages to the public, fell very heavy on the monied interest. That, at the formation of the general constitution for the union, it was thought prudent to take from the states the right to issue bills of credit; in order to prevent such another catastrophe—hence, we find it provided in section 10, article 1, "No state shall coin money, emit bills of credit," &c. Here then it is clearly unconstitutional for a state to emit bills of credit—and by inference of sound policy what cannot be done directly, cannot indirectly. It therefore only remains to examine if a bank note be a bill of credit, to determine whether the charters granted to the banking companies by the states are valid. To try this question, suppose the states to issue a paper currency in the words of a bank note, would such paper be constitutional? As this question is answered, it will follow either that the charters are void, or the states have shamefully thrown a very important interest from the people into the hands of a monied few, and which indirectly violates the provisions of the state constitutions, which declares that all laws shall be equal, and yet suffers these chartered stockholders to draw 8, 10, or 12 per cent, while other laws forbid more than 6, under the penalty of forfeiture and fine.

I cannot, however, think it necessary to consume time in proving what must be too clear to need proof; that a bank note, or any piece of paper purporting that the bearer shall receive the nominal amount is a bill of credit, no matter what the words are—or that what a state cannot do in its capacity as a state, it cannot do by third persons, and consequently that every charter granted is unconstitutional and void.

It then follows to enquire, if such is the case, can congress grant a charter, and ought congress to do so?

The constitution has no where given, in express language, the power to emit bills of credit—But it has given impliedly all the powers which the states are debarred from using, and expressly the power to provide for the general welfare; to borrow money; to coin money; to punish counterfeiting, &c. Although it is clear the right of congress is better than the right of the states, yet if a doubt existed, there is no doubt but an amendment might be had to give the power expressly. Because it is for the general and particular welfare that banking should go on—and it is an insufferable abuse to give corporate associations exclusive privileges at the expence of the people.

The sum that government could gain in this way, would be adequate to build a navy; fortify the union; canal and turnpike the union, or give general education to the poor.

Shall then these very important national benefits all be neglected; or be sunk at the footstool of a monied aristocracy, already too proud, and who keep their property beyond taxation, and themselves out of the way of public service?

It is pleasing to reflect that the honest part of the federalists are shaking off their prejudices against their own government, and uniting with the Republicans in support of the present administration: and indeed, how can it be otherwise? If they ever mean to escape from federal deception and delusion, they will escape now. There is no other alternative. They must either relinquish all claims to the name of Americans, or justify the British, join the Essex Junta, and openly declare "Great Britain has done us no essential injury"—notwithstanding she has impressed our seamen, violated our maritime jurisdiction, murdered our citizens in time of peace, insulted our government, and perfidiously disavowed the act of her authorized minister. It is not possible for a man to be a real American, and justify such accumulated wrongs. If Americans can ever be roused, they will be roused now. The British faction who cryed down the embargo, non-intercourse, and every measure that could protect the nation against British outrage, will soon become as obnoxious to the people, as were the old Tories and refugees of '75.—*Boston Chron.*

We are happy to find that the delusion and infatuation which existed among the federal citizens of the New England States in consequence of the pressure of the Embargo, &c. which the enemies of our government took infinite pains to represent as an oppressive and unconstitutional measure, is fast passing away. The late elections in Rhode Island and Vermont fully demonstrate the fact. We congratulate our republican fellow citizens on the glorious result of these elections, as well as on the great change which has taken place in the minds of the people of this state in consequence of the perfidy of the British government; so that we can calculate almost with certainty, that the next spring elections will give a large majority of votes for the Patriotic Farmer *Lincoln*, Esq. for governor—who the last spring received the free, unaided suffrages of Forty five Thousand FREEMEN, notwithstanding the then federal song of Gore and Free Trade—Gore and no Embargo!—which has now lost its charm. *Id.*

The Policy of Bonaparte contrasted with that of England—copied from the Edinburgh Review, Number 25, October, 1808.

BONAPARTE bends all his force to effect some grand operation in one quarter. Upon the late of the cause in that quarter every thing else hinges in the most distant scenes. Upon this single view of the subject is built the constant, steady, masterly, resistless policy of Bonaparte, from the attack of a post up to the combination of entire campaigns. Examine his battles and indeed those of all the great commanders of France, and we shall find that the plan of each engagement is similar to the general system of his military policy. They direct a vast column to one well chosen point; break through the line in that quarter; defeat the neighboring parts of it, and the rest falls before them.

Suppose he means to gain several objects in different parts of his extensive dominions. For example, to drive the English out of Portugal—to reduce the King of Sweden to an amicable acknowledgement of his title—to expel the Neapolitans from the Continent, or defend his new kingdom, Italy—to take a province or two from

the German prince—to punish, perhaps, the King of Prussia. Now if Bonaparte's counsellors were taken from the English political cast, it is very plain what method he would adopt to gain all those points. He would in the first place take care to make war without the shadow of a pretence, and put himself clearly in the wrong before all Europe; he would next delay doing any thing until the season for operations was nearly gone by; he would then probably treat a little, and be duped by his allies, and civil and wrangle a good deal, and quarrel with some of them, and excite a hatred with all of them, and of himself, and a contempt of his plan, among his own subjects. But all these preliminaries of failure being settled, he would at last come to his operations; and his policy would be to get up a number of neat little expeditions, equal in number to the things he wants to take, just one for each thing. He would send an expedition towards Sweden; and the sea not being his element, it would probably fail of itself. He would then send a tolerably large and intolerably expensive expedition to some port of Germany—and another towards Italy—a smaller expedition to Portugal—a nice little one to take a slice off Bavaria—besides a sort of by expedition to plunder Hamburg, and burn, for stage effect, some other capital in alliance with him, merely to astonish people and look vigorous.

Instead of enquiring what would probably be the result of all this drivelling, which is indeed too plain to require any statement, let us remark rather how Bonaparte does act, not having English politicians to advise him. He leaves Naples alone; if Joseph can support himself well; if not, he will restore him after the campaign is won. He leaves Sicily alone, filled with English troops, who are just as usefully employed for him, as if he had them in his depot of prisoners—filled too with the squabbles and intrigues of his faithful allies the old royal sovereigns and courtiers of Europe. Portugal he leaves to the English army, there assembled for the precise purpose of doing all sorts of nothings against him. He cares not if the English are mad enough to make a descent on Calabria in his absence, or childish enough, because it may have a partial success, to reward those who ventured on so useless an enterprise, instead of calling them to an instantaneous and severe account. All other objects of subordinate importance, he leaves in like manner to themselves. The Swede is allowed to strut his little hour of squibs, manifestoes, and bulletins. The Turk is un molested; except by his allies, Egypt is occupied by none but English forces. Eager for ships, colonies and commerce, he defies all trading speculations till the season of victory and peace; nor envies at all the plunder of the rajahs of the east, nor once throws away a thought on all the sugars of the west. But his game is not the less sure for being more contracted in its sphere. He singles out the vital part of his whole adversary, and the point of it which is most exposed. In that vulnerable part he plants his dagger; and he knows full well, that the remotest limb will quiver, with the shock. He sends forth his host in the plenitude of its array, to sweep over the interjacent regions, and to pour itself in one grand, deep, but contracted and therefore irresistible torrent, into the center of the strength of Europe. Here, as near Berlin and Vienna as he can he fights his battle; and while you are menacing the western departments—or landing and re-embarking in Italy—or capitulating in Holland—or idling in Portugal and Egypt—or butchering your friends in the north—or burying your own men and planting the slave trade in the West-Indies—he is playing that great game which must place in his hands the sweep of all those small stakes for which you are pretending to throw. Do you doubt whether he shall win the game he plays for? If you do, why then don't you send your men there to meet him? Think you that he even doubts of his success? It may be that he does—but he knows, that the only way to gain it is to think of nothing else than victory, and at any rate, to think of no other contest than this; above all, he feels, the folly of being either victorious, or vanquished in a little way. He knows, that if he conquers the Imperial or the Prussian arms in the center of the empire, he shall find no difficulty in carrying all the other points—no trouble but in preventing the escape of your forces from the little posts which they have been senselessly occupying; and, if he should be overcome in Germany he must make up his mind, not merely to the loss of those petty objects, but to being overcome in Germany—to the utter ruin of his foreign power. Plain and simple as this consideration is, and constantly as we have seen him act upon it, we have never yet been able to profit by his example, and by the sight of those victories which he has achieved, so as to alter, in the very least degree, our own fatal policy towards all our allies.

AMERICAN MANUFACTURES.

It is highly pleasing to observe the spirit prevailing in various parts of the U. States to encourage our internal manufactures.—There is nothing more calculated to check the insolence of foreign nations, especially England, than a vigorous exertion to furnish ourselves with such articles as we have so long been in the habit of importing from them. The raw materials within our country can be more beneficially used at home, than sent abroad to employ the people of other nations: our labor can be as useful to ourselves as to them. The population of the U. S. is adequate to all the purposes of agriculture and manufactures, if brought into proper operation. But the failure has been, that we have not apportioned the employment of our citizens to those various