

Text of Gen. Eisenhower's Speech Attacking Administration Defense Program

By the Associated Press
BALTIMORE, Sept. 26.—Following is the text of an address prepared by Gen. Eisenhower for delivery last night at a Republican rally here:

I want to talk with you tonight about the defense of our country. I want to talk with you about getting the most defense at least cost with least delay.

Our people's need for a stout defense is beyond debate. I pledge to you here and to you in your homes everywhere that we who are engaged in this crusade for good government will see to it that America is safe.

The real problem is to build this defense with wisdom and efficiency. We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle.

Public debate on this subject above all others must be candid and fair. The 156 million Americans whose lives and livelihood are at stake are entitled to and must have the plain truth. I propose to give it to them.

Here are the three personal convictions that I hold to be true:

First, our defense program has suffered from lack of far-sighted direction. Second, real unification of our armed forces is yet to be achieved. Third, our defense program need not and must not push us steadily toward economic collapse.

Critical of Lack of Imagination, Firmness

A large part of what I will have to say tonight is essentially critical, although I hope constructively so. By this criticism I do not intend to belittle the abilities and devotion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other thousands of men and women in uniform and in civilian clothes in our Defense Department. They are among the best, if not the best, of their kind in the world. What I do mean to criticize is routine in planning and operation, failure to establish clean-cut line of authority, and failure in preparatory work to combine industrial and military leadership. Finally, I mean to criticize lack of imagination and firmness in the over-all political direction which guides all security planning.

Some of our trouble has nothing to do with the politics of the present. We have never been a military-minded people. In time of peace, we have always cut the military establishment to the bone, then to the marrow. In time of war, we have said, "let the professional soldier take care of it." This attitude has encouraged the military, accustomed to famine, to try to take advantage of crisis. Resulting frenzied expansion has meant disorder and duplication and waste. It has meant an attempt by our air force to buy 20,000 super de luxe desk chairs at \$10 above the standard model. It has meant our Navy laying in a 50-year supply of anchors all at once. It has meant our Army buying enough front-axle gas tanks for jeeps to last a full century.

This pattern has been bad enough in the past. In today's world of continuing tension, it is intolerable. For we no longer have clear, precise lines between a time of peace and a time of war. We have to live and work and plan in a twilight zone between the two. Complexity creates confusion everywhere. Generals who used to be trained to concentrate on military decisions feel compelled to consider economic factors. Those civilians who should exercise authority in military matters feel hesitant because of their lack of specialized knowledge and experience. In threatened emergency, Congress is reluctant to question the demands of the military. When no emergency threatens, the entire subject is sadly neglected. And so there is shadow-boxing with the problems that crowd our twilight existence.

Must Face Issue of Security With Solvency

Against this background we must face the over-riding issue of security with solvency. We must analyze the details of that issue specifically, straight-forwardly and promptly. For next November, the American people are electing leaders not for just another ordinary term, but for years of decisive destiny.

The critical fact we must face is this: The cost of security today amounts to 75 per cent of our enormous National budget. This means high taxes. Beyond this, the Administration finds in this fact its alibi for its inflation and deficits and for the strain put upon our whole economy.

Can this burden be lightened without endangering National security?

A Democratic Administration, stale and self-satisfied from being too long in power, complacently says: No, nothing can be done.

That is not an American answer. Our answer is: Yes, much can be done. Let us begin with the fundamentals of the budget. Out of the \$80 billion our Government is spending this year, a few items like the \$6 billion for interest on the National debt can't be reduced. From the other \$74 billion for non-defense purposes, real savings can be made by the employment of business-like practices in a clean administration.

But the big spending is, of course, the \$60 billion we pay for national security. Here is where the largest savings can be made. And these savings must be made without reduction of defensive power. That is exactly what I am now proposing. To accomplish this will require the help of civilian leaders—business, labor and professional—who really know



EISENHOWER GETS A NEW WEAPON—Baltimore.—With one hand firmly grasping a real Irish shilleagh given him by Maryland's Gov. McKeldin, Gen. Eisenhower waves a hearty greeting to an armory crowd. —Star Staff Photo by Gene Abbott.

their jobs. Their wisdom and experience must be combined with the wisdom and experience of military men from the three services to get satisfactory results. They must have the full support of the President and enjoy the confidence of Congress.

Problems in Departments Can Be Controlled

To begin so comprehensive an overhauling, we need an Administration—a new Administration that will call a halt to stop-and-start planning; an Administration that will not demobilize and then hurriedly remobilize; an Administration that will not swing from optimism to panic; and an Administration that will plan for the future on something more solid than yesterday's headlines.

This kind of a new Administration, by restoring the pride of Americans in their Government, will be able to command a cross section of this country's best brains and best judgment, under attack by men and women of this caliber, the problems of the Defense Department and of our other departments and agencies can, I believe, be brought under control.

Just let me give you one example of the kind of thing that Americans want changed. The bungling involved in the creation of our Morocco air bases.

We need bases in Morocco. We have needed them ever since the Soviet Union made clear that it had no intention of letting the world return to real peace for a long, long time. To build bases of this type, economically, takes two to three years.

What did we do? We did not start on these bases at the time Soviet intentions became clear. We waited until 1951, six months after the war in Korea broke out. After all this foot dragging, the Administration then insisted on a "crash program"—get it done fast, whatever the cost. The result is this: We got two bases for the cost of five.

This instance is a symptom of deep, continuing failure: Failure to harness military plans to a coherent political program. As a consequence, our defense planning has swung full circle—through all the complexities of demobilization back through the costs, the waste and the human confusion of partial remobilization.

The running warfare between Congress and the White House has made such blundering even more costly to us Americans. Both must share mutual confidence and common purpose. The co-operation must be sparked by executive leadership.

Civilian Superiors Sometimes By-Passed

We have had little of such leadership. Special interests in the armed services have repeatedly been carrying their appeals to Congress—sometimes without knowledge of any of their civilian superiors. Supplemental appropriations by Congress have been vetoed, passed over a veto, and sometimes held back by the President. Service disagreements have become public brawls.

This is not a partisan judgment. Our failures have been painstakingly documented in the reports of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, headed by a Democrat. Speaking only of the buildup of our Air Forces, that subcommittee summed it up just three weeks ago in these words: "A saga of bad programming, neglected warnings, lack of co-ordination, abuse, misuse and disuse of power."

That is how another Democrat describes a part of the Washington mess. As, in the last few days, I have said of our foreign policy, as I have said of our problems

of inflation, so I say of our defense program: I do not recite this list of failures with any partisan pleasure. I cite them because they are failures too long hidden from the public. I cite them also because the next administration must promptly begin setting things right.

Our defense planning for the next four years will demand the best that is in us. The great and continuing struggle of the world today coincides in history with a real revolution in weapons and ways of defense. We are all—even the most professional soldier—somewhat awed by the facts before us. We all know the catalogue of wonders science has lately written: Atomic energy, guided missiles, jet transportation spanning the world in magnificent contempt of mountains, seas and deserts.

No less sobering is the realization that these awesome weapons can be wielded by some of the least skilled peoples of the world. The peoples of Asia in a short time have learned the difference between the oxcart and the airplane. Our jet pilots in Korea find nothing "backward" in the skill of Chinese pilots—if indeed they are all Chinese pilots—flying their MIGs into combat at speeds almost as fast as sound itself.

New Approach Needed To Meet Challenge

To meet the challenge of these fast-moving events, we must have a new approach.

First: We must press for a weapons program that is realistic. We cannot pretend to do everything in every field all of the time. Any attempt to do so

will waste as much skill as money. For this reason, our judgment in weapon development must be sure and sound and related to tactical needs. To do this, the professional fighting man requires the advice and knowledge of both industry and labor.

Whenever a new weapon comes from the laboratories, all services—sometimes understandably—demand the right to use it. Stranger than this is the almost inevitable demand of each service to do the research, development and production work on new weapons. Each believes that it can do the work better. In this matter prompt adjudication among the services is mandatory—otherwise you will find all three engaged in spending public money for a single need.

Second: To save money and increase efficiency we must emphasize simplicity in design. Back in 1948, when I submitted my final report as Chief of Staff, I wrote as follows: "A program for research and design of new equipment is an obvious necessity, but simplicity should be stressed more than has been

our practice in the past. We Americans are inclined to confuse the biggest, most complicated and most durable with the best. Whereas in war, the simple and expandable weapon, may, in the light of time and production facilities, be the most satisfactory." I could write the same today.

Modern war teaches one sure lesson that today's best weapon is out of date tomorrow. The progress of science wars against putting too much confidence into today's best weapon for soon it may be obsolete.

Third: More civilian personnel and direction must be called into the weapons production program. In this field again it is impossible for the professional to make the exclusive judgment. The interplay of labor, tax, production and economic factors requires a pooling of expert civilian advice.

Status of Unification Brings Triplication

All that I have said about how to save money and avoid waste in the weapons program applies with equal force to

other parts of the defense program. This brings us to the supremely important matter of unification of the armed forces. When I became Chief of Staff, upon my return from Europe in November of 1945, I felt that all our war experience had rendered obsolete the defense organization then existing. I was convinced then, as I am today, that effective co-ordination of the services in war requires central planning in time of peace. This is the essence of unity in the armed forces. That unity must also extend to the procurement and administration of all the costly material and paraphernalia of modern warfare. It was the hope and expectation of all of us who had worked to achieve the passage of the National Defense Act of 1947, that this kind of unity was in the making.

This has not proved to be the case. Such unity as we have achieved is too much form and too little substance. We have continued with a loose way of operating that wastes time, money and talent with equal generosity. With three services, in place of the former two, still going their separate ways and with an overall defense staff frequently unable to enforce corrective action, the end result has been not to remove duplication but to replace it with triplication.

All this must be brought to as swift an end as possible. Neither our security nor our solvency can permit such a way of conducting the crucial business of national defense.

Our task, however, goes still further than this. We must critically review the political policies governing our military program and we must review that military program itself in all its significant details. To this end I now make two major proposals.

The first is this: At the earliest possible date next year, the new Administration should create a commission of the most capable civilians in our land to study the operations of our Department of Defense. These men and women should, of course, be specifically qualified for their tasks. They should, I believe, be drawn from both parties, so that all matters of national security may clearly be placed beyond party politics. These men and women should be assisted by the ablest officers available from all services—Air Force, Army, Navy and the Marine Corps.

Must Not Again Send Untrained Into Battle

The mandate of such a commission should include the whole matter of military manpower. Our recruiting for the armed services must be done in the fairest, most economical way to fit the demonstrated needs of the Nation and the individual. We must never again be caught in the position of sending untrained recruits to the battle field. That is a murderous mistake, as every soldier knows. But it seems clear that so long as we are forced to employ the draft, because of actual combat requirements, we cannot at the same time establish any form of training for our young men. To

attempt this would create more difficulty and injustice than now exists. My second proposal relates to the National Security Council. This body is charged by law with high-level planning for the security of the Nation. We have seen how that planning has failed time and again these last years. The failure of this agency to do the job for which it was set up—to make the right plans in time—produces waste on the grand scale. I believe that membership in the National Security Council should not be limited to Cabinet officers and heads of administrative agencies. These men are already burdened by the duties of their own offices. The National Security Council, as presently constituted, is more a shadow agency than a really effective policy maker. That, I believe, can be corrected by appointing to it civilians of the highest capacity, integrity and dedication to public service. They should have no other official duties. If the principle of rotation were applied to the citizens filling these posts, a fresh point of view would be constantly brought to the council's deliberations. Thus, we would help transform this agency from shadow to substance.

No Magic Formula for Security and Solvency

There is no slick slogan, no magic formula, to give us the combination we need—security and solvency. But intelligence and determination can show us the way. My sober conviction is that action along the lines I have indicated, in the absence of radical change in world conditions, will soon begin to reduce expenditures and eliminate the Federal deficit. This is a first step toward tax reduction.

The program I have outlined demands skilled and purposeful leadership. It demands harmony and understanding between the executive and legislative branches of our Government. It will demand an end to what the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee has called

"abuse, misuse and disuse of power." Before us lies the realistic promise of achieving both military strength and economic strength. This is the only way to make secure the freedom that so proudly we hail. If the experience of 40 years in the military service of my country can help bring security with solvency to my fellow citizens, I am yours to command.

WHEELING, W. Va., Sept. 26.—A spokesman for Senator Nixon said yesterday the Senator's \$18,000 political expense fund, which caused such a furor in the presidential campaign is now dead.

In answer to a reporter's inquiry, the spokesman said: "It has been clearly stated that this was a fund solely to enable the Senator to carry out necessary political work while he was a Senator. The fund definitely is not applicable now."

"Supporters wanted to provide a fund for the vice presidential campaign, but he declined it."

The spokesman said about \$11,000 had been contributed to Senator Nixon's campaign for vice president by about the same group that provided the earlier money. He said the Senator is not going to use it and it still is in the hands of Dana Smith of Pasadena, Calif., trustee for the Senatorial fund.

The spokesman also was asked if Senator Nixon would start another fund should he find his pay and expense account as vice president were not enough to cover his activities.

"The spokesman replied: 'In view of the Senator's clearly defined position, there is no need for comment on this type of question.'"

Danube Opened to Austria

Austria, the Soviet says, now may extend river traffic through the entire stretch of the Danube flowing through the Soviet zone.

S.W. Rice
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