CONGRESS.

SENATE.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1851.

Mr. HAMLIN. I have received a memorial signed by D. L. Milliken, Wm. Milliken, J. H. Haines, and other residents of Burnham, in the county of Waldo, in the State of Maine, asking for the repeal or modification of the fugitive slave law; and inasmuch as the subject of that law is before the Committee on the Judiciary, I move that this memorial be referred to that Committee.

The motion was agreed to.

The petition was in the following terms:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

Whereas Congress, at its late session, did pass a bill entitled "An act to amend and supplementary to an act entitled an act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters," approved February 12, 1793, which said enactment was approved by the President September 18, 1850:

We, the undersigned, residents of the town of Burnham, in the county of Waldo and State of Maine, regarding that act as in conflict with the constitution of the United States, and also as infringing upon the duties which we owe to benevolence to humanity, and to God, and being unwilling to comply with its requisitions or submit to its penalties, earnestly ask its speedy repeal or modification.

Mr. BUTLER. I have no objection myself that any of these petitions should go to the Committee on the Judiciary. Most of them have been laid on the table, though I know that some have found their way to that committee. But I give notice that I shall have nothing to do with them. There are gentlemen of that committee who may take charge of this petition, if they think proper; but I give this notice because it is perfectly immaterial to me whether that law is modified or not.

Mr. ATCHISON subsequently rose and said: May I inquire what was the character of the memorial which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary?

The PRESIDENT. It was a memorial for the repeal or modification of the fugitive slave law.

Mr. ATCHISON. I move, then, that the vote by which it was referred to the committee be reconsidered. I make the motion, because I can see no good reason why a memorial presented by the Senator from Maine, upon the subject of the repeal of that law, should not be laid upon the table, as well as those of a similar character which were presented by the Senator from New York (Mr. SEWARD) or the Senator from New Hampshire, (Mr. HALE.)

Mr. HAMLIN. It is known to all that I have presented various petitions of a somewhat similar character, and that I have myself moved to lay them on the table, not because I believed it was right, but because that was in accordance with a determination of the Senate. This is a memorial which asks for a modification of that law, and I believe the Committee on the Judiciary have a bill now before them for that purpose; and coming from such a respectable source as this memoral did, asking for a modification of that law, signed by members of the State Senate and others who have been members of our executive council and State Legislature, and others of our most worthy citizens, in the discharge of my duty I could not do otherwise than to ask that the memorial may receive as favorable consideration as those which ask the Senate to consider a bill which has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Evenhanded justice requires that such a course should be pursued.

The PRESIDENT. On looking at the memorial, the Chair finds that the names are on several pieces of paper pasted to a printed petition at the top. Whether it was there when the paper was signed originally cannot be ascertained from the paper itself.

Mr. FOOTE. I think the Senator from Maine is mistaken as to the character of the measure, if he refers to the bill introduced by the Senator from Indiana, (Mr. BRIGHT.) I believe the bill to which the Senator refers does not propose to alter the law, but simply to declare what the late law was. For my own part, recognising what we have done as a definitive settlement, I cannot vote for any thing that will tend to renew agitation. I therefore move to lay the subject on the table.

The PRESIDENT. The proposition is to reconsider the vote by which the memorial was referred to the committee.

Mr. FOOTE. Very well; then I withdraw my motion.

Mr. CHASE. I think the Senator from Mississippi is mistaken as to the character of the bill introduced by the Senator from Indiana, (Mr. BRIGHT.) It does not propose to explain the late law, for it does not need any explanation, and I hardly think that any explanation which might be given to it would amount to much if it did. But it proposes to revive the old law so far as to enforce the penalties which are imposed by it, inasmuch as the district court of Indiana have decided that the law of 1850 repealed the law of 1793 as far as that is concerned. The district court of Indiana has so decided.

Mr. FOOTE. I think not.

Mr. CHASE. Well, it is feared that the district court of Indiana will so decide.

Mr. FOOTE. I understood the Senator from Indiana to say that it was simply a matter of disputation there, and, being so, it was looked upon as desirable that the proper interpretation of the law should be fixed. I do not understand that there has been any adjudication, or that there was any serious apprehension that the courts of Indiana would not decide as they will be bound to decide ultimately.

The PRESIDENT. The question is on reconsidering the vote by which the memorial was referred, and not the bill presented by the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. CHASE. I am aware of the state of the question, and I did not mean to trespass on the rules of the Senate at all. I think it may be proper to say that if no such decision has been made, there has been, as stated by the Senator from Mississippi, an apprehension that such a decision may be made. The act of 1850 provides for heavy penalties, much greater than those of the act of 1793, and being upon the same subject-matter, it is supposed that it may be repealed.

I pass from that subject. That bill, however, whatever may be the character of it, has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. There is now a petition, vouched for by the Senator from Maine as coming from gentlemen of the very first character in his State, praying for similar objects; and I submit to the Senate, without a single word of observation further, whether they are prepared to make a distinction between memorials, petitions, and bills upon one side of this subject and those upon the other side?

Mr. SEWARD. Mr. President, the record of the Senate shows this to be the character of its past action on this subject: That when a petition relating to the laws concerning fugitives from service was presented it was referred, if its object was to render these laws *more stringent* than they are now adjudicated to be. A bill the effect of which is to increase the rigors of the law, has received a reference. Petitions for the amendment of these laws, so as to render them *less rigorous*, are denied a reference. That is one discrepancy. The record shows another, viz. that when a petition is submitted to the Senate, on the motion of a Senator from Pennsylvania, praying even for an amelioration or a repeal of these laws, it receives a reference. When a petition for precisely the same object is presented by a Senator from New York, it is denied a reference.

I shall vote against the reconsideration of the reference which has been made, as well because I am in favor of equal and exact justice to both sides of this question, as because it is my duty to insist upon equal and exact justice from the Senate to all its members. But I shall vote against the reconsideration for another reason. For the reason that I think it most injudicious and most unwise to deny a reference to a petition of any class of citizens of the United States, whether they be such as those who have sent here the petition now presented by the honorable Senator from Maine, consisting of what has been called here the *elite* of society, or whether it be sent here by plain, unassuming republican citizens. I hold that all are entitled to equal legislative respect and consideration, and I never stop to inquire to which of the two classes petitioners belong. I never have obtruded upon the Senate the character, title, or rank of any person whose name was annexed to a petition relating to the present subject presented by myself.

But there is still another reason that I am glad to have an opportunity to state; and that is, that if the object of the Senate be to suppress agitation, in my poor judgment they take exactly the wrong course to do it. For years upon years the Congress of the United States, in one or other branch, refused, in one form or another, to receive and consider petitions on the subject of slavery. The effect was a denial of the right of petition. History, I think, has settled the point, that that denial of the right of petition increased the agitation on the subject of slavery instead of diminishing it. Now, I hold it to be precisely the same in effect, whether the Senate shall refuse to receive the petition and reject the petitioners from their doors, or whether they shall go through the formality of receiving the petition, laying it upon the table, and denying it reference and consideration. Whatever my opinion, then, of the merits of petitions may be, I am in favor, when they are respectful, of giving them not only a hearing, but a consideration.

But I desire to state further upon this subject, that I am in favor of receiving these petitions for the purpose of consideration and legislative action. The Congress of the United States at the last session attempted to do this thing——

The PRESIDENT. The Senator understands the question before the Senate, does he not?

Mr. SEWARD. Certainly, sir, I do. I am speaking of the fugitive slave bill of the last session, which is the subject of the present memorial; a law which attempted, by very vigorous enactments, to enforce upon the free States of this Union the domestic and social economy of the slave States; an experiment which I believe has reacted and will continue to react upon the institution of slavery itself. It is of the same class of legislation as that which demanded in Great Britain a conformity in religion on the part of the Catholic population of Ireland to the Protestant ceremonies and the religion of England. I believe such experiments will fail, and I believe so because they are not founded in true political philosophy, in what constitutes the true political philosophy of this Government, which should treat the States of this Union as being entrusted with the management of their own domestic concerns, and should leave the sentiments, and, as far as possible, the domestic institutions of the States to the care of the States themselves; and, where uniformity cannot be compelled, should be content without exacting entire harmony.

Whether these petitions are now referred and considered, or whether they shall be allowed to accumulate, as they will, in my humble judgment, continue to accumulate from session to session, the result will be that those who flatter themselves that they have arrested agitation will find that they have, by this very course, increased the agitation which it was their object to allay.

I may say this, sir, I am sure, because, although I have been distinguished on some occasions by the epithet of agitator, I happen to be at least one member of this body—how many others there are I do not know—who never introduce this agitating subject of slavery here, who have been content with the debates which were had upon it when it came legitimately before us in the form of bills requiring debate; bills which, in the process of legislation became, or might become laws. I am one who has never spoken on the subject in this house since the bills referred to became laws, and of whom it cannot be said that I have on any occasion, by speech, writing, or otherwise, addressed the people on the subject since those bills became laws. Sir, I claim then to be one of those who have been content to leave these measures to the scrutiny of the people, and to abide their judgment and the test of time and truth. I have added no codicils, and have none to add, to vary, enforce, or explain what I had occasion to say during the debates on these questions. Having thus no desire to interfere with the public investigation of these questions in any manner, but content to leave them to the examination of the people without interference on my own part, I may certainly be allowed to express my feelings on the present question. And I do therefore express my desire that the right of petition, whatever else we may do, may be respected and held sacred here; and for that reason especially, as well as for the others already stated, I shall vote against the reconsideration.

Mr. BERRIEN. I desire simply to say, that, as I understand the bill introduced by the Senator from Indiana, it is a bill which proposes to declare that the act of 1850 did not repeal the act of 1793. That is a very distinct proposition from the one contained in the memorial presented to the Senate. That seeks a modification of the act of 1850, and therefore throws open this subject to that agitation which it is desirable on all hands should be avoided. I trust that the motion of the Senator from Missouri will prevail, and that the memorial will be laid on the table, as those of a similar character have been.

Mr. BADGER. The distinction between the bill offered by the Senator from Indiana, as stated by the Senator from Georgia, (Mr. BERRIEN,) and the memorial under consideration, is clear and palpable. That was a bill the object of which was not to interfere with the provisions of the act of the last session, nor with the provisions of the act of 1793: but to declare—and very unnecessarily, as I think—that the act of the last session to amend the act of 1793 did not repeal the act of 1793. That is all. The bill proposes to touch the provisions of neither of these acts, but to declare the sense of Congress that the last act does not repeal the first. Still, Mr. President, I am extremely sorry that the Senator from Indiana introduced that bill. I was very sorry that the bill was not instantly laid on the table; for, although the distinction between the two cases is plain and obvious, I saw then, and stated to several of my friends, that subsequently propositions on the subject of this description would be brought before the Senate in consequence of the reception and reference of that bill.

I will say one word about the humbug concerning the right of petition. This we know, in connexion with the course taken by the two Houses of Congress, has been seized upon and made a subject of fruitful denunciation and discussion, and no small amount of mischief throughout the Northern portion of the United States, because a rule was adopted in the House of Representatives that the question of receiving such petitions should be laid upon the table; in other words, that the petition should not be received. We have now a new edition, and an extension of the right of petition; for, if I understand the Senator who last addressed the Senate, he considers that to lay the question of receiving a petition on the table, and to lay a petition on the table after it is received here, are, in substance, one and the same thing; each involving a particular denial of the right of petition. Then let us see what this leads to. According to the Senator, if we receive a petition or memorial, although the whole Senate may be of the opinion that nothing ought to be done with reference to the subject, we are obliged to refer it to a committee; for if we lay it on the table it is a refusal of the right of petition. We must refer it. Well, then, from a precisely similar course of reasoning, if the committee do not report, the Senate must require them to report, because a reference is made solely for the purpose of obtaining a report; and if they do not report, and the Senate do not compel them to report, it is, by the same process of reasoning, a denial of the right of petition.

Well, suppose the committee report a bill not in conformity with the prayer of the petition, and it is moved that that bill lie upon the table. According to the same reasoning upon this subject, that is equal to a violation of the right of petition; for it will be said: "What will you receive a petition, and have it referred, and a report made, and then treat the petitioners so contemptuously as not to consider it, but order it to lie on the table?"

Mr. President, that is what we habitually do. We receive memorials and petitions and we order them to lie on the table, or we refer them or not according to our sense of the necessity or propriety of the reference. And when we receive a petition, to say that we are bound to do any thing more, out of regard to the rights of the petitioners, is to say that when they think proper to petition or memorialize Congress on any subject, Congress is not only obliged to hear but to act upon it, and for aught I can see, to do what is desired.

Mr. BERRIEN. And substitute their judgment for our own.

Mr. BADGER. Yes, as the Senator from Georgia suggests, it is to substitute the judgment of the petitioners for our own. Now, Mr. President, we are told that if we pursue this course we shall promote agitation, and the Senator from New York is exceedingly solicitous to prevent it, and talks about the philosophy of government, or the philosophy of obligations. I think we have no need to involve ourselves in any intricacies of philosophy. Here is a law passed at the last session, and if the Senate are satisfied that the law ought to be suffered to stand until time and experience have tested its wisdom, its merits or demerits, then the Senate, with a due regard to the interests of the country and their own duty, dare not prematurely agitate a subject which they believe has been once closed; which would be otherwise unjust and offensive to the public itself, and injurious to the public interests. The agitation of the subject in an unfriendly and hostile manner now, would be to reopen the agitation of the subject before there has been an opportunity for the public to know whether the measure is wise and good or not. It therefore seems to me that this question has nothing to do with the right of petition, unless the right of petition be the right to compel this body to consider and act upon a subject irrespective of its own judgment of its propriety. I shall vote for the reconsideration of the motion by which this memorial was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary with the intention of voting to lay the memorial on the table, because I believe its consideration will be injurious, and cannot be beneficial. In the exercise of my own judgment I feel that I have invaded the privileges or rights of no portion of the citizens of the United States.

Mr. BRADBURY. I regard the decision of this question of no great practical importance, whether the vote of reference be reconsidered or the memorial be left with the committee to which it has been referred. The Judiciary Committee has the subject fully before it at the present time—as fully without this petition as it can be with it. A petition of the same character as this was referred some months ago, and the committee have agreed upon a report upon that petition. The bill introduced by the honorable Senator from Indiana was referred in like manner, and the committee have also agreed upon a report.

Perhaps it may be well that I should take the occasion to add that the committee deem any legislation upon the whole subject inexpedient. It can, then, make no practical difference whether the petition is referred or not. The first petition which was laid on the table was so disposed of, amongst other reasons, for the purpose of stopping useless debate. It was known that the morning business was interrupted by unnecessary and prolonged discussion on this subject, to the exclusion of all other business. I voted to make that disposition of such petitions, and shall do it again under like circumstances.

Now a different question is presented; a petition has already been referred, and the motion is to reconsider the vote of reference; if the petition had been suffered to remain with the committee there would have been the end of it. If, however, the motion to reconsider is pressed, we know not how long the discussion may be continued, nor how much of the time of the Senate may be taken up in this unnecessary debate. I regret that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. ATCHISON) felt it to be his duty to make the motion to reconsider, and open the door to all this discussion; for the disposition of the petition which had been made could do no manner of injury. As I voted to lay petitions on the table to prevent a waste of time, so now, to put an end to this profitless discussion, I move that the motion of the Senator from Missouri be laid on the table.

Mr. BUTLER. Will the Senator withdraw that motion for a moment?

Mr. BRADBURY. Certainly, if the Senator will renew it.

Mr. BUTLER. I wish to make an explanation, as the Committee on the Judiciary has been pretty freely alluded to, and I have no doubt in good faith, by the Senator from Maine. When the subject came before the committee I positively refused to have any thing to do with it one way or the other. What has been done by the other members of the committee I know not; but I wish to make one explanation, that my course now and hereafter may be intelligible to the Senate. I did as much, or endeavored to do as much, and in good faith, as any Senator on this floor to arrest agitation on this subject. During the greater part of the last session, while others were casting impediments—for they were but impediments—in this stream of agitation, I publicly declared to the Senate that, so far as I was concerned, I should not from that time forth raise any opposition to any petition of such a character which might be introduced to this Senate; and I say now, in my closing remarks, that you might as well attempt to put a maniac asleep by lullabies as to restrain agitation on this subject.

Mr. HALE. I am exceedingly gratified by the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina on this subject, and I think there is a great deal of truth in them. But I want to call the attention of the Senate to this consideration in the disposition of this question. I take it it will be conceded by every body that it is desirable to have the laws which we pass, particularly our quiescent laws, uniform in their operation. I have not read all the papers, and I am not posted up upon the proceedings in all the States; but I do know that this law has operated differently in several States. I think I know how it has operated in three of the States, and a more diverse operation of a simple law cannot well be conceived. This is the reason why I think a little more legislation is needed. For instance, in New York a slave has been seized and sent back to his master and sold. I suppose that is carrying out the objects of the law to the full extent, in the minds of some. In Pennsylvania a freeman has been kidnapped and sent into slavery. That is the operation of the law in Pennsylvania; but it so happened that the man to whom the freeman was sent had more humanity than the law and the officers of the law, and he sent him back again to freedom. Come to Massachusetts, and what is the operation there? I learn by the newspapers received this morning that a slave has been arrested there under the law, and has been taken by a mob out of the United States court room and liberated. There is not much uniformity then in the operation of this law in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts; and I would suggest to the Senate whether, in consideration of the fact that there is not more uniformity in the operation of the law, a little more legislation is not desirable. It is possible we may wish to make the law a little more stringent. There is a distinction admitted between this petition and the bill of the honorable Senator from Indiana; but I think the honorable Senator from North Carolina exceedingly unfortunate in his illustration, because he says the bill of the honorable Senator from Indiana was to declare what was the meaning of the law of 1850, whereas this petition is for an alteration of the law. I trust it is too late in the day for the Senate of the United States to undertake to adjudicate as to what was the legal effect of the act passed a year ago. I think the Supreme Court would be justified in sending an injunction against our proceeding any further in such a wild goose chase as that; because if there is any thing which belongs properly to the judicial department of this Government, it must be to consider the construction of a law passed a year ago. It belongs exclusively to the judiciary. But I think the argument of the Senator from North Carolina operates against the introduction of the bill of the Senator from Indiana, and in favor of the petition; because the petition is what we act upon, and the bill calls for action upon a subject which belongs to the prerogatives of the judiciary.

When we were discussing this subject a year ago, one of the most astute and clear-headed lawyers in the Senate, I mean my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. UNDERWOOD,) undertook to lay down a distinction between a petition which comes from those among whom it is to operate and one coming from those among whom it is not to operate. If the law is to operate upon the people who make the petition, or if it is to be executed amongst them, then clearly they have a right to petition, and consequently we are bound to receive their petition. Well, this is exactly the case This petition comes from a part of the country where the law is to go into operation, in the free States. It is to operate upon the citizens there. It imposes duties upon them, and puts them under heavy responsibilities, and therefore it comes within the case put by the Senator from Kentucky, where there is a clear obligation to receive the petition. That being the case, I trust we shall have the vote of the Senator from Kentucky against the reconsideration of the vote making the reference.

But much has been said by Senators on the right and left about the right of petition. Let me say that I do not attach much importance to the right of petition to this body. The right of petition should be to the people; and it is to them that I mean to make my appeal. I have tried it here enough to know that this is not the place; and if the people will listen to me I will tell them to spend their breath among themselves.

Some gentlemen seem to esclew the epithet of agitator. Sir, every thing valuable in the institutions we enjoy is the result of agitation, and it is only error that skulks from it; truth does not fear it. Instead of washing my hands of the charge of being an agitator, I glory in having done what little I have to merit the name in which O'Connell rejoiced, and to merit the name given to all those through whose exertions in times past, whenever a political reformation has been wrought out, it has come. Aye, sir, where there is no agitation there is stagnation, fœtid corruption, and death. But agitation is the great element of life; it was through agitation that the American revolution sprung into being; it was agitation which gave birth to the American constitution; it is the life and breath of every thing valuable, and when it ceases every thing worth having in our existence will die. Under the fœtid exhalations that will spring up from that putrefaction which must ensue when the life-giving element of agitation is withdrawn, all these will perish.

No, sir, I glory in the name of agitator; I wish the country might be agitated vastly more than it is. The great fault is that it is not agitated half enough. Thereare many errors which require agitation, and nobody but those who are hugging delusion and errors, fatal errors, have any thing to fear from that life-giving element which will impart its healing as did the waters of the pool at the beautiful gae of the temple. Nobody that stepped into that pool could be healed until the angel had gone down and stirred and agitated the waters.

Mr. BERRIEN. When the Senator from New Hampshire advises his coadjutors to transfer these speeches, calculated, if not intended, to produce excitement among the people of this Union, from the Senate chamber to the stump, it would have been gratifying if he had enforced his precept by his example. But I rise for the purpose of calling the attention of the Senate to the nature of the memorial which has produced this discussion. Unquestionably it was by an oversight that the vote of the Senate to refer it to the Judiciary Committee was taken. Sir, what is it? We are told that the signers of this paper are respectable persons. What evidence is there in the paper presented to the Senate that this memorial was ever signed by these individuals? Here are several sheets of paper on which names are inscribed, and on the top of these papers is pasted a memorial. There is not the slighest evidence upon the face of the paper that that memorial was ever subscribed by the individuals whose names are attached to it. And, sir, if they are of the respectable character which is given to them by the Senator from Maine, of which I will not permit myself to express, because I do not entertain a moment's doubt, the inference is a plain one that such men of respectable character have never signed such a petition. What is it? It states that you passed a law at the last session of Congress which violates the constitution of the country, which is in conflict with the duties which we owe to benevolence, to humanity, and to God; a law with the requisitions of which they are not willing to comply, and to the penalties of which they are not disposed to submit. It is this memorial, calling therefore for a modification or repeal of the fugitive slave law, which, by a vote of the Senate, is to be referred to the Judiciary Committee. And now, I pray you, what is the inquiry or what are the inquiries which that Committee is to make. We are to inquire if the Congress of the United States at the last session have passed a law in violation of the constitution, have passed a law violating the duties of benevolence and humanity, and the duty which we owe to God; we are to inquire whether these memorialists are bound by the requisitions of that law to submit to its requirements, or bear the infliction of its penalties. I ask whether this is such a memorial as ought to be referred by this Senate to one of its committees? I think, apart from all that has been said on this subject, the character of this memorial is one that forbids such a reference. I trust that the motion of the Senator from Missouri will prevail; that the subject will be reconsidered; and, since the memorial has been received, we shall do, from respect to ourselves, what that respect would have indicated if this suggestion had been made anterior to its reference, that we shall dispose of this memorial in the most summary manner possible. Such a memorial, if its substance had been known to the Senate, I trust, would not have been received; and the motion to reconsider having been made, I trust it will prevail.

Mr. FOOTE. After all that has been said, I do not deem it proper to occupy the attention of the Senate very long; but as a portion of the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire have not been responded to, I deem it expedient to give them a slight passing notice. The honorable Senator proclaims, what it was not necessary for him to have proclaimed—for all the world knows it—that he is an "agitator." He says he glories in the title of "an agitator," and his manner at the time was so marked with exultation that no one could doubt the sincerity of the declaration. There is one thing, however, about his adoption of the agitating vocation that we did not know before, though some, perchance, had suspected it; that the honorable gentleman from New Hampshire, instead of imitating any of the great models of rhetorical splendor on this side of the Atlantic, had singled out Mr. O'Connell as his model in the line of popular agitation. He tells us, in fact, this morning, pretty plainly, that he is the disciple of Mr. O'Connell, and that he is endeavoring to imitate him; that he glories in having the title affixed to him upon which O'Connell shed such extraordinary glory. I leave him to all the satisfaction which he can possibly derive from imitating such a model, and in such a style of imitation, too!

The gentleman tells us he is "an agitator." It was not necessary, I say again, that he should have made this known to us. We knew him to be an agitator before, by many and unmistakeable tokens; but we had hoped, from his having demeaned himself during the present session of Congress with much greater quietude and gentleness than formerly, that he had to some extent come to the conclusion that the business of agitation was, for him, rather an unprofitable one, and that it would be decidedly better for a man of genius like himself, and of no little intellectual promise, to pursue a different vocation altogether. But it seems that we were mistaken in this. It seems that he is resolutely determined to agitate hereafter, as heretofore; for he says that agitation is about the most useful and glorious occupation that can possibly be exercised, in connexion with all those matters which concern the dignity and welfare of man on earth. I think, indeed, that he has almost intimated to us that the Saviour of the world was an agitator, although I am certainly of opinion that there was a mildness and moderation, a godlike dignity and majestic serenity about him, which as little comported with the violence and declamatory fierceness of the real agitator of this poor world of ours as can well be conceived of. According to my poor judgment, there was but little of the true spirit of agitation in his noble sermon upon the Mount; but a placid dignity, a gentle and affectionate persuasiveness, which one of your fierce and murdering agitators would find it difficult either to understand or to imitate. I beg the Senator from New Hampshire to read the Scriptures a little more attentively, and to act upon the pure models of genuine benevolence and apostolic wisdom, and I think that he will be no longer known as an agitator.

But it seems that the gentleman cannot restrain that disposition to agitate which is native to him. Well, sir, we do well know that there is a class of men, who have been more or less known in all ages of the world, who seem to be so organized by Nature as to make it their "inevitable destiny" to seek rather to be propagators of discord and stirrers up of strife than upholders of quiet and maintainers of order; who are always seeking to convulse and disturb the society with which they stand connected, instead of endeavoring to propagate peace and to diffuse the calm and kindly sentimente of true brotherhood on earth; who, in fact, are always most unhappy if they cannot involve every body else in trouble and confusion. These persons are felicitously described by the poet who thus writes:

"But quiet to quick bosoms is a *hell*,
And there hath been *thy* bane; there is a fire
And motion of the soul which will not dwell
In its own narrow being, but aspire
Beyond the fitting medium of desire;
And, but once kindled, quenchless evermore,
Preys upon high adventure, nor can tire
Of aught but *rest*—a fever at the core,
Fatal to him who bears, to all who ever bore.

This makes the *madmen* who have made men mad
By their *contagion*; Conquerors and Kings,
Founders of sects and systems, to whom add
Sophists, Bards, Statesmen, all unquiet things
Which stir too strongly the soul's secret springs,
And are themselves the *fools* to those they *fool*;
Envied, yet how unenviable! what stings
Are thine! *One breast laid open were a school*
Which would unteach mankind the lust to shine or rule.

Their breath is agitation, and their life
A storm whereon they ride, to *sink at last*,
And yet so nursed and bigoted to strife,
That should their days, surviving perils past,
Melt to calm twilight, they feel overcast
With sorrow and supineness, and so die;
Even as a flame unfed, which runs to waste
With its own flickering, or a sword laid by
Which eats into itself, and rusts ingloriously."

But I rose for a much graver purpose. The honorable Senator from New Hampshire has thought proper to speak of this particular law as operating differently in different States of the Union. I think there is but little foundation for what the honorable Senator has said upon this point. But, inasmuch as he has singled out a particular case, which has recently occurred in the city of Boston, concerning which I happen to know something, I feel bound to make the explanation which I am about to give, so that what fell from the Senator's lips may not have that injurious and mischievous effect which it would be otherwise calculated to produce.

The Senator has told us what has recently happened in the city of Boston, although I have seen a telegraphic communication, which was forwarded to the Secretary of State, which harmonizes in all substantial particulars with the statement found in the New York Herald this morning. All the members of this body may not be aware that what the Senator has stated is actually true, and that an armed mob of about two thousand black men have actually broken into a room where there was an alleged fugitive slave in a state of confinement, under the care of ministerial officers of the court, and have violently rescued him under circumstances of great aggravation, and removed him; so that, I presume, he has been by this time carried off in triumph to the British dominions. It is a most astounding circumstance, and I regret that the honorable Senator has referred to it; but, being an agitator, I suppose he thought it his duty to do it. I feel bound to say, though I do not speak specially by authority, that I deemed it important to have recourse to the proper source for information as to what was likely to be the action of this Government upon the subject; and, without being authorized, I say again, to speak for the Government specially in regard to this matter, I feel bound to give this formal assurance, that the Government will without any hesitation do its duty and its whole duty in upholding and enforcing the constitution and laws, and that this particular law will be carried out as efficiently as any law upon the statute book.

Mr. COOPER. As I shall be called upon to vote on the pending motion, I desire to make an explanation in reference to the vote which I shall give. I will state in the outset, however, that I am opposed to all agitation here or elsewhere on the subject of the fugitive slave law. I do not concur in the recommendation made by the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. HALE) to agitate, to keep up the strife and bitterness which have pervaded the country too long already. If my recommendation would be of avail here, and could be heard and responded to beyond these walls, it would be that all agitation should cease; that harmony and good feeling between the different sections of the Union should be cultivated; and that every where obedience to the constitution and laws should be inculcated and acted upon. I do not believe in the virtue of agitation and excitement at any time. The Senator has told us that every great good is achieved by agitation; and that it was by agitation that impulse was given to the revolution in the beginning. Sir, our fathers deliberated, resolved, and acted; but they did not agitate in the manner recommended by the Senator from New Hampshire; they did not agitate for the purpose of stiring up strife between the different colonies which were to be united afterwards in the struggle for independence. There was nothing of that. But what is it the Senator now recommends to his people at home, and regrets that he cannot effect here? Why, sir, that they should encourage sectional feelings, rekindle the fire of strife, and keep alive the spirit of animosity and discord here. I am opposed to all this; and I am sure that those whom I have the honor in part to represent are opposed to it. In the main, my constituents believe that the act of the last session for reclamation of fugitive slaves is constitutional; that it enjoins nothing but what the constitution enjoined in the beginning; and that it only points out the mode by which the constitution, in that particular, is to be carried into effect. They are disposed to stand by and sustain the law, and carry it into effect as far as it is practicable. The Senator has referred to a case which took place, under this law, in the city of Philadelphia, in which a freeman was adjudged to be a slave. Sir, it is well that the facts of that case should be known. It is well that it should be understood that it was through no fault of the law that this wrong against the rights of a freeman was committed. It was through haste, mistake of its requirements, or indiscretion on the part of the commissioner, that proof was refused which was competent under the law, and which, if received, would have established the respondent's right to freedom. There is no doubt whatever of this; and the refusal to receive the proof which was tendered was an inadvertence, an error on the part of the commissioner, and no fault of the law. There was nothing in the law which required the rejection of the proof, or the haste with which the alleged slave was delivered up to the agent of the claimant.

One word in reference to the vote I shall give. I shall vote against the motion to reconsider. I shall do so, because petitions which I presented, of a kind similar to this, went to the Committee on the Judiciary. I presented one praying for the repeal of the fugitive slave law some weeks since, which, on my motion, was referred to that committee. I believed it was proper that it should go to that committee; and I have not changed my opinion since. Whilst I am opposed, totally opposed, to the agitation of this question, believing that it can produce nothing but mischief, I am nevertheless against the reconsideration; and allow me to say, that I believe, if all petitions upon this subject had been treated as other petitions are treated, it would have taken away a ground of agitation at the North. Refusing to refer these petitions, and to treat them as other petitions are treated, is made a ground of complaint; and even those who do not sympathize in the object of the petitioners at all, sometimes complain of the manner in which these petitions are treated. I think it would be the part of wisdom to receive and refer all respectful petitions. Sir, I have no counsel to give to the Senate on this subject, beyond what is contained in these suggestions. I shall vote against the reconsideration, because similar petitions presented by myself have gone to the Committee on the Judiciary, and that I am opposed to any discrimination that might appear invidious. For the repeal of this law, I see no necessity. The construction which has been given to its provisions, in my own State, by the judicial officers of the United States, is such that there is no danger to apprehend that these provisions will be abused, or perverted to purposes of oppression. I am therefore opposed to its repeal, and opposed to agitating the question of repeal here and elsewhere.

Mr. HAMLIN. I will detain the Senate but a single moment, and I regret that I deem it necessary to occupy the attention of the Senate at all. I should not do so but for the manner in which the Senator from Georgia (Mr. BERRIEN) assailed this memorial. It is true that the memorial is composed of detached sheets of paper attached together by wafers. The original memorial, it is also true, was printed. I believe it is the usual course of Senators here to present printed memorials almost every day, and neither the Chair nor any Senator takes any exception to them because they are printed. They are presented on various subjects.

The PRESIDENT. If the Senator alludes to the Chair, the Chair will say that he could not possibly take exceptions to them until his attention was called to them. But the Chair is under the necessity of rejecting printed memorials when his attention is called to the matter.

Mr. HAMLIN. From the noise in the Senate, I did not hear the suggestions of the President. I have now to state the reasons which enable me to sustain the character of the men who have signed that memorial, and who forwarded it to me. I hold in my hand a communication from William Milliken, well known to myself and to my colleague as one of the most worthy citizens of the State of Maine, a man for whose honor and integrity I stand ready to vouch. He is at this time a member of the State Senate; is now, has always been, and I have no doubt always will be, a democrat. He forwarded the memorial to me, and, in his communication, he states that the memorial was signed by the persons whose names are attached to it. Upon that authority I present it, and upon that authority I stand, and am willing to be held responsible to the fullest extent.

The reasons which the memorialists give are their own, and not mine. One may be in favor of the repeal or modification of that law for reasons quite different from those contained in the memorial. Their reasons and opinions are their own. I may agree or disagree with them in their opinions, but still, in either case, it is my duty to present their memorial. They express the opinions which I have no doubt they honestly entertain. Without regard to their views, it is the conclusion to which they come—a repeal or modification of the law that the Senate is to act upon.

Inasmuch as there is now a bill virtually increasing the penalties of the law, which has already been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, this also, being of a counter character, should go to the same committee. To say nothing of right, that is but equal justice. I said that the Senate by a vote had determined that memorials for the repeal of that act should not be sent to the Committee on the Judiciary. Though that decision was against my own judgment, yet, in accordance with the decision of the Senate, I had uniformly moved to lay them on the table. But in this case I can see no reason why a memorial for a modification of the penalties of that law, to mitigate them, should not receive at least as favorable consideration as a bill which seeks to impose additional penalties. For these reasons, as well as because right in itself, I asked its reference to the committee, and it went quietly to them. Who, then, is answerable for this debate? Let the Senate and the country judge.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. President, the Senator from New Hampshire, (Mr. HALE,) using very free language, has spoken of a case which recently occurred in Philadelphia as a case of *kidnapping*. That word has a distinct and well-known signification—not a mere legal meaning, but a sense in which it is universally applied in ordinary use. Neither in that nor any other sense in which it is ever understood, can it be properly applied to the case in Philadelphia to which he has alluded. I know the parties, sir, and the commissioner by whom that case was decided. He is a man of honor and a lawyer of ability, and as little likely to be guilty of any thing to justify the application to him of the word kidnapping as the Senator from New Hampshire himself. Sir, it was a case of ordinary occurrence. Regular process was issued for the recovery of a fugitive slave; testimony was taken *pro* and *con*, and the commissioner decided according to his own judgment, and with perfect integrity of purpose, I am very sure. There was, I admit, unfortunately a mistake of identity; nothing more; just such a mistake of identity as has occurred a thousand times in judicial proceedings, civil and criminal. And I take it that no gentleman has a right to apply to a mistake of identity, unless he is prepared to make a charge of fraud, the term kidnapping. There has been no case of kidnapping, and the gentleman to whom I suppose that term would apply—the commissioner who made the decision—is one of the last men in the community to which he belongs to whom it could with propriety be applied. I know the parties, and I may say this: that the promptitude with which the mistake was corrected by one of my constituents and neighbors is a very good proof how false have been the charges that this law would be deliberately converted into an instrument of fraud and oppression. The mistake was corrected as promptly as was possible. That is enough for Southern character.

But the Senator from New Hampshire tells us that he delights in agitation, and he has made a discovery in philosophy that agitation is an "element." What sort of an "element" I have not chemical knowledge enough to ascertain.

The Senator compares the agitations of what he calls foul and feted corruptions to the heavenly and benign action told of in Scripture; that gentle stirring of the waters occasioned by the angelic presence which invited suffering humanity to receive its benign influences? This he likened to that agitation which, stirred by a mistaken, a feigned philanthropy, has wrought so much evil and has threatened so much more to the destruction of national harmony, and every thing good and valuable among us. He delights in agitation, he says. I abhor it. That gentle stirring of the waters can scarcely be compared without irreverence to the mischievous agitation which he seems to cherish. Sir, I abhor agitation, because the first agitator ever heard of in the world was the very last being of whom a man should speak with any thing but abhorrence. The devil was the first agitator. He it was who, in the guise of a serpent, crept into Eden. He found the primal pair living in peace, innocence, and obedience. The woman's heart he corrupted, and so

"Brought death into the world and all our wo."

He was the first agitator. Who will be the last, it is not for me to tell; but the Senate can well imagine how easy it would be to describe some of his followers, who are prominent agitators at the present day in the strict line of diabolical succession.

Mr. RHETT. Mr. President, I understood the Senator from Pennsylvania to assert that the State of Pennsylvania was perfectly satisfied with the late fugitive law, and that his constituents are opposed to all agitation, and are perfectly prepared to enforce that law. I rise now merely to inquire of that Senator whether his State has repealed those laws which were passed some years ago, by which the operation of the act of 1793 was embarrassed, or whether those laws still continue on the statute book of the State of Pennsylvania?

Mr. COOPER. I can reply without hesitation to the question propounded by the honorable Senator from South Carolina. Bills have been introduced into both houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania to repeal the act to which the Senator refers, known as the act of 1847, and I presume that those laws will be repealed. But I did not say that all my constituents were opposed to the repeal of the fugitive slave law which was passed at the last session of Congress. I said that I believed a very large majority of my constituents were opposed to all further agitation on the question of slavery; that they were satisfied with the measures adopted for the restoration of harmony and the preservation of peace. I have no doubt that this is so. I have had many opportunities of conversing with gentlemen from all parts of the State, and they all united in saying that there is a sentiment generally prevalent, favorable to standing by the measures adopted at the last session of Congress, and believe them founded upon justice, and that they ought at least to be satisfactory to all portions of the country. If I chose to do so, I might enter into some of our domestic politics and explain to the honorable Senator why it may be difficult, though I think it may be achieved, to repeal those laws. But I forbear, because it would be unprofitable to do so. You