BORROWING MONEY.

Power of the City to Issue Certificates of Indebtedness.

Elaborate Discussion of the Subject by Comptroller Hayes.

The Constitutional Provisions and the Debates in the Convention.

Anticipation of Revenue Not Prohibited---An Iowa Case.

Concurrent Opinion of Corporation Counsel Dickey.

Agreement of Other Lawyers.

Comptroller Hayes has prepared, and will submit to the Council Monday evening, the following report relative to the power of the city to borrow money:

THE COMPTROLLER.
HIS ARGUMENT ON THE QUESTION.

CITY COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, CHICAGO, Sept. 6, 1875.—*To the Honorable the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Chicago, in the City Council assembled:*

Some weeks since a law firm in Milwaukee gave an opinion in regard to the power of that city to make temporary loans in advance of the collection of taxes. The amount required by the city was small, only $200,000. A constitutional provision similar to our own existed, and the city had a funded debt exceeding the limitation. The entire opinion, exclusive of the statement of facts, and quotations of the section of the city charter authorizing loans, and of the constitutional provision in question, is as follows:

If the constitutional provision above cited is applicable to an indebtedness of the character proposed to be incurred by the city officers, they would not have the authority to incur it, or to bind the city by a valid note for the repayment of the money at a future day.

We are of the opinion that the provision is so applicable, and that it operates as a prohibition against borrowing the money, or giving the notes as proposed.

There was no argument and no citation of authorities.

Although the opposite conclusion was arrived at and sustained in a careful and sound argument by the Hon. Charles L. Wells, one of the most eminent lawyers of the State, and although three of the largest banks of Milwaukee were still willing and offered to make loans to that city, the final opinion has been used as the foundation of a violent and widely-circulated attack upon the legality of the temporary loans of the city of Chicago, amounting to several millions of dollars. I have had from time to time inquiries on the subject from parties holding our certificates. It is due to them and to the public that they should be placed in possession of

THE REASONS WHICH INDUCED ME

to conclude that it was my duty, to provide for the payment of a large amount of loans of the same character which were outstanding and about to mature when I entered upon this office, and, with the consent of the Mayor and Finance Committee, to make new loans to meet expenditures required before the collection of the taxes.

Those loans were made by authority of Sec. 25 of the act of the General Assembly of Feb. 15, 1865, which is in the following words:

To provide for monthly or any other payments which shall have been authorized by the Common Council, and required to be made at any time before the collection of the taxes of any year, the Comptroller may, with the sanction of the Mayor and Finance Committee, borrow the necessary money for a time not longer than the 1st day of February next thereafter.

By Sec. 7 of the act of April 10, 1869, the time was extended to the first day of June.

Besides a few thousand dollars which were authorized by another section of the law, and were given in satisfaction of judgments against the city, no certificates have been issued except in strict compliance with this section of the charter. They have all been issued to discharge payments authorized by the Common Council. In amount they have not exceeded those payments, nor have they exceeded the amount of the uncollected taxes.

It is admitted that the amount of our funded debt contracted previously to the adoption of the Constitution, and now existing, exceeds 5 per centum on the value of the taxable property in the city, and that the following section of the Constitution of Illinois is in full force and effect:

No county, city, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding 5 per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. Any county, city, school district, or other municipal corporation incurring any indebtedness, as aforesaid, shall, before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same.

Both clauses are to be construed together. The last clause illustrates the meaning of the first.

The indebtedness for the payment of interest and principal of which the tax is to be levied, is the indebtedness referred to in the first clause, and that must be within the 5 per cent limitation. Indebtedness beyond that limitation cannot be incurred under any circumstances.

If a city be entirely free from debt it is still forbidden to create indebtedness without providing beforehand, or at the time, for the collection of an annual tax to pay the interest of such debt as it falls due, and the principal within twenty years.

Now the tax is to run with the indebtedness, to be fixed in advance, and to be collected annually in amounts sufficient to pay the interest as it accrues, and the principal within twenty years. But the indebtedness to be provided for in this manner be construed to be

ANYTHING BUT A FUNDED DEBT?

Had it been intended to prohibit the incurring of *liabilities in advance of the ordinary tax levy, would* not the language have been different, or rather would not another provision have been inserted applicable to the particular case; as that no liability should be incurred for the ordinary city expenditures until after the levy of the taxes, in case the 5 per cent limitation had not previously been exceeded, and in case that limitation had been exceeded no such liabilities should be incurred at all.

But if these ordinary temporary liabilities are covered by the word indebtedness, they must be estimated in determining the question whether an issue of bonds is within the amount authorized by the Constitution or not.

Let us suppose that in one of our cities the taxable property amounts to $100,000,000, and the funded debt to $5,000,000. The city makes its appropriations for a particular year, including the amount of $2,000,000 for various public works, school-houses, bridges, engine-houses, sewers, water-pipe, etc., for which appropriations a tax is to be levied payable the same year. As these are works of necessity, contracts are made for them payable from the proceeds of the tax of the year. At this time it is deemed important to build a city-hall, or make some other large outlay, and an addition of say $2,000,000 is made to the bonded debt. If the contracts based on the appropriations for the current year be excluded, this indebtedness would be lawful; if those contracts be included as a part of the indebtedness of the city, it would be unlawful and the bonds worthless, because in excess of the amount required by the Constitution. Would any intelligent Court for one moment consider the incurring of the contracts payable out of the tax levy for the year as a part of the indebtedness of the city? No Court would give so absurd a construction of the Constitution.

Again, every obligation resting upon a city or person to pay money is not deemed a debt. A city has a funded debt exceeding the limitation when the Constitution takes effect. If this provision is to be understood as only limiting the bonded debt, no serious difficulty ensues. Services are rendered, contracts made, temporary loans previously authorized by law are obtained as usual to defray the current expenses of protecting the lives and property of the inhabitants, and maintaining the varied and important functions of municipal existence, and all these expenditures are paid for and the accounts closed upon the collection of the taxes of the year.

But if any construction prohibits the incurring of any liability for the payment of money,

IN WHAT A CONDITION IS THAT CITY PLACED

by those who should have been and supposed they were the guardians of the rights and interests of its inhabitants. Nearly a year must pass before the revenues can be collected. Money cannot be borrowed for ordinary expenses, neither can any lawful contract be made with any one to serve the corporation. Policemen, firemen, school-teachers, cannot be paid if they render service, because it was unlawful to incur an indebtedness to them, and the city and its inhabitants are surrendered to anarchy and disorder, if not to destruction.

No such meaning as this can be found by the reflecting jurist in this wise and useful constitutional provision.

It follows that the practice of anticipating the collection of the revenue of a particular year by contracting for the performance of public services, or borrowing money in order to pay for these services in cash, however liable it may be to abuse,

IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

The great importance of the question, and the magnitude of the loans which have been made for the temporary convenience of this city, justify me in giving the history of the constitutional provision, such extracts from the proceedings of the Convention as throw light upon it, with an important judicial decision, directly in point. I have also procured, and appended hereto, the opinion of the Corporation Counsel, himself a distinguished jurist, with many years' experience on the Bench. I may say that the same conclusions were reached by his eminent predecessors, the Hon. J. C. Norton, whose loss we have recently been called on to deplore, and the Hon. Murry F. Tuley, as well as by Egbert Jamieson, Esq., City Attorney, who has carefully examined the subject.

FORTUNATELY THE PURPOSE OF THE PROVISION

and its meaning, as understood by its framers, can be readily ascertained. All the debates and proceedings of *the Constitutional Convention* show that the purpose was to prevent the improvident increase of permanent debts, and that by the words "debt" and "indebtedness" they did not intend to include liabilities created in consequence of appropriations and within the limits of the revenue accruing to meet them.

On the 7th of January, 1870, the Convention adopted the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Auditor of this State be requested to furnish to the Convention all the information in his possession upon the subject of State, county, township, and municipal indebtedness, and also all corporate indebtedness, in current under the laws in relation to public schools in this State.

In compliance with this resolution, the Auditor sent in a statement, No. 1, of the debt of the State of Illinois, as it existed at the close of the fiscal year ending Nov. 30, 1869. In this statement is specified the bonded debt, and the school, college, and seminary funds, but none of the large liabilities covered by appropriations from the revenues, as for printing and binding, and for the erection of public buildings, including the State-House.

Statement No. 2 showed the debt of counties, towns and townships, and cities, classified and arranged with great care, with a column headed "Railroad subscriptions not yet debts." This statement also excludes all temporary loans and liabilities incurred in anticipation of the annual revenues.

No objection was ever made to this report for not including the appropriations and temporary loans made in anticipation of the revenues.

Soon after the meeting of the Constitutional Convention, being a member of that body, I introduced the following, with other propositions:

SEC. 4. Taxation by the State shall be limited to——per cent, by counties to——per cent, by towns to——per cent, and by cities and other municipalities to——per cent annually of the assessed value of property. Special assessments shall not be unreasonable or excessive.

SEC. 5. No county, town, city, or municipal corporation, shall have power to borrow money so as to increase its indebtedness to a sum beyond —— per cent of the aggregate assessed value of the property subject to its taxation.

On my motion, this fifth section was referred to the Committee on State, County, and Municipal Indebtedness, and was reported back by them in the following form, in the exact words of the Iowa Constitution:

SEC. 1. No county, city, municipal corporation, township or school district, shall in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount in the aggregate exceeding 5 per centum on the value of the taxable property within such county, city, municipal corporation, township, or school district, such taxable property to be ascertained by the last State and county tax-lists previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.

Any county, city, municipal corporation, township, *or school district incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid* shall, before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same.

It was finally adopted by the Convention, with the addition of the words "including existing indebtedness," inserting "twenty years" instead of "ten years," but with no other material change.

The second section of the report of the Committee on State, County, and Municipal Indebtedness was in these words:

SEC. 2. The State may contract debts to supply casual deficits or failures in revenues, or to meet expenses not otherwise provided for, but the aggregate amount of such debt, direct and contingent, whether contracted by virtue of one or more acts of the General Assembly, or at different periods of time, shall never exceed the sum of $250,000; and the money arising from the creation of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was obtained, or to repay the debts so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever.

While this section was being considered, Mr. Anthony said, "The language here used is: 'The State may contract debts, ... as appropriation by the Legislature and a tax levied to meet the same, would not be included in this language."

Mr. Rice said: "The sole and simple object of that provision is that the General Assembly shall not have the power to pledge the credit of the State, or contract debts in excess of its resources or revenues over and above $250,000.

"My view of that is, and I think it is a natural and rational one, and I do not see how any other can be given of it, that it is a limitation, not upon the power to appropriate, but to the power to contract debts when we have not got the money to pay them nor the means provided to raise it; and that is exactly what the language means."

Mr. Coolbaugh—"It is perfectly legitimate under that section for the General Assembly to make any appropriation, not exceeding in the aggregate the estimated amount of the revenue to be received into the State Treasury during the term that those appropriations are made to cover."

Mr. Allen, of Crawford—"How can the General Assembly create a debt growing out of deficiencies in the revenue? It is by exceeding the amount of revenue levied and collected. When only arises the necessity of contracting a debt by supply a deficit. . . . We say to the Legislature: 'When you commence appropriating money, no matter for what purpose, whether for the ordinary expenses of the Government, whether to internal improvements, or to the building up of educational institutions, you must remember that if you appropriate to the extent of $250,000 more than you have revenue, or will have revenue in the Treasury to pay, you are limited from borrowing money or issuing bonds to supply that casual deficiency."

THE SECTION RELATING TO MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS

contains the phrase "become indebted," instead of "creating debt." Both expressions are substantially the same. As this section was considered last, it was not deemed necessary to repeat the explanation, so fully promulgated by various members when the second section was under consideration. But the remarks of Mr Haines, of Lake, and of Mr. McCoy, the Chairman of the Committee making the report, gave a clear and decisive construction to these words, which was not afterwards questioned by any member of the Convention.

Mr. Haines said: "This relates to the indebtedness of these municipal corporations. I do not understand, as the gentleman from Fulton (Mr. Rose) does, that it relates to the ordinary expenses of these corporations. If it become necessary to repair or rebuild a bridge in his own county, or in any other county, this section does not place any restriction upon it, or relates to it in the least degree; or to a court-house, or any expense that a municipal corporation sees fit to incur, or levy a tax for the payment of during the same year. It is quite competent under this section to incur such expenses, by the rule that has been established by the courts of the State. . . .

"This does not reach these cases; it relates to the indebtedness of these corporations. A man who makes a contract to buy a piece of property, and pays his money, discharges the obligation and there is no existing indebtedness. A municipal corporation that makes a contract, audits the bill, levies a tax, and collects it during the same year, pays for it at the time of the contract, and makes no debt at all. An indebtedness is a continuing obligation to pay at a future day. This provision is to reach a funded debt. It does not reach the case of the current expenses of these municipal corporations. In that view I think it is a very reasonable provision perhaps; but I should like to see this section go further, and prescribe according to the policy of our statute, to-day; that money for current expenses shall not be raised to exceed a certain per centum during each year. I would like to see that principle engrafted upon this Constitution, and then it will be complete for me. But this, as the old saying, common saying, which has been used so often that I may now use it myself, is like fighting a windmill. Individuals have their manner of payment, which is on delivery. Municipal corporations, in imitation of that, pay during the fiscal year, which is payment at the time of making the contract, and this provision does not relate to that principle of expenses at all."

Mr. McCoy—Mr. Chairman, it was not the intention of the Committee of which I have the honor to be the Chairman to interfere with the assessments of any county, city, municipal corporation, township, or school district in the State for ordinary expenses, but it did desire to put a limitation and restriction on indebtedness, and that, if created, a provision should be made for payment thereof, and that the people demand.

The construction placed upon this provision, by the members of the Convention, has been fully

SUSTAINED BY THE HIGHEST JUDICIAL AUTHORITY.

The section as reported from the Committee on Municipal Indebtedness was copied verbatim from the Constitution of the State of Iowa. The only material change made by the Convention was by adding the words "including existing indebtedness."

The provision of the Iowa Constitution came before the highest tribunal of that State, the Supreme Court, and was adjudicated upon by them, at the June term, 1873, on appeal from the Scott District Court, in the case of Grant vs. The City of Davenport, reported in 36 Iowa Reports, p. 396.

This was an action brought by James Grant and others, citizens and tax-payers of the City of Davenport, against the said city and others, to restrain the city from carrying into effect a certain ordinance passed Dec. 6, 1870, and Jan. 6, 1871, on the ground that the said ordinance is unconstitutional, because it creates a larger debt than the Constitution allows, etc.

The valuation of said city for State and county purposes was less than $4,000,000. The debt was $4,0,000.

Sec. 1 of the ordinance grants to certain parties the exclusive right to supply the city with water for twenty years, and the equal privilege to other with all others, of supplying the citizens of said city with water.

Sec. 11 provides for payment to said company, by the city, of an annual rental of $80 for each fire hydrant for the first five years, $70 for the second five years, $60 for the third five years, and $40 thereafter, payments to be made semi-annually; the rent of said hydrants to commence as soon as said 200 hydrants are ready for use.

The defendants demurred to the petition of the plaintiffs in error.

The District Court sustained the demurrer, to which ruling the plaintiffs excepted and appealed.

C. Whittaker, for the appellants, cited Scott vs. City of Davenport, to show that "a debt is created when one person binds himself to pay money to another. A party becomes indebted when he enters into an obligation to pay. A debt is that which one owes, a debt, he who may be constrained to pay what he owes."

He urged also that the ordinance created a debt. "The Constitution does not say that a municipal corporation shall not become indebted by bond or note, but it says, in any manner or for any purpose."

The opinion of the Court was given by Judge Cole, who said:

Our Constitution declares that "no municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount, in the aggregate, exceeding 5 per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness." (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 3.) The plaintiffs aver in their petition the amount of the taxable property, and also the amount of the city indebtedness upon bonds executed in compromise of a previous bonded debt, and so now by express averment that the present indebtedness of the city is in excess of the constitutional limit. The direct question is therefore presented, whether the ordinance and its acceptance, which together constitute a contract, create an indebtedness by the city, in the sense of the word as used in the Constitution.

We have heretofore recognized and adjudicated the right and duty of a city to retain and apply its current revenues to the payment of its proper and ordinary current expenses. The right to thus apply the current revenues to the defraying of ordinary expenses is grounded upon the fact that such a course is absolutely necessary to the life of the municipality and to the successful accomplishment of the purposes of its creation. Any appropriation of these revenues, therefore, whether by ordinance or by contract, to the payment of the ordinary expenses, would be, beyond question, legal, and within the constitutional power. And if the true appropriation was made in advance of the receipts of the revenues, the action would be just as legitimate; because that the revenues will be received is a legal certainty. And again, if the appropriation was made in advance to pay for services to be rendered or articles to be furnished, within the true scope and proper and *ordinary expenses, the payment to be made upon* the rendition of the services or the delivery of the articles, no question could arise as to the propriety or legality of such a course, regardless of the fact whether the city was indebted to its maximum limit or not; for the reason that the right to apply, and to have apply its revenues, notwithstanding its indebtedness, is a part of the well-settled and expressly-adjudicated law of the State.

If it can induce individuals or a corporation to construct and maintain such works for the use and benefit of the municipality and its inhabitants, and can pay a just and fair rent, as agreed, out of its current revenues, and can also, out of such revenues, pay its other ordinary expenses, we can see no sufficient reason for holding that an agreement to pay such rent, either weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annually, creates an indebtedness against the city. If it did create an indebtedness, then an ordinance providing for the payment of the salaries to the officers of the city would also create an indebtedness, and would be invalid, where the maximum of indebtedness has also been reached. And such a construction would also render invalid every contract for the delivery of lumber to repair a bridge or a sidewalk, or for the employment of a laborer to work thereon.

From these illustrations, as well as from the plain and practical meaning of the language of the constitutional provision, the true rule and interpretation is arrived, to wit: that when the contract made by the municipal corporation pertains to its ordinary expenses within the limit of its current revenues, and such special taxes as it may legally and in good faith intend to levy therefor, such contract does not constitute "the incurring of an indebtedness" within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. Dively vs. the Town of Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227. . . .

Upon a full examination of the case, we find, as did the learned District Judge, that no right of action exists, and therefore order that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.

Without protracting the argument further, I think it is clear beyond question that our temporary loans are fully authorized by the Constitution and laws of the State, constitute a just and valid claim against the city, and should be repaid with scrupulous fidelity as they mature.

Judge Lackey has submitted this report and his opinion to the Hon. C. B. Lawrence, ex-Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court, the Hon. W. C. Goudy, B. F. Ayer, Esq., Charles H. Morse, Esq., Francis B. Peabody, Esq., the Hon. Charles Hitchcock, President of the late Constitutional Convention, and the Hon. C. Beckwith, ex-Judge of the Supreme Court, gentlemen of the highest standing in the legal profession, and their responses approving our construction of the Constitution are presented herewith. Respectfully submitted.

S. S. HAYES, Comptroller.

LEGAL OPINIONS.
THE CORPORATION COUNSEL.

CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, CHICAGO, Aug. 31, 1875.—*The Hon. S. S. Hayes, Comptroller:* In answer to your letter of Aug. 27, inst., referring to the supposed legal effect of Sec. 12, Art. IX., of our Constitution, upon the practice of borrowing money from time to time (for a time not longer than to the 1st of June next thereafter), for making monthly or other payments, required to be made before the collection of taxes of any given year, as provided for in Sec. 25 of the act on that subject of Feb. 15, 1865, as amended by Sec. 7 of the act of April 19, 1869, I beg leave to say:

That as I understand this practice, it is merely a mode of applying the taxes of any given year to the current expenses of that year. If so, by so doing I think the city does not thereby "become indebted in any manner or for any purpose," in the sense of these words as used in that section of the Constitution.

In proving on to found the Convention of the State of Iowa which, in so far as concerns this question in the precise words used in our Constitution. The section in our Constitution is in these words: "No [county, city, township, school district or other] municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount [including existing indebtedness] in the aggregate exceeding 5 per cent on the value of the taxable property [therein], to be ascertained by the last [assessment for State and county taxes] previous to the incurring of such indebtedness." The language of the Iowa Constitution is in the same words, excluding the words I have placed in brackets, and substituting the words "within such corporation," instead of the word "therein," and also substituting the words "State and county tax-lists," instead of the words "assessment for State and county taxes," used in our Constitution. There is no other material difference in the meaning and force of the two Constitutions, and the substance of the language is the same.

The question of the true legal interpretation and construction of this provision has been disposed of by the Supreme Court of Iowa. I am not aware of any decision of our Supreme Court on the question, but THE REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA is so clear and cogent that there can be little doubt as to what our Court will say if ever called upon to pass upon the same.

The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case of Grant vs. the City of Davenport, 36th Iowa R., 401, lays it down as sound law that every city, without regard to the amount of its indebtedness, has the lawful right to apply its current revenues to the payment of its proper and ordinary current expenses, and that such appropriation of the revenues may lawfully be made in advance of the collection of the revenues.

That case related to a contract made by the city with the Davenport Water Company to furnish the city with water for twenty-five years, for annual installments, to be paid by the city, beginning with $16,000 a year, providing a liability to pay in the aggregate an amount which, would go beyond the constitutional limit.

The Court holds that a supply of water is necessary and the cost thereof comes properly under the head of "ordinary expenses;" that if the installments to be paid under such a contract can (with the other necessary current expenses of the city) be paid out of its current revenues, the contract to pay such installments does not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitution.

The Court say that the true rule evolved from the Constitution is that where a contract pertains to the ordinary expenses of the city, and the payments to be made under it are to be met either from the current expenses of the city) within the limit of the current revenues of the city, and such special taxes as it may legally levy, and in good faith intends to levy therefor, such contract does not constitute "the incurring of indebtedness" within the meaning of the Constitution.

The Court say, in substance, that any other view of this constitutional provision would render void in all cases an ordinance providing for the payment of the salaries of the city officers where the city is already indebted to its maximum limit, and that upon the ground that this same principle would render void every contract for material or labor to make the least repair of a bridge, sidewalk, or street, however necessary, and this although the current revenues of the city were ample to pay all its current and ordinary expenses; and that under any other construction, a city (already indebted to the constitutional limit) could not even contract for the use of the most necessary public buildings without a prior levy and collection of the revenues and the deposit of the funds in the treasury.

The Court say that the Constitution does not mean this.

WHERE A CITY, ALREADY LAWFULLY INDEBTED,

gives a bond providing for the future payment of such debt, this does not create such debt; nor would it create a new debt within the meaning of the Constitution, if the city already owing a lawful debt should borrow money and pay the old debt therewith. By so doing the city would not "become indebted" in the sense of the Constitution. The form of the indebtedness merely is changed, but a debt is not created.

The provisions of the Constitution, for which cases are in process of collection, to the payment of the current ordinary expenses of a city, in advance of the collection, is merely disposing of a chose in action which the city already has, and a city by so doing does not "become indebted" in the sense of the Constitution. If, therefore, the city has become lawfully liable to any one for any part of its ordinary and necessary current expenses, and the uncollected revenue anticipated is sufficient to cover this and other necessary current expenses, the city may lawfully give to such person a written promise to pay such liability at a future day beyond the 1st day of the next June; or the city may lawfully make a temporary loan of some other person, and with the money borrowed pay such liability, and give to the lender a written promise to pay the money to him on or before the then next June, and by so doing the city does not "become indebted" in the sense forbidden in the Constitution.

The conditions essential to the legality of the transaction are, that the money is to be applied to some portion of the ordinary or necessary current expenses of the city, and that this liability (together with the current revenues, necessary current expenses of the city for that year) does not exceed the current revenues of the city anticipated for that year.

The city officers authorized by law to transact such business are necessarily the persons authorized by law to judge and determine whether the essential conditions exist, and the courts will not look further, but is sufficient for the validity of such loan certificates, in the hands of bona fide holders, that they have been issued by the proper officers. This latter principle has been thoroughly established by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Respectfully,

T. LYLE DICKEY, Counsel to the Corporation.

OTHER OPINIONS.

In my opinion the construction of the Constitution presented in the foregoing communications of the Comptroller and the Counsel to the Corporation is the true legal interpretation thereof.

C. B. LAWRENCE,
C. GOUDY,
B. F. AYER,
FRANCIS B. PEABODY,
CHARLES HITCHCOCK.

CHICAGO, Sept. 4, 1875.—*The Hon. T. Lyle Dickey*—DEAR SIR: I return your opinion with the indorsement I do not see that there can be a reasonable doubt about the question. Yours truly,

CHARLES HITCHCOCK.

CHICAGO, Sept. 4, 1875.—*The Hon. T. Lyle Dickey*—DEAR SIR: I have carefully perused the opinions of yourself and the Hon. S. S. Hayes, Comptroller, in regard to city indebtedness, etc. I have given a careful reflection to the subject to which they relate. I fully concur with you in your views. Respectfully,

CHARLES H. MORSE.

CHICAGO, Sept. 4, 1875.—*The Hon. T. Lyle Dickey, Corporation Counsel City of Chicago*—DEAR SIR: I have examined the communication of the Hon. S. S. Hayes, Comptroller of the City of Chicago, relative to the power of the city to borrow money, and your opinion in reference to the same subject, and can say, substantially in the language of the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, that I have no doubt that the city has the lawful right to apply its current revenues to the payment of its proper and ordinary current expenses, and that such appropriation of the revenues may lawfully be made in advance of the collection. The appropriation of such revenues by a temporary loan based thereon is not, in my judgment, an indebtedness within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting the incurring of liabilities beyond a certa n amount. I am very truly, your obedient servant,

C. BECKWITH.

EQUALIZATION.

How the State Board Purposes to Tuck It on to Cook County.—A Personal Quarrel.

Special Dispatch to The Chicago Tribune.

SPRINGFIELD, Ill., Sept. 6.—In the Board of Equalization this afternoon, the Committee on Personal Property made a report of additions and deductions. The Committee add 86 per cent to personal property in Cook County. These reports have yet to pass through the Committee on General Equalization, and the figures will be materially changed. In fact, the reports are only a basis from which a perfect report is to be made. Thus far, individual Committees on Lands add 70 per cent to the lands in Cook, 65 per cent to town lots, and 86 as above. But, in each of these reports, a surplus or deficiency has been created, which, in the language of adepts in equalization, must be spread back over the counties in each class, so that no reliable report can be given until it passes through the hands of the General Committee on Equalization. The Railroad Committee cannot report until to-morrow, and then the report will be imperfect, like the others. The Committee on Capital Stock must await the completion of all other reports before it can fairly get to work. It is thought the Board will remain two weeks longer at least.

During the session this morning, Mr. Whitney, of Du Page, arose to a question of privilege, and read from the *Times* of Saturday what purported to be a statement made by Mr. Derickson, in which he said the State Board had formed a ring a swindle Cook County, and that the other members from Cook were in the ring. Mr. Whitney then asked Mr. Derickson if he made the statement.

Mr. Derickson said he never made any such statement to a reporter.

Mr. Whitney asked him if he had made a statement to the County Board.

Mr. Derickson said he did not, and that Mr. Whitney was no gentleman or he would have come to him outside the Board and asked him to explain the matter.

Mr. Whitney said the charge was a public one, and he wanted a public answer.

After the Board adjourned Mr. Derickson walked around to Mr. Whitney's desk and excitedly shook his fist in his face and said: "You are a liar, sir, and dare not resent it."

Mr. Whitney responded: "You are a jackass, and everybody knows it."

The quarrel went on, but terminated without a personal collision.

Mr. Derickson this afternoon expresses regret for the language he used, and says he was led to it under excitement, induced by the belief that Mr. Whitner was attempting to gain some advantage for DuPage County at the expense of Cook.

Mr. Whitney thinks himself justified in attempting to make Mr. Derickson admit the charge against him or deny it, and thus relieve the Board from aspersions which he thinks unjust.

NEW YORK CELEBRATIONS.

NEW YORK, Sept. 26.—The birthday of Lafayette is being celebrated by French and American citizens at the Suburban Park.

The five days' festival of the Platte Deutschers was begun this morning by a grand street parade and review by the Mayor and Aldermen and German Consul. Delegations are here from Chicago, Milwaukee, and other cities.

THE TEXAS EDITORS.

Special Dispatch to The Chicago Tribune.

FORT WAYNE, Ind., Sept. 6.—Extensive preparations are being made here for the reception and entertainment of the Texas editorial excursion, which will arrive at 2 o'clock to-morrow afternoon from Chicago. The visitors will be taken to the leading points of interest about the city, and in the evening a grand ball and banquet will take place.

CURRENT GOSSIP.

HEART.

Heart in my bosom beating
Fierce as a power at bay,
Ever thy rule regretting,
Louder, and then retreating,
Who shall thy being sway?

Over my will, and under,
Equally king and slave,
Sometimes I hear thee thunder,
Sometimes falter an I blunder,
Close to the waiting grave.

Oft in the beautiful season,
Restless thou art, and wild;
Oft, with never a reason,
Turnest and doest me treason,
Treating the man as a child.

Cold when passion is burning,
Quick when I sigh for rest;
Khelter of perished yearning,
Curb and government mourning,
Thou art lord of the breast.

Chicago. J. H. S.

MARRYING OF COUSINS.

A popular belief has long prevailed that the marriage of first cousins is attended with lamentable results in the insanity of their issue. This belief is not warranted by the facts. The last number of the *Fortnightly Review* contains an article by Mr. George Darwin on "Marriages Between First Cousins," giving the results of some researches he has recently made among the first-cousin marriages of the upper classes of England. There are incidentally brought out some statistics worth repeating, such as that, in every 79 marriages in England one is a Smith; in 70, a Jones; in 115, a Williams; in 148, a Taylor; in 168, a Davis; in 174, a Brown; in 529, a Griffiths. In fact, it is upon these proportions of fifty of the commonest names he bases all his succeeding calculations. Having found 10 per cent of marriages between people of the same names, he determines what per cent of these are marriages between first cousins, and again what proportion these bear to those between first cousins of different names.

His investigations he confines to Burke's "Peerage" and the landed gentry of England and Ireland, and discovers 57 per cent of same name first-cousin marriages, which is his first factor. His second he secures through circulars mailed to the same classes, provided with blanks to be filled, taking care to avoid receiving the same information through different channels; and though the statistics he receives manifestly must have been incomplete, he feels warranted in taking 2¾ per cent as the proportion of different-name first-cousin marriages. From these he determines that the proportion of first-cousin marriages to all other marriages is 4½ per cent., a percentage slightly increased among the upper classes and lowered among the common people.

He then proceeds to the asylums to discover whether such marriages are injurious. In this inquiry he seems to have been very ably seconded by the physicians, but his table of observations appended are not very satisfactory. The testimony of the physicians varies, but preponderates against the popular belief. Dr. Howden *goes so far as to say*: "Neither in insanity nor in any abnormal propensity do two plus two make four; there is always another factor at work neutralizing intensification and bringing things back to the normal." On the other hand Dr. Crichton Brown says that two plus two make more than four, and that even persons of similar temperament should not marry. Their investigation, Mr. Darwin thinks, showed that, in lunatic and idiotic asylums, probably between 3 and 4 per cent of the patients are the children of first cousins, and in the case of deaf-mutes there is no evidence that the percentage is any greater than that of the general population.

Concerning the death-rate of the children of first-cousin marriages Mr. Darwin turned again to the "Peerage," and in a careful examination of thirty-seven families, too small a total upon which to base satisfactory statistics, there remained but the shadow of evidence that the children of first-cousin marriages possess a slightly lowered vitality, which under favorable conditions would show no ill effects. This, he says, is in accordance with his father's experiments with in-bred plants, which suffer no deterioration when allowed plenty of good soil and room, but perish or become stunted in competition with other plants. Finally, his opinion is that while certain maladies do take hold more easily of the offspring of first-cousin marriages, the evil has been vastly overrated.

While Mr. Darwin writes an article, Mr. Huth, undeterred by the difficulties which have beset marriage with even the deceased wife's sister, has written a book, "Marriage of Near Kin Considered with Respect to the Laws of Nations: the Results of Experience the Teachings of Biology," with a view directly to legislation. In this gentleman's opinion existing prohibitions are but relics of asceticism. The first part of the work is historical. He quotes Jeromy Taylor, who says the earlier the times the more liberty there was of marriage with kin, and passes to review Egypt, where a man might marry his sister; Persia, where it was honorable to marry his mother, and the Isle of Wight, where a man is permitted to marry his niece. Of the general theory that the marriages of blood relatives are injurious, it is his opinion that evils have been hastily accounted for in that way because they could not be satisfactorily explained otherwise. Mr. Huth follows Mr. Darwin's experiments among plants and the lower animals, but arrives at different conclusions. The benefit of crosses he regards rather as removing inherited diseases—it is negative, not positive. In his view there are no grounds for believing consanguineous marriages injurious, while the tendency of restriction on general grounds is harmful, and he insists that it is not advisable to extend the prohibition against marriage beyond the third collateral degree, and to permit all marriages of affinity except in the direct ascending and descending lines.

READY WIT.

Appletons' Journal has some curious instances of good things said at the right time. Here are some specimens:

A certain learned man being congratulated on his talent for small talk, said: "It has cost me more effort and study to achieve small talk than to conquer the higher mathematics, but I felt the desperate want of it, and went at it as a study."

Theodore Hook was an instance of the power of readiness. He had the talent of an *improvisatore*, and could make verses to order. He was asked what was the chief objection to dining alone.

"Why, the bottle comes round too often," said he.

On being told that he must write something for the *Knickerbocker* on the death of the King and Queen of the Sandwich Islands, he immediately wrote:

"Waiter! two Sandwiches," said Death,
And their wild Majesties resigned their breath.

John Van Buren was a master of repartee. In making a speech, he drew a picture of the evil effects of a certain measure, which would be sure to defeat the candidate. Some antagonistic politicians said: "Who did that in 1848?" Van Buren remembered instantaneously that his illustrious father *had done* that very thing, but his quick wit saved him. "I don't remember the gentleman's name," said he, "but I think it lost him his election!"

A gentleman who hated cold weather said: "It is one of the many inducements to lead a bad life that the dreadful place is so comfortably *heated*."

Happy was that London gentleman into whose house Theodore Hook intruded with Mr. Terry on a wager, and, after dining and making the company ache with laughter, sat down and sang an improvised song, ending with the words:

We are very much pleased with our fare,
Your cellar is as good as your cook;
My friend is Mr. Terry, the player,
And I am Mr. Theodore Hook.

Accident sometimes brings about a very good pun. A lady sitting in a drawing room playing with a kitten; a gentleman entered with a print of *Correggio's* picture of the "Magdalen with the Skull." The lady said: "See, she has the same attitude as my kitten." "Yes," said he, "and like her, she is thinking over her *fore paws (faux pas)*."

Here is a story of Madame de Stael's large foot. She went to a fancy ball as Minerva. "How shall you know your goddess?" said one of her admirers to another. "Par le pied-de-Stael," was the response. Had she gone otherwise than as a goddess she would not have needed a pedestal.

After Gen. Scott's famous "plate of soup," some wit dubbed him "Marshal Tureen."

SETH WRIGHT'S SHEEP.

In the year 1791, there was a farmer of the name of Seth Wright in Massachusetts, who had a flock of sheep consisting of a ram and some twelve or thirteen ewes. Of this flock of ewes, one at the breeding-time bore a lamb which was very singularly formed: it had a very long body with very short legs, and those legs were bowed. If this peculiar build had presented no practical utility, it would probably have disappeared in time—some of the offspring of the lamb in question would have inherited their parent's structure, but successive admixtures with the normal type would have gradually effaced the exception. It so happened, however, that in that part of Massachusetts where Seth Wright was living, the fields were separated by fences, and, as the sheep were active and robust, they often overleaped these fences to stray into the neighboring farms, causing thereby much bickering and quarrel. It occurred, therefore, to Seth Wright, who was, like his successors, more or less cute, that if he could get a stock of sheep like those with the bandy legs, they would not be able to jump over the fences so readily, and he acted upon this idea. He killed his old ram, and as soon as the young one arrived at maturity he bred altogether from it. The offspring, as are told, were always either pure Ancons (the bow-legged type) or pure ordinary sheep. Seth Wright kept the two types carefully apart, and allowed the Ancons only to breed with one another. In consequence of this, the farmer was able in the course of a very few years to get a considerable flock of this variety, and if the Merino sheep introduced a short time later had not proved more advantageous in all respects, the Ancon breed would probably still cover Massachusetts.—*Westminster Review.*

A HISTORICAL LEG.

All the Year Round says: The Marquis of Anglesea's leg was for some years almost as famous as the chivalrous Marquis himself, so far superior was it to anything that had previously been produced for a similar purpose. This gallant officer had a leg shattered by a cannon ball at the battle of Waterloo; he underwent two amputations, one on the battle-field by an army surgeon, the other by Mr. (afterward Sir Everard) Home, after his return to England. Then Mr. Gray set to work. He took a cast in wax of the stump of the poor unfortunate leg, transferred the impression to tough and light desiccated willow, and ingeniously introduced strings of cat