ling power; but there is one among them of marked a character, and which operates so extensively, that I cannot conclude without making the subject of a few remarks, particularly as it will be calculated to throw much light on what has been already said.

Of all the impediments opposed to a just conception of the nature of our political system, the impression that the right of a State, to arrest an unconstitutional act of the General Government, is inconsistent with the great and fundamental principle of all free States, that a majority has a right to govern, is the greatest. Thus regarded, Nullification is, without further reflection, denounced as the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as in truth it would be, were the objection well founded as, in fact, it is destitute of all foundation, as I shall now proceed to show.

Those who make the objection seem to suppose that the right of majority to govern is a principle too simple to admit of any distinction; and yet, if I do not mistake, it is susceptible of the most important distinction—entering deeply into the construction of our system, and, I may add, into that of all free States, in proportion to the perfection of their institutions, and is essential to the very existence of liberty.

When, then, it is said that a majority has the right to govern, there are two modes of estimating the majority; to either of which the expression is applicable. The one, in which the whole community is regarded in the aggregate, and the majority is estimated in reference to the entire mass. This may be called the majority of the whole, or the absolute majority. The other, in which it is regarded in reference to its different political interests, whether composed of different classes or different communities formed in one general confederated community, and in which the majority is estimated, not in reference to the whole, but to each class or community of which it is composed, the assent of each taken separately, and the concurrence of all constituting the majority. A majority thus estimated may be called the concurring majority.

When it is objected, to Nullification, that it is opposed to the principle that a majority ought to govern, he who makes the objection must mean the absolute, as distinguished from the concurring. It is only in the sense of the former the objection can be applied. In that of the concurring, it would be absurd, as the concurring assent of all the parts (with us all the States) is of the very essence of such majority. Again, it is manifest, that, in the sense it would be good against Nullification, it would be equally so against the Constitution itself: for, in whatever light that instrument be regarded, it is, clearly, not the work of the absolute, but of the concurring majority. It was formed and ratified by the concurring assent of all the States, and not by the majority of the whole taken in the aggregate, as has been already stated. Thus the acknowledged right of each State, in reference to the Constitution, is unquestionably the same right which Nullification attributes to each in reference to the unconstitutional acts of Government; and, if the latter be opposed to the right of a majority to govern, the former is equally so. I go farther. The objection might, with equal truth, be applied to all free States that have ever existed—I mean States deserving the name, and excluding, of course, those which, after a factious and anarchical existence of a few years, have sunk under the yoke of tyranny, or the dominion of some foreign Power. There is not, with this exception, a single free state, whose institutions were not based on the principle of the concurring majority—not one in which the community was not regarded in reference to its different political interests, and which did not, in some form or other, take the assent of each in the operation of the Government.

In support of this assertion, I might begin with our own Government, & go back to that of Sparta, & show conclusively, that there is not one on the list, whose institutions were not organized on the principle of the concurring majority, and in the operation of which the sense of each great interest was not separately consulted. The various devices which have been contrived for this purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would be a curious and highly important subject of investigation. I can only allude to some of the most prominent.

The principle of the concurring majority has sometimes been incorporated in the regular and ordinary operation of the Government, each interest having a distinct organization, & a combination of the whole forming the Government, but still requiring the consent of each, within its proper sphere to give validity to the measures of Government. Of this modification the British and Spartan Governments are by far the most memorable and perfect examples. In others, the right of acting—of making and executing the laws—was vested in one interest, and the right of arresting, or nullifying, in another. Of this description, the Roman Government is much the most striking instance. In others, the right of originating or introducing projects of laws, was in one, and of enacting them in another, as at Athens, where the Areopagus proposed, and the General Assembly of the People enacted, laws.

These devices were all resorted to with the intention of consulting the separate interests of which the several communities were composed, and against all of which the objection to Nullification, that it is opposed to the will of a majority, could be raised, with equal force, as strongly, and I may say more so, against the unlimited, unqualified, and uncontrollable veto, of a single tribune out of ten at Rome, on all laws and the execution of laws, as against the same right of a sovereign State, [one of the twenty-four tribunes of this Union,] limited, as the right is, to the unconstitutional acts of the Government, and liable, as in effect it is, to be controlled by three-fourths of the co-States; and yet the Roman Republic, and the other States to which I have referred, are the renowned among free States, whose examples have diffused the spirit of Liberty over the world, and which, if struck from the list, would leave behind but little to be admired or imitated. There, indeed, would remain one class, deserving from us particular notice, as ours belongs to it; I mean confederacies—but, as a class, heretofore far less distinguished, for power and prosperity, than those already alluded to, though, I trust, with the improvements we have made, destined to be placed at the very head of the illustrious list of States which have blessed the world with examples of well-regulated Liberty, and which stand as so many Oases in the midst of the desert of oppression and despotism which occupy so vast a space in the chart of Governments. That such will be the great and glorious destiny of our system, I feel assured, provided we do not permit our Government to degenerate into the worst of all possible forms, a Consolidated Government swayed, by the will of an absolute majority.

But, to proceed

Viewing a confederated community as composed of as many distinct political interests as there are States, and as requiring the consent of each to its measures, no Government can be conceived, in which the sense of the whole community can be more perfectly taken, and all its interests be more fully represented and protected. But with this great advantage, united with the means of the most just and perfect local administration through the agency of the States, and combined with the capacity of embracing within its limits the greatest extent of territory and variety of interests, it is liable to one almost fatal objection, the tardiness and feebleness of its movements—a defect to be remedied, and, when not, so great as to render a form of government, in other respects so admirable; almost worthless. To overcome this difficulty, was the great desideratum in political science, and the most difficult problem within the circle. To us belongs the glory of its solution, if, indeed, our experiment (for such it must be called) shall prove that we have overcome it, as I sincerely believe and hope it will, on account of our own, as well as the liberty and happiness of our own race.

Our first experiment in government was on the old form of a simple confederacy, unmodified, and extending the principle of the concurring majority alike to the Constitution [the Articles of the Union] and to the Government which it constituted. It failed, and the present structure was reared in its place, combining, for the first time in a confederation, the absolute with the concurring majority, and thus uniting the justice of the one with the energy of the other.

The new Government was reared on the foundation of the old, strengthened but not changed. It stands on the same solid basis of the concurring majority, perfected by the sanction of the People of the States, directly given, and not indirectly, through the State Governments, as their representatives, as in the old confederation. With that difference, the authority which made the two Constitutions—which granted their powers, and ordained and organized their respective Governments to execute them—is the same. But, in passing from the Constitution to the Government, [the law-making and the law-administering powers] the difference between the two becomes radical and essential. There, in the present, the concurring majority is dropped, and the absolute substituted. In determining, then, what powers ought to be granted, and how the Government appointed for their execution ought to be organized, the separate and concurring voice of the States was required, the union being regarded, for this purpose, in reference to its various and distinct interests; but, in the execution of these powers, (delegated only because all the States had a common interest in their exercise,) the Union is no longer regarded, in reference to its parts, but as forming, to the extent of its delegated powers, one great community, to be governed by a common will, just as the States are in reference to their separate interests, and by a government organized on principles similar to theirs. By this simple but fortunate arrangement, we have engrafted the absolute on the concurring majority, thereby giving to the administration of the powers of the Government, where they were required, all the energy and promptness belonging to the former, while we have retained, in the power granting and organizing authority, (if I may so express myself,) the principle of the concurring majority, and, with it, that justice, moderation, and full and perfect representation of the interests of the community, which belongs exclusively to it.

Such is the solidity and beauty of our admirable system, but which, it is perfectly obvious, can only be preserved by maintaining the ascendancy of the constitution-making authority over the law-making—the concurring over the absolute majority. Nor is it less clear that this can only be effected by the right of a State to annul the unconstitutional acts of the Government—a right confounded with the idea of a minority governing a majority, but which, so far from being the case, is indispensable, to prevent the more energetic but imperfect majority, which controls the movements of the Government, from usurping the place of that more perfect and just majority which formed the Constitution and ordained Government to execute its powers.

Nor need we apprehend that this check, as powerful as it is, will prove excessive. The distinction between the constitution and the law-making powers, so strongly marked in our institutions, may yet be considered as a new and untried experiment. It can scarcely be said to have existed at all before our system of government. We have yet much to learn, as to its practical operation, and, among other things, if I do not mistake, we are far from realizing the many and great difficulties of holding the latter subordinate to the former, and without which (it is obvious) the entire scheme of Constitutional Government, at least in our sense, must prove abortive. Short as has been our experience, some of these, of a very formidable character, have begun to disclose themselves; particularly between the Constitution and the Government of the Union. The two powers, there, represent very different interests—the one that of all the States, taken separately, and the other that of a majority of the States, as forming a confederated community. Each acting under the impulse of these respective & very different interests, must necessarily strongly tend to come into collision; and, in the conflict, the advantage will be found almost exclusively on the side of the Government, or law-making power. A few remarks will be sufficient to illustrate these positions.

The Constitution, while it grants power to the Government, at the same time imposes restrictions on its action, with the intention of confining it within a limited range of powers, and of the means of executing them. The object of the power is, to protect the rights, and promote the interests of all, and of the restrictions to prevent the majority, or the dominant interests of the Government, from perverting powers, intended for the common good, into the means of oppressing the minor interests of the community. Thus circumstanced, the dominant interest, in possession of the powers of the Government, and the minor interest on whom they are exercised, must regard these restrictions in a very different light—the latter as a protection, and the former as a restraint, and, of course, accompanied with all the impatient feelings with which restrictions on cupidity and ambition are ever regarded by those unruly passions. Under their influence, the Constitution will be viewed by the majority, not as the source of their authority, as it should be, but as shackles on their power. To them it will have no value, as the means of protection. As a majority, they require none. Their number and strength, and not the Constitution, are their protection; and, of course, if I may so speak, their instinct, will be, to weaken and destroy the restrictions, in order to enlarge the power. He must have a very imperfect knowledge of the human heart, who does not see, in this state of things, an incessant conflict between the Government, or the law-making power, and the Constitution making power. Nor is it less certain, that, in the contest, the advantage will be exclusively with the former.

The law-making power is organized, and in constant action, having the control of the honors and emoluments of the country, and armed with the power to punish and reward; the other, on the contrary, is unorganized, lying dormant in the great inert mass of the community, till called into action on extraordinary occasions and at distant intervals, and then bestowing no honors, exercising no patronage, having neither the faculty to reward nor to punish, but endowed simply with the attribute to grant powers and ordain the authority to execute them. The result is inevitable. With so strong an instinct on the part of the Government, to throw off the restrictions of the Constitution, and to enlarge its powers, and with such powerful faculties to gratify this instinctive impulse, the law-making must necessarily encroach on the Constitution-making power, unless restrained by the most efficient check; at least as strong as that for which we contend. It is worthy of remark, that, all other circumstances being equal, the more dissimilar the interests represented by the two, the more powerful will be this tendency to encroach; and it is from this, among other causes, that it is so much stronger between the Government and the Constitution-making powers of the Union, where the interests are so very dissimilar, than between the two in the several states.

That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the danger which I have described, we have conclusive proof in the provisions to which I have so frequently alluded.—I mean that which provides for amendments to the Constitution.

I have already remarked on that portion of this provision, which, with the view of strengthening the confederated power, conceded to three-fourths of the States a right to amend, which otherwise could only have been exercised by the unanimous consent of all. It is remarkable, that while this provision thus strengthened the amending power, as it regards the States, it imposed impediments on it, so far as the Government is concerned. The power of acting, as a general rule, is invested in the majority of Congress, but instead of permitting a majority to propose amendments, the provision requires, for that purpose, two-thirds of both Houses, clearly with a view of interposing a barrier against this strong instinctive appetite of the Government for the acquisition of power. But it would have been folly in the extreme, thus carefully to guard the passage to the direct acquisition, had the wide door of construction been left open to it indirect; and hence, in the same spirit in which two-thirds of both Houses were required to propose amendments, the Convention that formed the Constitution rejected the many propositions which were moved in that body, with the intention of divesting the States of the right of interposing, and thereby of the only effectual means of preventing the enlargement of the powers of the Government by construction.

It is thus that the Constitution making power has forfeited itself against the law making; and that so effectually, that however strong the disposition and capacity of the latter to encroach, the means of resistance on the part of the former is not less powerful. If, indeed, encroachments have been made, the fault is not in the system, but in the inattention and neglect of those whose interest and duty it was, to interpose the ample means of protection afforded by the Constitution.

To sum up in a few words, in conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire philosophy of Government, in reference to the subject of this communication:

Two powers are necessary to the existence and preservation of free States: a power on the part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing their authority, by compelling them to be faithful to their constituents, and which is effected through the right of suffrage; and a power to compel the parts of society to be just to one another and compelling them to consult the interest of each other, which can only be adopted, whatever may be the desire for the purpose, by requiring the concurring assent of all the great and distinct interests of the community to the measures of the Government. This result is the sum total of all the contrivances adopted by free States to preserve their liberty, by preventing the conflicts between the several masses, or parts of the community. Both powers are indispensable. The one as much as the other. The rulers are not more disposed to encroach on the ruled, than the different interests of the community on one another; nor would they more certainly convert their power from the just and legitimate objects for which Governments are instituted, into the instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents, than would the stronger interests theirs, at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to consult them, in the measures of the Government, by taking their separate and concurring assent. The same cause operates in both cases. The constitution of our nature, which would impel the rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevented, would in like manner, and with equal force, impel the stronger to oppress the weaker interest. To vest the right of Government in the absolute majority, would be, in fact, but to embody the will of the stronger interest, in the operations of the Government, and not the will of the whole community; to leave the others unprotected, a prey to its ambition and cupidity, just as it would be in the case, between rulers and ruled, if the right to govern was vested exclusively in the hands of the former. They would both be, in reality, absolute and despotic Governments; the one as much so as the other.

They would both become mere instruments of cupidity and ambition, in the hands of those who wielded them. No one doubts that such would be the case, were the Government placed under the control of irresponsible rulers; but unfortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not seen, with equal clearness, that it must necessarily be so, when controlled by an absolute majority; and yet, the former is not more certain than the latter. To this we may attribute the mistake so often and so fatally repeated, that, to expel a despot is to establish liberty—a mistake to which we may trace the failure of many noble and generous efforts in favor of liberty. The error consists in considering communities, as formed of interests strictly identical throughout, instead of being composed, as they in reality are, of as many distinct interests as there are individuals. The interests of no two persons are the same, regarded in reference to each other; though they may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the community. It is this diversity, which the several portions of the community bear to each other, in reference to the whole, that renders the principle of the concurring majority necessary to preserve liberty. Place the powers in the hands of the absolute majority, and the strongest of these would certainly pervert the Government from the object for which it was instituted, the equal protection of the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself, at the expense of the rest of the community. Against this abuse of power no remedy can be devised, but that of the concurring majority. Neither the right of suffrage, nor public opinion, can possibly check it. They, in fact, but tend to aggravate the disease. It seems really surprising, that truths so obvious should be so imperfectly understood. There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in our intellectual powers on political subjects, when directed to large masses. We readily see, why a single individual, as a ruler, would, if not prevented, oppress the rest of the community, but are at a loss to understand, why seven millions would, if not also prevented, oppress six millions, as if the relative numbers on either side could, in the least degree, vary the principle.

In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experience of ages, comprehending all free governments preceding ours, and ours as far as it has progressed. The practical operation of ours has been substantially on the principle of the absolute majority. We have acted, with some exceptions, as if the General Government had the right to interpret its own powers, without limitation or check; and though many circumstances have favored us, and greatly impeded the natural progress of events, under such an operation of the system, yet we already see, in whatever direction we turn our eyes, the growing symptoms of disorder and decay—the growth of faction, cupidity and corruption; and the decay of patriotism, integrity, and disinterestedness. In the midst of youth we see the flushed cheek and the short and feverish breath, that mark the approach of the fatal hour; and come it will, unless there be a speedy and radical change—a return to the great conservative principle which brought the Republican party into authority, but which, with the possession of power and prosperity, it has long since ceased to remember.

I have now finished the task which your request imposed. If I have been so fortunate, as to add to your fund a single new illustration of this great conservative principle of our Government, or to furnish an additional argument calculated to sustain the State in her noble and patriotic struggle to revive and maintain it, and in which you have acted a part long to be remembered by the friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated for the time occupied in so long a communication. I believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice—of Union, Liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ordinary party struggles of the day sink into perfect insignificance; and that it will be so regarded by the most distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt.

With great and sincere regard,

I am yours, &c. &c.

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

His Ex. James Hamilton, Jun.
Governor of S. Carolina.

WOODVILLE:

SATURDAY MORNING, NOV. 17, 1832.

We have this week redeemed our pledge (given 3 weeks since, to a subscriber,) in laying before our readers, the letter of Vice-President J. C. Calhoun. This document, occupying as it does nearly the whole of our paper, has forced us to omit several articles intended for the present number.

U. S. SENATOR.

James C. Wilkins, Esqr., who lately accepted of the Executive appointment of U. S. Senator, in the place of Judge Ellis; has, we are credibly informed, *resigned*, in consequence of sickness in his family,—and the appointment has since been tendered to Judge Black.

The Presidential election returns in this State, so far as they have reached us, gives the Jackson *Van Buren* ticket, a large majority. Also the election in Louisiana, so far as heard from, gives the Jackson ticket a sweeping majority over the Clay ticket. We shall next week give all the returns received.

The sickness, in New Orleans, Natchez, and Vicksburg, has considerably abated since our last.

We are authorized to announce Gov. A. M. Scott, as a candidate for re-election at the ensuing canvass in May next

We are authorized to announce Judge Posey, as a candidate for the House of Representatives of the Legislature of this State, at the ensuing December election.

We are authorized to announce Thomas H. Prosser, Esq. as a candidate for the Senate, at the ensuing December election.

We are authorized to announce Col. F. R. Richardson, as a candidate for the House of Representatives at the ensuing December election.

We are authorized to announce G. D. Boyd, Esq. as a candidate for the House of Representatives at the ensuing December election.

We are authorized to announce Mr. *George W. Miller*, (at present Deputy,) as a candidate for the office of *Clerk* of the Circuit Court of Wilkinson County, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Mr Edward Feltus, as a candidate for the office of *Clerk* of the Probate Court of Wilkinson County, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Mr. John Netterville, as a candidate for the office of *Clerk* of the Probate Court of Wilkinson County, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Mr. *John Slade*, as a candidate for *Sheriff* of Wilkinson County, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Maj. Francis Mayes, as a candidate for Sheriff, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Col. William T. Lewis, as a candidate for Sheriff, at the ensuing May election.

We are authorized to announce Mr. James Buford, as a candidate for Sheriff, at the ensuing May election.

[*Communicated.*]

To Richard Stewart, Esq.—

Many of your fellow-citizens are desirous to have you serve the county of Amite in the next Legislature, it will be a session of vital importance to the State, in carrying into effect the salutary provisions of the new Constitution,—Your devotion to republican principles, and your untiring application during the setting of the late Convention, recommend you to our consideration, who look upon you, as emphatically "one of the people."

Entertaining these sentiments for you, we hope you will consent to add your name to the list of candidates, and you may be assured of support from the Homminy Creek

DEMOCRACY.

Amite County, Nov. 7th, 1832.

[PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.]

To the Editor of the Mississippian.

Sir:—As the refusal of the Convention to submit the Constitution as revised to the people for their approval or rejection has produced some little excitement, I beg, that you will insert the list of the Ayes and Nayes on that subject, which I give below, in order that the people of the State may know who were willing to trust them, and who were not. First, however, I will explain as well as possible the manner in which the sense of the Convention was tested. On the day before the final adjournment of the Convention, Mr. Quitman moved to strike out the whole of the fifth section of the schedule and to insert a clause to the following effect viz: That an election should be held on the first Monday in March next, to ratify or reject the Constitution as revised, at which election the people should vote directly for or against the same. If a majority of the qualified electors of the State, should vote for it, then the Governor should forthwith announce it by his proclamation to the people to be their Constitution, and it should go immediately into operation as such. If however, a majority should vote against it, then the old Constitution should stand, subject however to the following alteration, viz: The old mode of revising the Constitution should be *stricken out* and the one *inserted, which is at present in the amended,* (I beg pardon—*revised* not *amended*) Constitution. The arguments advanced in favor of the proposition were such as the good sense of every member of the community must immediately suggest to him. That the Constitution being, not like a law subject to continual change and alteration, but something which is expected to be permanent and lasting, should be well considered before it became binding upon the people, and first receive their free and unbaissed sanction at the polls. That it was true there were some points upon which the people had declared their will in the election of their delegates; and had the Convention gone no farther than these, the reasons for submitting would not have been so strong, but the Convention had made many changes and alterations which the people had never anticipated or thought of, nor even they themselves, until they were assembled. That at any rate there could not possibly be any harm in it since the Convention certainly would not wish to force down a Constitution upon the people which they would not approve. In answer to this it was urged that they had been in session a much longer time than was expected, had consequently spent a great deal of the public money—if the Constitution was rejected it would be so much wasted. That they were elected by their constituents to revise the Constitution—they had done so; and now they would not go home and tell them they were afraid they had not been honest, upright and faithful in the duties allotted them—and other arguments of the same kind, all based upon two positions.—1st That the people of the State would be certain to reject the Constitution if submitted—and 2nd. That the Convention ought not to admit that they were fallible and subject to the common frailties of human nature. Now in my humble opinion the possibility of the people's rejecting the Constitution ought to have been the strongest reason for submitting it to them; and had I been a member of that body I should have felt proud to say to my constituents, "I have made the Constitution as near to your wishes as I could, but I acknowledge myself liable to error, and may have mistaken your will—here is the Constitution; accept or reject it. I do not wish to force it upon you contrary to your will." Such a course would certainly have shown a confidence in their own rectitude of intention, and in the goodness of their Constitution, which I am sorry to say their votes have subjected to deserved suspicion.

To return however to the question, a division of the question was called for, and the vote was taken on striking out the 5th section; when the vote stood as follows:—

Ayes.—Messrs. Black, Dickson, Duncan, Falconer, Freeland, Gale, Grayson, Greenleaf, Jefferson, Kennedy, Knox, Morris, M'Rae, Pendleton, Quitman, Scott, Seaman, Williams, Williamson.—19

Nays.—Messrs. Pray [Prest.] Austin, Bacot, Cain, Farish, Floyd, Granberry, Hicks, Higgason, Hurst, Johnson, Jones of Jones, Keegan, Lowe, Lynch, Magee, McLaughlin, McMillan, Pope, Reed, Rose, Runnels, Stewart, Trotter, Wright.—21.

In furnishing the above sketch of the proposition and list of votes I have done no more than the frequent inquiries of my fellow citizens seemed to demand and have no other object in view than that the people should be put in possession of the facts that they might make such decision as to them may seem proper.

CIVIS.

South Carolina.—The Charleston Mercury calculates that the new Legislature of South Carolina, which was convened, for the purpose of carrying into effect the project of nullification, on the 22d ult, will be found to contain, in the senate 31 nullifiers and 27 union men, and, in the house of representatives, 97 nullifiers and 27 union men. If this estimate prove correct or nearly so, the work will be done by the most approved mode, through the medium of a Convention, and we have no doubt it will be done with wonderful promptitude and expedition.—*Nashville Banner.*

Extract of a letter, dated
Columbia, Oct. 24, 1832.

The *die is cast*. The Convention Bill has just passed a third reading in both Houses. The vote in the Senate was 31 to 13; in the House, 97 to 24. To-morrow and next day will only be taken up, with matters of form, and the Legislature will adjourn on Friday, without touching any other business.

NEW ADVERTISEMENTS.

☞ *New Advertisements continued on the fourth page.*

A FRESH SUPPLY OF FANCY GOODS.

☞JUST received, a variety of beautiful GOODS, of the latest fashion, from Philadelphia; which I will dispose of on reasonable terms.

ANN M. PRAY.

November 17, 1832. 46

NOTICE.

To all whom it may concern.—Know ye that at the regular Term of the Orphans' Court of the County of Wilkinson, to be holden in December next, I shall file my petition for my right of Dower in the Estate real and personal of which my late husband George B. Newell, died seized and possessed, viz—

One Third of a Tract of Land situated on the waters of Thompson's Creek containing One Thousand Acres, more or less, (being the Land on which my said deceased Husband last resided) to embrace the Mansion House, one Gin House, the Kitchen, Stables, Barns and other out houses.—Also one child's part or portion of the Personal Estate consisting of 64 Negroes, a Stock of Horses, Cattle, Hogs, Sheep, Mules, &c.—also of Farming Utensils, Household and Kitchen Furniture, and 20 Shares of the Capital Stock of the Planters Bank of the State of Mississipi, at Natchez, which personal estate is estimated at 24, 163 50-100 dollars.

LYDIA H. NEWELL.

Nov. 17th, 1832. 46

NOTICE.

THE UNDERSIGNED, Administrator on the Estate of *John Newsham*, deceased, will at the next January Term, 1833, of the Probate Court of Amite County, present his accounts as Administrator for final settlement and allowance.

DAVID DAVIS, *Admr.*

Nov. 17th, 1832. 46

NOTICE.

THE UNDERSIGNED, Administrator on the Estate of *J. W. Edwards*, deceased, will at the next December Term, 1832, of the Probate Court of Wilkinson County present his accounts as Administrator for final settlement and allowance.

JOHN OGDEN, *Admr.*

November 17, 1832. 46

Office of the West Feliciana
Rail Road Company.
August 17, 1832.

SEALED proposals will be received from the 1st of October until the 15th of November next, or the grading on the first division of the West Feliciana Rail Road, beginning at the Mississippi river near St Francisville, and extending in the direction of the present travelled road to Woodville, a distance of eleven miles. The division will be laid off into suitable sections, and the Engineer of the company will be upon the ground to give the necessary explanations. At the same time will be received, proposals for furnishing the necessary materials for the formation of the track, consisting of scantling of red cypress, cedar or pine, six inches by six inches in width, and varying from sixteen to forty feet in length all lengths varying from each other by four feet. Wooden sleepers of cypress, white oak, locust, cedar, mulberry or willow, from 7 to 8 inches in diameter, and from seven to eight feet in length.

☞ The Southern Planter, at Woodville, and the Mercantile Advertiser, at New Orleans, will publish the above till forbid.

JOHN N. DILLAHUNTY,
35 Chief Engineer.

☞ THE time for receiving the above proposals is extended until the 15th day of December, next. By order of the Board of Directors.

JOS. JOHNSON, *Pres't.*

November 12th, 1832

NOTICE.

WAS Committed to the Jail of Wilkinson County, Mi. on the 15th of November, by Daniel Bass, Esq., a negro boy who calls his name JIM, and says he belongs to *William Postlethwaite*, of Natchez—Said boy is about 5 feet 4 or 5 inches high—about 22 or 23 years old—had on a blue domestic roundabout, cotton shirt, and a striped woollen vest—dark complected—had a blanket with him—chunky built—says he ranaway from a plantation below the line, near Mrs. Briants.

The owner of the above described negro is requested to comply with the Law, and take him out of jail.

T. E. W. JAMES, *Jailor.*

November 17, 1832. 46

LAW NOTICES.

JOS. H. STREET,

Attorney & Counsellor at Law.

HAVING located himself in Woodville, respectfully offers his professional services to the people. He will attend the Circuit, County & Probate Courts of Wilkinson, the Circuit Courts of Amite and Adams Counties;—also the Supreme & Chancery Courts held at Natchez. His office is in the west end of Jones' new building, on the South side of the Public Square.

July 21, 1832. 29m6

PRESTON W. FARRAR, will practice Law in the Courts of Wilkinson County and the Circuit Court of Adams, Franklin and Amite, and the Supreme and Chancery Courts of the State. Office, Woodville, East side of the Square, the same occupied heretofore by Smith and Farrar.

July 7, 1832. 27

BLANK DEEDS,
For Sale at this office.