

Proceedings of the Supreme Court

"Washer Women" Butter Nut

Opinions filed September 28, 1912. 1947. Hoffman against Chicago & North-western railway company.

In an action against a railroad company for negligence causing the death of a brakeman earning \$4 a month at the age of 20, a verdict in favor of plaintiff for \$3000 was excessive.

In an action against a railroad company for causing the death of a brakeman by bucking him in the night time, evidence that there was no light in the car, that there was no brakeman thereon, that it was not a regular train, notice or warning, led insufficient in absence of a custom requiring such notice or warning, to prove negligence, where decedent was an experienced brakeman familiar with the switch-boards and with the mechanics of switching therein and was injured while crossing a switch-track in the private switchyards of his employer on his way home from work, there being nothing to show that the car was not being moved in the usual and ordinary manner. Reese, C. J., dissenting.

1948. Sanford against Saunders county. Appeal from Saunders. On motion for rehearing. Former judgment affirmed. J. J. dissenting in part. Letton, J. dissenting. Reese, C. J., concurring.

1949. Carpenter against Scherle. Appeal from Franklin. Reversed and remanded with directions to grant a perpetual injunction against both defendants as prayed in plaintiff's petition. Fawcett, J. Sedgewick, J. dissenting. Letton, J. concurring.

1950. Slight deviations from the line of public travel to avoid mud, pools, or natural obstructions, are not necessarily prohibited by the establishment of a highway by prescription, especially so when it appears that the natural obstructions have been removed, and the highway has been used without interruption or substantial change for more than ten years.

1951. Where a landowner notifies his lands, and in lieu thereof to travel over the section line road along the edge of his land, and his grantee, in consequence, for a period of ten years, permit public without interruption to travel along said section line over a strip of land less than the width of the road, such acts will be construed to constitute a dedication of such strip of land as a public road.

1952. In order to constitute a highway by dedication, it is not necessary that the offer of dedication be accepted by the public itself, and the acceptance by the public itself is shown by its entering upon the land and enjoying the privilege offered by user.

1953. Harris against Lincoln & North-western Railway company. Appeal from Lancaster. Reversed and remanded. Reese, C. J., dissenting. Letton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Reese, C. J., not sitting.

1954. The measure of damages for permanent injury to land occasioned by the necessary and proper construction of a railroad, no part of the land having been taken, is the difference in the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the construction of the improvement, and the value of the increase or depreciation of values generally, in the same vicinity.

1955. In such case the reception of evidence of the fair and reasonable value of the land immediately before and immediately after the overflow is reversible error.

1956. In an action for damages to land and growing crops by flood waters of a stream, subject to overflow from natural causes, and which it is alleged were thrown upon the plaintiff's land by the negligent and improper construction of a railroad nearby and adjacent thereto, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the construction complained of either caused such overflow or increased the same, or in some manner contributed thereto, together with the nature and extent of the increased overflow if any and the amount of damages caused thereby.

1957. Evidence examined, and found insufficient to sustain the verdict.

1958. March against Village of Trenton. Appeal from Hickok. Affirmed. Hamer, J., Sedgewick, J., concurring in result affirming judgment. Reese, C. J., dissenting.

1959. Upon an appeal from the judgment of the district court under section 2718, Ann. St. 1907 (sec. 4, art. 11, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1907) to detach territory from village of Trenton, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed unless it is made to appear that the trial judge committed an important mistake of fact or made an erroneous inference of fact or of law. Hines against City of Randolph, 50 Neb. 521, 138 Neb. 272, 273.

1960. Evidence examined and found to sustain the judgment of the district court.

1961. Heywood against Heywood. Appeal from Lincoln. Reversed and remanded. Reese, C. J., concurring in result affirming judgment. J. J., like all other.

1962. The provisions of a will, like all other.

contracts, must be construed with a view of carrying out the intention of the testator, and unless there is something in it contrary to the law of the state, or in contravention of public policy, it will not be declared invalid. (St. James (opinion) Appeal from Shelby, 40 Neb. 78.)

1. The testator was the owner of a 280-acre farm in Pleasant Valley township, otherwise described as the west half of the north-west quarter of section thirteen and the south half of the northern quarter, and the east half of the south-west quarter, of range five east of the sixth principal meridian, in Dodge county, on which he had two sons, Joseph Heywood and Thomas J. Heywood, who were farming the same and to whom he desired to devise the said farm subject to the life estate of his wife, Katherine Heywood, and he so informed the witness who drafted the will, and who made a rough draft of the proposed will from which he shortly afterwards prepared the will itself, leaving out of it one of the three eighths which constituted the farm; at the time the will was made the testator owned the farm in Pleasant Valley township, and he owned in township land above described and no other land in the county, and he owned in township land in that township, so that the land is identified with the particular farm intended to be devised to two particular sons named in the will.

2. Where the intention of the testator is to give to the wife the life estate and to divide the remainder among his sons, and the evidence of facts surrounding its execution, such extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of ascertaining whether a will of facts existed at the time the will was written which corresponded with the words used in the will, and such evidence may not be admitted to vary the terms of the will or to add anything to it, so as to arrive at an intention not expressed in it, but to harmonize the language used by the testator with the facts referred to and shown to arrive at the testator's intention as expressed in the will, and a ruling which makes the will the facts inconsistent with it to be adopted.

3. Evidence examined and found to sustain the judgment of the district court.

1972. Crites against The Capital Fire Insurance company. Appeal from Franklin. Reversed and remanded. Reese, C. J., concurring. Letton, J., dissenting.

1. Where an insurance company relies as a defense upon false representations made in answers to questions in an application for insurance, and the burden is placed on and proved that the answers were made as written in the application.

2. Where a corporation is provided in substance that if default be made in payment of the note given for the premium the insurance should cease, the note was made payable at the office of the defendant company in Lincoln. Prior to its maturity it was sent to a bank at Bloomington for collection. The maker went to the bank at its customary hour for opening on the day of maturity, prepared to pay the note and waited for nearly half an hour, but the cashier went to his work. The property was burned between 9 and 11 o'clock that night. Held, that having waited a reasonable time to pay the note at the place selected by the insurance company, and the day not having expired when the day of maturity was due, the liability of the insurance company upon the policy continued in force.

1973. Forrest against Nebraska Hardware company. Appeal from Lancaster. Affirmed and remanded. Reese, C. J., concurring.

1. Transaction between stockholders and members of the board of directors of a corporation, by which the property of the corporation is transferred to one of such stockholders and directors, when attacked by another stockholder, will be examined by the courts with care, and when a want of good faith, fraud or illegality is shown, the transaction will not be upheld. But where the proposition of purchase is made to the board and accepted, and also submitted to a meeting of the stockholders and accepted by a majority of them, and the transaction appears fair and free from fraud and upon a reasonable consideration, a court of equity will not declare such sale invalid.

2. Where in a proper action it is shown that the managers and directors of a corporation have unlawfully withdrawn the funds of such corporation and applied them to their own use, a receiver will be appointed to take charge of the affairs of the corporation, unless the funds so withdrawn are restored and the action and stockholders are indemnified against further illegal acts by such officers.

3. It is the duty of the managing officers of a corporation to consult, protect and conserve the interests of all who are interested in the corporation. Discrimination against a stockholder when the value of his stock is unjustly depressed will justify the intervention of a court of equity and the unwarranted acts of such managers will be enjoined.

4. The duty of the managing officers of a corporation to consult, protect and conserve the interests of all who are interested in the corporation, and the management of the financial affairs of a corporation by suit in court, or in case of the failure of the managing officers to do so, including the compensation of counsel, may be chargeable against the stockholders.

1974. Bredvick against Gates. Appeal from Boone. Affirmed. Hamer, J., Sedgewick, J., concurring. Letton, J., dissenting.

1. Where a boy 9 years old undertakes to work in obedience to the command of the master, the law will not deny him relief on the ground of his minority, unless the danger was so manifest and glaring that it must have been known to the master, and he could not do it without injury.

2. Where a boy 9 years old undertakes to work in obedience to the command of the master, the law will not deny him relief on the ground of his minority, unless the danger was so manifest and glaring that it must have been known to the master, and he could not do it without injury.

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4. Where a boy 9 years old undertakes to work in obedience to the command of the master, the law will not deny him relief on the ground of his minority, unless the danger was so manifest and glaring that it must have been known to the master, and he could not do it without injury.

5. An inconsiderable variance between the pleadings and the proof will not require the reversal of a judgment unless it appears that the party complaining therefrom was prejudiced or misled to his disadvantage.

1975. Exchange Bank of Ong against Clay. Reversed and remanded. Fawcett, J.

The existence of a written contract between the parties to an action and delivered, does not prevent the party apparently plaintiff from pleading and proving that contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of such contract or instrument the parties had entered into a verbal agreement which constituted a condition on which the performance of the written contract or agreement is to depend, and which agreement is in fact established by the evidence.

1976. Drake against McDonald. Appeal from Clay. Reversed and remanded. Fawcett, J.

A real estate trust will not be declared upon doubtful and uncertain grounds and the trustee will not be held liable for the existence of the trust to establish the facts upon which it is based by clear and convincing evidence.

1977. Cooper against Hall. Appeal from Dawson. Affirmed. Fawcett, J. No syllabus.

1978. Case against Haggarty. Appeal from Saline. Affirmed. Reese, C. J., concurring. Letton, J., dissenting.

1. Evidence examined and set out in the opinion, held: Sufficient to establish the fact that the defendant was the agent for the sale of the horses in question, and sufficient to justify plaintiff in suing against Waite.

against the heirs of the mortgagor, the mortgage created by her upon the undivided one-third of said land, and was not subject to foreclosure.

2. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

3. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

4. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

5. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

6. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

7. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

8. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

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12. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

13. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

14. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

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16. The defendant held the office of county judge for three successive terms; the plaintiff was surety on his official bonds, the agreement between them was that the defendant should indemnify the county and save it harmless from all claims, etc., arising out of the sheriff's office, and should place the surety in funds to meet any claim, etc., before it should be required to pay the same.

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valid consideration therefor, and it is not appearing that the wife and it is known of the daughter's interest in the premises, held, that the college could not be a bona fide purchaser of the same.

2. As a general rule a mere erroneous statement of value, when made by the owner of land in an effort to sell it, is not actionable.

3. Where defendant, in a suit on a note executed by him and delivered to plaintiff in part payment of the purchase price of land, pleads that he was induced to make the purchase by means of false representations of plaintiff, in regard to the character of the land, he must, in establishing that defense, prove, among other things, facts or circumstances showing that he was entitled to rely on such representations.

1948. Hartwig against Bauer. Appeal from Seward. Affirmed. Letton, J.

In order to authorize a county board to grant a liquor license a petition containing the names of at least fifty-seven qualified resident freeholders was necessary. The petition in the record contains seventy-nine names. A number of petitioners withdrew their names before the hearing. It is therefore sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.

1949. Stratton against State. Error from Cedar Rapids. Reversed and remanded. Letton, J.

A Missouri corporation which manufactured and produced ranges in that state was a corporation under the laws of that state when it was organized in this state. It worked for a salary and had no interest in the sale or in the horses and wagon which he used in the business.

A statute imposing a tax upon peddlers, but expressly excepts "parties selling their own work, or their own produce, or their own property by themselves or employees." Held, that defendant is within the exception and is not liable to be taxed as a peddler under such statute.

1975. State ex rel. Hoctor against Trainor. Appeal from Douglas. On motion for judgment of acquittal. Reversed and remanded. Fawcett, J.

1. Respondents, who held the offices of mayor and city clerk, respectively were appointed by mandamus ordered in call a primary and a general election, in advance of the time that such election should have been called. They complied with the command of the writ by presenting to the persons elected at such election as respondents their certificates of election by the persons so elected, and respondents turned over their respective offices, together with all of the books, papers, and documents pertaining to the same, to their said successors, who have ever since held and are now holding and administering the same. Held, that respondents were voluntary on their part.

2. And in such a case an appeal by respondents of such mandamus action, prosecuted to this court after such voluntary surrender of their offices, will not be maintained.

1976. Realty Investment Co. against Shaffer. Appeal from Lancaster. Reversed and remanded. Reese, C. J., concurring. Letton, J., dissenting.

1. A purchaser of land, to justify a decision on account of a misrepresentation, must show in some manner that it was material and misled him to his injury and damage.

2. As a general rule a mere erroneous statement of value, when made by the owner of land in an effort to sell it, is not actionable.

3. Where defendant, in a suit on a note executed by him and delivered to plaintiff in part payment of the purchase price of land, pleads that he was induced to make the purchase by means of false representations of plaintiff, in regard to the character of the land, he must, in establishing that defense, prove, among other things, facts or circumstances showing that he was entitled to rely on such representations.

1948. Hartwig against Bauer. Appeal from Seward. Affirmed. Letton, J.

In order to authorize a county board to grant a liquor license a petition containing the names of at least fifty-seven qualified resident freeholders was necessary. The petition in the record contains seventy-nine names. A number of petitioners withdrew their names before the hearing. It is therefore sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.

HEY THERE! I WANT MY PANTS! IRATE CITIZEN CHASES DRESHER

Omahan Hurrys to Regain Pants and \$100 Before These Wearables Are Sent Through a Gasoline Bath.

MONEY FOUND AND READY FOR WORRIED CLAIMANT

What would YOU do if suddenly overtaken by an apparent madman who as he runs, screams out in stentorian tones: "Hey there! I want my pants! I want my pants! I want my pants!"

And to think that "Al" Dresher, head of the Dresher Bros. Cleaning plant at 2213-2215 Farnam St., would be accused of needing a pair of trousers belonging to some other gentleman. Just as though "Al" wouldn't have a tailor shop full of pants of all colors, sizes and materials.

Yet, this peculiar thing happened in Omaha's most traveled street just the other day. Happy "Al" of Dresher Bros. while sauntering along Farnam street near his plant, was startled to hear the aforesaid yell directly behind his shoulders. The same "I want my pants! I want my pants!"

Turning to see the cause of the commotion "Al" beheld a prominent Omaha citizen, out of breath, exhausted, unheeded, but still yelling, "I want my pants!" "Now claim yourself, Old Pal," said Dresher, "claim yourself! What's the matter? I haven't got your pants, I've a dozen pairs at the tailor shop and six more at the cleaning plant. Besides, you've got a pair on, so what's the riot about?"

"Well, I-I-I left a pair of pants at your cleaning establishment a few minutes ago and I-I-I want 'em quick!" "What's the matter," said Al, "don't you think we can clean 'em properly? We clean about three hundred pairs a day!"

"No-o-o it isn't that," exclaimed the worried one, "but—you see—I left 'em and—"

"Well, if you must have 'em, come on," said "Al," and the route to the plant was soon covered. As luck would have it the trousers in question had not yet gone through the Dresher cleaning equipment and were promptly passed out to the worried one.

Just phone Tyler 345 or leave your work at Dresher The Tailor, 1515 Farnam St., or at the Dresher Branch in the Pompelan Room of The Brandeis Stores. Dresher pays express one way out of town shipments amounting to \$5.00 or over.—Advertisement.

How The Body Kills Germs.

Germs that get into the body are killed in two ways—by the white corpuscles of the blood, and by a germ-killing substance that is in the blood. Just what this substance is, we do not know. The blood of a healthy person always has some germ-killing substance in it to ward off the attack of disease. The fountain head of life is the stomach. A man who has a weak and impaired stomach and who does not properly digest his food will soon find that his blood has become weak and impoverished, and that his whole body is improperly and insufficiently nourished. To put the body in healthy condition, to feed the system on rich, red blood, and to make the blood germ-killing, is the purpose of Dr. Pierce's Golden Medical Discovery, a pure glyceric extract (without alcohol), of bloodroot, golden seal and Oregon grape root, stone root, mandrake and queen's root with black cherrybark.

"My husband was a sufferer from stomach trouble and impure blood," writes Mrs. James H. Martin, of Frankfort, Ky. "He had a sore on his face that would form a scab which would dry and drop off in about a month, then another would immediately form. It continued this way for a long time. He tried every remedy that any one would suggest but found no relief. He then tried Dr. Pierce's Golden Medical Discovery which completely cured him. He has stayed cured now for two years, and I recommend this valuable medicine for impurities of the blood."

Dr. Pierce's Pleasant Pellets regulate and invigorate stomach, liver and bowels. Sugar-coated, tiny granules.



J. H. MARTIN, Esq.

You Should Have Seen the Pimples But Now Her Face is the Fairest of the Fair, Due to Stuart's Calcium Wafers.

Those pimples are like pearls in a ruby cluster when Stuart's Calcium Wafers clear the face of every pimple, spot and blemish. And even if you haven't pimples, the clear, transparent skin of a healthy, Calcium Wafer complexion is more radiant than the delect touch of an artist to the most exquisite water color.

Stuart's Calcium Wafers act directly upon the sweat glands of the skin, along their mission is to stimulate the excretory ducts. They do not create perspiration, but cause the skin to breathe out vigorously, thus transforming perspiration into a gaseous vapor. The calcium sulphide of which these wafers are composed, consumes the germ poisons in the sweat glands and pores, hence the blood makes a new, smooth skin in a surprisingly short time.

You will never be ashamed to look at yourself in a mirror, once you use Stuart's Calcium Wafers. Nor will your friends give you that hinting look, as much as to say for goodness sake, get rid of those pimples!

There is no longer any excuse for anyone to have a face disfigured with skin eruptions, when it is so easy to get rid of them. Simply get a box of Stuart's Calcium Wafers at any drug store and take them according to directions. After a few days you will hardly recognize yourself in the mirror. The change will delight you immensely. All blemishes will disappear.

All druggists sell Stuart's Calcium Wafers at 30 cents a box.—Advertisement.