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"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."
ESTABLISHED 1877. WASHINGTON, D. C., SATURDAY, MARCH IS, 1882. NEW SERIES . V03D-1., N- 31. I I; A PERILOUS ENTERPRISE. ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY CON SECUTIVE HOURS IN THE SADDLE. THE CARTER RAID, An Expedition Into East Tcnnessco and the Destruction of tho Virginia Railroad. Br G. C. KXIFFIN. Among the patriots of 1SG1 there are none who have a stronger hold npon the venera tion of the American people than those of East Tennessee. The courage and constancy of their devotion to the Union, their suffer ings and exposure to death in every form that the malignity of their enemies could invent, their separation from their families during months of anxious waiting, when every messenger from their native land brought to their cars talcs of outrago and cruel persecution inflicted upon those who were left behind, "by a lawless horde of guer rillas who, in tho name of the confederacy, filled the land with rapine and murder, theft long probation and final triumph, forms mnt ter for an epic poem for which the poet has not yet arisen. Banished from their homes by the stem edict of a power whose authority they defied, and which was at war with all their traditions of loyalty, they had no re course from entering the confederate service except in expatriating themselves from their homes, and leaving their families to the ten der mercies of freebooters. The occupation of East Tennessee by a military force suffi cient to hold possession of it, had from the first outbreak of the rebellion been an object dear to the great heart of President Lincoln. Failure to accomplish this cherished result had caused the removal of General Bucll from the command of the Army of tho Ohio, to which General Rosccrans was assigned in October, 1862. The determination to carry out this object was impressed upon General Rosccrans, who found, on assuming command, the confederate army, under General Bragg, encamped in Middle Tennessee, thirty miles from Nashville. To move into East Tennes see through Cumberland Gap, even if so long a march over country roads, without ade quate transportation for army supplies, in the early winter months had been practi cable, would invite the capture of Nashville and the invasion of Kentucky from the South, resulting in cutting off his lines of communication with his base at Cincinnati and the possible occupation of the States north of the Ohio by the confederates. Yet preposterous as it-appears, at this distance, the march through Cumberland Gap was persist entty urged b the War Department. While Rosccrans was gathering his forces for a de cisive blow upon the army in his front, the confederate cavalry, outnumbering that in the Union army three to one, were constantly raiding through the country in his rear. Forrest in West Tennessee turned his atten tion to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in rear of General Grant, and Morgan in Kentucky fell upon the Louisville and Nashville Rail road, and swept it clear of bridges and trestle work from Bacon Creek to the Rolling Fork. While Morgan with his rough riders was illuminating the heavens along the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad with the light of burning bridges, a counter raid was in progress in East Tennessee, conducted by Brigadier-General S. P. Carter. On No vember 25th an expedition was proposed to enter East Tennessee and destroy the bridges along the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. A good deal of time was used in organizing the expedition, and it was not until December 19th that arrangements were perfected and the movements ordered. Even then an insufficient force was detached upon a most hazardous expedition. Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, a native East Tcn ncssccan, in command of the forces assigned to the work, ordered a junction to be made in Clay county, Kentucky, and proceeded to that point on the 20th. The organizations composing this force were as follows: Two batteries, Second Michigan cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Camp bell; Ninth Pennsylvania cavalry, Maj. Rus sell ; First battery, Seventh Ohio cavalry, Maj. Rainy, the brigade, 980 strong, being under command of Col. Clias. J. Walker of the Tenth Kentucky cavalry. A forage train accompanied the command sixty miles, and then, after distributing a portion of the supplies to the men, transferred the remain der to a train of pack mules. At noon on the 2Sth the foot of the Cumberland Moun tains was reached on the north side, opposite Crank's Gap, equidistant between Pound Gap and Cumberland Gap. The horses were then red, a day's forage procured, and the pack mules sent back. A little before sunsot the summit of the mountain was reached and in the distance the whole field of their operations was spread out to view. Four hours were sccupicd in the steep, narrow descent, where General Carter learned that 400 confederate javalry were encamped at Joncsville, five aiiles distant. The territory into which Carter had penetrated was comprised in the iistrict entrusted to the guardianship of Humphrey Marshall, whose Falslafiian pro portions required that he should remain near, icadquarters at Abingdon. On the night of ;hc29th he received from Captain Lanier, stationed at Pattonsville, information by telegraph that 4,000 Union cavalry were mrching on Bristol, forty-five miles distant. Marshall's force consisted of tho Forty pith Virginia infantry, newly formed, en camped near Bristol, a battalion of Kcntuck ians under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ezekial F. Clay, a battalion of artillery, 500 strong, at Jefferson, Tazewell county, with twelve guns, and a battery of six pieces at Wytheville. He had in addition to this a mounted force scattered through the country whoso principal employment was to ftrago for subsistence for themselves and horses. The obese general seemed to be always a man with a grievance. Kirby Smith had banished his cavalry from his domain and forbidden them to collect forage in East Tennessee. General Floyd, in the enjoy ment of vice regal rights under State author ity in Western Virginia, although not his superior officer, treated him with cold con tempt. A nomadic life had brcdVithin his capacious breast a restless desire to accom plish something, but as fast as he succeeded in accumulating a force sufficient to carry out a grand design it was taken from him. The constant victim of nostalgia he was compelled to stand without the gates of that paradise which all true-born Kentuckians are taught to believe centres in tho Blue Grass region, and feed his hungry recruits upon the husks beyond Pound Gap. Colonel Giltner's Fourth Kentucky cavalry had moved on from day to day, in compliance with Kirby Smith's demand, to Russell coun ty, Virginia ; Clay's battalion of Kentucky mounted rifles was near the Three Springs, in Washington county. Johnson's battalion still lingered near Kingsport, always on tho eve of starting for Kentucky in search of forage and recruits. Witcher's battalion of Virginia riflemen had drifted as far east as Chatham Hill, above the Salt Works. Mc- Farland's company were grazing in the rich lands of Tazewell county. Thus at tho instant when Captain Lanier's telegram was handed to General Marshall his force of 3,000 men was scattered over sixty miles of terri tory, all intent upon the one object of filling their stomachs and those of their horses. Colonel Sharp, commanding the regiment at Bristol, was ordered by telegram to keep a sharp lookout in the direction of Pattonville. Batteries of artillery were ordered from Wytheville to Bristol. Judging that the real point of attack was the Salt Works, where irreparable injury could be inflicted in a few hours' time, the Georgia battery was ordered to that place, where, in front of Hyde's Gap, covering Saltvillc, a regiment of cavalry was encamped. Lieutenant-Colonel Pryor, of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry, visiting at Abingdon, was aroused and sent to his camp, 22 miles, with orders to throw out heavy pickots toward Russell, Hcnson villc, andjthc mouth of Dump's Creek, with videttes thrown out towards Estillvillc and Osborne's Ford, on Clinch River. Major Tom Johnson, visiting at Abingdon, was sent to his camp at Kingsport with orders to join Clay at Three Springs. Captain Har mon, in command of Witcher's battalion, was ordered to move rapidly down Poor Valley to the Little Moccasin Gap, throw out scouts to' Hanson's and open communication with Giltner. Toward morning n railroad train arrived from Bristol, and tho conductor was directed to remain and transport troops back to that point, but disobeyed the order, thus preventing the arrival of troops at that point until too late to be of any avail. While Marshall was making these dispo sitions of the forces at his command, Gen eral Carter was advancing rapidly toward the railroad. All through the day and night of the 29th the column marched down Covo Creek through a gap in Poor Valley Ridge across Powell's Valley, reaching the top of Waller's Ridge at daylight of the :50th. Thence through Stickncy ville across Powell's Mountain through Pattersonville and across Clinch River, arriving at Estillvillc at 10 p. m. Here they met Witcher's battalion, which fled towards Kingsport without firing a gun. No time now for rest. Confederate cavalry hovering upon their flanks, on they moved, in compact ranks, through the mud and darkness, over unknown roads, picking up the enemy's stragglers at every mile of the march. A sergeant of the Second Mich igan cavalry, with two soldiers, falling to the rear to adjust a saddle girth, rode on to join the command and missed the way in the darkness of the night. Seeing cavalry ahead, they rode up and asked if the column had passed. " What column," was asked. " Car ter's," was the response. " We are confeder ates, and you are prisoners." The poor fellows surrendered, and immediately after wards a pistol shot laid one of them dead at the feet of their captors. Tho .murder was committed by Major Johnson, commanding a battalion of Kentucky mounted rifles, who was on his way from Abingdon to join his command. Immediately preceding the capture he had come up with Lieutenant Duncan's company "A," of Lieutenant-Colonel Clay's command, scouting from his camp toward Estillvillc. "The two remain ing prisoners," says Clay in his report, " wero sent to camp accompanied by Major Johnson, who was very much excited and yet holding his pistol in his hand." At daylight, on the morning of the 30th, CarterrcachcdBlountvillc, where he captured and paroled somo thirty soldiers of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry.' Bristol was eight miles ahead, but hearing that it was guarded by a regiment nine hundred strong and a battery of artillery, Carter moved to the right to strike the railroad toward Union. Meanwhile the country lying to the left oi his line of march was alive with troops hastening to the defease of Bristol and Saltvillc. The Second Michigan cavalry was dis patched to Union to take tho place and destroy the railroad bridge, while Carter re-, maincd a few hours to await the arrival of the rear-guard in charge of stragglers. Major McDowell, in command of a battalion of tho Sixty-second North Carolina, surrendered without resistance, and on the arrival of Carter with the main body the bridge across the nolstbn, a fine structure) GOO feet in length, was slowly burning. The prisoners wCro( paroled, and that afternoon were, on their way to the mountains of North Carolina-, swearing they would never be ex changed. Their joy at being captured seemed to be unbounded. Tho depot, con taining a large quantity of salt, nitre, and Other covcrnment stores, was burned. As soon as the work of destruction was fairly underway Colonel Walker, with Colonel J. P. Carter, of the Second East Tcnnesse infantry, who accompanied the expedition as guide, with detachments of the Second Michigan, Ninth Pennsylvania, and Seventh Ohio cav alry, in all 181 men, started for the Watauga bridge at Carter Station, ten miles west of Union. On their way they captured a loco motivo and tender, on which Colonel Love, of tho Sixty-second North Carolina, was hastening to Union to investigate the truth 6f tho rumor that a Union force was advanc ing upon Bristol. Two companies of his regiment wero posted at Carter's Station, where Colonel Walker arrived about sunset and attacked at once. After a brief resist ance the guard, 200 strong, broke and fled to tho woods. Major Roper, of the Sixth Ken tucky cavalry, with two companies of the Ninth Pennsylvania, under Captain Jones, in a gallant dash in pursuit, captured and destroyed many of the fugitives. Walker lost two killed and three wounded; the con-. federates lost twelve to sixteen killed and a proportionate number wounded. The rail road bridge, 300 feet in length, was soon in flames and completely demolished; also a largo number of arms and valuable stores, including the locomotive, which was run into the river. While the Union cavalry was engaged in de stroying the railroad, General Marshall hav ing, as he supposed, obtained accurate infor mation of its number and movements, made such disposition of his forces as to attempt its capture. The alarm had been given ; the road was open to Knoxville from Carter's Station and from Union to Abingdon. At half-past seven on themorning of the 30th Lieutenant Colonel Clay telegraphed Marshall the cap ture of three prisoners, and reported a force of 1,500 or 2,000 strong advancing toward Bristol. Clay determined to hold his position in front of Stamp's regiment, which war : Bristol, 400 strong, until reinforcements cc1 4 be sent to that point. Between Clay's en.-.' .; and Bristol two roads converged, by caclj, which he Was informed the Union cava was advancing. He therefore sent scouts down both of these roads in the direction of Blountsvillc and Estillvillc. At 11 a. m. videttes on the former road brought informa tion that tho Union cavalry had left the Bristol road and advanced on Union Station. This information was also telegraphed- to Marshall at Abingdon, and Cla' fell back upon Bristol in the expectation that Carter would move cast upon that place. All this time Marshall had been in telegraphic com munication with the railroad officials first at Bristol and then at Lynchburg, asking for cars to transport his troops from Abingdon to Bristol, only fifteen miles. After at last reaching tho proper officer a train reached Abingdon. After the burning of the bridges at 8 p. in. of the 30th, information came from Stamp that his command and Clay's, 900 strong, were concentrated at Bristol, but j afraid to attack Carter, whose force they estimated at 2,000. Colonel Giltner was directed at G p. m. to move his cavalry to Bristol and unite with Clay and Stamp. The same order was sent to Witchcr at Little Moccasin Gap. Marshall arrived at Bristol with reinforcements at midnight; no one knew where Carter had gone from Watauga. Fearing an attack upon Johnson's camp, he ordered him to join Clay; then went to bed. The train came in during the night, bringing ten cannon but no horses to move them. These he had ordered from Wytheville, the horses to travel on foot. While the con federate commander was wooing the drowsy god Carter had turned the head of his column westward. Leaving Watauga at midnight he reached Kingsport at sunset on the 31st. A brief rest, a supper to men and horses, and tho men were again in tho saddle, past Rogersvillc, which they left eight miles to the south, through Looney's Gap of Clinch Mountain, bivouacking for the first time in ninety-six hours late at night at a point in Hancock county, Tennessee. The morning of the 31st found General Marshall engaged upon a map of the country constructed under the supervision of several citizens of Jones boro. At 12 m. he received information that the Union cavalry was still in camp near Union; then that they were en route for Kingsport; later that they were in camp at Hull's, fonr miles south of Blountville, on the Jonesboro road, with an earnest request to send all his force to Kingsport. Still later Captain Baldwin telegraphed that the Union cavalry, about 2,000 strong, were making their way, to Rogersvillc with a view to plundering tho bank at that place. This dispatch was dated 8 p. m., and still tho plethoric commander lingered at Bristol. Captain Bedford, of Clay's command, who had left Bristol about noon, passing through Blountville, and hearing nothing of a camp at Hull's, sent back word to that effect whereupon Giltner was dispatched with all speed to Blountville, there to co-opcrato with Baldwin and cut Carter off from Moc casin Gap. Marshall had been promised reinforcements by General Sam Jones, com manding at Dublin, Va., but they had not arrived. His artillery horses were still on tho road. The conflicting statements of his scouts obscured tho movoments of Carter's cavalry, and to add to his per plexity the map provided for him by Mr. Dunn was made without regard to points of compass or distanco from place to place. When finally ho was warned by the flight of time that a movement must bo made in pursuit, he found that: he had but 1,533 effectives with which to capture a force estimated at double that number. Never theless Marshall moved from Bristol on the night of tho 31st and occupied Moccasin Gap about four a. m. o the morning of the 1st of January. Supposing that Carter would cross the Clinch range below Estillvillc he sent jncs?cngcrs to arouso the bushwhackers in Lee county, Virginia, through which Carter would be likel' to pass, and others to Cum berland Gap and Pound Gap, requesting co operation while he moved forward to Spier's Ferry, which Carter had crossed in his out ward march. Up to midnight of January 1st no information could bo obtained of Car ter's movements. In obedience to his orders the countrymen had felled trees across the roads, but in some cases had taken tho pre caution to wait until tho Union column had passed, when, finding his way blockaded, Marshall remained at Pridemores, five miles beyond Spier's Ferry, until the morning of January 2d, when he moved to Pattonsville, and Carter resumed his march in the direc tion of Joncsville, where 400 infantry and two companies of cavalry from Cumberland Gap had taken position. Carter reached Joncsville late in the afternoon. Tho in fantry fell back but the cavalry showed fight. A charge led fcy Colonel Walker drove them in haste to the Avood with a loss of sev eral killed and wounded. Twenty were cap tured and paroled. At eleven p. m. the column passed through Crank's Gap, and thoroughly exhausted from a march of five days and a half, in which they had been out of the saddle but seventeen hours, threw themselves upon tho ground and rested until morning. Marshall advanced from Pattonsville toward Joncsville, reaching there in time to hurry Carter's rear 'guard out of the town, but, deterred from pursuit by the impression that Carter's force was superior to his own, and that his troops might be tad into an ambuscade, he followed Carter's example and went into camp. Tho expedition returned to Manchester, Ken tucky, on the 5th, when the force was dis banded and the detachments sent to their respective commands. This raid of over 470 miles, 170 of which was through tho enemy's country, bears favorable- comparison with any mado by either "m -p.:: or Forrest during the year, and dem .., -- ul.tlie,equal endurance of the north- i .r. . dry. Had the force bcon at all com ; invito with tho undertaking, General . carter could have turned eastward from Watauga bridge and swept the railroad as far as Abingdon. The destruction of the saltworks at Saltville would have inflicted irreparable damage upon the confederacy, and the defeat of the broken and disorgan ized force of Humphrey Marshall would have given a favorable opportunity for the Union men of East Tennessee to assert their rights by revolt. Their probation, however, soon ended. For nearly two years tho Unionists of East Tennessee had looked forward to the time of their deliverance from confederate bondage. The flag of their country had floated on sev eral occasions from the peaks of the Cumber land Mountains, but had as often disappeared behind the western slope. Like a mirage, it had excited their hopes only to dash them to the ground. The expedition led by their countryman, General Carter, proved the avaut courier of a powerful army under General Burnside, which a few months later planted the Stars and Stripes upon the pina cles in Knoxville, where it floated in triumph until the close of the war. A CONFEDERATE SOLDIER'S OPINION The evacuation of Richmond was a sad blow to tho tens of thousands whose blind faith in Lee had led them to believe that his army could suffer everything and still stand between Grant and the capital. But when he left the trenches of Petersburg not one man in a thousand in his army knew that the,, end was near. Indeed, thoy looked upon it as a move toward somo new victory. Cavalry and artillery horses were mere skel etons, the army in rags and confederate money no better than brown paper, and yet when did those men fight better than in those last dark days ? On the morning of the final surrender only a few men saw the shadow of the falling hammer which was to strike a last blow. Brigades which did not number 500 men, regiments which did not number 100, companies in which thero were only six or soven private soldiers, girded themselves for another battle. The last skirmish line ever thrown out in front of Lee's army was commanded by a captain now attached to the Virginia state govern ment. With thirty men he pushed forward through tho woods until stopped by thrco Federal lines of battle. The skirmishers halted in amazement. Look which way they would there wero tho lines of bluo. Not a shot was fired. Instead of tho crash of musketry there came tho words: "No use, Johnny Lee is going to surrender! It was tho last day and the last hour. The principle of secession had been drowned in .blood rebellion had been wiped out. After that should have come peace and good-will. A hate born of war and enduring through years of peace is unworthy even of a savage. Tho confederacy was a bubble in which but few belioved with all their heart. If secession meant separation from tho North it meant separation from each other afterwards. It would be hard to find a scoro of intelligent men in tho South to-day who have any arguments against a grand and glorious Union which shall bo represented by a single flag. Tho Senate Committee which investigated tho Treasury contingent fund expenditures, has made a report reciting tho various petty frauds which were perpetrated by subordi nates in tho property department of tho Treas ury, and condemning the looso system under which tho vouchers were passed. GAKFIELD---B0SECRMS. EXTRAORDINARY INTEREST AROUSED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. TTIiat. General Rosccrans Says Abont tlio Stanton Morton Interview Tho Chase Letter Read in Cabinet Meeting GoTcrnor Toung, General Sturgis, Colonel Tcmplo Clarfco and Col. Hunter Rroohe Express their Views Freely Opinions of tho Press. The publication of General Rosccrans's paper on the Tullahoma Campaign in the last issuo of Tiie National Tribune has attracted wide-spread attention which has not alono been limited to military circles. The Tribune's article was reproduced in the columns of many of our exchanges, in cluding the New York Herald, Philadelphia Press and Times, Louisville Commercial, Bos ton Herald, Chicago Times, and Baltimore Sun, Gazette, and American, and the subject has been discussed editorially in these and many other leading journals. There have also been numerous contributions on the subject involved in tho controversy, some of which we reproduce below, together with opinions of the press. We have avoided the most offensive, on either side, and have en deavored, by selecting such as are compara tively calm and temperate, to gauge the depth of public feeling on the subject. VIEWS OF GENERAL JAMES BARNETT. A correspondent of the New York Herald at Cleveland, Ohio, called upon General James Barnctt, who was colonel of artillery in tho Army of the Cumberland, and who, from November 24, 1862, was chief of artil lery on Rosccrans' staff. He said in substance : " I regret exceedingly this unfortunate affair and do not wish to be drawn into the con troversy. Of all men, living or dead, Garfield and Rosccrans were two of my best and most intimate friends. I was a member of Rosccrans' military family during the time Garfield was chief of staff, enjoyed the confi dence, of both and knew their plans and sentiments. Tho idea that Garfield was untrue to his commander, two-faced in his dealings, or sought to supersede him is all bosh and unjust. IIo was not that kiiiiloini man; he was impatient at tho delay and anxious for tho army to movo and so ex pressed himself. Tho feeling was general among tho men and with many of the officers, though it was not shared in by Rosccrans and tho division commanders generally. Garfield's views were well understood and freely expressed, yet ho was true to Rosc crans, and carried out his plans to the letter. He always, whilo in the army and after the war, spoke in the highest terms of 'Roscy,' as ho was in tho habit of calling him, de fended him when attacked and extolled his ability as a military man and his character as a gentleman. This talk about his working a scheme to get Rosccrans removed or to supersede him is absurd. Even if Rosccrans had been removed thero was no probability of Garfield being placed in command, with General Thomas and others in tho line of promotion, and I do not think such an idea ever entered Garfield's head. Durinn- the Presidential campaign Garfield stepped into my office one day, and in the course of con versation said: ' What do you suppose is the matter with Rosey? Do you seo how he is attacking me?' Ho appeared very much grieved over it and said ho could not under stand it. He at that timo reiterated his high opinion of the General, and said he would not believe the report until it was confirmed. Garfield's letter to Chase, as published, is undoubtedly genuine, but there is nothing in it reflecting upon General Rosccrans or that should cause all this com motion. Tho letter was not official, but a strictly private and confidential expression of his views and feelings to a dear friend. In his interviews with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, after the battle of Chick amauga, ho simply gave a history of the movements and the battlo from his stand point, and defended Rosccrans to both, as his many friends were given to understand at tho timo from his conversation. Garfield was never untrue or unfaithful to Rosccrans. If ho had been I would have been likely to know it. lie was not capable of the double dealing which some of his enemies have charged, and this attempt to array the living Rosccrans against tho dead Garfield and to blight the sacred memory of tho dead is unwarranted. There is nothing in it." WHAT GENERAL NEGLEY HAS TO SAY. General James S. Ncglcy, ono of tho best known division commanders during the war, ono of Garfield's intimate friends, and one who went through the Tullahoma campaign, was interviewed on tho Garficld-Rosccrans matter at Pittsburg, Pa. ITe said: "Whilo a member of Congress in Washington I learned through a military friend that let ters of criticism upon the Tullahoma cam paign had been -written by General Garfield, and that a knowledge of this fact had pro voked whatever feeling was understood to have existed between Generals Garfield and Rosccrans, although I never conversed with either of them upon the subject. Later on I learned authoritatively that .General Gar field claimed the credit of differing with General Rosccrans and his other generals in regard to the movements at Murfreesboro, henco I was not surprised to learn that Gen eral Rosccrans had taken offense at what he deemed to bo the treachery of his late chief of staff, and I am not surprised now to find that General Rosccrans entertains a deep sensitiveness npon this subject, for if thero ever were two officers in the army who wero as intimate as father and son it was to be found in tho military relations existing be tween Generals Rosecrans and Garfield. I regret exceedingly that a letter written in the enthusiasm of youth, more from a po litical standpoint than from the inspiration of military judgment or experience, has been made the occasion or misintcrpretirg tho true motives of General Garfield and tho cause for doubting tho military ability and efficiency of General Rosccrans in that cam paign. If the terms of this letter are to be construed into a grave reflection upon tho military reputation of General Rosccrans they might with equal propriety bo so con sidered in connection with the reputation of ever' one of the seventeen generals referred to in General Garfield's letters. "Now, to my understanding, the following are about the faets in the case: General Rosccrans achieved a brilliant success at Stone River, but the victory was attained at a heavy cost, not only in the loss of men but in the destruction of the equipments and munitions of war. Murfreesboro was a strategic position, not only for the Union army, but also for the confederate com mander. It formed the basis of operations against a wide sweep of the lines of tho Southern Confederacy. To maintain and hold permanently the position commanded the immediate attention of General Rose crans after tho battle of Stone River He therefore caused elaborate fortifications of the strongest type to be constructed at that point, and busied himself ingathering sup plies and in reorganizing his army. This work wa3 necessarily slow, in consequence of the long exposed lines of his communica tion, bad roads, and the deficiency of forage in the surrounding country. While it is true that the aggregate of his army might be larger than the force under General Bragg, the latter occupied an intrenched position naturally favorable for tho purpose of defense or attack, and near enough to the Federal lines to harass them continually by the aid of his large force of regular and irregular cavalry. General Rosecrans was compelled to maintain outlying posts and lines to protect both the river communi cation and his lines of railroad. It wiU therefore be readily understood that an ad vance movement from Murfreesboro could only be made with any hope of success by withdrawing a portion of the outlying gar risons under the command of General Rosc crans. When the advance was made I do not believe the army had more than fiv days' ,apply-of forage in store, andVI ata certIu it was not fuUy equipped two weeks pre vious. The confidential letter addressed by General Rosecrans to his corps com manders and brigade generals was not re ceived by them until the 9 th of June. Of coursenooneof those generals, exceptingGen eral Garfield, was in a position to know the contents of tho correspondence which had taken place between Generals Halleck and Rosecrans ; and indeed, so far as I wa3 con cerned, I did not learn of tho fact until in formed by Mr. Stanton some months subse quently. While the discussion had assumed a spirit of asperity between the War De partment and the commanding general, the fact had made no impression on the judg ment of the other general officers with the exception of General Garfield. Hence his desire to constrain his view3 in acccord with those entertained in Washington. "This is tho more apparent when we find that he addressed his letter to Mr. Chase on the 27th of July, immediately after the ter mination of tho Tullahoma campaign, a campaign ably commenced and executed with remarkable completeness, a campaign wherein General Rosecrans fully sustained his reputation for military genius, fore thought and boldness. The enemy was driven from his chosen position and hastily retired beyond the Tennessee River without being able to derive any benefit from tho stronghold he had established at TuUahoma, and the extensive preparations he had made to receive the army of General Rosecrans and win a long-looked-for victory for the confed eracy. General Garfield did not state in his letter to Mr. Chase what opinion he passed upon the other interrogations contained in tho confidential letter, "but seems to have confined his expression of judgment on the single inquiry as to whether the army should immediately move forward. I do not doubt if that single inqniry had been propounded by General Rosecrans to his officers that the answer of the majority would have been in the affirmative, but when taken with au estimate of the contingencies which could arise through a forward movement each an swer was doubtless given with a studied hesitancy and extreme caution. "I sum up the whole case to be abont as follows: General Garfield wrote freely to his friend, giving utterance to his hopes and political views without the slightest inten tion of doing an injustice to his superior and it was only in after years that this untimely and unfortunate letter became tho source of unexpected interest, and to-day it attains its chief proportions in the ill advised attempt to glorify the already illus trious memory of President Garfield at the expense of the feelings and honor of his living comrades. That ho would condemn it if living I am positively certain. That every true friend of his condemns the act I am certain; and every lover of justice and truth should hesitate to deprive General Rosecrans of the credit he deserves for tho achievements of the army under his com mand at Stone River and at Tullahoma. General Garfield was at that period of his life more of a politician than he was a general, by lack of experience. He had lately left the Ohio senate, where he had taken a very active and aggressive part in tho political issue grown out of the war, and it was quite natural that he should sympa thize with this side of the question. He had grown to bo familiar with tho cry. ' On to Richmond!' and deemed it a necessary re quirement on tho part of the general officers to satisfy the public impatience at home, I Continued on Sixth page. :U-- -.- . .-?. 1 . -L'