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jr M "I xmmt. or xm frv &it wlto to tow tU toitk, m& fw M Mm mH mtos." ESTABLISHED 1S77.-NEW SERIES. WASHINGTON, D. 0., THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1883. YOL. 1I-E0. M.-WHOLE m. SQ. 4( SlfRISE AT SHILOH. Hovey Replies to Veatdi "Vindicating the Tratli of History." AInT outlying picket. The Unanimity of West Pointers in Supporting Each Other. REPORTS 03? OEMGERS. The Testimony of the Battle 'Was the Army Surprised? In my address dolivorcd before Farragut Post, 6. A. It, on the 25tli of January, 1833, at EvansviUe, I intended to assert, amongst other niattars, that General Sherman was virtually in command of our forces in the battle of Shiloh on Saturday night and Sunday morn ing, April Gth, 1582, until the arrival of General Grant, and that our forces were taken by sur prise by the rebel army on that morning. Such were my positions then, and after read ing quite a number of articles in the papers and a Tory able address by General Vealch, delivered before the same Post on the Sth day of the present month, I am still of the same opinion. To vindicate the troth of history," I desire to malic a brief reply in answer to some of the positions assumed by General Yeatch. I shall first recall a few facts taken from General Sherman's Memoirs and his military reports, and leave personal opinions out of the controversy. General Sherman tells us tbat on the 13th day of 3Iareh, preceding the battle, he advised General Smith, who was then in command of the army at Savannah, " that he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Land ing;" that on tbe 14th he reported to General Smith, in person who" instructed him to dis embark his own division with General Hurl but's at Pittsburg landing; to take position well back, and leave room for his whole army." That the troops, according to the same order, were disembarked, Hurlbut's on the ISth, and posted about one and a half miles back, and ' on the lflth I disembarked my division, and took post about tbree miles back, three of the brigades covering the roads to Purdy and Coriuth, and the other brigade (Stuart's) tem porarily at a place on the Hamburg road, near Lick Creek ford. "Within a few chrys Prentiss' division arrived and camped on our left, and afterwards HcClernand's and W. H. L. Wal lace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear. I kept my pickets woll out ta the road, and made myself familiar with all the grounds inside and outside my lines." Sherman's Slemoiss, pp. 227, 223 and 229.) The Jlemoirs further show that the skirmishing was done under Stierman'g command, and on the 19th of March, 1S62, in his report to Grant, he styles himself "W. T. Sherman, brigadier-general commanding." Even down to Saturday be fore the battle, in his report dated April Sth, Sherman shows tbat he considered that he was doing a!! the lighting up to that date, Major General SlcCIernand not being even referred to, and he (Sherman) was totally oblivious to the fact that the enemy were in less than three miles of the headquarters, and ready in line of battle to attack: him 1 TJUE FKEEMASONEY OF WEST POINT. Feur facts are better known by volunteer officers from civil life than the very close con nection and partiality that existed in tbe late rebellion between the graduates of "West Point. They assumed to themselves all military knowledge and seemed to have a sovereign contempt for generals who were appointed from civil life. This prejudice was carried so far that they often seemed to ignore the arti cles of war, which they had sworn to support. I believe this prejudice lay at the very root of our disaster at Shiloh on Sunday morning. Badeae, Grant's historian, exhibits this feeling in & vry natural and truthful manner, and with oownieadablesiniplicity he says: Brigadier-General Prentiss was ordered to report to Grant at this time,jmd another division was organised for him out of tbe troops constantly arriving. Six regiments were thus assigned and sent at once to join the main army at Pitts burg. But a question of rank was raised at the front by McCHornand, who claimed command in the absence of Grant The latter was un willing te trust McClernand with the responsi bility; and as the relative rank of the division general was unsettled (?) he determined to re move his own headquarters to Pittsburg, and obviate the difficulty." (Military History of U.S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 70.) Copee, another of General Grant's historians, states the same fact "Owing to Smith's severe sickness and McCJeraand's dissatisfaction at being com manded by a junior, Grant assumed the imme diate command of the expedition of March 31, 1K82." See Grant and His Campaigns, by Henry Oopee, note on p. 83.) In confirmation of i his view, I refer to Gen oral Sherman's letter in 1S6S to the last-named historian, where ho says: "Even the divisions of the army were arranged in that camp b3 General Smith's orders, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket whilst McCJemand's and Pren tiss' worctJtc real line of battle, with W. ILL. "Wallace in support of the right wing and Hurl but the left; Law Wallace's division being de tached." (Military History of Grant, vol. 1, p 005. j SHEEMAN'S OUTLYING PICKET. Graut on Saturday night and Sunday morn ing must have had two headquarters, one where ho in reality was, at Savannah, and the shadowy one at Pittsburg Landing, where he would not permit a major-general to command a brigadier, refusing to allow McClernand to command. Prom the very nature of the army and the post, his mantle was cast over the. shoulders of the "West Point brigadier. The two major-generals, "Wallace and McClernand, had been so placed that they were in but little danger of interfering with the arrangements made by Generals Smith, Grant and Sherman. West Point was in theascendant! In any and every possible event, Sherman had the past of honor and of danger "the outlying picket,'' -which had to be passed before it could strike any part of our army. And what was this out lying picket? Why, only twelve regiments of infantry, one regiment of eight hundred cav alry and four batteries, making a full third, part or more of our effective forces on Sunday, if we only .had thirty-two thousand men on the field. "What is an outlying picket and what are its duties? Scott, in his Military Dictionary, on page 4G2, thus describes it: "Picket a detachment, composed of cavalry or infantry, whose principal duty is to guard an army from surprise and oppose such small parties as the enemy may push forward for the purpose of rcconnoitering." General Sherman says he had the outlying picket under his direct command, which must have reached from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and. it was his duty to guard against surprise. He should, if possible, have known, according to military authorities, the position of the enemy within two leagues of his forces in every direc tion and in every hour, day or night! a vnny significant pact accompanies his report of the battle. He had S00 cavalry lying just back of Shiloh Meeting house, and yet he does not report one man of that command dead, hurt, or missing! But, when the ring of the rifle is heard in his front, he sends to McClernand for a battalion of his cavalry to go forward with his and discover the cause of the firing! But was General Sherman virtually in com mand on Saturday after Grayt left and on Sunday morning until he arrived? I never dreamed of being understood, that after the 31st of March, General Sherman was ever in command by any direct order. My position is, and has been, that as to all practical effects Sherman was in command in the absence of Grant. Technically Grant may bo said to have been in command, though not present, as no order had been made changing his status, bnt in reality the army in his absence was under tbe active control of Sherman for all fighting purposes. If it was not so practically regarded, then who was in command in Grant's absence? IilcClernand was, as we have seen, ignored and placed beyond the post of honor; besides, Sher man in every regard had the superior numbers under his control, and it will not be denied that he was regarded as in command from the 19th of March until the ''question of rank" was raised by McClernand. When did Sher man ever report to McClernand ? All the reports printcfd show that early in the morning McClernand, Hurlbut, and Pren tiss, acting on the same impression, sent troops to sustain and re-enforce Sherman's command, and that he and his superior in rank, McCler nand, afterwards acted in concert Ho took no command from his superior in rank they simply acted together. GENEEAI. YEATCH DESCRIBES A SURPBISK BUT TOX'T KNOW IT. General Teatch, in his well-written paper on the Sth inst, seems to be at a loss to know the meaning of the word " surprised" when applied to an army. He has described it graphically, but does not seem to know it He says : " But our generals did not believe they intended to attack us, and we confidently expected to at tack them as soon as Buell arrived. Wo had the advantage in position, but in nearly every other respect the advantage was on their side. They had 45,000 men ; wo had 32,000. They had three corps commanders, a commander-in-chief, and a second in command under him. They had a well arranged, plan of attack, un derstood by all their olficers. We had no plan of defense, for an attack was not anticipated. " But the attack came I The first fighting is reported to have taken place in front of -Prentiss' division. Three companies of the Twenty fifth Missouri had moved out on the road as early as 3 o'clock on Sunday morning. They soon struck the advance guard of Hardee's corps, and the fight began. The alarm spread along our lines, and Beauregard, seeing that his movement was discovered, advised that the attack should be abandoned; bnt Sidney John- j son ordered the advance to push rapidly on our i , front The pickets and advance guaids were soon driven in on all the roads, and the battle of Shiloh was on." Xow what docs General Yeatch mean? "Our generals did not believe they intended to attack us." - Docs he mean that wo knew they iiad an array of 45,000 and we only 32,000? That "we had no plan of defense if attacked? That we did not anticipate an attack? That Beauregard advised the abandonment because it had been discovered? Now, if only a pari of the above facts were true, is it not more than ! conclusive that our army was surprised at Shi loh on Sunday morning? Itwould be injustice and cruelty to charge that General Sherman had a knowledge of the facts above set forth by General Veatch. He could not have known the rebel order for battle on Saturday morning. He could not know that a large army, exceeding ours by 13,000, was in less than three miles from his own headquarters ! He could not have used his 800 cavalry :is the eyes of his com mand. He could not have known their march at 3 o'clock on Sunday morning. Nov.', if he did not know it, were not the " outlying pick els "surprised? Had Grant been on the field the army would have been in no better position for hattle, for "the pickets" had made no new discoveries. For the purpose of showing how several officers thought whose reports have been pub lished in Executive Document C6, in 1862, and alluded to by General Yeatch, I will quote a few words from those who had the good fortune not to have their reports forgotten or sup pressed. The greater number have never been printed. What is the reason ? HAVE ODE MILITARY ABCHIVES BEEN- 3IANIP TJLA.TED ? Where are the reports of General Prentiss and his sis regiments and battery? Where Sherman's Ohio regiments with Colonel Worth ington and Colonel Dickey of the cavalry ? And who has told the tale of those 20,000 fugitives around the landing, and under the banks of the river, so graphically described by Buell and Nelson? Some pen, however feeble, should try to do them justice; But let us, for a few mo ments, turn to those who have been permitted to tell their deeds of glory. EXPRESSIONS WHICH SHOW EUEPBISE. "Early in the morning of Sunday, the Gth of April, hearing sharp firing at short intervals on my left and front, m the direction of Sher man and Prentiss' divisions, I sent a messenger to General Sherman's headquarters to inquiro into the cause of it. Soon after, my messenger returned with General Sherman's request that I should send a battalion of my cavalry to join one of his for the purpose of discover ing the strength and design of the enemy." (McCleruand's report) He Eent cavalry to Sherman, as requested. " On Sunday morning, April Gth, about 7:30, I received a messenger from Brigadier-General Sherman, that he was attacked in force and heavily upon his left I immediately ordered Colonel James C. Yeach, commanding the Sec ond brigade, consisting of the Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and i'orfcy-sixth Hlinois, to proceed to'the left of General Sher man, where he went into notion." (General Hurlbut's report) ' On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front ; yet I did not believe that he designed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morn ing early, the Gth inst, the enemy drovo our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms my division, and sent word to General McClernand asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in front in force, and to General Hurlbut asking him to support Gen eral Prentiss." (Sherman's report) J "At 3 o'clock on Sunday morning (?) several companies were ordered out from the First brig ade to watch, and endeavor if possible to cap ture a force of the enemy who were prowling near our camp. Our bravo boys marched out, and had not over three miles to go before they met the enemy, and immediately a sharp firing commenced, our little force giving ground. About daylight the dead and wounded began to bo brought in. The firing grew closer and closer, till it became manifest that a heavy force was upon us." (Colonel F. Quinn, Twelfth Michigan regiment, commanding Sixth divis ion.) "On Sunday morning, whilst most of the troops were at breakfast, heavy firing was heard on our line in a direction southwest from my camp. I was ordered to move forward and support General Sherman. I had hot little time to examine the ground, but took the best position that could be found, to support the troops in front of us. An officer, representing himself as acting under General Sherman's orders, rode up in great haste, and directed mo to move my brigade by the right fiank and join the line which was forming on the right" (Kcport of Colonel James C. Veatch, com manding two brigades of the Fourth division.) " On Sunday morning, the Gth inst, about 7:30 o'clock, the enemy's fire was first heard in my camp, whereupon I warned my men to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice." (Colonel Davis, Forty-sixth Illinois.) "Between G and 7 o'clock Sunday morning I was informed that our pickets were fired upon and being driven in." (Colonel It P. Buck land, commanding Fourth brigade, Sherman's division.) "About 7 o'clock on the morning of the Gth, heavy and rapid firing of artillery and mus ketry was heard to our front, and in a few minutes we received orders to form in line of battle in front of our camp." (Lieutenant B. H. Bristow, commanding the Twenty-fifth Kentucky. "My regiment was ordered into lino early on Sunday, the Gth inst, upon a sudden and unexpected attack, which had been made on our lront lines by the enemy." (John Mc Henry, colonel of the Seventeenth regiment, Kentucky volunteers.) " On Sunday morning, the Gth inst, about .half-past 7 o'clock, rapid voile ys of mus- fketry from camps to the front indicated the commencement of the battle." (Report of Charles Cruft, colonel of the Thirty-first Indi ana volunteers.) " On Sunday, April Gth, 18S2, an alarm was made in front of this brigade, and I called my regiment from breakfast and formed it in lino of battle on tho color line." (Report of J. R. Cockrell, commanding the Seventeenth Ohio.) If it had been known that the enemy in tended to make an attack, cither on Saturday or Sunday morning, would our troops have been at their "breakfasts" when the firing commenced ? Would the regiments have been formed before their encampments or color lines for battle? Is it not certain that they would have met tho enemy on a favorable position of defense, standing shoulder to shoulder, as they did on Monday morning? WHAT IS A MILITARY SITRPEISE? Mahau on Field Fortifications, page 93, thus defines it : " An attack by surprise is an unex pected attack, for which the assailed are not prepared. It is, perhaps, the best method of assailing an undisciplined and careless garri son, for its suddenness will disconcert and cause irremediable confusion." v Under this definition, was not General Sher man and his forces more than surprised on Sunday morning, April Gth, 18G2? There are untold thousands of men, Federals and Confederates, that met face to face on that bloody field, who would swear before the world and their God that there could be no mistako as to that surprise. In making these comments on the past, I disclaim all personal motives. I feel sure that somo parts of our recent history, have been twisted out of shape and perverted, and that it devolves upon the living who have tho courage to tell the truth, without fear, favor or affection, and to-" know no man after the ficsh." As General Veatch has well said, we see things differently from different standpoints, but we owe it to ourselves to honestly express our opinions on matters that affect the honor and character of others. That officer, however brave ho may have been in battle, who will not do so, is a moral coward, and should never have been placed in high command. Nelson at Shiloh. General Buell had no information from Gen eral Halleck that there was any need to hurry to Savannah. On the contrary, ho had permis sion from General Halleck to rest for several days at Waynesboro, and it was only thepushing energy and uneasiness of Nelson that secured the arrival of tho Army of the Ohio in time to participate in the second day's battle. Upon hearing at Columbia that our forces were on the west side of the river, instead of at Savan nah, Nelson got permission to lake the advance, provided he could cross Duck River before tho bridge was finished. He succeeded in getting over a day ahead of anybody, and set the pace of advance at such a rate that before Halleck's authorization for the stop at Waynesboro had come, Nelson was miles beyond it, and two other divisions following him were also beyond it: Nelson is entitled to credit in this matter that he has never received. It was his belief in the danger to the troops at Shiloh and his restless energy in pushing forward that brought help to our battered forces at their utmost need. We believe that impartial history will decide that Halleck was responsible for tho misunder standing and delays which caused the first day's fight at Shiloh to bo so nearly a disaster, and that Nelson is entitled to a degree of credit never given him for his. part in arresting dis aster. Louisville Commercial. According to tho Louisville Courier-Journal, tho coining industrial exposition to be held there promises well. The preparatory work is so well advanced, and the applications for space have been so numerous, that it is reasonably certain that everything will bo in fine order for opening day. The displays of the manu factures and agricultural products of the South will doubtless be tho best over made. SIGNAL CORPS. The Battle of July 22d in Front of Atlanta. DEATH OF McPHERSOR Hood Repulsed on the 22d Re news the Attack on the 28th. A CAMP SCENE. The Signal Officer Describes What He Saw from a Tree. IV. The desperate charge of Hood's army upon tho Army of tho Tennessee on tho 22d of July,, the opening of which was recorded in tho last chapter, has taken its place in history as one of the decisive battles of tho war. The scene was one of surpassing grandeur. Tho roar of battle rolled over the hills and down the ravines until lost in tho distance' How terrible tho strain upon tho Seventeenth Corps ! Could it hold out? Could it hold tho position? were questions often asked, but an swered only with "I hope so." Human en durance has its limit; men cannot stand against such fearful odds long; they must yield unless speedily ro-enforced ; but where are tho re-cn-forccments to come from ? The Sixteenth Corps was in line on the right of the Fifteenth Corps, and had received but little of tho shock that had shattered portions of tho Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corpsand Hazen's di vision was therefore detached'lfrom tho lino and sent on the double-quick to JBlair's assist ance. McPherson was here and there, wherever the battle was the fiercest, giving personal attention to tho smallest and seeminly imma terial matters concerning his troops, inspiring them with energy and courage" by personal deeds of heroism, and by words of kindness and cheer, displaying his great coolness and courage. It was while riding along tho lino of the Seventeenth Corps, looking to see for himself if all things were working right, that ho received his death-wound. Tho command now devolved on General Logan, who at once put spurs to his black charger, and with Hashing eyorode into the battle-front, just as his beloved commander had done before hhn. I remember a little incident in this connection that I will here relate: A nephew of General Logan was visiting him. He always rode with the staff and had desired to act in tho capacity of aid-de-camp, but tho general had refused him, as he was not a soldier. Shortly after Logan assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, and was overseeing somo movement of the Fifteenth Corps- he desired to send an order to a battery iirhe Seventeenth Corps. His nephew asked, permission to carry tho order, and the general said if he wanted to get killed ho did not know of a better chance. Nothing daunted by this remark, the young civilian took the order, gave his horse the spur and rode away. Wo watched him with bated breath, expecting to see him fall from his horse, a sacrifice to his darinjr. spirit On ho went aud soon gained tho inside of the fort and de livered the message. He raised his hat to in dicate to us that he was safe, when a minie ball went crashing through his arm and it fell useless at his side. He rodo leisurely back to us and then to the hospital, where the arm was amputated just below the shoulder. His good right arm was given for his country, and ho re ceived neither pay nor pension. A COOL COMMANDER. Tho battlo raged fiercely. Thousands of brave men were already dead and many thou sands wounded. The Second brigade Second division, Sixteenth Army Corps, charged tho rebels in the line they captured from Morgan L. Smith in the morning, and recaptured the guns lost and quite a good many prisoners. This brigade was commanded by Colonel Mersy, of the Ninth Illinois infantry, and in tho charge, as the colonel's horse was in the act of leaping a fence, it was struck by a bullet and fell dead on the fence. Tho colonel coolly arose, unbuckled saddle and bridle, threw them on his back, aud said ; " Como on, boys, we'll give them hell for shooting my poor Billy." Just before dark I caught sight of a rebel signal flag and took this message : " Colonel Hardco is wounded and a prisoner." Night closed in upon this dreadful scene of carnage aud blood. Our army lay upon its arms, ready to renew the fight in tho morning should Hood desire to attack. The rebel army withdrew to positions held in tho morning sullenly and in silence. Twice Hood had thrown his troops upon our lines, and twico had they been severely beaten. The next morning found tho lines of both armies hard at work with pick and shovel strengthening tho defenses. After looking over tho losses and recaptures, wo found only eight brass guns missing; 3,315 nfen killed, wounded and missing. , Tho rebel loss was much greater. On tho 21th Lieutenants Worloy and Wiorick accompanied the division of Brigadier-General Wood to Decatur. I made my way up to tho top of a pine tree, about sevouty feet high, and sat there all day watching for their flag and thus open communication with headquarters, but the attempt was a failure. No good posi tion could be attained by them from which thoy could see my flag, which was waving above tho tree, yetl could see the town, their line of march, aud their camp after they reached their destin ation. nOOD'S ATTACK ON THE 2STII. On the 33th we moved our camp to where wo could get good water, ariu on tho 2Gth I was ordered over to the Twentieth Army Corps headquarters to obtain tile signal countersign for August, aud returned to camp just in timeto strike touts and prepare to march another flank movement, which placed tho Army of tho Ten nessee on the right flank. This movement occupied all the night and part of tho 27th. While a portion of our troops wore engaged in preparing tho camp-ground, tho rest of the troops wcro busy erecting defenses against an attack, should General Hood bo venturesomo enough to mako tho attack after tho sovoro handling ho had received at the hands of tho same army only a few days before. Sure enough, on tho 28th, just as soon as wo could see, by tho aid of our glasses, wo discovered thoy were massing heavy columns in our front, and soon they camo down with terrific forco upon us four lines deep. Their intentions wcro to flank us, hut our good glasses revealed THE this in time to communicate tho fact to Gen eral Logan, who deployed his lines farther to the right. This, of course, exposed a portion of our line without earthworks, but the men holding the line were those who never flinched, who stood liko a wall, and met tho assailants with a withering fire that caused them to re coil and fall back to tho cover of their batteries to reform their lines. Charge after charge was mado with tho energy of despair. They flung themselves upon our bayonets, and sealed their devotion to their causo with their life blood. Human endurance could not hold out against such terrible volleys of minie balls, grape, and canister as our brave boys hurled into their broken and scarred ranks. Discomfited and. crestfallcn,they marched back to their trenches, leaving on the field S70 killed for us to bury. Sunday, the 31st, found us all tired and much worn with tho constant work, marching and fighting we had been subjected to. Tho rain was falling in copious showers, which was a god send to the troops in cleansing tho battle-field and cooling the atmosphere. I called for my horse, and rode ont on tho front, looking for the enemy. I climbed into two or three trees successively, but could not see for tho rain that was falling, so I returned to camp to rest AN UNEXPECTED VISITOR. Monday, August 1st, found mo quite re freshed, and ready for business, which soon came in the shape of an order from Captain O. H. Howard to proceed with all dispatch to the right front, watch and report tho progress of an advance that had been ordered; also, to watch the movements of the enemy. This advance was in tho direction of the railroad, with tho intention of getting control of it if possible. Tho advance was mado in gallant style, but was checked by tho enemy before tho object was accomplished, yet wo were nearer than in tho morning. I had a splendid station in a tree-top, where I saw tho enemy move out their reserve troops to hold tho Toad, which was of vital importance to them. On returning to camp I could not find it, and on inquiring found it had moved over into the ravine where tho train was parked. After some time I found them camped in a very fine little grove trees somewhat scattered, but tho ground well set in grass which, after the shower, looked beautiful in its verdant green. Tho tent flies (we had no tents) wero all staked, and tho cook was preparing supper, the officers and men wero lying around on tho sward, or propped up against trees, resting as best suited their tastes. Seating myself in tho shade, I lit my pipe for a quiet smoke before supper. Lieutenants Allen and Worloy were sitting on camp-stools, under their fly, busily writing. All seemed to be going along as smoothly as could well be, when, hark ! What is that? Gm it bo thun der from a clear sky? Or is it distant artil lery? Not long were we left in doubt Soon an instrument of death came whizzing through the air, in the shape and size of a 61-pound shell, the fuse of which could plainly be seen, blazing and hissing as it came towards us. There was hurry now in camp. IjSvery ono seemed to have important business somewhero else. Men who seetnedto be1 asleep were on their feet in an instant and making for some sheltered spot, if such could bo found. Lieu tenants Allen and Worley continued their writing, as though nothing of importance was transpiring in camp. But the scene suddenly changed. The shell struck the ground, rico chetted aud passed under ono side and out through the other-side of the lieutenants' fly, and exploded j list beyond it. Lieutenant Wor ley was thrown to tho left from his stool and lay flat upon his face, while Lieutenaut Allen went to the right and rolled quite a little dis tance on tho ground. Where tho shell first struck a saddle was lying, which was lifted high in tho air and came down with skirts spread out, alighting on the upturned back of Lieutenant Worley. Ho thought the immense missile had fallen upon him he could, almost hear tho hissing of tho fuse. He called lustily for some ono to remove tho intruder, which had made a captive of him so unceremoniously. Of course we ought not to have laughed at him, but the joke was too good and wo were all glad wo were alive, so we laughed and our colored boys joined in tho chorus. This did not suit tho taste of the recumbent lieutenant, and ho took us severely to task for laughing at an offi cer in so great danger as ho felt he was. But tho merriment continued. Worley, at last, raised his head, looked over his shoulder, saw not the terrible shell but an inoffensive sad dlo; jumped to his feet, gave tho object a vig orous kick and strode off out of camp. But soon these visitors became so numerous that wo gladly changed our quarters. Tho next day (the 2d) I was instructed to obtain a sta tion of observation from whence I could view tho rebel lines, and leave the work of recon uoiteriug to tho other officers. PERCHED IN A TREE-TOP. After quite a long search for a good position that would enable mo to seo their lines and observe their movements and the climbing of a good many trees, I mado a selection of a tall chestnut, standing on a hill occupied bv a bat tery belonging to tho Sixteenth Army Corps. From my perch I could see tho west and north lines of works, palisades, abatis, forts, and all tho appurtenances thereto ; the men in rifle pits, outer works, and main line ; nearly all of Atlanta, with its streets, depots, warehouses, store buildings, dwellings, and the busy throng of citizens and soldiers. This treo was my homo from early morning until night spread hor shadows over tho sceno. For twenty-five long, weary days I was at my station, rain or shine. I had built a platform of boards largo enough for threo or four to stand on, and made a rustic seat, so that I could take it as easy as possible. Higher up in the topmost branches I had anothor porch, whither I ascended when I wanted to look a little farther south. I had at times threo telescopes and a field-glass. Ono telescope I kept bearing on that gun that threw those largo shells into our camp and its mates (for there wero three in the battery) all tho timo; for my treo was in, tho road those shells traveled as thoy went on their mission of death and destruction. Tho limbs on cither sido showed visible marks of these monsters, and it behooved me to watch them closely, elso thoy might cause mo to descend in a more rapid manner than would bo desirable. Anothor was bearing on tho Montgomery Railroad, and was also constantly watched, as this road was used in moving troops to their left wing and trans porting ordnance and quartermaster stores. Another telescope was fastened to tho treo with a swivel, so it could bo ranged along over tho entire country. This glass I moved up to my upper seat when I had occasion to go up there. TV siego guns wero in such position that I could look nearly half their length into them, and very frequently when I put my eye to that glass the gunners wero in tho act of load ing, aud, knowiug the range they had on my tree, it naturally made me feel like crawfish ing. I have vivid recollections of those huge shells camp kettles, as the boys called them as they camo a-humming their merry little tunes and slashing through the tree, sometimes to tho right and sometimes to tho left, occas ionally closo to the body, lopping off tho limbs, not with the care of a professional pruner, but with a recklessness of somo of Sherman's bum mers. A great many visitors camo to my station, which was very annoying. Tho news had spread all along that there was a signal sta tion in tho Sixteenth Army Corps, from which everything in and about Atlanta could bo seen. Officers and men wero alike anxious to look through those wonderful glasses that re vealed so much of tho enemy and their doings. HOW THINGS LOOKED IN ATLANTA. On the 5th I observed quito a body of cavalry moving through tho town towards their right and reported the same to Captain Howard. I always kept two of my men with mo to carry messages to headquarters, and generally kept them both busily employed. On the Gth Cap tain Howard sent me tho following : It is reported that the enemy were evacuating during the night. Can you see anything to indi cate it ? Renort by tho bearer. I surveyed tho robel position as well as I could, and a 9:15 sent tho following reply: It is very foggy this morning and qnite difficult to sec correctly, but from what I can see I should bay their line is unchanged. About noon the fog was dispelled and I could see clearer. At 1:30 p. m. I sent tho following: Captain Howard: Enemy in same position as yesterday. Two freight trains left and one passen ger train arrived during the a. m. At 1 p. m. a wagon train of thirty Avagons passed in direction of -milium. aj;ons ana amouiances are constantly passing to and from town to the southeast. At 4 p. m. the rebels opened fire along our entire front, and our batteries replied. For threo hours this duel was furiously kept up, and shot and. shell flew around mo in pro fusion. Tho smoke obscured my vision nearly all the time, but occasionally the breeze would raise a little and. waft it away; then I could see tho effect of our firing. Buildings were shot full of holes; chimneys were shot away I trees beautiful shade trees were ruthlessly torn to pieces; fences wero knocked down; for tifications were badly dismantled; guns were dismounted, and dead and. dying soldiers and citizens wero lying along tho lines and streets. And such is war. Wishing to. learn how this canonading affected tho enemy, I was in my treo at an early hour on the 7th, and. took, a careful survey of tho field. Tho injury to the earthworks had been fully repaired during the night Tho men wero busy on new lines ex tending to their left, doing their level best to keep apace with tho rapid prolongation of our right wing. The Twenty-third. Army Corps was pushing hard for tho railroad, and tho rebels were working hard to hold it At 10:30 a. m. I sent this message to Captain Howard: A column of the enemy just moved toward their left. On account of the formation of the ground and the dust I cannot tell how Large a force. In the column I discovered two flags white ones, like signal flags. A train of twelve wagons and two ambulances followed the column. A freight train arrived this a. m. During the day three trains ar rived and two left. Atlanta. On the Sth, Monday, I repaired to my tree, but did not stay long, as the rain soon fell in torrents; yet at 9:15 a. in. I sent the following to Captain Howard: A very heavy detail of fatigue men (negroes) just parsed toward the enemy's left. They took the right-hand road at the forks. They nnmber about SCO, perhaps more. The enemy's lines in front appear unchanged. They did not hesitate to use the colored men in their array, and though they dared not arm tnein, lor lear they would, turn against their masters, yet they wero quite useful to put on tho fortifications, exposing them to our fire, thus saving their soldiers. At 9 a. m. on the 9th tho following was sent to Captain Howard: Enemy is hard at work on new line of works, commencing on the left of six-gun battery, (near siege guns,) and running southwest, connecting with fort near white house with green blinds. A strong detail is working on this line. A new work is being put up in edge of timber nearly due west of barracks on Marietta. Eailroad ; also, in open field on right of barracks a heavy work has been commenced, but apparently abandoned. A strong fort is bein mnde at the left and rear of said bar racks on east side of Marietta Kailroad; is behind trees, and cannot tell the number of guns. Fatigue parties and small bodies of troops are passing in different directions. ISSUING RATIONS OF GEEEN COP.N. It was evidently tho intention to make tho defenses of Atlanta so strong that a small force could holci them against great odds, so as to enable them to extend their lines to repel our attempts to outflank them. I had observed quite a distance to my right a huge pile of dirt, which looked as though it had been moved there, and when I took my seat in my terial perch on the morning of the 11th I discovered this uncouth pile had assumed form, and now stood out in bold relief a formidable battery. Embrasures wero being made. A heavy detail was at work. The following dispatch was sent at 9:30 a. m. to Captain Howard : Enemy hard at work making embrasures in that heavy earthwork southwest of Atlanta. I can see from this side of the magazine. And at 6 p. m. this was sent in : A train of seventeen cars just left Atlanta, par tially loaded with troops. On tho 12th, at 5:15 p.m., I sent General Logan the following : Three trains loaded with troops just arrived at Atlanta. One train had four passenger and seven freight cars; one thirteen freight, and the last seventeen freight cars, loaded outside and inside with troops. And so the changes rang. Every day some thing was to bo seen that was important to bo known, and there was no way to find it out ex cept from tho signal officers. I said I was in my treo continually every day for twenty-fivo days, but I will have to modify that, for, onlooking over my diary, I find Lieutenant Allen relieved mo on tho 13th, and I spent tho day in riding along the lino and visiting a sigual station occupied by officers of tho Seventeenth Army Corps, up the line to my loft. Thoy had disputed some of my reports and I wanted to see who was right They had a very good station, but I could seo from my station nearly double the distance along tho rebel line, and thoy could not see the railroad at any point I was greatly interested at tho issuing of rations among the rebels oc cupying their outer works. They would drive their sixmulo teams along the line, tho wagons loaded down with green corn, which was thrown out to tho men and was gathered up in haste, as though they woro hungry. Green corn seemed to be tho principal article of diet, interspersed with an occasional issue of fresh meat. I could watch them while engaged in cookiug thoir meals, and could sec them making heir pones of bread in the ashes, fry ing their meat, boiling the corn aud making their sassafras tea. It was wonderful what an amount of labor those men could perform ou scant rations. AllRAXGIXO TO EVACUATE ATLANTA. On the 18th our commanders were expecting extraordinary movements on tho part of tho rebels. All along tho lino the orders were " te be unusually vigilant and observe closely all movements of the enemy." This order waa also given to the signal officers, and conse quently wo strained our eyes looking for the mysteriou3 something that was to occur. Was it a charge on our lines, or was the enemy about to evacuate Atlanta? At 8 a. m. they began concentrating their forces, and at 10:30 marched off towards their left. Thi3 wa3 a pretty heavy column, as was indicated by tite length of line, amount of trains and the num ber of flags displayed. At 11 a. m. I saw an other heavy column of mixed troop3 moving in tho samo direction. As it passed through, the town and out on tho Whitehall road, a bat tery left its position in lino of works and fell in with the marching column. There was evi dently something of importance going on, and it behooved all to be vigilant These matters were immediately transmitted to headquarters, an intermediate station having been estab lished for that purpose by Lieutenant Edge in person. Troops were in constantmotion all day, changing position, strength enicff tho line in weak places and withdrawing troop3 from their strong line of works. The works showed the handiwork of skillful engineering, and were so strong they could be held with a very thin line. This gave them power to throw heavy forces on their left wing, where General Sherman was pressing hard togainpossessionof their railroads, and thus delaying considerably our advance, much to our annoyance. On tho 19th trains consisting of open and flat cars were run out and after a few hours were backed in. I knew they were the same by the con struction of some of the cars and also by the numbers on the cars and the name of the rail road to which they belonged. On the 20th these trains arrived, two of which were freight, and both carrying a few troops, and at 5:15 p. m. a largo train pulled out loaded down with, troops. This was another evidence they wera prolonging their left and re-enforcing, to pro tect their means of subsistence. There wera no visible proofs tbattheyintended toevacuata Atlanta, at least so long as they could hold the roads that led south and east. Heavy fatigno details of both whites and blacks were con stantly at work on the new lines I have before spoken of on the east side of the Mariette depot, riflepitswere dug,andnearly thewholelinewas finished, and when completed a small forca could have held them against the whole of our army. During the night of the 23d a fira broke out, and was still burning when I went to my station in the morning (24th). I could seo the flames quite distinctly as they rapidly consumed the buildings. Another fire broke out about 4 o'clock p. m.r not so extensive as tho previous one, yet several buildings wero consumed. No apparent effort was made ty either citizens or soldiers to extinguish or pre vent the extending of these fires, and I con cluded they were set under orders. In all probability thoy contained stores, and wero burned to keep them, from falling into our hands, as was done at Corinth, Hiss. In tho afternoon, about 5 o'clock, a freight train left town loaded with boxes, bundles, &e.T that vary much resembled household goods, and looked as though the citizens were leaving for tho South. Governor Brown's militia occnniefl a portion of their line, relieving the veterans for defense of their flank3. On the 25th extra locomotives were being run out of town at tached to trains carrying a mixed lot of freight some household goods, some military stores, Some troops, andsomeartillery. All things hadi cated that an evacuation was contemplated, but how soon it would occur no one knew. On the 26th trains wero still leaving town leaded partially with troops, and one train had, to all appearances, aload of sick or wounded on board. This was more convincing proof than any thing else that they were about to evacuate. But Io ! a change came over the scene. Scan ning the country to the northeast I discovered a force of the enemy moving into the Ha of works m the rear of theTwentieth Army Corps. What could tMs mean? Had General Heod, by somo means unknown to us, moved his army to and around our left wing, and was he about to attack us from the rear ? SHERMAN'S FLANK MOVEMENT. It was difficult to understand their move ments, for at 1 p. m. five regiments of infantry moved out towards their 1&L Here was a problem to be solved. What meant that move ment in the rear of the Twentieth Corps? Lifo and activity was visible in our own camps, and something was on the tapis here as well as among tho rebels. Had thoy scented the move ments already planned by General Sherman, and was this force in our rear a column of oh- serration? Did they intend to deceive us by marching troop3 to their left In full viiw, and countermarch them, out of the range of our glasses, and fall upon us in an unguarded mo ment and pay us back for the pounding they had received on July 20, 22 and 23? "Whatever their intentions were they did nofc surprise us. The surprise was on the other side, as the nexS day or two revealed. The Fourth division, Sixteenth Army Corps, were hard at work on a reverse line just at the right of my tree, which looked as though this was soon to become tho left wing, aud that the Army of the Cumber land was to move around us and get possession of the railroads and put a stop to the moving out of so much property. If this should be done my station would be untenable, beingjout side the now works. But what a revelation met our eyes on the morning of the 27th. Nofc a man was left on our lines of the day previous, with the exception of a few skrrarfehars, and thoy wero withdrawn at daybreak. General Logan, in person, requested mo to take my station ac an early hour and watch all move ments of the rebels closely, and report to him. on the march by courier. I took my sqmd. of seven and got to my tree before it was Bgfcfc enough to scot but as the dawn approached and objects became visible, it was as good as-aoir cus. To be confirmed. One of Shermaa's Characteristic, leiten. Col- Geo. H. Butler, the brilliant nephew of his uncle, whose erratic performances and idiosyncracies have made him famous not only in Washington, but throughout the country, was a few weeks since given an anointuieufc under the Quartermaster's Department of the army, aud detailed for service on the frontier in the command of Gen. Terry. On his arrival ho indulged in somo characteristic displavs. Gen. Terry immediately wte in plaintive complaint of thisunexpected assignment to his command, aud asked the iinaiediato discharge of Air. Butler. The letter of Gen. Terry was referred to the General of tho Army, on whosq recommendation the appointment of Mr. But-, lor had been made. Gan. Sherman read it and returned it with an indorsement somewhat ag follows : " This man was appointed for the pur pose of developing the latent good that fs in him. Let bin": be subjected to a severe course of discipline, send him to jail, pub a ball and chain on him, shoct hua. it cesessairy, bat doa'J dischaige him."