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THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE; WASHEmiON. D. 0.. THURSDAY, AVRIh 23, 1896.
. . -. . . -. ,-i y. . i i ' ' ' " in. I., i . i
personally by him, and llielr fighting
qualities had been tried on many a
! ( WELL-FOUGHT FIELD.
aKlj.ajjllllcry was above par, and to the
liciiirayof the Cumberland belonged one
olf'llle" best engineer and pontoon-trains
& tjfc United Stales sen-ice, that had
jJucgi-Jprcdnccd under his own skillful
rliaad. .Again, the Army of the Cunibcr
vhvid -had the best-equipped wagon-train
. in -existence. But these were just what
Qwjjbmn wanted, and in his Memoirs he
Sdjrogueiiliy speaks of their efficiency.
But why was Schofield sent back to
Thomas? Simply because he made a
pfpjRumi request to uen. tolicnnan, ana ic
, n.iGen. Thomas was expected to whip
" bod's advancing army almost without
'Ci iWi Mi
G'KS. Joiix M. ScnOFITvT.D.
men or means. "When Hood crossed
the Tennessee River Thomas's force
was about 50,GjOO men, scattered from
Chattanooga, in East Tennessee, to
folmson ville, west of Nashville. Chatta
nooga was to be held at all hazards, as
well as all important points on the rail-
road between Chattanooga and Kash
"nlle. Gen. A. J. Smith, with two di
visions of the Sixteenth Corps, was in
Missouri, but was ordered to Thomas's
support, and arrived at Nashville while
the battle of Franklin was being fought
Hood crossed the Tennessee River
; Kbv.r2Qwith the following forces: Lee's
Corps, 12,693 s Stewart's Corps, 12,4S2;
-Cheatham's Corps, 15,205; Engineers,
;805; Forrest's cavalry, 12,753; total,
53938. This was exclusive of Forrest's
. 'Gen. Thomas's report on Oct 30 was
as follows: The Fourth Corps, 12,331;
Twenty-third Corps, 10,624; cavalr',
5,01; District of Tennessee, 18,661;
tmassigncd detachments, 7,359; total,
54,556. Showing Thomas's forces
greater in infantry, but weaker in
cavalry. Neither does this report in
clude the District of Etowah, which ar-
pfolfe in Thomas's report of Nov. 20, 1
and which numbered 0,421; making
Thomas's forces in Tennessee 60,977,
Nov. 20, in field and in garrison, from
Chattanooga to Nashville, Johnsonville, J
and near Decatur and lluntsville, Ala.
The actual forces in frmt of Hood
when he began his forward movement
were: Stanley's Fourth Corps, at Pu
laski, 12,331; Cox's Division, of the
Twenty-third Corps, and one brigade
of Sugar's; Cooper's Brigade, of the
Twenty-third Corps, "and one other, were
at Johnsonville. Ruger and one bri
gade of the Twentj'-lirird Corps joined
Schofield at Columbia about the 26th
inst Cooper's Brigade was sent to Cen
GI&Ttn A CROSSING
of the river at that point Had all the
Twenty-third Corps been at Pulaski
there vouhl have only boerr 10,624 ofj
asl ''corps. AM to this the cavalry
foross under Croxlon, Hatch, and
Caprou, 5,591, and we find only 28,546
ofneors and men opposing Hood's force
of 58,838 officers and men. Forrest's.
cavalry was well equipped ind of the
best fighting qualities, and were as good
to Hood's forces as 20,000 men.
A groat portion of Thomas's forces
were a combination of different regi
ments and commands returning from
furloughs and convalescent camps to
.Sherman's arm-. Of the retreat to
Franklin and that battle and the con
tinued retreat to Nashville I shall say
jioliring in litis article, as I wish to show
the gonwal treatment that Gen. Thomas
and his army received after the brilliant
X'ictory at Nashville and the destruc
tion of Hood's army while on the
n Dec 15, 1S64, at 11:30 p. m.(
-Gam Grant telegraphs Gen. Thomas as
follows: "1 was just on my way to
Naahviilc, but, receiving a dispatch
fram Van Duson detailing your splendid
success of to-da, I shall go no farther.
Push the enemy now, and give him no
rest until he is entirely destroyed.
Your army will cheerfully suffer many
privations to break up Hood's army
and make it useless for future opera
tions. Do not stop for trains or sup
plies, but take them from the country,
as the enemy has done. Much is now
On the 18th inst Gen. Grant tele-graphed-
again as follows : " The armies
operating against Richmond have fired
200 guns iu honor of your great victory.
Sherman has fully established his base at
Ossabaw Sound, with Savannah fully in
vested. 1 hope to be able to ffre a
ealute tomorrow in honor of the fall of
Savannah. I n all of you r operations we
hoar nothing from Forrest.
should lc taken to prevent him crossing
the Cumberland or Tennessee Rivers Lq-A
low iLastport. After Hood is driven as
far as it is possible to follow him, von
want to reoccupy Decatur and all other
Gen. Hallcck telegraphed Thomas
on the 21st as follows: "Permit me,
General, to urge the vast importance of
a hot pursuit of Hood's army. Even
possible sacrifice should he made, and
your men for a few days will submit to
..any hardships and privations to accom
plish tiie great result If you can cap
ture or destroy Hood's army, Gen. Sher
man can entirely crush out the rebel
military force in all the Southern States.
He begins a new campaign the 1st of
January, which will have the most im
portant results, if Hood's army can be
used up. A most vigorous pursuit on
your part is therefore of vital importance
to Gen. Sherman's plans, No sacrifice
must be spared too btain so important a
To this dispatch Gen. Thomas re
plied as follows: " Your dispatch of the
21st inst is just received. jGen. Hood's
army is being pursued as rapidly and
vigorously as it is possible for one army
to pursue another. AVc cannot control
the elements, and you must remember
that to resist Hood's advance into Ten
nessee I had to reorganize and almost
entirely equip the force now under my
" I fought the battle on the 15th and
16th with the troops partially equipped,
and notwithstanding the inclemency of
the weather and the partial equipments,
have been enabled to drive the enemy
beyond Duck River, crossing two streams
with my troops and driving the enemy
from position to position without the aid
of pontoons, and with buL little transpor
tation to bring up supplies and ammuni
" I am doing all in my power to crush
Hood's army, and if it be possible will
destroy it. But pursuing an enemy
through an exhausted country, over
mud roads completely sogged with heavy
rams, is no child s play, and cannot be
accomplished as quick as thought of. I
hope, in urging me to push the cuemj,
the Department remembers that Gen.
Sherman took with him the complete
organization of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, well equipped as regards
ammunition, supplies and transportation,
leaving me only two corps, partially
stripped of their transportation, to ac
commodate the force taken with him, to
oppose the advance into Tennessee of
that army which had
KKStSTED THE ADVAXCE
of the Militar' Division of the Mississippi
on Atlanta from the commencement of
the campaign until its close, and which is
now aided by Forrest's cavalry.
" Although my progress may appear
low, I feel assured that Hood's army
can be driven from Tennessee and event
ually driven to the wall by the force
under tny command. Rut too much
must not be expected of troops that have
to be reorganized, especially when they
have the task of destroying a force in a
show thaf at the sending of the dispatch
Gen. Grant had sent orders to Sherman
to transport his army by sea to Virginia.
"Was Sherman's army needed to help
draw the sting from Lee's forces ? But on
the 27th Grant assented to Sherman's
march through the Carolinas to Vir
ginia, and at the same time says: "I
have thought that Hood being so com
pletely wiped out for present harm, I
might bring Gen. A. J. Smith here with
14,000 to 15,000 men. With this increase
I can hold my lines and move out with a
greater force than Lee. It would com
pel Lee to retain all his present forces
in the defenses at Richmond, or abandon
On the 21st of January Grant had
written a letter to Sherman sharply cen
suring Thomas for lack of vigor in the
pursuit of Hood's army, and also for his
unwillingness to advance into Alabama.
"Before your last request to have
Thomas make a campaign into the heart
of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to
Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The ad
vance (6,000) will reach the seaboard by
the 23d. I was induced to do this be
cause I did not believe that Thomas
could possibly be gotten off before
Spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated
a sluggishness that satisfied me he would
never do to conduct one of your cam
paigns. The command of the pursuit of
Hood was left to subordinates. When
Hood crossed the Tennessee Thomas had
not much more than half crossed the
State, from which he returned to Nash
ville to take boat to Eastport, Miss. He
is possessed with excellent judgment and
COOLNESS AND irONESTY,
but is not good upon a pursuit. He
also reported his troops fagged out, and
that it would be necessary to equip up.
This report, and the determination to
give the enemy no rest, determined me
to use his surplus troops elsewhere.
" Thomas is left with a sufficient force
(surplus) to go to Selma under an ener
getic leader. He has been telegraphed
to know whether he could go, and" if
so, which of several routes he woidd
select. No reply is et received. Cav
alry has been ordered to act offensively
from the seacoast to the interior toward
Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's
force will move from the north at an
early day, or some of his troops will be
sent to Can by."
The foregoing clippings from tele
grams and letters from Grant and Hal-
Winter's campaign, which was able lo lock speak for themselves. That Gen.
make an obstinate resistance to twice its Thomas, GOO miles away, would not be
entirely governed by either Grant or
Halleck, and commence a campaign
against Hood until he was sure of suc
cess, was not pleasant to either of them,
and they resorted lo a perfect system of
nagging, as has been shown. The War
Department at -Washington, through
Secretary Stanton, emphatically denied
being in sympathy with either Grant or
Halleck's action towards Thomas. Again,
Grant complains that Thomas should
have completely annihilated Hood'sarmy
at Franklin. Schofield was in command
at Franklin, and ho says that he. could
not hold his position after 11 o'clock p.
Schofield was at this time carrying on
a letter correspondence with Grant, and
Thatcher, in his book of a "Hundred
Battles," says that in this correspond
ence Schofield says that he first saw
Gen.Wilson at Franklin Nov. 30, 18G4.
Gen. Cox says distinctly that Wilson
joined Schofield at Columbia, and as
sumed command of the cavalry forces
that were being slowly reinforced ; also,
that he was joined by Gen. Ruger and
a brigade of the Twenty-third Corps
that had been left at Johnsonville, and
that Wilson had orders lo operate on
Schofield's left flank, covering the Lew
isburg and Shelhyville roads, as well as
watching the fords and crossing of Duck
River above Columbia. Schofield
reached Columbia with the Fourth
Corps on the morning of the. 24th, and
numbers in Snriner and Summer. In
conclusion, I can safely slate that this
army is willing to submit to any sacri
fice to crush Hood's army or to strike
any other blow which may contribute to
the destruction of the rebellion."
Hon. E. M. Stanton,Secretarj- of War,
telegraphed Gen. Thomas on the 22d as
follows : " I have seen Gen. Halleck's
dispaum of yesterday and your reply.
It is proper for me to assure ou that
the Department has the most unbounded
confidence in your skill, vigor, and de
termination to emploj to the best ad
vantage all the means in your power to
pursue and destroy the enemy. No De
partment could be inspired with More
profound admiration and thankfulness
for the great deeds which you have al
ready performed or more confiding faith
that human effort could do "no more, and
no more than will be done'bv you and
the accomplished and gallant officers
and soldiers of your command."
Secretary Stanton had been impatient
Gbk. 2f B. FonansT, C. S. A.
with Gen. Thomas on account of his de
lay in forcing a fight with Hood, and
his utterances were not of a very com
plimentary kind, and in view "of the
great victory the supposition that
Thomas needed urging was abhorrent
to him, and his opinion of Halleck's dis
patch imj-elled him to speak in strong
est praise and in expression of the firm
est confidence. No matter who or what
inspired Halleck's dispatch, Mr. Stanton
was quick to free his Department from
the appearance of sympathy with it.
In reply to Secretary .Stanton, Gen.
Thomas telegraphed as follows : " I am
profoundly tlfankful for the hearty ex
pression of your confidence in my de
termination and desire to do all in my
power to destroy the enemy and put
down the rebellion, and in the name of
this army I thank you for the compli
mentary notice you have taken of all
connected with it for the deeds of valor
they have performed."
On the 22d Gen. Grant also tele
graphed his congratulations; lo wit:
u You have the congratulations of the
public for the energy with which you
are pushing Hood. 1 hope you will suc
ceed in reaching his pontoon bridge at
Tuscumbia before he gets there. Should
I you do so it looks to me that
noon is cut off.
If you can succeed in destroying Hood s
army there will be but one army left to
the so-called Confederacy capable of
doing u:j harm. I will take care of that,
and try to draw the sting from it so that
in the Spring we shall have easy sailin".
You have now a big opportunity, which
I know you are availing yourself of.
Let us push and do all we can before
the enemy can derive benefit either
from raising negro troops on the planta
tions or while troops in the field."
There is documentary evidence to
ChUdren Cry for Pitcher's Castoria.
JOIN'ED BV WIT.SON-.
the 24th, Schofield became
alarmed, and took up a new and chorter
line at Columbia. Wilson notified Scho
field that Forrest was trying the differ
ent fords along Duck River east of Co
lumbia, and on the night of the 27th
moved his whole command, to the north
Gen. Schofield, in his report of the
battle of Nashville, says: "During the
morning, therefore, our operations were
limited to preparations for defense and
co-operation with the cavalry, which was
operating to strike the Granny White
pike in the rear of the enemy. About
noon, the troops on my left, Gens. Smith
and Wood, having advanced and come
eight pieces of' artillery and from 200
to 300 prisoners." '
Gen. Smith, In. command of the Six
teenth Corps, in bis report, says : " The
Iwenty-tlnrtl lprpjs was on my riglit, in
the intrenchments thrown up by them
on the night before, and at nearly right
angles to my prjsent line. Expecting
that .corps to tako the initiative, as they
were on the flank of the enemy, I held
the command in its present position,
keeping up a - -
SLOW ATCTILTKRY FIKE
at their line jvithout eliciting any re
sponse. About 1 o'clock I received a
request from Schofield, and a few mo
ments later an order from you Thomas,
to send another division to his assistance,
he having retained the one sent at day
light that morning. Not having any
reserve, and my whole line being imme
diately in front of the enemy, and being
liable to be attacked and broken at any
point wherever a brigade should be with
drawn, I sent therefore a slafT officer to
him lo ?ftate the condition of my com
mand, and ascertain if ho could get
along without the division.
" The officer reported to me that Gen.
Schofield's line was not engaged, and,
upon the condition being reported to
him, that he said he did not need the
additional force, consequently it was not
sent. About 3 o'clock p. in., Gen. Mc
Arthur sent word that he could carry
the line on his rigli by assault Maj.
Gen. Thomas being present, the matter
was referred to him, and I was requested
to delay the movement until he could
hear from Gen. Schofieldto whom he
"Gen. 31 re Arthur not receiving any
reply, and fearing that if the attack should
be any longer delayed the enemy would
use the right to strengthen his works,
directed the First Brigade (Col. W. L.
McMillen, 95th Ohio, commanding) to
storm the hill on which the left of the
enemy's line rested, and the Second and
Third Brigades of the division to attack
in front when the First should bo half
way up the hill."
Gen. Hood recognized the effect of
Gen. McArthur's assault. He say3 in
his report of the battle of Nashville :
"About 3:30 p. m. the Federals con
centrated a number of guns against a
portion of our line, which passed over a
mound on the left of our center, and
which had been occupied during the
night. This pojn,t was favorable for
massing troopsforan assault under cover
of artillery. ' Accordingly, the enemy
availed himself of the advantage pre
sented, massedf a; body of men appar
ently one division-at the base of this
mound, and unHdrfire of artillery, which
prevented our mb'ii from raising their
heads above the breastworks, made a
siwDrof And gallant
charge up and'ovir our intrenchments.
Our line thus piSrced gave way ; soon
thereafter it b.roko at all points, and I
behcldj for the first and only ti me, a
Confederate ariny; abandon the field in
In his report Gen-Hood makes no
reference to the-cavalry, which gained
his rear and assaulle'd his'line"in reverse
in conjunction wfyh the direct attack of
infantry in his front, but during the
morning ot the loth lie sent this dispatch
to Gen. Chalmers:
""For God's sake drive the Yankee
cavalry from our left and rear or all is
This message was captured by Gen.
Wilson and sent to Gen. Thomas about
noon on the 16th inst. One of the most
remarkable features of this battle was
the desperate and spirited charges of the
dismounted cavalry. Ofttimes they
would mount their horses, make a circuit
of five to ten miles around the flank of
the enemy, dismount and form in lino-of-hattle,
and then wifh the Yankee yell
charge the enemy upon" the ground
picked by them and heavily intrenched,
and drive them iu confusion from their
The largo force of cavalry at Nash
ville, so skillfully handled, was one of
the conditions of a decisive victorv, since
by the unprecedented co-operation of cav
alry and infantry the pivotal advantages
were gained. The infantry on our left
had no distinct help from the cavalry, but
on the right the turning movements
were made by Wilson, and by his co
operation the strongest positions of the
enemy on that part of the line were car
ried. The achievements of Wilson's
Corps stands against all possible criti
cism as the justification of all the efforts
that had been made to give it efficiency,
and fully compensated for the consequent
postponement of the action.
As soon as the rebel lines were broken
and Hood's army in full retreat, notwith-
and reach the flanks of Hood's retreat
ing, army if possible. The enemy were
discovered late in the evening in line-of-battlc
in an open field about one mile
north of the West Harpcth.
Wilson ordered Knipc and natch to
charge the flanks of this force, and Lieut.
Hodges, with a detachment of the 4th
V. S. Cav., to attack its center on the
road. The enemy opened with artillery,
but Wilson's men, undeterred by this
fire, charged center and flanks, drove
them from their position and captured
their guns. Darkness prevented further
With this engagement of Wilson's
forces we leave him, as we now join his
forces with that of Gen. Wood's, of the
Fourth Corps, a description of which has
been given, until the pursuit of Hood's
forces Was abandoned at Sugar Creek.
That the battle of Nashville was a
complete victor, and that Hood's forces
were followed closely and quickly and
with grent results, there can be no
Of Wilson's brilliant work on the I
17th Gen. Hood, in his book, "Advance
and Retreat," 5.133: " During this day's
march the enemy's cavalry pressed with
great boldness and activity, charging
our infantry repeatedly with the saber,
and at times penetrating our lines."
Why was the battle of Nashville de
layed from 12 o'clock noon until 3:30
Gen. Wilson tells you that he was
read lo attack at noon and that he dis
patched Aid after Aid to Schofield and
Thomas, and becoming uneasy, that
about 3 o'clock he rode around Hood's
flank to, see why tho
ACTION WAS DELAYED.
Gens. Smith, Wood and Steedman say
they were ready at noon and waiting for
Schofield to take the initiative. Gen.
Schofield, in his report, say3 that about
noon he ordered Gen. Cox to attack.
(See his report.) Gens. Thomas, Smith,
'Wilson, Wood and Steedman tell you
the battle began about 3:30 p. m., as
also doe3 Gen. Hood. Why did not the
army advance at noon ? Looking back
at the arrangements for the battle of
that day, we find that early in the morn
ing Gen. Schofield became uneasy and
asked for reinforcements, and that a
division of Gen. Smith's Sixteenth Corps
was sent him, and he (Schofield) says
that he placed them in reserve. When
Wilson notified Gen. Thomas that he
ready to attack Hold's left and
from tlioir lurking-place under the rivor
bank ami disappear in the woods, while four
or five heavy fieltl-jjnns, drawn by pnntinj?
and overworked horses, trundled rapidly
along the red el y road, the drivers whip
ping and swearing.
' After a few rounds there came a short Inll
in the bombardment, dnrtng which a singu
lar sereniiy pervaded the air and sky.
"Dr, now. Lor, stop de wa' right heah,
and lef ' de ole darky "
But Uuele Duff 9prnng to his feet as
another awful cannonade began, and a shell
burst on the railroad track in front of tha
door, ire forgot his prayer.
'Hell nn'faryl" he cried, " dnt's danger
ous ! Gi my hat, fo' de Lor' soke ! Vs gw ino
outen jer!" And ho rnehod through the
hack door-way and across the garden to tho
woods, followed by Sam and Aunt Saluda.
A TJrnvp OfllcerN Anwer.
Harper's Round TnMe.
During Napoleon's campaign in Russia a
young officer was very successful in defeat
ing, with a hondfnl of men, a largo body of
Co?sacks who had been skirmishing along
the line for some days, doing considerable
damage. The officer risked his life in a
daring deed of bravery, and Napoleorj, hear
ing of it, sent for him and praised him.
?4Sire,"said the officer, ,;I am happy for
your praise, but the CroS3 of the Legion of
Honor would make me happier."
Bntyon are very yonug," said Napoleon,
"Sire," answered the brave officer, "wo
do notTTve long in yonr rogiments."
standing the latcncs of the hour, Gen.
in contact with the enemy in his new I Wood, with the Fourth Corps, immedi
position, thecnemy again withdrew from f ately started in pursuit of Hood's main
his let I a considerable iorcc to strengthen
his right and center.
" I ordered Gen. Cox to advance in
conjunction with the cavalry, and en
deavor to carry a high wooded hill be
yond the flank of the enemy's intrenched
line, and overlooking the Granny White
pike. The hill was occupied by the
enemy in considerable force, hut was
not intrenched. My order was not
greeted with the energy and promptness
which J expected, 3ct probably with as
much as I had reason to expect, consid
ering the attenuated character of Gen.
Cox's line and the grent distance, and
the rough ground over which the attack
ing force had to move.
"The hill was, however, carried by
Gen. Wilson's cavalry (dismounted),
whose gallantry and energy on that and
other occasions which came under 1113 ob
servations cannot he too greatly praised.
Almost simultaneously with this attack
on the extreme right, the salient in front
of Gen. Couch was attacked and carried
by Gen. Smith's troops, supported by a
brigade of Gen. Couch's Division, and
the fortified hill in front of GonjL'ox's,
which constituted the extreme Hank of
the qiemy's intrenched line, was attacked
and carried by Col. Doolittlc's Brigade
.of Cox's Division, the latter capturing
force, who clung desperately to the
Franklin pike, )t was unable to over
take the enemy. Gen. Wilson remounted
his cavalry and pursued the enemy
through the rrfill and darkness until 11
o'clock a. m. 'About four miles north
of Franklin Gen. Hatch ran against
Chalmers's Division formed in linc-of-battle
across the turnpike. Hatch im
mediately dismounted a portion of I113
command and deployed his men each
side of the roafl, then
with the 12th Tenn. Cav., Col. Spauld
ing leading, broke their line and routed
their whole force, capturing Gen. Rucker
and three guns,, 3eforc daybreak on the
1 7th Gen. Wilsons troops were again in
saddle ; Knipe's, Croxton's and Hatch's
troops on thcc Granny White turnpike
and Johnson's on the Hillsboro road.
Gen. Knipc had the advance, and found
the enemy about four miles north of
Franklin, posted in Hollow Tree Gap.
The enemy were quickly charged on
front and flank, losing 413 prisoners and
three stands of colors. Moving rapidly
forward they crossed the Harpeth River
at fords above and below Franklin, and
advancing from that point on the Co
lumbia, Carter's Creek and Lewisburg
turnpikes under orders to move rapidly
Gen. Thomas ordered Schofield at 12
o'clock to take up the fight in co-operation
with the cavalry, what did Scho
field do? Asked for reinforcements.
Gen. Thomas tells you that he was put
out by this request, but finally ordered
Gen. Smith to send Schofield another
This Gen. Smith hesitated to do, and
sent a staff officer to Schofield, who
finally said he didrnot need them ; and
Gen. Thomas, after an investigation, can
celled the order and rode to Schofield's
Headquarter and requested him to ad
vance upon the rebel works. Then
Schofield intimated that he would lose
men if he attacked those intrenchments1,
and Gen. Thomas said, " This battle
must be fought if men are killed," and,
looking to the left, saw Gen. McArthur's
troop3 on the move and Wilson's dis
mounted men carrying the works on Scho
field's right. This was at 3:30 p. m. on
the lGth, and Hood t6lls you that about
4 o'clock p. m. his whole army was in
Again, Schofield says that Gen. Cox
in carrying out hi3 orders was slow, but
that he accomplished all he expected
with his long and attenuated line. Why
was Cox's line attenuated? Schofield
tell3 you that he had one of Smith's
Divisions in reserve. Why was Cox's
line n6t strengthened ?
It is the first and only time that I
ever heard of Gen. Cox and his troops
being too slow, and I have no hesitancy
in saying that had Gen. J. D. Cox been in
command of the Twenty-third Corps at
Nashville the battle
wour.n have beex Fouonx at noon-.
That the battle was not fought at noon
was clearly Schofield's fault. The proof
is conclusive of that fact. Had Scho
field advanced when notified by Wilson
and ordered by Gen. Ihomas the battle
would have been fought and won before
1 o'clock p. m., and Hood's army would
never have recrossed the Harpeth River
It is a fact, nevertheless, that Schofield's
forces did not advance until after Mc
Arthur's and Wilson's men had carried
the enemy's works in their front in
plain view of Schofield's forces. I have
no wish to discredit the fighting quali
ties of tho Twenty-third Corps, for they
bravely proved their valor on many a
well-fought field, but I believe in giving
honor to those entitled to it.
Tho battle of Nashville was fought
and won, and the enemy were closely
followed until they recrossed the Ten
nessee River. Yet wo find Gens. Grant
and Halleck were not satisfied that
Hood's nrmy wa3 closely pursued. I
have never heard a Johnny that be
longed to Hood s army complain about
not being followed closely enough to
suit him, and Gen. Hood, in his book,
" Advance and Retreat," says that the
constant charging of tho Federal cav
alry made it impossible to keep his rear
guard in a state of defense ; that,
mounted or dismounted, they charged
hi3 infantry whenever they overtook
them ; that from the time of the leaving
the battlefield at Nashville until he ro
crossed the Tennessee River Wilson's
cavalry pressed them at every point.
Gen. Grant said that he had great
faith and confidence in Gen. Thomas,
but that he did not press Hood hard
enough, and that when Hood crossed
the Tennessee River Thomas, with his
staff, was not half-way across the State
of Tennessee. Cen. Thomas was with
the mahf'Joody of his infantry at Pu
laski, Tenn., within about 25 mile3 of
the State line, and 70 miles from Nash
ville; while Gen. Wilson, with his cav
alry forces, wa3 in close proximity to
Hood's army all the time, dealing
to the enemy daily until he crossed the
river upon his pontoon-bridge3 that
awaited his arrival.
Was it expected that Gen. Thomas
should neglect the main body of his
nrmy and lead the cavalry forces in pur
suit of the enemy? From the corre
spondence between Gen. Grant and
Sherman it i3 readily seen that Gen.
Grant was displeased with Gen. Thomas
because he did not move earlier upon
"Hood's forces before Thomas's troop3
were consolidated, and that in military
parlance a 'scape goat" must be had to
appease the "public, and Thomas was the
Again, Gen. Grant says in his tele
grams: "If you can clean out Hood's
army there will be only one Confederate
army left that of Gen. Lee, and I will
draw the sting from that."
And, yet, while he was urging Gen.
Thomas to follow Hood closely and cap
ture I113 army, he (Grant) was already
contemplating the reduction of Thomas's
forces to reinforce the army of Gen.
Sherman and his own army in front of
Gen. Leo. In Gen. Grant's own words,
as soon as Hood's army was annihilated
by Gen. Thomas's forces there wa3 only
one Confederate army left in the field,
and that was Gen. Lee's. What was he,
Rrnnt rrninrr In null tlio crinrr -irifh 9
Why, with Grant's, Sherman's, Scho
field's, Sheridan's and a large portion of
grand old Pap Thomas's army.
And, again, look at the surroundings.
While Grant's army, according to his
own letters to Sherman, were mud bound,
the banks of the river overflowed :
!!L.e". Jl 1 1 Tabules reduce the wear
the Carolina campaign, Gen. Thomas, un
der like circumstances, watf expected to
In strength, lightness, grace, and
elegance of finish and equip
ment Model 41 Columbia, is un-
approached by any other make,
saddles are recommended by riders and
physicians as proper in shape and adjust
ment, and every;
detail or equipment!
con!nrjiae to com
fort and pleasure.
z jmmmmn n .
1 arHMfV-i it srv v.
The Columbia Cat
'Wtv year, is free
bia agent, or is
ipmiwsmmm msmmmm mm
1 To - Keep Young
needs no magic elixir. It
only requires a little daily if
care of the health. Ripacs
That is impure ia a constant source of
danger. Circulating as it doc to every
part of the system, carrying nutriment to
thd nerves, muscles and the grent vital
organs of the hody, it is absolutely neces
sary that tho hlood should he pure ir good
health is to be expected. The great secret
of the cures by Hood's Sarsapanlla lies iu
tho fact the blood is
("advance into the enemy's country- and
carry on a new campaign, after he had
defeated one of the only two Confederate
armies then in existence.
Let us search history from the Records
of tho War of the Rehellion. Can you
remember any battle, except Sheridan's
at Cedar Creek and Winchester, where
a rebel, army was defeated and the
victory followed up as was the case after
the battle of Nashville, Tenn.? What
were the results? Seventy pieces of
artillery, nearly all of Hood's wagon-
train, consisting of arms and ammunition,
baggage and clothing, 25,000 prisoners,
and the balance of his forces scattered
all through the country seeking hiding
TO KSCAPE CATrrCRK;
in fact, Gen. Grant's orders completely
carried out. "Hood's army was an
nihilated" ; not a rebel army organiza
tion left, in the West.
If what the rebel Generals told U3
at the dedication of the Chickamauga
battlefield was true, that the battle of
Chickaroau2a was the bejnnninic of the
end, what can we say of the battle of Nash
ville? When the history of the Army
of the Cumberland shall have been cor
rectly written, the record of Gen.
Geo.IT. Thomas will need ho defense at
the hand of any living person. He was
the solid phalanx at Stone River, the
Rock of Ciiickamaujra, the central pivot
of the Atlanta campaign, and the ava-
lnncue at .Nashville.
For him both officers and men freely
risked their live?, and Old Glory never
trailed in the dust where Pap Thomas
He was the last to receive the promo
tion that had long been earned, but un
grumblinglydid his whole duty through
all. And, in conclusion I can only say
that I perfectly agree with Gen. Sher
man when he said in his Memoirs:
"There should have been three appoint
ments of Lieutenant-General made
Meade for Gettysburg, Sheridan for
Cedar Creek, and Thomas for Nashville,
and the rank to die with them."
The making of Brigadiers by Congress
after the. war wa3 obnoxious to Gen.
Sherman ; for as a soldier born to com
mand, he believed only in promotions,
recommended by general officers, of men
who had been tried and found true.
and tear of life to the M
M Itlpans Tabnles : Sold by druggists, or by mall
53 If the price (30 cents a box) Is sent to The Ittpans
Chemical Company, Mo. 10 Spruce St., New ,
s Yonc. fcampie vuu 10 cents.
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Illustrations, muxiea trer, irgivc Man a
Music& Instructions for Amateur Bands
.LI0.1 & I1EALY, .onVdtojU Ire., Chicago.
Mention Tha National Tribune.
THE STORY OF CUBA,
BY BYRON ANDREWS.
flflTIOfmh TRIBUNE MBftflftY fk 9.
By this great medicine. It is in fact the
Otic True Blood Pnrilier. A great variety
of diseases yield to its power becanse a
great variety of diseases arc caused solely
by impure blood. All forms of scrofula
eruptions, boils, humor, pimples and sores
are I'cifectly and permanently cured by
The Ono Truo Wood Turlller. All dnl-j-iaU. 31.
- ! " ' --- 1 1 i - . i . ,. .,, iiii
Mrtnrir E3!ll nro tho only pills to liiko
U.IUUU O riiiow
Prayers iu "War-Time.
Uncle DufF. hearing the noise began to
pray; Annt Salnila joiued him fervently;
Sam listened stupidly and in suffocating
Fifteen cannon thundered together, over
beyond the bridge, and a flight of shells in
theair made n prolonged whirring noise,
followed presently by a rapid spluttering
of mnskctry in the woods at the lower edge
of the plantatiou. The regiment weut across
the Hold at double-quick step, knocking oyer
the fences as they came in tlic vnxy.
"Oh, good Lor', cf ye kin spa' de ole man
er leetlc bit lonscr " , bsgrm Uncle Dttif,
but bis prayer was interrupted byaa explo
siou on both sides of the river, rival bat
terits thnndering at ono another, ami op
posing lines of infantry exchanging long
iih llood'a SitMuparilla, Mrs. i arrow BaiT the cavalry ecurry away
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Early History, Products, Commerce and
Capture of Havana by the British.
Slavery and the Slave Trade.
Principal Cities of the Island.
Cause of Cnban Discontent.
The Ten Years' War.
A Glimpse of the Interior with Gen. Grant
The Kevolntion of 1895.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Map of tho Island.
A Typical Spanish Volunteer.
First meeting of Columbus and the "West
City of Ilavana.
The Flag of Cuba Libre.
Portrait of Gen. Ccspfcdes.
Portrait of Governor-General Martinez do
Gen. Grant Travelling in Pinar DeltHio.
Portrait of Jose Marti.
Portrait of Gen. Maximo Gomez.'
Portrait of President Bctancourt.
Portrait of Vice-President Mhso.
Portrait of Gen. Carlos Kbloff.
Portrait of Lieut.-Geu. Antonio Maceo.
Portrait of Sr. T. Estrada Palma.
Portrait of Governor-General Yalcriano
fiST" Sent postpaid for 5 cents ; six copies
for 25 cents.
Tin: JfATIOXAL TRZUVXn,
1739 3f Y. Atc, lYaaliiutou, 1. V,