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THE EXTRA COPY.
ll extra copy i? mailed to some tab
ocribera this week for diatribvtion to
oolditra who are not aubacribora, that
tkeir attention may be called to " The
Solemn Duty of Harried Soldiera."
WASHINGTON, D. 0.,
.-V
THE EXTRA COPY.
An extra eepy ia mailed to aeme anb
aeribera tkia week far diatribatien to
aeldiera wbe are net anboeribera, tkat
tkeir atteatiea may be oalled to ** Tke
Solemn Dnty of Harried Soldiera."
THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1904.
VOL XXIH-NO. 41.?WHOLE NO. 1196.
Campaigns of the
Army of the Potomac
A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Penn
sylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War,
1861-1865. <
By WILLIAM SWINTQN.
Copyright bt Chas. Sciubnek's Sons, Nkw York City, 1882.
THE MINE FIASCO.
Terrible Mismanagement Brought a Very
Promising Plan to Bloody Disaster?Where
the Fault Lay.
It required no clearer demonstration than
that already given in the unpromising re
sults of the several assaults made against
the Confederate lines, to show that the diffi
cult problem of the capture of Petersburg
had passed beyond that stage at whi.-h suc
cess might be hojied from expedients, par
tial efforts, and coups de main. The task
was one of the tirst magnitude, in which
an auspicious issue was only to he expected
from systematic operations and a weH-con
sidered combination of effort. This will be
manifest from a brief description of the
relative situation of the opposing armies.
powerful line of redoubts was pushed for
ward, and a series of heavy batteries was
placed in position to cover an assault, in
case a suitable opening therefor should
present itself. By the close of July, a sys
tem of earthworks covering the front then
held by the army had been constructed and
armed, (irant was then in position either
to undertake direct assault or operate on
the tianks of the Confederate line.
THE MINE FIASCO.
As soon as the system of works hail been
completed, it was determined to make an
assault on the enemy's position on Burn
side's front, and it was resolved to work
into tlie plan the explosion of a mine which
that officer had prepared.
Th:s enterprise had been undertaken some
weeks previously by Burnside of his own
motion, and was allowed to proceed rather
by sufferance than sanction. Having at
cock held a simply defensive attitude, Lee
meanwhile concentrating so heavily against
hirn that he finally had drawn to the north
bank of the James five of the eight divi
sions of the (Confederate army. Of this
circumstance f?en. Grant determined to
take advantage; for, though the direct pur
pose of the move had failed, it had yet
caused I^ee so materially to weaken his
force in front of Petersburg as to afford
an excellent opportunity for the assault,
which it was designed to make on Burn
side's front. Hancock's move, therefore,
assumed the character of a feint; and the
expeditionary force was ordered that night
to withdraw secretly from its position on
the north side of the James, and return
.to the lines of Petersburg, to participate in
the attack of the following morning.
SELECTION OF TROOPS TO ASSAULT WHEN
MINE EXPLODED.
It will have appeared, from the outline
already given of the proposed assault, that
it was an operation essentially of the na
ture of a coup de main. It involved the
explosion of the mine, through the breach
formed by which an assaulting column
would then push forward to sweep the hos
tile line rig\?fc UL?d left, and crown the crest
of the ridgu. Thus the whole momentum of
the action and the entire promise of the,
result centered in the corps to which the
duty of assault was assigned.
In tins state of acts, it would seem to be
the dictate of prudence, and certainly has
been the invariable practice of the groat
commanders, to select for the storming col
umn the elite of the army?a rule that does
not seem to have been followed in this
case. It happened that the Ninth Corps,
under <ien. Burnside, held the front from
which the assault was to be made. With
no purpose of undertaking the ungracious
task of comparison, but with the simple
desire of stating a matter of fact essential
1
Growing in strength day by day, the Con- J
federate line of defense Lad, by the begin- |
?ing of July, become so formidable that j
assault was pronounced impracticable by
the Chiefs of Artillery and of Kngineers.(l ?
This line consisted of a chain of redans,
connected by infantry paraj>ets of a power
ful prrfile. while the approaches were com
pletely obstructed by abatis, stakes, and en
tanglements. beginning at the south bank
of the Appomattox, it enveloped Petersburg
on the east and south, stretching westward
beyond the furthi'st reach of the left flank
of the Union army. A continuation of the
lame system to the north side of the Appo
ttattox protected the city and the Peters
burg & Richmond Railroad against attack
from the direction of the front held by But
ler'm force at Bermuda Hundred. The de
fense of Richmond was provided for by its
own chain of fortifications.
The attitude assumed by Grant before
Petersburg was somewhat peculiar. As the
Union lines were drawn, the defending force
was not under siege, investment, or block
ade; for its line* of communication were
all open. Petersburg, in fact, was in the
same situation as Sebnstopol, when belea
guered by the Allies in the so-called siege
?a term not applicable to the kind of
operation practised in both these cases.
This is of a character novel and modern,
and may be better descril>ed as a partial
investment, or an attitude of watching.
There were, however, several manuvers and
operation* open to the I'nion commander.
COULD HAVE MENACED RICHMOND t KOM
DEEP DOTTOM.
1. The first of those was a move result
ing from tliat peculiar strategic relation of
the contending armies by which. wliUe
1< ichmond was the ultimate ohj?-ctive of
attack and point of defense, the actual
struggle was waged before Petersburg, on
the south side of the James, and XI miles
distant from the Confederate Capital, sit
uate on the north side of that river. A
lodgment for the Union force on the north
side of the James had early been secured
by Gen. Butler at Deep Bottom, only 10
miles south of Richmond. Here a force
under Foster held an intrenched camp, and
communication with Bermuda Hundred
was established by means of a pontoon
bridge. Thus it was always practicable for
Gen. Grant, by a movement to the north
bank of the James, to threaten Richmond
by its direct approaches. These were, how
ever, "observed" by Gen. Lee, who, by
codtoon bridges across the James, near
l)rewry's Bluff, a few miles below Rich
mond, preserved his interior lines, and held
the means of rapidly reinforcing either
wing. Yet. since Gen. Grant couhl at any
time take the initiative, it was always in
bis power to outrun any immediate action
of bis opponent.
MIGHT HAVE TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE
HA1LBOADS.
2. The next course open to the Union
commander was to operate against the rail
road hues that fed Lee's army at Peters
burg. These lead into that city from the
south and west. They could be acted
against, either by a gradual extension of
the left flank, or by cutting loose a column
of active operations powerful enough to
meet any forte the enemy might bring to
meet the menace. The Weldon Railroad
was within the scope of the former course,
and, as will presently appear, it was soon
after ward seized and held.and the left flank
of the army extended to insure its tenure.
The main lines of supply by the South
side and the Danville Roads wer.?, however,
well covered by I*ee's army. The distance
from the position of the army before Peters
burg ty the pea;e-t p->int at which the
Bouthside Railroad coulu 1m> struck is from
iO fo 15 miles, and to Burkesri|!e?which,
s the junction of the Southside and the
Danville Roads, is the strategic key to all
the Confederate communications of Peters
burg and Richmond?the distance is near
40 miles. These, therefore, could not be
reached by any ext<n*ion of the I'nion in
trenched line to the left, without danger
ously weakening the front covering Grant's |
depot at City Point; but they could bo
operated against by a column able to cut
itself loose from its base.
3. In the relative situations of the op
posing armies, the liue to be guarded by
Lee was between 30 and 40 miles, runniug
from southwest of Petersburg to northeast
of Richmond. There was. accordingly, oj?en
to Gen. Grant a great variety of tactical
combinations, compelling, on the part of
the Confederates, continued motion to the
greatest distances from flank to flank, and
visiting concentration on one flank by a
sudden blow on the other. There also re
mained the contingency of a good ojiening
for direct assault, in case the Confederates
should roduce the force within tlieir Hues
of defense to meet these inanuvers.
In order to hold the actual front w'th a
fractional force, and relieve as large a part
of the army as possible for a column of
active operations, the construction of a
1. Report of an Examination of the
iy's Lines, July 6. by Gen. Hunt,
" of Artillery, and Maj. Duane, Chief
loeer.
SECTIONAL AND PROFILE VIEW OF TUNNEL.
first excited only ridicule, the mine, now
that it was finished, began to receive more
serious consideration, and it was resolved
to bring it into play in the proposed plan
of assault. Burnside occupied a position
very close to and within 150 yards of the
enemy's liue.(2j which happened there to
form an angle, that was covered by_ a fort.
It was' under this fort that the mine had
been run. The location of the mine did
not promise well, the fort to be destroyed
being in a re-entrant of the enemy's line,
and therefore exposed to an enfilading and
reverse fire right and left. (M) Still, it was
seen that if the crest of the ridge behind
the fort, and distant from it by only 4<HJ
yards, could be carried, it would secure
the most important results, carrying with
it Petersburg, and probably a large part
lof the enemy's artillery and infantry.(4)
About the time fixed for the assault,
which was the morning of the 30th of July,
there happened a conjecture of events that
promised a happy bearing on the result.
Four days before?that is, on the 26th of
July?an expeditionary force under Gen.
Hancock, consisting of the Second Corps
with two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry,
had been sent to operate toward Richmond
by the north side of the James. Ilancock
crossed at Deep Bottom on the night of the
20th. with instructions to proceed rapidly
to Chapin's Bluff, where Lee had estab
lished pontoon bridges, that were his means
of communication between the two parts of
his army. Hancock was to prevent Confed
erate reinforcements from being sent to
the north side of the James, while Sheri
dan with his cavalry was to proceed to the
Virginia Central Railroad, to operate to
ward Richmond, the works of which being
thinly held were supposed to be open to a
surprise.(T?> As will presently appear, how
ever, there were circumstances that thwart
ed the execution of this part of the plan.
SHERIDAN'S PROPOSED EXPEDITION BAULKED
Foster's lodgment at Deep Bottom had
caused Lee to send a body of troops to ob
serve him. This force held position on his
immediate front, and had already made
one to two unsuccessful sallies to dislodge
him. Hancock determined, next morning,
to disengage this force by a turning move
ment by the right, while Foster threatened
it in front. The operation was successfully
accomplished, and the skirmish line of
Miles's Brigade, of Barlow's Division,(G)
by a well-executed manuver, captured four
guns. The enemy held this front weakly;
and, when thus assailed, retired a short
distance to another line of wt>rks, behind
Bailey's Creek, where he effectually barred
Hancock's approach to Chapin's Bluff. This
position seemed so formidable that Hancock
preferred to flank it. The cavalry, mean
while, moved to the right, and, by one or
two spirited charges, gained possession of
some high, open ground, which it was hoped
might enable it to get in the rear of the
enemy's line. Night came on, however,
before anything was accomplished, and the
movement being now fully disclosed, Lee
drew to this point a very heavy force from
DIAGRAM
Petersburg. In the morning ha assumed
the offensive, drove back Sher'dan from his
advance on the New. Market and lA>ng
Bridge roads, and, though that officer was
1 able, by dismounting his troopers, to check
] and finally drive off his assailants, it be
came obvious that his proposed expedition
was baulked.
DtSriug the 28th and following day Ilnn
2. This was the pos tion secured by <*rif
fin's Division, of Warren's Corps, in the
attack of the ISth of June.
3. For proof of the disadvantageous loca
tion of the m'ne, see Meade's Report;
Meade's testimony before the Court of In
quiry.?Report of llie Conduct of the War,
p. 125. Testimony of the Chief-Engineer.
?Ibid.
4. Meade's testimony.?Ibid. p. 12fi.
5. Hancock: Report of the Expedition to
Deep Bottom.
0. The sk'rtnish line was composed of the
183d Pa.. 28th Mass., and 2Gth Mich., un
der Col. J. C. Lynch.
J J J ^
to the correct appreciation of the action
and its result, it is due to say that that
corjw could not be considered the elite corps
of the ariny. The old Ninth, than which
there never was better, had been reduced
by long and varied service to a mere nu
cleus, with which had been agglomerated
(not fused) a mass of new, heterogeneous,
and inferior material. The first division
was largely made up of foot-artillerists and
dismounted cavalry, and the fourth divi
sion was composed exclusively of Blacks.
To such au extent had the morale of the
Ninth Corns become impaired, that its in
specting officer a short time before the as
sault declared the three white divisions to
be in so bad a condition thijt the division
of Blacks was to be preferred for the duty.
If, in view of this circumstance, it be
asked why another selection was not made,
an answer does not readily present itself.
There is, however, in Carnot's work, De la
Defence des Places Fortes, a remarkable
passage that closely touches this matter.
"The reasons why our assaults occasionally
fail," says he, "are, in my opinion, various.
In the first place, it is a rule that the
troops immediately on duty, or near the
spot, generally storm or do whatever serv
ice may be required. These troops may be
most unfit for it, and by this mode the good
old custom is done away of employing gren
adiers or chosen men for occasions of diffi
culty. There are no troops in the world
that can be taken indiscriminately for bril
liant services, and undoubtedly none more
so than for storming works. Besides, the
officer to whom the command falls may be
very unfit for the particular service."
But, what is even more extraordinary
than the selection itself, is the mode in
which the selection was made. Gen. Grant
refused to permit the black division to be
chosen for the assaulting column, and it re
mained to appoint one of the three divi
sions of white troops. Gen. Burnside then
resolved to determine the choice by casting
lots?or, as Gen. Grant has expressed it,
by "nulling straws or tossing coppers." The
lot fell to the First Division, under com
mand of Brig.-Gen. Ledlie. With such a
mode of determining such a question, need
it be wondered that an elfish fate turned
up of all the divisions the poorest?a divi
sion fitted neither in respect of its compo
sitipn nor its commander for the glorious
but exacting duty assigned it.
The hour for the explosion of the mine
was fixed at 4:30 in the morning of the
30th. At that hour the match was applied,
but, owing to the defective fuse employed,
the mine failed to explode. After waiting
some time, a commissioned and a non
commissioned officer(7) volunteered for the
perilous duty of entering the mine and as
certaining the cause of the failure. The
fuse being relighted, the mine exploded at
42 minutes past 4 in the morning. A solid
mass of earth, through which the exploding
powder blazed like lightning playing in a
bank of clouds, arose slowly some 200 feet
into the air, and, hanging visibly for a few
seconds, it subsided, and a heavy cloud of
?nd or Tamping
or CRATKK.
black smoke floated off. The explosion of
the mine was the signal for a simulta
neous outburst of artillery fire from the
various batteries. This had the effect of
soon silenciug the enemy's guns.(81 The
leading division under Ledlie then advanced
to the charge. The place d'armes was,
however, very restricted: no proper de
bouches had been pr< pared for the assault
7. I.ieut. Jacob Douty and Serg't Henry
Rees, of the 48th I*a.
8. "On the morning of the 30th, as soon
as the mine exploded, our fire opened along
the whole liue. The firing was from each
piece slow, deliberate and careful, partak
ing of the nature of target practice,' and
was very effective. Tfce enemy's guns in
front of the Fifth Corps were soon silenced,
and his fire in front of the Ninth Corps
confined to a battery on the bill behind
the mine and to one gun from another
THE EXPLOSION.
ing column, (9) and the advance was ma3e
slowly and strngglingly.
TlIE CRATER.
On reaching the site of the fort, it was
found to have been converted by the explo
sion into a huge crater 150 feet long, 00
feet wide, and from 25 to HO deep. Here
the assaulting column sought shelter,
though there was nothing to prevent its
rushing forward and crowning the crest;
for the enemy, paralyzed by the explosion,
remained inactive for above half an hour.
Portions of the other two divisions, under
(Jens. Potter and Wilcox, then advanced,
but they also huddled into the crater, or
sought rover behind the breastworks, which
had been vacated by the enemy for 200 or |
800 yards to the right and left of the mine.
Here tbe troops of the several divisions
becoming mixed up, a scene of disorder aud
confusion commenced, which seems to have
continued to tbe end of the,opera lions. (10)
In the meantime the on cms, rallying from
the confusion incident to tnfe explosion, be
gan forming his infantry in a ravine to
the right, and planting his artillery both on
the right and left of the crater. Seeing
this, one of the division commanders. Gen.
Potter, made a praiseworthy effort to ex
tricate himself from the disgraceful coil,
and charged toward the crest; but, owing
to want of support, he was compelled to
fall bark. It was now 7 a. in., more than
two hours after Ledlie occupied the crater,
yet he made no advance himself, and ob
structed the efforts of other officers. In
this state of facts, the more troops that
were thrown In. the worse was the confu
sion; yet Gen. Burnside threw forward the
black division to essay an at^ault. Pass
ing beyond the crater, the colored troops
made an advance toward the crest, when,
encountering a tire of artillery and infan
try, they retired"in grpat disorder through
the troops in the crater, and back to the
original lines.(11) After ^he repulse of
the colored division, all semblance of offen
sive efforts ceased; blacks and whites tum
bled peli-rnell into the hollow ^of the ex
ploded earthworks?a slaughter-pen in '
which shells and bombs, rained from the
enemy's lines, did fearful havoc.(12) Fail
ing to advance, it soon proved almost
equally difficult to retreat, though par
ties of lO's and 20's, crawling out, ran hack
as best they could. The enemy then made
a sally toward the crater, but was repulsed.
A second assault, however, shook the dis
jointed structure of the hapless mass,
which, without head or direction, obeyed
the instinct of sauve qui pent. Above 4,000
were killed or captured. Thus ended what
Gen. Grant justly called "this miserable
affair," in which, if success promised re
sults of the first importance,! it' would be
difficult to say that the preparations were
of a character to insure success.(13)
lee's diversion.
In the threatening attitude maintained
by Grant, there was one move open to
Lee that promised, for a time at least, to
relieve the pressure on his beleaguered
lines. This was to make a diversion in
favor of his own army by such a menace
agaiust Washington as would com{>el Grant
to part with so much of the Army of the
Potomac that offensive o|*rations against
Petersburg must cease. This measure was
now adopted by Lee.
The execution of this project was facili
tated not only by the fact that the i>osi
tion of the Army of the Potomac south
of "the James completely uncovered Wash*
9. On this point Lieut.-<*en. Grantsayr:
"I am satisfied that he (Get). Burnside]
did not make the debouchemeiii that he was
ordered to make. 1 know that as well as
1 know anything that I can not
exactly swear to."?Report on the
Conduct of the War, second se
ries, vol. i, p. 110. Gen. Meade says:
"There was a high parapet in front of our
lines, an abatis and other obstacles to keep
the enemy from us. Those obstacles should
have been removed to enable our troops
to move out promptly. There was but a
small opening made, by which ths Ninth
Corps, 15,000 men, moved Aut by the
flank."? Ibid., p. 35. See a?o the testi
mony, of Maj. Duane, Ibid., p.U&; Warren,
I Ibid., p. 83. ?
10. Meade: Report of tha Battle of
i Petersburg.
! 11. "A part of the colotfed division was
deflected to the right, and charged and cap
tured a portion of the enemy's line, with a
stand of colors and some prisoners."?
Burnside: Report of tbe Battle of Peters
bur*- ^ #
12. The most destructive fire came from
a gun in a work south of the mine, which
was covered from the l*nion batteries by
a fringe of trees on their front, that the
Chief of Artillery had required should be
felled. "This work having been delayed by
tbe Ninth Corps until the night of the
29th, it was then objected to by Gen."Burn
side that the noise of chopping woulj^alarm
the enemy."?Hunt: Report <f^Sief^0?per
ations. &
13. The report of the Congressional In
vestigating Committee finds chat the fail
ure of the assault was due to the following
causes: 1. The fact that the charge was
led by white, instead of black troops. This
is stated by the committer to be "the first
and great cause of disaster." 2. The fact
that Gen. Meade directed that the assault
ing column should push at once for the
crest of Cemetery Hill, instead of first
clearing the enemy's lines to tbe right and
! left of the mine. This is a ridiculous
diarge: for the order to crown the crest
iovolved, in its execution, the clearing of
the enemy's lines right and left, as much
as an order to Gen. Burnside to pass
through a door would presuppose his open
ing the door.
A very different verdict was, however,
{?ronounced by a military court of inquiry
nstituted soon after the failure. This
court was composed of Gens. Hancock.
Ayres, and Miles, and its finding is as fol
lows : f
"The causes of failure are?
"1. The injudicious formation of the.
troops in going forward, tbe movement be
ing mainly by flank, instead of extended
front. Gen. Meade's order indicated that
columns of assault should be 'employed to
take Cemetery Hill, and the ^proper pas
sages should be prepared for thofce columns.
It is the opinion of the conrt that there
were no proper columns of rfsaault. The
troops should have been formed m the open
ground iu front of the poiuf ?? attack, par
allel to the line of the enemy's works. The
evidence shows that One or irto*e columus
might have passed over at an# to the left
of the crater, without any previous prep
aration of tbe ground.
"2. The halting of the troops In the crat
er, instead of going forward to the crest,
when there was no fire of anjR' consequence
from the enemy. . . * *
"3. No proper employment of engineer
officers and working parties, and of mate
rials and tools for the'r use, In tbe Ninth
Corps. l
"4. Tf'at- some parts of the assaulting
column^ were not properly led.
"5. The want of a competent common
head at the scene of the assault, to direct
affairs as occurrences should demand.
"Had not failure ensued from the above
causes, and the crest been gained, the sue
cess might have been jeoparded by the
failure to have prepared jn dfcason proper
and adequate debouches thtoukh the Ninth
Corps lines for troops, aflfl Especially for
field artillery, as -ordered* ay Maj.-Gen.
Meade."^Re-port* on tha.$popduct of the
War, .second series, vol. t^in.1215.
Neither of these vasTUss, however,
reaches the jjpot of the qfJl. * If the read
er will study; carefully the passage I have
quoted from Oarnot, in Its application to
the character of the trofeps that made the
assault, he will have the real cause of the
?failure. Ail tba rest followed from that
primal evil. . , . j
(Coullnaa* oa nsirl ma)
Views of Comrades.
THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE is exceedingly gratified over the enthusiastic reception
of its plan to help the widows, as reprinted in another place on this page under
the heading of " The Solemn Duty of Married Soldiers."
A few timid advisors said: "You will make the comrades nervous." But they were
poorly informed. Men who stormed batteries are not so easily prostrated.
There is no reason in the world why careful preparations for the last roll call, which
we all know is inevitable, need depress any man's spirits. The contrary effect?peace of
mind and a contented spirit?is more likely to follow.
Following will be found some words of commendation from comrades:
Comrade J. S. Vincent, Cos. C and Iv,
13th Iowa, now in Oklahoma, writes: "My
wife is the girl I left behind me and she
is still with me. If 1 pass to the Great
Beyond before she does I want the way
made easy for her to get her just dues."
A comrade of Co. A, 7th Wis., wlu?
forgot to sign his name, writes: "Your last
move to benefit soldiers' widows is the best
of all. The National Tribune, under its
present management is gaining fame and
love with true patriots." The comrade is
requested to send his uante that we may
answer the question in his letter.
Comrade Charles Sellmer, U. S. A., re
tired, writes from Florida: "I was so
much impressed with the soundness of
your article, 'The Solemn Duty of Married
Soldiers,' and the great liberality of your
offer, that 1 make out aud send herewith
my Preliminary Report."
Mrs. L M. N., of New York State,
writes: "I am the wife of a soldier, and
goodness? knows I have no denire to be a
widow, but if such a trouble should come
to me I can see the proofs ought to be in
your office, so I fill out the -Preliminary
Report of my husbaud's service aud of our
marriage."
^ Comrade F. D. Ellsworth, Co. D, 100th
N. Y., writes from the State of Wyoming:
"I inclose my Preliminary Report. It is
just the thing to greatly facilitate the al
lowance of a widow's claim. Many
thanks for your t hough tfuln**** and kind
ness in taking charge of so great and im
portant matter. 1 will see that the com
rades of this place have their attention
called to it."
Comrade James F. Stone, Co. H, 12th
Kans., writes fiom Kansas: "I am glad
that Comrade Shoppell has developed a
plan for looking out for the interests of
widows. 1 have often wished for this very
thing. What we can do now to lighten the
burden of our widows we certainly ought
to do."
Comrade J. IT. Tunis. Co. A. 107th N.
Y., writes from New York State: "Send
me some blank copies of the Preliminary
Report, aud I will help along in the good
work. It is certainly a splendid thought,
well devised to help the widows. The
National Tribune is surely the soldi?*r'.s
friend?always on the lookout for any
thing that will contribute to his happi
ness and welfare."
Comrade John C. Harvey, 2d Minn.
Battery, writes from Canada: "Accept my
heartfelt thanks for the plan you have per
fected to help the comrades' widows. You
have taken a weight off my mind. I live
a long way from my comrades, but The
National Tribune keeps me in touch with
them."
Comrade T. H. Tryon. Co. I, l.riOth Pi.#
writes: "I thoroughly approve of this step
you are taking to insure widows getting
their just due* readily, ft is a matter I
have often thought of. but did not know
exactly how to proceed. Now you have
opened the way. It is a relief to me and
to thousands of others. I know a widow
who has !>een trying for nearly four years
to get a pension, which she is justly en
titled to, but will probably never get, on
account of lack of evidence that the hus
band could have supplied during his life
time. I shall make it my business to call
the attention of many comrades to this
matter."
Comrade Oscar J. Piper, Co. I, 12th
N. H., writes as follows: "(Comrade
Shoppell: Your idea is just the thing.
Make up the paj>ers as strong as circum
stances will allow with the end in view of
getting all widow* what they ought to
have?$12 a month."
Comrade John T. Williams, Co. D, 32d
Ohio, now living in Arkansas, writes: "I
am very thankful to Mr. Shoppell for this
offer. I am an invalid, and fear that I
must soon leave a good and deserving
wife a widow. It is a pleasure and com
fort to me while yet alive to place in your
hands the necessary evidence that will
make it easy for my widow to ftt a
pension." ? *
The Solemn Duty of Married Soldiers.
IT does not follow, as a matter of course, if a man
was a soldier, even if he is a pensioner, that it
will be an easy matter for his widow to get a
pension. As a matter of fact, widows' claims are
unnecessarily delayed, and in some cases never
allowed for lack of evidence, which the husband,
usually, could have supplied during his lifetime.
This important matter has been discussed, from
time to time, in the columns of The National Tribune,
and has been made the subject of orders by Com
manders-in-Chief of the Grand Army, but every
appeal heretofore was deficient in one essential par
ticular: no safe and permanent place was suggested
for the custody of the information.
- ' The National Tribune Co., in a practical way,
proposes to supply this deficiency. In a fire-proof
room, in its own building, and under lock and key to
insure privacy, it will care for such papers and infor
mation until such time as they may be needed, even if
such time is many years distant. The National Tribune
Co. is incorporated. Having a perpetual existence,
the death of the present managers of the Company
will not disturb the business or change the custody
of the papers. No safer place in the world can be
found for the purpose.
But The National Tribune will go further in this
commendable work. It will assist in getting in shape
the proofs and information required. The first step
for every comrade is to answer the few simple ques
tions that are printed below under the heading 44 Pre
liminary Report." This report will disclose the case
and enable The National Tribune to complete all the
proof required.
There will be no charge whatever for this service,
but it will be expected of every comrade that ha
will call the attention of other married comrades
to this matter and influence them to do likewise. No
other mteshmary worlr among romratfercan be pro
ductive.of more good. Many comrades who are not
subscribers to The National Tribune will not learn
of this important service if subscribers do not call
their attention to it. Extra blanks will be sent for
distribution upon request.
Comrades who attend to this matter promptly will
be taking the best possible step toward securing for
their widows the higher rate of pension: that is, fi2
a month instead of ?8*
Preliminary Report
To aid my widow, if I leave one, in getting her pension.
Not*.?This report is short, and can be easily written out on letter or legal cap paper. This course avoids cutting the paper. Be itn to
writs the names and dates clearly and distinctly. When report is ready mail it to B. W. 8H0FPELL, er THE HATIOBAL TSIBU1S,
Washington, D. C.
Date 1904.
Soldier's Name P. O
State 1 was in the service from day of , 186 , to
the day of , 186 , as a
(Give tank, also company and regiment.)
and was honorably discharged at , on the day
of , 186 . Are you a pensioner ? At what rate? $ per month.
(Yes or no.)
Were you pensioned under the old law or the new? ...
(.The new l?w is the act of Jnue 27,18*0.)
What wounds, diseases or disabilities, if any, are written on your pension certificate?
1 was married to. I on the day of.
lUive wife's name before marriage.)
18 , by at
((jive name of cleigymau or person officiating.)
At marriage my age was Her age was.
Is there a court or church record of this marriage?
Were either of you previously married?
Remarks:
(If remarks are of considerable leugth they should be written on a separate sheet of pai>er.)
AH About the New "Age" Order.
THE LAW OP JUNE 27. 1890, AND THE NEW
"AGE" ORDER.
The laws of June 27, 1890, aud May 9,
1900. provide for a pension, according to
degree of disability, from $G to $12 per
month for any soldier of the War of the
Rebellion who served 90 days and was hon
orably discharged.
The new "AGE" Order simply says that
any claimant who has arrived at the age
of 02, or 05, or 08, or 70, is presumed with
out further proof (and, inferentially, with
out examination) to be suffering disability
su&cient to warrant $0 a month pension
at age of 02; $8 a month at age of 05; $10
a month at age of 08 and $12 a month at
age of 70.
To Those Who Have Never Ap
plied for Pension.
We urge upon these comrades that
it U their duty to apply. If many are so
well-to-do that they do not need it, they
can apply the money to help those who
do need it. Under this "AGE"
Order an application can be made
that', hi most cases, does not involve ex
amination, which probably removes a fea
ture that was objectionable to saany.
Write to B. W. Shoppell, or The National
Tribune. Washington, D. C., and a proper
blank will be mailed you without cost.
TO GENERAL LAW PENSIONERS DRAWING
LESS THAN $12.
If under the law of June 27. 1890, as
construed by the New "AGE" Order, which
is given elsewhere, a pensioner will receive
an increase, he should write to R. W.
Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Wash
ington, D. C., and a proper blank will be
mailed him without cost.
TO PENSIONERS UNDER THE ACT OF JUNK
27, 1890, WHO ARE RECEIVING LESS THAN
$12 PER MONTH.
Read very carefully the new "AGE" Or
der given in another column. If it allow*
you more pension than you are now re
ceiving, write to R. W. Shoppell, or The
National Tribune, Washington, D. C.,
and a proper blank will be mailed you
without cost.
TO THOSE WISHING TO ALLEGE MORE DIS
ABILITY THAN IS PRESCRIBED BY THE
"AGE" ORDER.
Under the "Age" Order it is assumed, if
the contrary does not appear, and all other
legal requirements are properly met,
thai a claimant is hall disabled for manual
labor at the ag? of 62; two-thirds disabled
fffffltfrr nfiiH fr lii gi r" ?
at the age of G5; five-sixths disabled at the
age of US, and wholly disabled at the age
of 70. If the claimant can not show that
he has greater disability at these respective
ages than is recited above, it is of no use
for him to describe his ailments. It is a
disadvantage, in fact, because it will incur
the expense and delay of medical examina
tion. If a claimant is in fair health for
his age, it is useless to apply for more than
is allowed by the "age" order.
Any one, however, who is sure that he
is more disabled than is allowed for by the
"AGE" Order should write to It. W.
Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Wash*
ington. D. C., and a proper blank will be
mailed him without cost.
Widows.
Upon the death of your soldier husband,
apply for pension promptly. It is one of
the provisions he leaves for your mainten
ance. In most cases the pension will com*
mence from date of application. Some
thing is lost by delay. Write to R. W.
Shoppell, or The National T. Sune, Waslw
ington, D. C.. and a proper blank wtt1 **
mailed yon w ithout cost.