Springfield weekly Republican. [volume], October 21, 1915, Page 2, Image 2

About Springfield weekly Republican. [volume] (Springfield, Mass.) 1851-1946

Image provided by: Boston Public Library

                
2
THE '■CONTINENTAL ARMY”
A ‘‘citizenry trained in arms," referred
to by President 'Wilson in his last annual
message, has evidently appeared on paper
in Secretary Garrison's interesting project
for a ‘"continental army” of reserves num
bering, after six years, some SOO,OOO men.
This reserve army is a feature of the pro
gram that wilt probably he dropped en
tirely’ tinless public sentiment comes to
its support- The proposal will test the
real desire pf the American people to be
fairly well prepared for a hypothetical in
vasion. The public response cannot fail to
be instructive. Already it has been point
ed out that the reserve army of volunteers
would be.impossible to maintain unless em
ployers, throughout the United States should
show enough patriotism to grant employes
who may enlist a two months’ leave of
absence each year for three successive
years without loss of position. Difficulties
frequently encountered by state militias
with the employer class, in connection
with summer camps of instruction less
than two weeks in duration, might be in
creased bommepsurately with the two
weeks lengthened into two months.
Enough young men in the United States
could 1 probably be found to assure the
success of the "continental army” on a
purely voluntary basis. The two months
in a military camp for three successive
years would be attractive to them, if the
success of the riattsfcurg experiment last
summer be any guide. But the plan is
sure to fail if the volunteers could not
depend upon such helpful co-operation by
their employers as to safeguard the reten
tion of their jobs after the breaking up of
the training camps. The real test of the
system would come after the present war
excitement had died away and the world
had settled down again to a period of peace.
How much preparedness does America
want; and how strongly does it want
what it thinks if wants? No one desires
compulsory military training, it appears,
even for short periods; the voluntary basis
of natiopal defense must be regarded as
the starting point. Based on volunteer
service, the administration presents its
plan. The nation muat take it or leave it.
There is a bare suggestion of the Swiss
system of training in the proposed con
tinental army in that the annual periods
of military instruction are short. But in
no other respect do the two plans sug
gest each other. The Swiss training i«
compulsory for virtually all citizens. It
extends over 20 years. The total service
with the colors of the Swiss infantrymen
is. at the outset. 65 days at the recruit
school, seven repetition courses of 11 days
each in the active army and one of 11
days in the landwehr, or second Hue —a
total of 15S days, or five months and three
days, during a 20-year period. The Wilson
administration now offers a volunteer
training in its projected continental army
of six months, in the aggregate, during a
three-year period, with later service in
emergency subject to call. Those who
have been urging the Swiss system upon
the consideration of Americans must ad
mit that the secretary of war and the
president are offering military training to
those willing to receive it, in stiffer doses,
and in a nffich shorter time, than tha
Swiss "are accustomed to.
The Jjlan calls for serious study; and„
whatever its practical -defects may be, it
will force Congress to interpret as nearly
as it" can the will of the constituencies
which it represents in legislation the com
ing winter. The mere increase of the
regular army by 30,000 or 40,000 men
could not involve a revolution in our
American military system; but the crea
tion this proposed army reserve and volun
teer training sehool for men never in the
regular service, or in the state militias,
would mark a distinct departure from the
more happy-go-lucky methods of the past.
THE NAVAL PROGRAM
A material addition to the navy, both of
ships and men, at the coming session of
Congress, is clearly dictated by the mad
state of the world. There would be some
what less need if the navy department had
been sufficiently alert last year to the
obvious lessons of the European war and
had then urged the authorization of battle
cruisers rather than of slower dread
noughts. But the need exists. In pre
paring to meet it the Wilson administra
tion is perhaps shrewd, from a purely
political viewpoint, to advance a program
of naval increase covering not merely the
year to come, hut a period of five years.
That period will instantly be recognized ns
coextensive with the next presidential
term. The program, if the statement of
Secretary Daniels has President Wilson's
approval, therefore appears as a plank m
the next democratic platform. But it is
of urgent importance that it he under
stood. both by the American people and
by other nations, that this so-called pro
gram is limited and conditioned by our
American form of government.
Fortunately, under our constitution, it
would be impossible to bind Congress to
any such scheme as the authorization of
a definite number of ships throughout a
period of years. There can be nothing to
prevent succeeding Congresses, if happily
the present war should result in a vig
orous movement for the limitation of arma
ments. from diminishing the program as
now contemplated and diverting to other
and, in that case, more useful purposes a
portion of the immense sums involved.
The European war is itself an illustration
of the mischief that lnrks in fixed military
programs. President Wilson could not
better employ his gift for clear and fe
licitous statement than in emphasizing the
fact that the American government can
not be committed to a fixed program and
that Our administrative officials could un
der no Circumstances take advantage of
such a program to begin, in advance of
the duly authorized time, the seerht con
struction of additional dreadnoughts.
Any effort to establish a naval program
for a term of years, with a given number
of ships to be laid down each 12 months,
forces gt once an ominous comparison with
the German naval bill of IWJO. Those who
sat in the visitors - gallery in the Reichstag
on the June afternoon when that measure
was brought up for final action, may now
look buck upon the scene as of tragic por
tent. Tha law embodied the new principle
of a less ambitious measure which Admiral
von Tirpitz had forced through two years
before. By the law of 1808 the Reichstag
had virtually surrendered its power over
naval appropriations, save to increase
them, for six years. By the law of 1900
the jjeriod was extended and the number of
The establishment of a fixed program,
thus inaugurated by Germany in contrast
to the poHcy of the other powers, was from
that time until the outbreak of the war,
one of the chief causes of irritation be
tween Germany nnd England. There were
constant suspicions and charges, possibly
well founded, that the 1900 program and
the succeeding ami always enlarging pro
grams were being secretly accelerated. Ex
cept for this system Winston Churchill s
proposal of a couple of years ago, of an
agreement upon a naval holiday, or a year
during which no new ships were to be laid
down by either nation, might have gained
a more favorable response in Germany and
possibly have paved the way for better re
lations. As it was. a fixed naval program
having been established by Germany, na
tional pride was. at once antagonized by
the British proposal to depart from it.
It is true of the navy, as of any other
organization, that its development should
be well rounded and intelligent. Provi
sion should be made for ships of different
types, according to the manner in which
they would necessarily supplement each
othpr. if ever called into action. For this
reason is is proper that the navy depart
ment should have its scheme of the ships
which, according to its belief, should con
stitute the navy at a given time, assum
ing international relations to have re
mained the same. But such a scheme should
govern the annual recommendations made
to Congress rather than be put forward as
something to which Congress and the coun
try are to be inflexibly committed.
The disposition of the administration
should reassure those who have feared in
sufficient attention to military prepared
ness at the coming session. The proposed
new ships, particularly the 35,000-ton bat
tle cruisers, surpassing so far as is known
any other war vessels yet .projected, will
add greatly to the strength of a fleet which
if not wholly adequate is far from weak. But
whatever force there may be in the so-called
program for the four years to follow, will
depend upon Mr Wilson’s re-election and
his judgment in putting it into effect. In
that there is reassurance also for those
who desire an adequate national defense,
but do not wish to see the country stam
peded. But it would be better to lay the
five-year program aside for the present and
meet the immediate need.
WAR AND POLITIC®
Sir Edward Grey assumed for the Brit
ish government a serious responsibility last
month when he pledged the support of the
allied powers to the Balkan states threat
ened with attack by Bulgaria. For such
an announcement he must have had the
assent of his colleagues as well as of the
French government. For consultation M
Vivian! is said to have come to London—
the first French premier to visit England.
Russia's assent was a matter of course,
the only question being how Russian troops
could be forwarded.
The western powers, with command of
the sea, had a freer hand, and are able to
support diplomacy with an armed expedi
tion, but this very freedom of action gives
more chance for blunder. - Hardly any one
thing has caused more military disaster
than the dispatch of expeditions for politi
cal .reasons. Hbw far the politicians have
had the support'Of the military experts in '
these pledges may be questioned. Italy's
decision that all its troops are very much
needed at homo may be ascribed with
some confluence to Gen Cadorna’s skepti
cism as to a Balkan campaign. In France
the opposition of the foreign minister,
Delcasse. which may have precipitated his
fall, shows that opinion is divided. Eng
land is plainly perturbed, and the proposal
seems to command little confidence.
It is not the first time that the course
of the war has been disturbed by political
considerations, yet the British cabinet
is exceptional having at the war office a
distinguished soldier who is not a poli
tician at all. How much influence. It may
be wondered, has Lord Kitchener in the
cabinet? Did he sanction tlie Dardanelles
undertaking, or did he like Ixird Higher
at the admiralty merely acquiesce to W:n
ston Churchill’s demands? Is be respon
sible for strategy, or dc his civilian col
leagues settle that, leaving him to look
after the prosaic details of recruiting,
arming and drilling an army? He is a good
organizer, but the war Seems to have
done nothing to clear up doubts as to his
generalship. Nor is it at present possible
to judge how far the cabinet is free to
follow military considerations; some con
straint of generals by politicians is almost
inevitable in a coalition.
Germany is in some respects more for
tunate, The emperor is both warlord and
diplomatic head, and though strategy is
left to the general staff and diplomacy to
the imperial chancellor, they unite in the
kaiser, and Austrian. Turkish and Bul
garian strategy and diplomacy are dictated
from Berlin. The advantages are obvious.
Yet mistakes have been made, even under
this system. Setting aside the reports of
the emperor's meddling with the military
plan, as for example in the drive oh Ca
lais. under his control military influences
have had the upper hand of political con
siderations even to a dangerous extent.
Energetic internal resistance by civil au
thority was needed to control the Tirpitz
submarine program and sare for Germany
a few friends in the world. Even the tri
umph in the Balkans which has brought
the opposed diplomats into disgrace was
a triumph for German arms rather than
for German diplomacy; it was the forced
retreat of the Russians which paralyzed
Rumania and encouraged Bulgaria, to fol
low its selfish aims. But a balance can
not be struck till the war is ended.
Much of the criticism now raging in the
countries of the entente is premature and
ill-considered, and to some extent seems to
be colored by personal or partisan mo
tives. Little has been divulged as to the.
conflict in the French cabinet, hut It is
obvious that the personal .cliques which
.play so great a part ip French politics, at
first submerged in the general uprnsh-, of
patriotism, have, been asserting themselves.
In Russia the situation sinae the assump
tion of command by the czar is even more
obscure, though no weakening as to the
prosecution of the war has appeared.
In England, thanks to a rigidly censored
but perfectly nnbridled press, there Is no
mystery as to, the situation, which is, by
no mesne so black as it is depicted by the
tory press, which is working for the con
scription and seizes joyfully upon every
misfortune as a weapon against -the gov
ernment. Lord Kitchener has been the
special--target, in the first piece as
the advocate of the voluntary system, and
THE SPRINGFIELD WEEKLY REPUBLICAN• THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1915
in the second place because of. the censor
ship. Sir Edward Grey, who was loy
ally supported by the tories against the
criticism of pacifist radicals, is how at
tacked, not so much for any fault in Bal
kan diplomacy as because the glaring de
feat there, following the stalemate at the
Dardanelles and the ignominious Antwerp
expedition, gives an opportunity to assail
the government with effect and to make a
new demand for conscription. At times
it has almost seemed that some of the
oonsoriptionists would rather lose the war
than win it with a volunteer army.
In all these ways it may be seen how
impossible it is to separate war from pol
itics. In the nature of things England
cannot prosecute the war like Germany
With a single eye to-strategy. As the
sea power, operating on the circumfer
ence, it is the organizing force of the co
alition. It has to finance needy allies,
supply munitions, keep open paths of com
merce; on it falls the delicate task of
conciliating neutrals while squeezing them
to the limit, and of maintaining on the
periphery of the war the prestige of the
entente in the face of German victories.
It is a manifold task in which sea power,
military action and diplomatic persuasion
or coercion have to go hand in hand.
Mistakes are but they are not
mistakes which a purely military control
would obviate, and the record has to be
judged as a whole. The real test is the
outcome of the war.
THE DARDANELLES
Though Gen Sir lan Hamilton is called
hqme to report, his supersession by Maj-
Gen Monro must be taken as a mark of
his failure to achieve results; it gives no
hint, however, as to whether the unlucky
enterprise is to be continued or dropped.
To hold an inquest now on the Dar
danelles campaign is not very useful, but
after the war it will call for rigid in
vestigation. In this country it has at no
time looked hopeful, and the further it
has gone the more has it appeared that
a grave blunder had been made which the
authorities dared not confess by abandon
ing the attack.
tVhilc a quarrel over the question of
responsibility now would merely be an
other blunder, a frank statement by the
British government as to the circum
stances leading up to the attempt would
be of extreme interest. It is understood
that the campaign was undertaken at the
request of Russia; until it is known how
urgent that, request was, the question of
blame cannot be intelligently disenssed.
If Russia deemed such aid indispensable
and pressed the matter, its allies had no
option but to comply. Failure at the
Dardanelles would be a small matter in
comparison with loss of Russia's support.
There is no proof, however, that Russia
put the case so seriously, nor is any
adequate motive to be found in the con
ditions which then obtained. It is true
that during the winter the pro-German
party in Russia was said to have gained
strength, and the German press exulted in
the prospect of Russia’s concluding a
separate peace. But with Witte’s death
this movement seemed to dwindle, and
'when the attack on the Dardanelles began
she Russian''armies -were pressing forward
With new energy.
One explanation offered was that Rus
sia urged the allies to relieve pressure in
the Caucasus by drawing off a Turkish
army. But so far as the meager reports
show, the Russian army in the Caucasus
was not so hard pressed as to make such
relief necessary, and if it had been the
allies could have landed an army where it
would have kept more Turks busy. As
a military diversion the campaign on the
peninsula of Gallipoli was not a happy
choice.
Much more rational was the explanation
that Russia was in urgent need of sup
plies, so that the opening of the Dardan
elles was regarded as vital. Yet Rus
sia has kept going with the help of round
about communications, and it is believed
that the pressing need for arms and am
munition has been met by Japan. It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the
energy expended at the Dardenelles had
been devoted to keeping up a steady flow
of supplies by way of Yladivostock and
Archangel. Russia would have been better
off; its greatest pinch came when Japan
was keeping back supplies for possible
war against China.
There remains the need, or assumed
need, of impressing the Balkan states by
a ebow of force in their neighborhood, and
it may be that here British diplomacy
has its share of blame. It was. of course,
hoped that a resolute attack upon Turkey
would command the support of these small
states which had so lately been at war
with the Ottoman empire, but in this hope
there were serious miscalculations. The
threat at Constantinople *:t once dis
turbed Bulgaria, which wonld rather have
Turkey than Russia in control of the
straits. With Bulgaria’s attitude uncer
tain. Greece could not leave its rear un
guarded by sending au army to Asia; the
sanguine expectation of Venizelos fell
through and the influence of the pro-Ger
man king grew day by day.
Thus it happened, from a complex of
causes which cannot, yet be analyzed, that
Britain with French support, found itself
committed to a campaign which was from
the outset a forlorn hope, and which it
was difficult to abandon without disgrace.
It was undertaken with a rashness and
levity such as might be looked for in
Winston Churchill, who was then first lord
of the admiralty. England gasped at the
news, and nobody showed real approval.
Naval experts thought it a military job;
military experts looked at the map of
Gallipoli and pronounced it a job for the
navy. The navy undertook it, with no
plans for co-operation except the uncer
tain hope that a Greek army would help.
What happened is sufficiently well known.
The ships suffered the usual fate of ships
sent against powerful fortifications; the
loss was heavy, and the effect was prac
tically nil. *
More harm than good was done by this
attack, because the Turks had ample
warning to prepare for the land cam
paign to come. It was much delayed; the
troops had to be made ready and trsas
ported, and in the transportation there
were serious blunders which involved fur
ther delay. Troops were brought to the
spot and then , taken a way to Egypt be
cause it was tardily discovered that the
ships had net been properly loaded for dis
embarkwent. Nearly a month elapsed be
fore they reappeared on the scene, and
■ the meantime whatever needed doing to
complete the defenses of the Dardanelles
had been done. Possibly a wise strategist ,
would have dropped the matter there, or
have given the Turks an unwelcome sur
prise by landing an army where it was.
not expected—<Jreece might have been
more eager to eo-operate at. Smyrna with
the hope of. expansion there.
But an apny once landed on the penin
sula of Ggllipoli, a desperate situation
was created, in which it was equally hard
to get on or ger out. No great force was
at hand to. effect a diversion. Troops
were doled out as they could be got ready
nnd transported—enough of them to keep
the fire hnrning but not enough to make
it spread. The landing was effected with
amazing heroism and resourcefulness, and
largely by green troops; it would be hard
to find in warfare a parallel for the ex
ploits of the men from Australia and New
Zealand, who had their introduction to
war in this forlorn hope. To land under
fire on a beach bristling with barbed wire
entanglements and swept by unseen ma
chine guns, to scale precipitous cliffs in
the face of a superior fee. to lie for days
in a shallow trench-without sleep or food;
to press on when the officers were shot
down—this Is not work for raw levies, and
the way it was done is a splendid chapter
in the book "Someone had Blundered." It
has cost the British 100,000 men and the
French in proportion, and it has got no
where. We need net wonder that Aus
tralia, which has taken such pride in the
fighting, should now feel wrath and dis
may at talk of -the abandonment of the
campaign.
To continue it, however, does not ap
pear very hopeful. It's one chance has
appeared to be the prospective exhaus
tion of Turkish-munitions, and Germany
bos kept a careful eye.on that; the push
to open a road through Bulgaria was well
timed and seems almost certain to suc
ceed. Tactically the Turks hold almost im
pregnable ground, and near as the allies
may be to success by. the scale of miles,
their progress is to be measured in yards.
Even on the showing of the rather too
glowing reports of Gen lan Hamilton the
campaign is a stalemate very like that
in France, and a stalemate on that out
lying peninsula is not very profitable. for
the allies—if they must fight the Turks
they could find a battle ground where the
odds would he less overwhelmingly against
them. But to withdraw would, of course,
be a great humiliation, and to withdraw
without disastrous losses would not be
easy. While there was a chance that the
Ralkan states would attack Turkey, it
was proper to hold on at the Dardan
elles; now the situation is entirely altered,
and the continuance or abandonment of
this campaign is one of the gravest ques
tions which the allies have, to decide.
INCOME TAX AND THE COURT
An early decision in the federal income
tax case by tbq. United States supreme
court is desirable, in,view of the govern
ment's need of sure sources of increased
revenue. The , attack on . the income-tax
law is directed against derails such as the
surtax on incomes over $20,000 a year, the
failure to treat,. corporation? like individ
uals, and the sj-gterq. °f collection at the
source. The.primarj; principle .of the tax
ation; of incomeg assailed, • since. _the.
amendment to .flip 'federal constitution
placed it beyond question: yet the present
law would need immediate recasting if the
features of it under, attack should be nul
lified- as unconstitutional.
Congress has to face a difficult problem
in finding money for. an improved national
defense and it cannot know too soon how
far the income tax must be reshaped, if at
all. The court would cripple seriously the
government’s possible revenue resources if
it should outlaw the surtax. The grad
uated tax on large incomes is a feature of
every income tax law abroad and in time
of war the tax on such incomes is raised
to a very high point. In Great Britain to
day. the largest private incomes are being
taxed fully 33 1-3 per cent. In periods of
national emergency, a government must be
able to go for money, through the taxing
power, where money is to be found in the
greatest plenty.
There is no injustice in taxing the big
income on a higher percentage basis than
the small income. The small income is but
a short way from starvation. The big in
come, with all the comfort, opportunity and
. power it brings to its possessor, could not
exist but for the protection afforded it by
the state, and the men of small incomes
make up the armies which safeguard pri
vate wealth against enemies in war time.
The federal income tax was made a part
of the country’s revenue system at a for
tunate time. If hundreds of millions of
new money must be found for a larger
army and naTy, the Income tax should be
utilized here as it is utilized abroad in
forcing the great private accumulations of
wealth into an ampler support of the gov
ernment. The United States supreme court,
it may be hoped, will not hand down a de
cision that, would pile up upon the backs
of the poor the financial burdens of mili
tary preparedness.
BRYAN IN OPPOSITION
Public opinion will settle whatever con
troversy may arise over the national de
fense program of the administration. Pub
lication of its main features is not prema
ture since it is well to have criticism at
work early and the people well informed
on the subject before Congress takes ac
tion. Mr Bryan in this month's Com
moner assumes the position of an irrecon
cilable opponent. A few leaders like him
would soon develop the strength pf the
opposition; that,it should make itself heard,
and felt must be conceded by the most'
earnest advocates of preparedness.
The question calii for cool analysis g#
the situation of the, United States in the
light of the world's experience during the
present great war and of the probable
course of events after the war It is not
a question for the statesmen of dreamland.
No one is fit to eonsldsr America's prac
tical needs who permits himself to float’
off on a cloud of idealism, with the havd
emit, of earth’s realities lost to viaw. The
moat effective way to oppose militarism'
Is to meet militarists on their own ground
with analysts and discussion of the coun
try's military position and the probabil
ities of Invasion or attack. By this
method well-informed and cool-headed per
sons may expose the exaggerations of hot
heads and alarmists and maintain au
equilibrium of sanity in the solution of
America's defense problem.
But Mr Bryan is singularly 111-fittedi
for critical -work of .that character, Evi-.
dently he has -no. knowledge of the prac
tical question of ..national defense. Note
-his easy remark -jn. hia.. Commoner, edi
torials “It is, not a question ,of defense.
‘—this-country--will defend itself if .it is
’ever attacked—and if , that time evey
* ’comes the common people .will, furnish.
•the soldiers; those who tight when the,
‘country needs fighters, and work when
’the country needs workers.” The time
has gone by when people of common sense
will be satisfied with rhetorical assur
ances that the country will defend itself
if attacked. The evidences of the nation's
capacity for defense must be more tan
gible than emotional.
It is the‘ further weakness of Bryan
pacifism that" its criticism is mainly
abuse. Mr 1 Bryan is bitter;-he sees noth
ing but a raid of "special interests,"
•of rascally manufacturers of war muni
tions. in the demand , for more-adequate
deferise. This ime of attack will scarce
ly triumph in the country or in Con
gress as against a - well-considered and
moderate program. <Unless abler critics
than Mr Bryan appear to show the need
lessness or the wickedness of the admin
istration's army and navy hills, their en
actment would seem "to be fairly well
assured. »■*
COMING CONTEST OVER SHIPS
Secretary McAdoe’s speaking tour in
the M'est in support of a government
shipping enterprise startles those who had
supposed that the project was killed with
the virtual defeat of the government ship
purchase bill at’the last, session of Con
gress. Here is she secretary outlining a
measure of government ownership but lit
tle different from the one fought over so
bitterly in the Senate last winter. He
places special emphasis on the detail that
much needed naval auxiliaries could thus
be provided, and such an appeal to the
popular sentiment in favor of prepared
ness for war cannot be overlooked. Our
fleet is weak in the support usually fur
nished by a merchant marine in colliers,
transports and supply ships. The gov
ernment ownership scheme is a short cut;
it has the merit at least of “getting there.”
If ships are needed in foreign trade or
in naval operations, the government may
proceed to provide them instead of waiting
on private enterprise to chirk up its
courage under the stimulus of the sub"
sidies. which are proposed by the opponents
of government skipping..
Unless the opposition unites on a coun
ter proposal for the revival of shipping
under the American flag, the simple, di
rect plan of she Wilson administration
may yet be successful. It already has
real strength because it is a positive ad
vance toward a solution, whether or not
it be a solution that people like. Negative
criticism yriU never get the country any
where, and it is yet to be seen whether
the critics, of the Wiison-McAdoo plan
can agree among themselves on a positive
constructive program. Are they for pri
vate enterprise without government aid?
Are they for private enterprise with gen
eral subsidies; or are they for private
enterprise stimulated on particular trade
routes by more liberal postal subventions?
Ijt is, p?rbapv.a: weakness-of . the, op
position to government ownership of ship
ping Tines that it invariably demands gov- -
ernment aid for private ship owners. The
chamber of cominercO of the United States
revealed by its referendum last spring
that government ’ shipping was abhorrent
to the bulk of its members; it would be
the deathblow of private enterprise on the
high seas. Yet the same referendum
showed these business men asking for
$30,000,000 from the government''for a
fund to be loaned to persons orcorpora
tions as first mortgages on vessels. Sub
sidies they approved by a vote'of 558 to
186. Doesn’t the money come out of the
taxpayer, sooner or later, it may be asked,
whether there be government subsidies or
government ownership? And what is pri"
vate enterprise good for, if it cannot ex-'
ist w'ithout government aid in sotoe form?
The answer to these' pertinent ques
tions is tb be found in the inefficiency*
of government ownership and operation.
It is good business for the taxpayers to
have as much private ownership and can
trol as possible" in ocean transportation In
order that the best management -may be
realized and waste eliminated. Under gov
ernment ownership in any form, shipping
would be worse than Unprofitable to the
United States, for there could be ho
monopoly'of traffic on the high sCas. The
mismanagement of parcel post: since -it
was started a few years ago is » warning
against the further extension of govern
ment activity 1 In these lines, at least for
the present. Considered as a purely enter-'
gency measure last winter, the war Con
ditions furnished a special argument for
the government ship purchase bill, but the
new bill is not to be regarded as tin
emergency program. It will cohtemptate
a permanent establishment under govern
ment auspices in marine trinsportation,
and it will be exposed to much 'the same'
objections as a measure to inaugurate the
system of government ownership of rail"
roads.
The republican party has always been
divided on the ship subsidy question; it
was many years in power without re 3
habfliating the merchant marine, owing
to western opposition. ThC republicans;
however, might now be able fn 'Congress to
agree upon a bill providing for more 1 lib
eral subventions to shipping ii’ries carry
ing the United States mills.'’ Former Sen
ator Burton of Ohio, a consistent opponent’
of general subsidies as well as of govern
ment ownership, now favotfc’ ’the -postal
subvention plan, particularly in the RAutH
American trade. Private lines could be
encouraged in this way to' operate on
routes where our foreign trade needed ath- 1
plgr facilities. Postal' Siibvehtions’ are’ a! 3
ready provided for to a limited'exteht fth
der a law passed by Congress' nearly 25
years ago; the policy implies po‘ radical
innovation and its exteheio'h Hb meet the
needs of the present time could involve
no resort to extreme measure*. '
MISUSE OF A TECHNICALITY
Judge Hwtghy annulment of the federal
act taxing transaction* in cotton for future
delivery because the law originated in the
Senate instead of the Bouse is an ex
treme example of the control of a Judicial
decision by a mere technicality, *n»* MM
himself admits ,th> unsatisfactory nature
of such « decision,.and, eSfact ij».th«t first
t ■ l ' t v
: .
mandates of the constitution are to be
respected by Congress. The original bill
was labeled a revenue measure; but the
constitution provides that “all bills for
‘raising revenue shall originate in the
‘House of Representatives.” although “the
‘Senate, may propose or concur with
’amendments, as on other bills.”
The passing of the “cotton futures” law
was the result of a long agitation against
speculation in cotton, and the South drove
the measure through Congress in the al
leged interest of the cotton planter. The
act sought to check speculative abuses by
requiring the use of official grades, written
contracts, and a system based on actual
. commercial values in making settlements,
so that the market quotations would re
flect accurately the value of spot cotton.
The law authorized the secretary of, agri
culture tq establish grades from time to
time, and levied a tax of two cents a
pound on all cotton not so sold. That
the' act is economically sound is open to
grave doubt. It is singular-, however, that
congressmen so much given to stickling
over fine points of constitutional law as
the southern members should have allowed
the bill to become a law exposed to the
fatal technical objection urged by Judge
Hough.
The real purpose of she legislation was
as far as possible from the raising of reve
nue for the government; the purpose was
to check speculation and increase prices
for the producer, if possible, and the fed
eral tax power was utilized merely to make
. the legislation surely constitutional. It
was a . clear case of taxing something in
.order to destroy it. The bill was made
technically flawless to the extent that it
was labeled an act to Taise revenue and
that a tax of two cents a pound was levied
on all the transactions aimed at. The
originators of the measure, lacking for
some reason the caution of framers of
tariff bills, did not take care to have it be
gin its life in the House.
One can think of federal laws bo vitally
important to the country’s interests that
no court probably would annul them on
grounds so palpably technical, and right
here perhaps is the strongest criticism to
be made of Judge Hough. The courts are
not always consistent in setting up techni
calities as the basis of their decisions.
But that may be no criticism at all; it may
be merely a recognition of the fact that
judges are human and that, like other
men. they use their power for the larger
ends in view. In the present case it is.not
necessary to assume that the cotton fu
tures act was economically unsound, in
his honor's opinion, and therefore deserved
annulment; but it is possible to conclude
that he regarded the carelessness of Con
gress in disregarding an important pro
vision of the constitution as something
worth while to expose and rebuke. His
decision, consequently, may be useful in
its disciplinary.effect.
TWO NOTABLE SPEECHES
Stronger appeals to pure Americanism
in contrast with a patriotism cut in two
in the middle have seldom been made
than those coming last Week from an ex
president as well, as the president of the
United States., .These two speeches are
of .significance' in .that they demonstrate,
how little in fear 'of the ;poflßeaT' ’
of the Hyphenates are politicians of suifli
high grade as Mr Wilson and Mr Roose
velt.
The president has the more to fear than
Mr Roosevelt because he is still in high
public office and is to be, in all probability,
a candidate for re-election. Yet his
“America first” speech before the Daugh
ters of tile American Revolution, while
lacking the Rooseveltian vehemence, went
to the mark like a cannon shot. Mr
Roosevelt's Columbus-day speech befote
an audience composed mainly of Irish-
Americans was received with an enthusi
asm that left one in no doubt concerning
the quality of the allegiance of the Irish
race in America.
The probabilities are overwhelming that
similar appeals to the eitizens of any race or
nationality whatever would evoke demonstra
tions of approval no. less impressive. This'
country is a going concern, running under
its own power, and one might as well
.try to obstruct the ocean’s tide as to
stand in the way of “America first.”
Every new immigrant instinctively knows
this, just as every immigrant has instinc
tively known it ever since the Declaration
of Independence.
If these is a politician who thinks he
could make a career for himself on the
platform of “America second,” or “Our
’country first some of the time,” he should
try the experiment. The voting masses
are waiting for him.
STATE AND FEDERAL BUDGETS
Mr Ttift likes so well the budget plan
of the proposed new constitution of the
state of New York that he would recon
struct the federal constitution tn the same
line. Under the present state constitu
tion the governor of New York has more
'poWer in vetoing supply bills than the
president of the United States. For the
' governor mhy veto items 'in a bill as
well as the bill as a whole, while the pres
ident'can never single oift special features
of i supply MU for his disapproval. Nsr
would Mr' Taft have this power to veto
items In a bill- granted to the federal
’executive. He Tins more faith in the bud
get t>lan adopted by’ the recent constitu
tional convention' at Albany under which
the executive frames the budget and sub
mits' estimates to the laWfnaklng body
and that in turn may reject or prune
dowit the estimates, but never increase
thcfii, in its . appropriation of funds for
government expenditures.
A change of this character in the fed
eral government could not be hrought
about unless the constitution were amend
ed, but Mr Taft would indorse the amend
ment obviously needed. In this direc
tion, many believe, is to be found the
remedy for extravagance, waste and leg
islative log-rolling. In Mr Taft’s opin
ion, “among all the wild fads *nd nostrums
’in . recent constitutional amendments in
‘various states this , stands out as a shin
ing light of hope and a vindication of
’optimism.” It i*. probably the moat states
manlike adaptation of the ministerial ini
.tiative in budget-making to our congres
sional-presidential system that has yet
beep devised. Whatever the fate of tha
proposed constitution in New York may
be next, month, thi* particular project
wilj prpbably receive widespread sanction
amppg the states of the y«ion in the years
to come.. It is difficult to see any other
outcome if public finance in this country
is not to become the high road to na
tional bankruptcy.
The change, from the popular view
point, involves only a slight redistribution
of power between the executive and law
making branches. It cannot fairly be
called inimical to democracy. Indeed it
would increase both the driving power
nnd the efficiency of democracy because
it would concentrate upon the executive
head of government a direct responsibility
for expenditure which is now so widely, dis
sipated among the members of a legisla
tive body that holding anyone. to. a strict
accountability in elections is impossible.
The countries in Australasia whose gov
ernments are the most democratic in the
world, have the system of direct executive
responsibility for .budget-making.
That the change would itjyolve an ex
cessive invasion of the legislative field by
the executive does not appear. The veto
power itself is an exercise of a legisla
tive function by the . executive. . but the
constitution of the United States and
nearly all of the state constitutions grant
that great power to the head of the execu
tive department. The New Y’.ork budget
plan would in effect shift the balance,
mainly by transferring the initiative in
legislation to the executive and the veto
power to the Legislature. The executive
would gain legislative power at one point,
while losing legislative power at another.
Massachusetts should try this new bud
get system, and it should secure the op
portunity by a constitutional amendment
if not by a constitutional convention.
The success of the plan in some of the
states—the more the better perhaps—
would insure the ultimate adoption of it.
as Mr Taft says, by the nation itself as a
remedy for the confusion that now exists
tinder all administrations in financing the
needs of the federal government.
OUR SHIPPING ON THE PACIFIC
It has not taken the Japanese long to
profit by the withdrawal of the American
company long known as the Pacific Mail
from the trans-Pacific trade. The Jap
anese government now dominates the
transportation situation by virtue of its
subsidy system and Japanese ownership
of 430,000 tons out of the total tonnage
of 490,000 in the trans-Pacific service. The
last Pacific Mail steamship, the Persia,
was scarcely disposed of by purchase and
transfer to another flag when freight rates
from America to the Orient were raised
on Japanese lines. According to she United
States consul-general at Hongkong, the
rates from Japan to the United States
will remain as they were. This policy is
designed to increase the profits of the Jap
anese steamship companies and also to
discourage American exports to the Orient
while stimulating Japanese exports to the
United States.
While there is no inherent relation be
tween the trans-Pacific transportation
question and the Panama canal’s .ill-for
tune, it is worth while to note in this;
connection that the prolonged closing Of
the canal on account of the earth slides
has very seriously embarrassed all ship
ping on the isthmian route. Panama
, shipping lines are said to be losing an
.aggregate of $500,000 a month. This in
clude* the, extra, coats of .the longer routes
. they must now use. ae well-as additional,
port'charges and the loss of time on each
steamer under the present high valuations
of steamship property. Another source of
loss, following the increase of water
rates, will be the increased competition of
the transcontinental railroads. Steamship
companies blame the government, appar
ently, for their embarrassment, and talk
is heard of damage suits on account of
the closing of the canal, although some
time’ ago the canal commission ruled that
the government could not be made respon
sible for losses arising out of delays or
accidents in the waterway. With the
canal tied up and the new federal sea
man's act operating to drive American
shipping off the trans-Pacific routes, as
the companies charge, the general situa
tion at present is far from exhilarating.
Efforts to show that the Pacific Mail
company was hasty, or resentful, or vin
dictive, or unpatriotic in withdrawing from
the oriental trade, on account of the sea
man’s act. will not help the situation. It
seems an cstabHshed fact that the com
pany threatened to do this very thing ia'
case the law were enacted. The sponsors
for the law must have regarded the threat
as a bluff, for Senator La Follette at least
has seemed surprised as well as peeved by
so unwelcome' a development. Secretary
Redfield criticizes the company on the
ground that it did not test the new act
by six months’ operation under its terms
in order to develop by actual experience
the possibilities. The department of com
merce might have modified Hnd softened'
by legal interpretation the severities of the
language requirement for crews which the
company thought so obnoxious; and, as a
last resort, the resnlts of experience could
have been made the basis of a strong ap
peal to Congress for the amendment of
the law.
The answer to this criticism by the presi
dent of the Pacific Mail is not so con
vincing as it should be, one regrets to
say. The company was sincerely per
suaded no doubt that it could not operate
its ships - profitably under the language
rule, but the suspicion remains that, as
much in bitterness and greed as in cool
business judgment, it quickly accepted tha
very high, prices offered for its trans
pacific fleet, which the war. had made a
desirable acquisition in the Atlantic trade.
The sale was made very profitable t© the
Pacific Mail company; but the unfortu
nate aspect of the case, for which the com
pany is now directly responsible,, is that
the labor union supporter* of the law can
not hereafter be persuaded by the test in
actual experience that the seaman’s act, it
faulty, should be promptly amended. The
entire contingent of assailants of the act
are weakened in their future attacks on
the law by the fact that the Pacific Mail com
pany would not stay in the business long
enough to give the law a decent trial.
Tha logic of such a situation ia obvious.
Thq mischief done by the withdrawal of
the Pacific Mail, steamships from the
oriental trade cannot be remedied, it would
appear, by the establishment, of a new
American line, under private management
if it be true that the seatrau’« act is .a
handicap too heavy to be borne, yet there
is slight prospect that Congress will amend
the act so as to reassure capitalists in
the shipping industry in the face of a
strong labor union opposition .that will be
unconvinced of the faulting** of the new
j law. The shipping situation in the Pacific,
.