Springfield weekly Republican. [volume], September 19, 1918, Page 2, Image 2

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2
The Secret Documents
If any doubt existed that t.enine.
Bfrotzky and their associates were tools
of Germany it would be dispelled by
the documents which the committee
On public information makes public.
As a matter of fact, the bolshevist
leaders have hardly troubled to deny
the charge of taking German money
and it is interesting in the documents
now brought tp light to find that ef
forts at secrecy were inspired by Ger
man socialists like Scheidemann. who
MrveU as intermediaries and who saw
in a possible exposure of their plots
"a danger to world socialism." As for
the bolsheviki, their attitude has been
openly cynical. What if they did take
German gold? They never professed
to be patriots; they had their own
grandiose projects and to further
them would take gold from anybody.
Bribery? They were not bribed be
cause they did exactly what their pro
gram called for; if that fitted Ger
many's look, why let Germany pay the
bills. In that bluffing manner the
charges have been met in Russia, and
unfortunately with some success be
cause of the ignorance and fanaticism
of the mop and the paralysis of means
of communication through which the
evidence could rapidly be diffused
among the people.
So far as the outside world is con
cerned,--it was hardly necessary to
prove the perfidy of the bolshevist
leaders. From the beginning then
actions were suspicious, and honest
men were all the more turned against
them hy the' pretense that they were
playing a. deep game that would dish
the Germans. "Wait and see." said
their gdmirers. Russia waited till the
Brest-Lltovssk treaty was signed, when
the patriotic and intelligent elements
even among the radicals revolted.
Lenine and Trotzky had not the slight
est hesitation in selling out the al
lies ; but the peace treaty showed that
they were ready to sell out Russia, too.
It was of .course not what they had
expected; they had counted on being
able to farce the allies to make peace,
thereby getting better terms for Rus
sia. Failing m this, they had to dp
the bidding of their German masters,
and the documents show how ciosely
they worked with Germany from the
outset. ;
But the exposure of the details of
their negotiations merely supplies
proofs of what everybody knew from
their conduct: the real problem is how
to deal with their deluded followers,
and it does, not at present appear
how any multiplication of proofs
could help matter's, By degrees the
evidence may be got .into the hands
Of the Kussian people, but it is slow
work and not made the easier by
military operations. The important
thing is to win over the supporters
Of the' soviets: and the documents
should be useful for propaganda pro
vided the allies, are discreet in t.ieir
treatment of the local soviets, not
antagonisms ‘Them b’ut trying to de
tach them -from a-.corrupt and treach
erous government.
So far as,athy/ countries than Rus
sia. are ■ concerned; ; there will per
haps be most interest in the striking
bit of proof 1 that? the German gov
ernment was preparing war by June
8. 1914., several week*: that is, before
the murder o¥ the Austrian archduke.
It is a document' of high importance.
On that date mobilization section 421
sent out this notice: "Within 24 hours
‘of the receipt of this circular you
•are to inform all industrial concerns
•by wire thaf the dofumehts 'With
•industrial mobilization plans and with
‘registration forms be opened, such
•as are referred so in the circular of
‘Count Aon "VValdersee and C'aprivi,
‘of June 27, 1887." There has been
much circumstantial evidence of Ger
man activity of this kind, but this
circular of June 9. 1914. clinches the
matter.' it is a timely answer to the
vice-chancellor’s pretense that Ger
many, as the party attacked, has a
moral right to indemnity. This docu
ment Germany was at pains to re
cover from the Petrograd archives,
but a copy and proof of its genuine
ness were secured. Likewise proof is
found of the direct responsibility of
the German government for explosions
and incendiary fires in this country:
nobody doubted it, but it is of interest
to find the general staff of the Ger
man high seas fleet ordering such a
campaign as early as November 28.
1914.
If Germans in years to come should
ever ask why America joined Ger
many's enemies, they should be able in
their histories to find part of the
answer in this order for secret crim
inal warfare upon a nation with which
Germany was at peace.
Austria's Bid for Peace
It is not clear that any forward
step is taken by the request made
Saturday by the Austro-Hungarian
government that all belligerent na
tions enter into nonbinding discus
sions at some neutral meeting place.
Although Germany’s aim has been to
bring about a meeting of plenipoten
tiaries, the German government has
more than once proposed discussion
of a nonbinding character. The ob
jection of the allies has arisen from
the fact that the central powers
showed no disposition to commit
themselves' upon points absolutely es
sential to a Just and lasting peace.
Under these conditions to carry on
discussions would be unprofitable and
would involve some risk of dissension
in allied countries, a possibiUty of
which German propaganda would take
advantage. Germany's war aims were
clearly enough revealed in its deeds,
and the Brest-Litovsk treaties in
which Austria as well as Germany took
part, merely put into words what
students of the war had been able to
discern in the course of events.
; While those war alms remain un
changed in their essential character,
even though partially frustrated by
the growing strength of the allies,
there is no basis on which to begin
diecuseion. if Austria-Hungary has
abandoned it* war ata>» it has given
mo evidence of the fact, and «ven Its
complete moral reform would not
justify a general parley while the
war aims of the dominant partner.
Germany, are known still to be such
as the allies couid not possibly ac
cept. ,
Indisputable proof that Germany
Has nothing to say which would
justify even a nonbinding peace dis
cussion was given as late as last Fri
day by the formal statement by Vice-
Chancellor von Payer of the terms
which Germany would accept. From
the German point of view it may ap
pear a remarkably magnanimous con
cession to consent to make peace
without exacting from the allies any
further indemnities. For Germany
has always thought of itself as the
victor with the victor’s right to dic
tate terms, including the payment of
vast indemnities in cash or raw ma
terials such as have more than once
been officially promised to the Ger
man people by spokesmen for the
German government. To forego these
profits of victory may be for Ger
many a painful and meritorious sac
rifice, but it does not interest the
allies, because they have never con
sidered the enemy to he victorious
and have never contemplated buying
peace by the payment of an indem
nity. This concession, therefore, is
r.o concession at all.
There is. in fact, some reason to
think that the vice-chancellor's state
ment was aimed not so much at the
allies as at Austria-Hungary, and it
should be read in connection both with
the Austrian proposal which has im
mediately followed, and with the not
able recent speech by Count Czernin.
in which he said; "If we are to treat
‘the German interests precisely as our
'own . . , then we must know what
'are the war aims for which we are to
'continue to wage the war. . . . Never
‘would the races of Austria understand
'that we should prolong this terrible
‘war for the desires of conquest
‘cherished by a foreign state.” As ex
minister he could speak more plainly
than his successor. Baron Burian, and
this passage is plain enough. Moreover,
it is to be noted that while in the east
Germany and Austria are accomplice?,
no considerable part of the people of
Austria-Hungary has at any time
favored the German conquest of Bel
gium. Through 1917 the Austrian gov- .
ernment was using its influence to in
duce Germany to surrender Belgium,
and the Austrian emperor, as we know,
went so far as to promise to urge the
just claims of France to Alsace-Lor
raine.
To Austrian influence in part.may.
be ascribed the grudging and cloudy
statement of Chancellor von Hertling
that Germany did not mean to keep
Belgium, but to treat it as a pawn.
!57._ther Austria's pressure or Gen
Foeh’s victory has brought about the
explicit promise of Vice-Chancellor
von Payer that upon certain condi
tions Belgium will be unconditionally
evacuated is immaterial, since both
worked in the same direction, and the
pressure w:as of course increased by
the victory. The important thing is
whether Austria will consider this con
ditional promise a sufficient concession
to Justify further support to German
war aims. As to this the Austrian
proposal of a peace parley is not abso
lutely! conclusive. It might be taken
to show a belief that Germany's re
vised terms would serve as a basis
for negotiation, hut it may also signify
a disposition in Austria to press for
peace by using the discussions as a
means of forcing Germany into further
concessions.
Till this point is cleared up it is
hardly worth while to consider the
prospect that Austria-Hungary may
break loose from Germany and seek
to make a separate peace. But it should
be easy for the allies to make it per
fectly plain that it is not merely Bel
gium that stands in the way of peace.
Not to mention other requirements,
some of which touch Austria, the
whole policy of aggression in the east
in which Austria-Hungary is Ger
many’s accomplice must of course be
abandoned before discussion can so
much as begin. The Austrians are quite
right in considering Belgium an
obstacle to peace, but Brest-Litovsk
is another. Germany, says Vice-Chan
cellor Payer, stands by the Brest-
Litovsk treaty; if that is Austria’s
attitude also, a meeting to discuss
peace terms would be not merely
futile hut absurd.
The President's Reply
Ccmmendably prompt and decisive
is the president's reply to the proposal
of the Austro-Hungarian government.
There will be no secret conference, no
conference whatever in fact, for the
purpose of discussing the basis for a
negotiated peace at this time. The
president says more than that he
cannot entertain such a proposal; he
“will” not entertain it.
Mr Wilson's war aims were ex
plicitly defined in the "14 points"
speech last winter, and in more re
cent utterances; the central powerg.
or either of them, have only to sig
nify their readiness to accept tnem
as the basis for discussions to secure
the coveted conference. Austria-
Hungary, however, ignores the peace
terms which have hitherto been fore
cast by the president and Lloyd
George, and proposes that the discus
sion be unlimited in range and involve
at the outset no specific and tangible
admissions and concessions by the
enemy. In emphatically refusing to'
consider this suggestion, the presi
dent escapes a grave danger involved
in any peace discussions, whether
"binding" or "nonbinding," In the
present aspect of the military map.
It would be folly to open up diplo
matic discussion concerning peace
with no positive assurance whatever
that the occupied territories in the
west would be unconditionally cvacuat
ed, Belgium restored and indemnified,
our contentions as to U-boat warfare
conceded, Servia re-established and the
treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest
canceled. These conditions at least
•r» fundamental and must be fully
recognized If our government is not
to enter a conference with the issue
THE SPRINGFIELD WEEKLY REPUBLICAN: THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1918
of victory or defeat so much in doubt
that it might be determined by the
smartest diplomatist sitting at the ta
ble. There are certain conditions of
peace which the people will not leave
to the diplomatic sword play of dele
gates to a "confidential” confab in a
neutral capital, even if it were “non
■binding" in character.
The argument of the New York
Times that such a conference would
be perfectly safe because the delegates
of the allies would presumably enter
it with “definite instructions to yield
‘no point" is vitiated by the fact that
if the delegates were thus instructed
there would be nothing to discuss and
the conference would be a waste of
time. Such discussions as the Austro-
Hungarian government asks for would
necessarily treat every issue of the
war as an open question; if every
question were not so treated there
could he no real “exchange of views.”
If the Vienna government, on the
other hand, desires the cover of a
secret conference in order to make
concessions and yield contentions
which It dare not do in the open, it
has kept its purpose to itself too well.
This is too grave a business to handle
with whispering and dark-lantern
methods, and a government that seeks
to negotiate in a corner must not
wince if its sincerity is under sus
picion.
That all nations long for peace is
true, but America now has something
at stake besides an early peace. Slow
to go into the war, this country should
be slow to come out of it. until its
aims are measurably achieved. The
trouble with the present military
situation as a background for peace
making is that while the balance of
force will be decisive in any negotia
tion with the Hohenzollerns and Haps
burgs. there is an insufficient balance of
force on our side. They will surely take
advantage in diplomacy of the favor
able balance of the contending mili
tary pressures which still leaves them
in actual possession of Belgium, val
uable parts of France and Italy and
all Servla. and supreme in European
Russia. The tide of war has recent
ly turned in the West; let the tide
run its course in order that the
“mil tary map." for which great head
quarters always professes so much
respect, may present a more convinc
ing argument for a peace that wilt be
"just and lasting.”
Peace negotiations in any form this
autumn would bring the prosecution
of the war to a virtual standstill; it
would ruin the prospects of marketing
the coming Überty loan; for a people
half persuaded that the war’s end was
ir sight, and with no clear and posi
tive assurance Of the attainment of the
purposes of the war. would be a poor
financial support to their government.
We must have victory* before we can
ever hope to have a just and lasting
peace, and for nothing less than vic
tory will the American people burden
their backs and spend their blood.
Victory for us must mean power to
make a peace not for hate-extremists,
or- imperialists, or militarists, or jin
goes. it must mean power to compel re
straint even op the part of the victors;
to moderate insensate demands, to
enthrone justice—if that be possible
—and finally, in Lincoln's phrase,
“with malice toward none and charity
•for all,” to help bind up the wounds
Of the world.
Germany's Offer to Belgium
Although an official statement is
lacking, there is no special reason to
doubt the truth of the report from
London that Germany has offered
peace to Belgium. Among the condi
tions reported are the neutrality of
Belgium for the rest of the war. the
consideration of the Flemish question
which Germany has been pressing in
the pan-German interests: and the use
of the good offices of Belgium for the
recovery of Germany’s lost colonies.
Nothing is said of reparation or in
demnities, but it is promised that aft
ter the war the economic and political
independence of Belgium is to be re
constituted.
Moreover, London hears that it is
promised that upon these conditions
Belgium would be immediately evacu
ated, and in this lies the essence of
the proposal. The restoration of Bel
gian neutrality would protect 181 miles
of the western frontier of Germany,
cutting off an even longer distance
from the length of the western front,
and leaving to be protected only the
242 mi’es of the French frontier, plus
10 miles or so of Luxemburg. Thus in
stead of having to defend over 400
miles of front. Germany could con
centrate its strength on 250 miles,
a saving of over 40 per cent.
Of lts army of over 2,000,000 men
on the western front, over 60
per cent are now on the front
which would be eliminated, and even
if half of these were transferred to Al
sace-Lorraine. there would still be a
large force left free for operations in
Italy, or for completing the conquest
of the east.
Belgium was invaded to facilitate
German offensive strategy. If Ger
many is now definitely forced to the
defensive in the west and is too weak
to defend the old lines, the neutraliza
tion of Belgium would again become a
German interest just as it was when
tl:e solemn treaty was signed which
Germany broke in order to attack
France where it was weak. To with
draw from Belgium and put it out of
bounds once more would be first
class military strategy. On a greatly
shortened front the old static condi
tions might be restored. Maneuver
and surprise would be almost elim
inated. and the allies would be con
demned to frontal attacks on power
fully fortified lines every mile of which
could be given as many defenders as
could be used. Such an outcome would
wholly transform the military situa
tion. and incidentally it might post
pone somewhat the defeat of Germany
without which Belgium can have no
true independence and no hope of the
reparation that is ita due. The Bel
gians understand this perfectly, and
respite the censors they have heard
[of Gen Foch’s victory and of the ar
rival of a great American army. They
will not easily be tricked.
Austria and the German Chestnuts
It is much too simple to consider
Austria’s call for a peace conference
as merely a German trick. We must
not forget that the dual monarchy is
under terrific pressure from within.
By taking up the cause of its re
bellious subject nationalities the allies
have touched Hapsburg rule at a vital
spot. There is no room for doubt as
to the genuineness of the desire for
peace on the part of the Austrian gov
ernment, because the Austrian govern
ment finds it more and more difficult
to hold its people in line. Even out
side of the nationalities which are ripe
for revolt, the feeling grows that this
is a German war. waged for Ger
many’s benefit and for the further en
slavement of the non-German peoples
of central Europe. We need not sup
pose the Austrian government can
easily be detached from its dependence
upon Berlin or induced to negotiate a
separate peace, but it is plain that be
tween the external pressure of Ger
many and the internal strains and
stresses of the empire, Austria’s posi
tion has become nothing less than
desperate. Whatever Berlin may think
of Austria’s independent proposal, it
is quite certain that no prodding from
Berlin was needed to bring it about.
This is not to say* that the proposal is
an honest proposal. Berlin has no
monoply of trickery, and Austria-Hun
gary is still ruled by the groups which
conspired with Germany to force war
upon Europe There is some tenden
cy to regard the Hapsburg govern
ment as more virtuous than the Ho
henzoliern government, but there's
small choice in rotten apples. There is
no reason to doubt that the young
emperor is well-meaning, but the same
was said with some justice of the
late czar of Russia. The machinery
of corrupt government is too power
ful for an inexperienced youth to cope
with, and in the fifth year of the war
we find Baron Burian back in power,
and Count Tisza still dominant behind
the scenes.
There is not the slightest reason
why the allies should feel more tender
toward the Austrian government than
toward the German government.
Which was the leader and which the
follower in planning the war they
may dispute between themselves; what
concerns us is that they acted as a
unit in bringing it on. Austria, in
fact, was chosen, for strategic reasons,
to strike the first blow, and there is
not the slightest evidence that it acted
unwillingly; its share in the guilt is
not a shade less than Germany’s. Nor
has its conduct of the war*been on a
higher plane. Its treatment of Servia
was. if possible, worse than Germany’s
treatment of Belgium; it has bombed
Venice as Germany has bombed Paris
and London. In the Machiavellian in
trigues conducted in this country there
was no choice between Dr Dumba and
Count Bernstorff, In the plot against
Russia Austria took a hand with Ger
many, and it is still trying to get Rus
sian Poland as an offset to Germany’s
annexation of the Baltic provinces.
After promising, when the promise
seemed safe, not to send an Austrian
army into the Ukraine to aid in the
work of subjugation and plunder, it
revoked the pledge the moment an
army was needed. After talking be
nevolently about peace without indem
nities or annexations, thereby con
tributing to the befuddlement of Rus
sia, it' took part in the infamous Brest-
Litovsk treaties and so far as is known
it shares Germany’s present purpose
to stand pat on them. *
It is superfluous, therefore, to dis
cuss whether the proposal of a peace
conference is a German trick, because
an Austrian trick needs to be guarded
against with equat wariness. The dif
ference between the two empires is
mainly that Germany is pro-Germatr,
while about half of the people of Aus
tria are anti-German. This is the half
that forces the Austrian government
to make desperate efforts for peace,
but it is also the half which that gov
ernment's hangmen and firing squads
have been decimating. The allies can
not possibly reward their supporters
in Austria, whose anti-Germanism is
putting pressure upon the Austrian
government, by making peace at their
expense.
It would be premature at present
to discuss what solution of the Aus
trian problem would best serve jus
tice and a durable peace, but it is ob
vious that the allies are under a moral
obligation to see that in one way or
another the wrongs' of their supporters
in Austria-Hungary are set right.
They bwe much to the Czechs and the
Jugo-Siavs; they owe nothing to the
house of Hapsburg and less than noth
ing to the corrupt Austro-Hungarian
bureaucracy. The reformation of the
Austrian empire may be a staggering
problem, but a restoration of the bad
old order is unthinkable and until
Austria has not only renounced the
Brest-Litovsk treaties, but set its own
house in order, discussion of peace
would be premature. The root of tho
present world disaster lay in the fact
that German and Austrian autocracy
was able to use the peoples of Austria-
Hungary as vassals, and this must not
be allowed to happen again.
The Intelligentsia in Ruuia
We need not accept without further
evidence the sweeping assertion of
overwrought refugees that the Moscow
government has begun a war of ex
termination on educated people as
such, with the purpose of ruling Rus
sia by knocking out its brains. If such
a program were in progress we should
hardly hear that the famous Rus
sian novelist, Maxim Gorky, who has
long had a feud with the Lenine
government, ha* become bolshevlst
director of propaganda, stirred there
to by the attempt to assassinate
Lenine. But it is quite true that the
bolshevlki have not got on well with
the Kussian intelligentsia, and
strangely enough they have in many
instances shown themselves hostile to
education. "Strangely," because it
was the deliberate policy of the old
regime to protect autocracy by keep
ing the people ignorant. Reading
books, it was held, put dangerous ideas
into people's heads; popular educa
tion in other countries has had to
make headway against a like prejudice
on the part of privilege. In Russia,
the case was made worse by serfdom,
which was not abolished till 1863. In
the case of the serfs there was the
same motive for keeping them ignor
ant as in the case of the slaves in. our
own country. But whereas the Ne
groes were emancipated by a republic
which could only profit by their en
iightment, the emancipated serfs
formed a dense substratum in Russia
which autocracy did not wish to have
plowed up. The educational facilities
offered were meager, and the zealous
reformers of the I9th century who
tried to teach the people were apt to
get into jail or to be sent to Siberia.
It might be supposed that the
heartless obscurantism of the bu
reaucracy would turn the people in the
direction of enlightenment, yet at this
point democracy is not always logi
cal. An English woman who has been
living at Rostov-on-the-Don, recently
told how education was crippled there
under the bolshevist regime. "Forms
'in both girls’ and boys’ schools, above
'the fourth, were closed on the ground
'that education caused inequality of
'rank and brought one man above his
‘neighbor.” This feeling survives to
some extent in other countries; there
is a prejudice, for example, against
classical studies and culture in gener
al because they used to be regarded as
the monopoly of a privileged class. It
would have been more logical to draw
the inference that in a democracy such
things were made democratic by being
brought within the reach of ah. yet
one may still find traces of the old
dislike for culture of the sort associat
ed with aristocracy.
It is the natural course of revolu
tions. if they go the whole length, to
eliminate progressively their more in
telligent elements. ■ The intelligentsia
provides the detonating charge, but
is in danger of being destroyed by the
delayed but tremendous explosion of
the subterranean magazines. What
begins as the age of reason soon be
comes the reign of brute force. The
thinkers who had expected to. be the
leaders are pushed aside by the moo.
In Moscow a little group of intelli
gent if visionary men, has succeeded
in keeping control, but pnly by so ca
tering to the mob spirit that in many
parts of Russia densely ignorant and
wholly unfit men have risen to posi
tions of authority.
With each new paroxysm the revo
lution loses some of its all too few
competent men and gets deeper into
the slough for lack of leadership. It
has been Russia’s tragic fate not to
be able either under the bureaucracy
nor under the revolution, to make use
of its ’’intelligentsia.’’ Under the old
regime of red tape and graft educated
men found berths, but not an oppor
tunity to use their brains. And after
the revolution constructive work had
hardly begun when the violence of the.
mob began tq destroy everything. Old
Russia was fearful of an "educated
■proletariat"; the revolution demon
strates anew that the real danger lies
In an uneducated proletariat.
The Kaiser and Lloyd George
Of all living men the kaiser is the
least fitted to speak in terms which
would soften the hearts of Germany’s
enemies and strengthen what Ger
mans know as "the will to peace."
Yet his long address to the munitions
workers at the Krupp works is pub
lished abroad and in America at the
instance of the German government,
which must be suffering from the de
lusion that this monarch’s interpre
tation of the war might possibly make
the least appeal to the sympathy of
the American people. The kaiser is
as remote from us as Beelzebub, he
speaks no language we can under
stand when he talks of God and war
and "I on my throne."
Still less does he command our re
spect when he seeks to explain philo
sophically and ethically the war and
its fearful length to his tortured peo
ple as due to the envy and hatred of
“our enemies.” The confusion of the
worried Hohenzollern mind is revealed
in his pitiable attempt to reconcile
mere hatred and envy as motives for
the war with its prolongation far be
yond the calculations of the scien
tific militarism which is the super
trained understudy of religion in the
German state and social system. Boor
Wilhelm is forced to remind his peo
ple that the "Anglo-Saxons” are not
easily brought to surrender even when
they Teel themselves beaten. "Every
•one who knows the character of the
he says, "knows what
‘it means to fight them—how tena
cious they are.” A discovery this is,
indeed! What gives one tenacity,
what makes a whole nation tena
cious? Is it not the product of un
shakable moral conviction that one's
cause is the cause of right and jus
tice? Peoples that the kaiser per
force compliments for their tenacity,
alter four years of the most depress
ing struggle, cheered by almost no
strokes of good fortune in the field,
must be conceded to possess inner
forces of propulsion utterly inex
plainable by the base passions of
grosg selfishness, envy and hatred.
Whether or not the German peo
ple as a whole are capable of drawing
such an inference from the facts, their
ruler’s style of utterance has under
gone a remarkable change since those
eaifer, ardent days in March when he
staked everything on the favor of his
German God of battles and consigned
hie enemies to the tender mercy of
hi* good German sword. He had no
doubt then about the divine will being
In accord with his own. His battle-ax
had simply to fall on the enemy’s
neck, the war wouid be over, and then
hurrah! for a German peace. How
could a just God fail him?
That was in March. September
comes; every square mile almost that
had been won in the west in spring
and summer has been yielded again
to the enemy, half a million Germans
have been sacrificed, thousands of
guns have been lost and vast stores
of munitions left in the hands of the
foe; and this “supreme war lord’ —
how hateful the official phrase in our
western ears!—now plaintively que
ries in the presence of his stricken
countrymen: "We have peace with
'Russia and peace with Rumania; Se*-
‘vla and Montenegro are finished; only
‘in the west do we still fight, and is it
'to be thought that the good God will
‘abandon us there at the last mo
‘ment?"
The British premier has spoken on
the same day. Perhaps the finest of
his utterances since be assumed power
fell from the lips of Lloyd George. It
gives the lie to the kaiser's charge
that hatred alone inspires Germany’s
enemies to fight on for victory. For
there must be victory. Yet, said the
British prime minister. "Peace must
'be of a kind that commends itself
'to the common sense conscience of the
‘nations. As a whole it must not be
‘dictated by extreme men on either
‘side." "We shall neither accept for
‘ourselves nor impose upon our foes a
‘Brest-Litovsk treaty.” That is the
attitude of the majority of the Amer
ican people, and it is to be regarded
also as the attitude of the majority of
the British people.
No peace shall be dictated by ex
tremists. even on our own side. Al
ways the extremists, still charged with
passion and unable to restrain their
hate of the foe, have dictated a peace
that should serve as the hopeless pre
lude to new wars. Tile world has
been made to shed oceans of tears be
cause of their excesses in the proces
sion of the centuries. The statement
that peace must not be dictated by
extremists is the effective reply to the
kaiser’s insistent warning at home
that his enemies seek to destroy the
German people. It is an utterance
that should be remembered, reiterated
at opportune moments and finally
acted upon.
Effects of Foch's Victory
“Peace offensive” is hardly the word
for the epidemic of pacifism which
has seized Prussia’s allies since the
collapse of Ludendorff’s drive. Tur
key took the lead with an expression
of confidence that peace would come
before winter. Austria-Hungary fol
lows close. Cottnt Michael Karolyi,
independent leader in Hungary, de
clares that “decisive military victory
‘is a dream” and calls on Austria to
break with the Middle Europe scheme
and negotiate a peace on President
Wilson’s program. The Austrian gov
ernment does not go so far, yet Baron
Burian lays stress on the terrible cost
and bloodshed of a military victory,,
“if indeed this is at all possible," and
suggests to a deputation of German
journalists an exchange of views with
the allies: "Such a discussion need
‘not take the form of peace negotia
tions," but would be for discovering
the obstacles to peace: "Further
‘fighting will perhaps be unnecessary
‘to bring the nations closer togeth
er.”
Saxony, too, feels the new drift;
Its foreign minister, who last year
was insisting on the need of a huge
indemnity, now says: "The enemy’s
'means of success have plunged him
‘in a .kind of war madness which
‘makes conciliation impossible. Wa
'must hold out, but confidence is tot
’tering." On the political side Prus
sia has not yet spoken, but its gener
als have bluntly admitted that it is
now a case of “holding out," thereby
vindicating Kuchlmann, who was dis
graced for saying that Germany could
not win a military decision in the
west. Gen Foch's strategy is already
bearing fruit; this wave of pessimism
is not an arti'ul strategy and need
not give the allies the least alarm.
There is no evidence that the enemy
is ready to offer or to consider terms
worth discussing, but there is plenty
of evidence of discouragement and
alarm.
Baron Burian’s plea is essentially
for peace on the basis of reforming
the dual monarchy instead of break
ing it up: "The question arises, is it
’not a crime against humanity even
•to think of completely pulling down
'a structure which has become his
'torical, which certainly here and there
'needs improvement, but Is capable of
’improvements, in order to found a
'paradise of the future on its ruins." In
this may be seen the alarm created riot
only by the growing strength of the
allies, but by their support of the
Czechs and Jugo-Slavs. It is a direct
appeal, also, to the moderates, special
ly numerous in England, who feel
that a prolongation of the war for the
sake of an ideal reorganization of Eu
rope would not be justifiable. In gen
eral there is little demand for the
disintegration of Austria-Hungary 5s
a war aim in itself. If it could be
genuinely reformed, and made satis
factory to its subject nations, and if
furthermore it could be made inde
pendent of German control, few would
desire to continue the war merely to
pull it to pieces. But after four year 3
it is the same unregencrate Austria,
and the allies have in the meantime
taken upon themselves large moral
obligations to the Czechs, Poles and
Jugo-Slavs. The Hapsburgs must make
peace with their outraged subjects be
fore they can talk peace with the al
lies. The road that must be traversed
Is the one pointed out by Count
Karolyi.
The American Offemive
Gen Pershing's eminently successful
attack on the St Mlhlel sallefit came
as a surprise only in the sense that
we could not be sure that his army
was yet ready for so important an
j independent operation. The stage was
set for it, one more tempting German
salient was left, the Americans were'
on the spot, and tile advance else
where had temporarily slackened as It
came up to the Hindenburg line. The
most obvious move that could be
made, therefore, was to squeeze out the
last of the big salients, but whether
ft would be made could, of course, not
be known, Americans have wished
for it. but have not been excessively
impatient, having by this time come
to realize the importance of careful
preparation. That the Germans an
ticipated it was shown by their vig
orous reeonnoissance raids for some
time before the attack, but their vigi
lance did not prevent their being tak
en by surprise and losing 13,000 men
by capture before! the salient, could be
evacuated. If it is true, as asserted
in Berlin, that withdrawal from the
salient had long been contemplated,
this outcome is not very flattering to
the German general staff.
It is probably true that the salient
had become a liability rather than an
asset with the collapse of German
offensive projects, yet it would be
abandoned with reluctance, because its
surrender gives the allies a broad
front beyond the Meuse for an attack
in the direction of Metz, or perhaps
rather to both sides of that redoubta
ble fortress. The time may not have
come for the great forward sweep of
the American army, but after this
swift and successful operation it is noc
likely to be idle for the rest of the
season. A fact of great importance
is that operations from Champkgne
south are often feasible after the fall
rains have turned the northern front
into a quagmire. By the reduction of
the gt Mihie! salient the allies are
brought within striking distance of the
important railways from Metz, upon
which the German armies in great
part depend, and only 20 miles away
lies the Briey iron basin, the loss of
which would seriously cripple the war
strength of Germany.
But in whatever order the various
possible moves may be made, the great
thing is that the American army has
arrived; for more ominous to Ger
many than the loss of the salient is
the fact that it was taken by an
American army under an American
general in the first American offen
sive on a large scale. So far as can
be learned from the results, it was a
crisp and businesslike operation that
would have done credit to a veteran
army. It was a splendid beginning,
and it will hasten the end.
Gen Pershing
The selection of Gen Pershing as
the commander of the American ex
peditionary forces in France was
never seriously criticized. If there
were people who thought that certain
other American officers were equally
qualified for the task, —and of course
those people abounded—it was not
denied that the choice actually made
by the president was meritorious. His
previous record in the army had been,
excellent. He had very early, as by
his conquest of the rebellious Mores
ih the Sulu archipelago, shown ca
pacity to do rather difficult things
which his government wanted done.
It was his thorough “cleaning up” of
the Moro country that made him a
brigadier-general in the old regular
army .at the age of 46.
In Mexico Pershing showed him
self to be the ideal soldier in a re
public, for he obeyed implicitly the
instructions of h s civilian comman
der-in-chief and made military action
conform strictly to the political policy
Of the administration which employed
hini. Probably Pershing was per
sonally as eager to "clean up” Mexico
after the exasperating Villa raid on
American territory as any army offi
cer; hie complete subordination to
the president in that episode testified
to his possession of the first requisite
of a soldier. Governments so often
have been committed beyond their
original intentions by the indiscretion
or excessive zeal of their military
agents, especially in punitive enter
prises on foreign soil, that Pershing's
Mexican record showed him to be an
exceptionally well-poised and finely
tempered soldier —an officer, indeed,
whom his superior could trust far
from home.
The colossal task to which this of
ficer tvas set In France was so far
beyond the range of his previous ex
perience that no one could surely fore
cast the degree of his success. What
was certain at the outset was that
no available officer in the United
States army seemed to possess higher
qualifications, whether in physical
vigor, administrative ability, mental
keenness for military problems, pro
fessional training, or in personal ca
pacity to command forces in the fleid.
The appointment, however, was neces
sarily an experiment, as any appoint
i ment to such a post would have been
j under the circumstances, and it had
;to be justified by the course of
I events. 4
Gen Pershing has been in France
more than a year. The army under
his command has grown to great size.
No American general has ever before
directed the operations of so vast a
number of men. His responsibility,
| moreover, extends far beyond the field
command of the expeditionary forces;
he is supreme in every particular,
whether In the supply, the training,
th- discipline or the active field oper
ations of the army. He names the
corps and divisional commanders. A
large staff works under his direction
He, in turn, is under Marshal Foch,
the supreme commander-lri-chief of
the allied armies; but Gen Pershing
still controls the American Just, as
Gen Haig controls the British forces,
and he now has as much at stake as
the British commander In the success
of the allied efforts against the enemy
It. seems time to say that no mis
take was made in the selection of Gen
Pershing to command our armies in
France. His brilliantly executed op
eration in wiping out the salient of St
Mihiei and making 20.000 Germans
prieoncra of war within two days,
need not be given an exaggerated ira
porlance in the history of the war to
demonstrate that Pershing has made
good, so far as events have carried
him. In his character there is no sign
of vainglorlousness, of bluster or of
conceit; modest, yet strong in his faith
in himself, lie is direct and business
like. the clear-headed man of action
withal who develops with his opportu
nities. Gen Pershing at this moment
commands the full confidence of his
countrymen.
Munitions Plants and labor
A government that cannot safe
guard and control its war-making
processes at home is not fit to wage
war abroad. The president in dealing
with certain labor disputes in muni
tions industries, has determined that
the United States shall not have that
sort of a government. His letter to
the striking machinists in Bridgeport
is one demonstration of his resolu
tion; his order commandeering the
Smith & Wesson pistol plant in thie
city is another demonstration.
The strikers in Bridgeport had
passed all limits of reason and de
cency. Their recalcitrancy in refus- ■
ing to heed the award of the arbitra
tor, which they had agreed in writing
to accept, had led to a condemnation
of them by the prescient and execu
tive board of the international asso- ■-
ciation of machinists of which they
were members. "The integrity and
‘honor of our association is being
‘very seriously endangered by the re
fusal of our members in Bridgeport
‘to obey the advice and instructions ,
‘of this office to return to work and
‘to endeavor to apply the award with
‘the interpretation rendered by the
‘umpire and to try if possible to bring
‘about a solution to the vexing prob
lems confronting you:"
Such was the language of the ruling
of the head of their own trade union
which these Bridgeport strikers de
fied. They were a small minority, some
10 per cent Of the workers affected
by the award; but the disturbance
caused by them had been sufficient to
slow up the product on of munition*
and their conduct has already been
made use of as material of quasi
propaganda against the war labor
board and Its policies by the man
agers and owners of munitions plants
elsewhere who are hostile to any col
lective bargaining or any recognition
whatever of trade unions.
Under the circumstances, it is not
surprising to find Secretary Morrison
of the American federation of labor
approving the drastic terms which
President Wilson has given to the
Bridgeport Strikers. Organized labor
cannot afford to support- unruly or
anarchical elements in its own ranks,
for organized labor cannot even serve
its own ends unless it embraces Or
ganized self-control in theory and in
practice.
The ultimatum sent to the striking
machinists in the name of the gov
ernment marks a new stage in ihe War
labor problem’s development. The time '
for argument and appeal is past:—
"If you refuse (to return to work),
each one of you will be barred from
employment in any war industry in
the community In which the strike oCr
curs for a period of one year. During
that time the United States employ
ment service will decline to obtain em
ployment for you in any war Industry
elsewhere in the United States, as well
as under the war and navy depart
ments. tile shipping board, the rail
way administration and all govern
ment agencies, and the draft hoard*
will be ins ructed to reject any claims
of exemption based on your alleged
usefulness in war production."
The underlying force sustaining the
president's. ultimatum must be the
force of public sentiment. With that
sustaining him. the award of the war
labor board will be enforced, subject
!o legitimate appeal and revision, the
air will be cleared and the produc
tion of munitions for our armies m
France will be less interrupted than
in the past.
Public opinion, at the same time,
must condemn the recalcitrant or
obstructive employer quite as un
qualifiedly, if we are not to have eljacu
in war industries. The recommenda
tion of the War labor board that col
lective bargaining and the right to join
a labor union be recognized has been
called "fantastic” by one concern,
which refused to comply with it. Vet
what could be more "fantastic” than
the idea that this war can be waged
with labor generally held to a status
which denies absolutely the right to
organize? One might as well arm the
American forces in France with bows
and arrows as to try to bring Ameri
can labor to the support of the war
on the principle that if a man Joins a
trade union he loses his job. A vuiee
for labor in shop disputes over the
conditions of work —even that is not
inherently unreasonable, and those
who deny this principle evidently for
get that this war is not being fought
in the year 18T>0.
The commandeering of munitions
plants and tholr operation by the war
department must come throughout the
country, if their present manager*
cannot accept the conclusions of the
war labor board in principle. In till*
city at least, government operation of
a munition* plant is not regarded a*
necessarily a catastrophe. Springfield
has lived for over a century with a
government plant for the manufacture
of rifles, and the republic still lives.
The ‘‘Loyalty Contests”
With the overwhelming defeat of
Senator Hardwick of Georgia for re
nomination in the democratic prima
ries, the president scores for the third
time in the southern states against
democratic candidates for the Senate
who wer* classed as antiadministra
tion men. Mr Hardwick, after Mr
Wilson’s openly expressed opposition
to him, stumped Georgia on th« ”ruh»
‘her stamp” issue, declaring that he
was In the Senate to represent a sov
ereign state and not to "take orders”
from the president. It should be said
that tho senator made a consistent
fight to tho end as an insurreelo; hi*
final appeal to the old states’ rights