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VOL.. XXXal.... H .4. M NT..S N A M E 2 .I, 1 PRI K IV.. . . voE XXXl,--NO 2,2& HELENA, MONTANA. SUNDAY -MORNING, 8PTEMBBR 24l, 1891 PRICE FIVE CBNT I EVER TO THE FRONT I ALWAYS IN THE LEAD!_L 41- HARRIS BROTHERS." We beg leave to inform our .friends that we are finally settled in our new quarters and cordially invite all to visit us. We think a visit will bear out our claim ta.at we have the finest male 'outfitting establishment in the west, perfect in its appointments, and ex cellently arranged for light and convenience. The lower floor is filled with oak and plate glass counters and cases, being entirely the work of Helena mechanics. The upper floors are devotedto the clothing, show and sales room and to the manufacturing depart ment, now a hive of industry, with orders ahead far in excess of our ability to supply. EVER TO THE FRONT! OUR OFFERING. OUR TERMS! Those who know us will verify the truth of albove motto be- DEALER'S PRICE, - - $55.00 ing correctly applied to us. We are the TIREJLESS TOIL- OUR STRAIGHT PRICE, - $50.00 ERS FOR TRADE. We not only work for it but encour age by division of profits end a system of premiums which we OR, hope will build up our business to a point where competitors With a $25.00 purchase, - $37.50 cannot reach. With a $50.00 purchase,- - $25.00 STANDARD With a $75.00 purchase, - $12.50 With a $100.00 purchase, - FREE OUR ARGUMENT!11 Our stock of machines is limited, and those who expect to de iSE W IN G rive benefit must jiake early purchase. Our stock is the most The premium is a standard Sewing Machine, equal in make complete in the city, especial attention having been paid to and material to any of the machines which have created mill- Children's Clothing. Three-piece Suits, Vested Suits, Long ionaires. They are all guaranteed machines, parts supplied Pants School Suits, and every style worn by by clalers and warranted for three years. The machine's merits were fully investigated before we YO TH OR BOY adopted it for this project. 4llll, l ý 119 MAINSTREET HARRIS BROTHE2 MAIN STREET STOCK. - CK-GOOD LL, IXTURBSI My entire stock, also good will and fixtures will be sold at a great sacrifice. Enquire on premises or at HARRIS BROTHERS, 119-121 NORTH MAIN STREET. B. HARRIS, 121 SOUTH MAIN. I u u • I IN l I I l .. FIELD MARSHAL COUNT .0N MOLTKE WRITTEN FOR THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT. BY GEN. VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K. P., G. C. B.. Commanding the Forces in Ireland. [FOURTH PAPER.] BY AND BY THROUGH THE NECEB cities of the position which the army occupied, and still occupies, in the Prussian kingdom, it was, and it may be presumed it will be in the future, necessrry during a war-failing a Frederick the Great as king-to keep in the background the real commander disguised under the title of chief of the staff, and to put the king prominently forward as if he occupied the position in reality as well as in name. This was the position in 1866, when it is very doubtful if even the name of Von Moltke was known to the rank and file of the army. Yet he was the comman der, the great strategist who planned the operations and directed their execution. He, in his turn, was wise enough to keep this a secret as long as he could, and to ac caept with all loyalty the second position in an army of which he was, in all but the name, the actual commander. In other epochs far larger hosts of armed men have gone forth to conquer than the armies which invaded Austria in 1866, or France in 1870. ]ut in thos6 hosts of for met ages the commander was the central figure around which all rallied, as it were. His name was a watchword, a talisman among them. It was his magnetic influ ence that kept his followers in heart and gave life and soul to the mass of men he personally led. When he was able to in epire them with his own enthusiasm, vio tory followed his standard. DIen like Alexander, Hannibal, Cemsar, Tarenne, Marlborough and Napoleon conjured with their names. The ighting value of an army with which the great' COrsican was present and that of one com masuded by a Soult or a Marmoont was very different. This was due, not only to the fact that it was more ably directed, but that the influence of Napo lcon's name sent the blood of those who fought under him coursine through their veinr more rapidly. They believed him to be invincible, and his great name so took the imaginatilon by storm that it almost made heroes of even the weak both in body and in spirit. I know of no more striking renent example of the influenoce which a name can exercise over an army than the magic effect which McClellan's name had upon those beaten armies which came struamina back toward the Potomac In 18.2. His appointment to supreme com niamid at that monrenit saved Washington, for st, ugae such renewed lihfe and coherence to those dlsi·irltedt mobs of armed men that he was able to nmake them stand up successfully against Lee at Antietartii. In this particular instance it is curious to note that this confidence and belief in McClellan as a general was based upon no victories, for he had won none. At the beginning of the confederate war the north felt they wanted a hero, a figure head, a military idol to worship, and they set up McClellan. They styled him "the young Napoleon," and they insisted that he was a great gen eral. The system of advertising had be come a high art with them, and they were able to make the army believe he was what they advertised him to be-the next best thing to his being so in realty. Moltke never put himself forward, and outwardly deferred always to the wishes and opinions of his master. But, as a mat ter of fact, his word was law in all mili tary matters, and no one dared dispute with him on any point bearing upon the strategy of the campaign or the tactios of any battle. He was a new development in the species "general." Here was a man who had never commanded a company, battalion, or any larger body of soldiers in action up to the day when he was called upon to direct all the operations of a war stupendous in its magnitude. The move ments of masses greater in nuninbers than any of the armies which Napoleon in his day had led to victory were confided to this "cabinet" soldier, who himself "had never set a squadron in the field." The most remarkable point about Von Moltke's strategy, especially in 1870-71, is the self-restraint he imposed upon himself in leaving his subordinate commanders such free scope, each within his own imme diate sphere of action. He could not, he dared not have adopted this policy in the field with the ordinary run of even German generals hhd he not previously ptrained them and their staff officers to the responsi bilitles the new condition of things would necessarily impose upon them. In doing this he provided Germany with men capa ble of taking his place as military advisers to the empire. A far-seeing military instinct had warned him of the changed circumstances under which war would be waged when whole nations took the field, divided into many maneuvering armies, each army a complete unit in itself. He had taught his generals self-reliance and to work, as it were, in a team,'each not only playing his own hand, but always looking out for how, when and where he could help his brothers in command. Eminently practical and businesslike In all he did, the training of these generals and staff officers had been for years his special aim. They were Impressed with the lesson that tactical suceues, wherever the enemy should be encountered, was of the first conlsequence, and came before all strategical considerations, so far as theyv the subordinate comirnnders-were con eerned. "March to the sound of the guns under all clrcumstances, and so secure the overthrow of whatever eneemy your col league to the right or left may be engaged with." But this policy, this system of strategy would have been disastrous, if not impossible, unless there were trained leoad erB and a practical staff to maneuver and to move large bodies of troops in presence of the enemy to the best possible tactical advantage. The objeotive point of Moltke's strategy was not the important fortresses or positions. or even the capital of the enemy, but the enemy's field armies. Destroy them first, and the other objects of the war fall as a matter of course into your possession. Such was the theory of his strategy, and for years he had educated men to be the leaders capable of carrying it out successfully. No man can be a great general or or ganizer of armies for victory who is always looking back, content to prepare his army to meet the tactics of any previous war, no matter how recent. The wise general peers far ahead, well into the distance, so that he may be able to picture mentally what war will be in the future. He studies not only the inventions and most recent discovgries in applied science, and the improvements in mechanical implements of the day, but he catches eagerly at those which he sees loom ing in the distance. He questions him self how all these can be most usefully en listed and most promptly and efficaciously adopted in his army. He is eager to adopt new ideas. The man who is now content to merely drill and train his army for a system of warfare even as recent as that waged in 1870, with the breech-loading guns and rifles and black powder of that epoch, may be an admirable sergeant-major but he is not even a good peace general,and he can never be a good leader. Thearmy upon which he expends so much care and energy, when tested by actual warfare, will be found wanting in fighting efficiency. To excel, the general must be ahead of his adversary in tactical knowledge, and in the application of modern inven tions to tactics; and those he com mands, the rank and file, as well as the of ficers, must be well trained in the new sys tem of tactics he has thus elaborated to meet this new condition of things. He must train his army, and prepare it tacti cally for a warfare to be waged with high explosives and magazine arms, and in which balloons, the electric light and cycles are made use of. Masses of cavalry, sup ported by large bodies of mounted infantry will be in acotion, and heavily engaged for days, perhaps for a week or fortnight, be !fore the main body of the army can reach the front, Of the two contending forces, that which has been best practiced at such work and in night maneuvers, all other things being equal, will most surely win. The victories of Prussia in 1816 and of Germany in 1870 were, however, very differ ent affairs from the victories of Frederick the Great. In these latter the individuality of the king-general in command entered as largely as that of Napoleon did at Austerlitz. Frederick's battles were won by Frederick, but who could say that Koniggrata or Gravelotte or Sedan were won by Frederick William? Still stranger, who could say that they were won by Moltke? And still more strange, it would be impossible to say by what individual general they were won. It is, however, quite certain that for these Germany is much indebted to Moltke. He it was who took care that the great military ma chine was always in working order, and the ssrmy maintained in the highest state of efficiency, the men well drilled, and, above all things, highly trained in all war opera tions. He took care that it was no fuss and-feathers and gold lace atmy, devoted to theatrioal objects, but a serious, solemn nmachine, constructed to Perform certain national work. He did not train it with a view to amuse idle people, but I, iltht for tihe king in defense of his klngdom, and for the attainment of the natu ral aspirations of the great German rioo. When shall we have a similarly efficient little army, which, as far as it goes, oaght to be and can be made the finest little fighting machine in the world? When shall we have thoroughly professional offi cers, devoted to training their men to the rough usages and operations of real war, rather than to the hurdygurdy. marching pa t side of a soldier's life in peace? When shhll we be more absorbed in the serious business of the profession than in the fat condition of our horses, and in the bright polish of steel homes and collar chains? Are we never to have officers more bent upon the study of war and upon training their men to be fighting soldiers than they are upon their own amusements? There was nothing of the enterprising, pushing showman about Moltke. He made no appeals to sentiment. Like Wellington, he knew his duty, and he was content to do it righteously, neither looking to the right nor the left. He pulled the strings, and made his marionettes dance as he wished, but he never himself came before the curtain. His one object was to make the Pruseian" army a perfect fikhting ma chine, and when perfect to launch it on ob jects well thought out in all their possible phases. Bazaine, MoMahon and Montauban were no matches for Moltle and the men he had trained and educated, Chanzy was an able general; and had he been listened to the wild and absurd war schemes of Gambetta would never have been embarked in. It was Moltke's strategetio skill and far seeing combination which won for Prussia the great results achieved in 1866 and in 1870. In seven weeks he forced Austria to sue for peace, and in about six months he broke up Louis Napoleon's brand new em pire. In both instances he made the world realize that if a nation is determined to have an efficient army something more is necessary than sentiment and traditions of victory. As a nation we have lived too long upon our former renown and our past reputation for military prowess. It is convenient for the rival political sides in the system of party government under which we live to boast during peace of strength and security because of brilliant victortes won for us by Marlborough and Wellington under en tirely different conditions from those of to. day. The British subject likes to be soothed by boastful expressions of the strength and the might of our army and navy. It is a cheap and easy process that commends itself to the taxpayer, and to the politician whose chief aim is to flatter the taxpayer's vanity. Moltke knew the true value of military and national sentiment. He rightly es timated its mighty importance when backed up by true military efficiency, which is now almost synonymous with per fect preparation. But none knew better than he did how utterly unreal and worth less and dangerous is all such sentiment that rests only on tradition, on the deeds achieved many generations before by an army that had been created and seriously trained under the pressure of war by a Marlborough, a Moore or a Wellington deeds that cannot be achieved by an army that has been trained theoretically, and, as it were, for an open air ballet rather than for war. lentiment unbacked by milita:ry efficiency is like faith without words in religion. Moltke is an extraordinary instance of a man who made hitmiself a master of modern war by study and by force of thought and character. His industry was indefatigable, his untiring application and attention to details was as remarkable as his modesty, reticence and inflexibility of purpose. in strategy he was entirely of Napoleon's schlool, and in forethought and skill he was nearly that great master'sequal. His powerrs were never tried, however, by any great reverses, by any serious defeat, that oru oial test of the highest form of military genius. But a fertile brain enabled him. seemingly to foresee every possible combi nation against him, and without doubt he was always prepared for failure, He left nothing unprovided for, and he certainly succeeded in eliminating chance occur rences from his calculations, as far as this can ever be done in war, or in any human affairs. In the field sunooess may be said to be the offspring of forethought. He possessed to a remarkable degree the war gift of sleeping well and easily. He could at any time take eight hours' sleep at a stretch. He had a good ear, and was as fond of music as Frederick the Great, and of oatmeal porridge as any poor Highland er. He was a very gooe linguist, an excel lent surveyor and topographer, and a clever artist in water colors. He played chess well and was an accomplished swordsman. He once asked an English officer how came it that Lord Wolseley objected so strongly to the proposed Channel tunnel, when the whole French army might be killed with sticks if it ventured to debouch from it. It was then explained to him that, if ever made, it must the by a company bent on money making, and could never be a purely government affair; that our com mercial interests and notions of liberty oausedus to live in such a state of military unpreparedness that at any moment an ene my might possess himself of our end of the tunnel by the sudden descent of even a few thousand men near Dover. As soon as he took this in, he exclaimed. "Then it must never be." Upon another occasion, over hearing some of his officers criticizing one of our small wars, he turned round and said, "Gentlemen you must remember that when the English make War their officers are not carried to the front in first class railway carriages." Referring to himself and the part he took in his country's wars, he says: "I have done my duty and filled my position, I hope hon orably, like all my comrades-nothing more. God's almighty power has guided the victorious flight of the Prussean eagle; the bravery of her army, the caution of her leaders, as well as my plans, are only the instruments of his will, and when I hear the boundless laudations which the public heap on mue, the thought always reours, how would it have been if success, the un paralleled success, had not crowned our efforts? Would not the unmerited praises of so many ignorant critics have become just so much unmerited blame?" Reputation came to him late in life; but as the best and hardest timber is slowest of growth, his fame will last the longer. Loyalty to his king and devotion to his country constituted his proud rule of life. He could not-indeed, he would not-sep arato those two ideas. To him they were as inseparable asn is the love of England from devotion to England's queen in the heart of every British gentleman. This feeling was the foundation of German unity, of German success; and on it Moltke built up the superstructure of absolute and complete preparedness for war. The rewards he received from his king and country rendered him well off in his declining days. After the war of 1860 he was given about £30.000, and after that of 1870 a further sutu of about £40,000. With this he purchased it landed estate. I have often been much struck by the fact that, Sedan excepted, none of the battles of 1870 came off as Moltke intended. In some iostoanoos they actuallygsame off a day before he had intended or wished to fight. Weissomburg, Wort h, Spicheren, Colombey, Nouilly and Manre a Tour aill were brought on without orders froms Moltke by the initiation of subor diinate commandoers. Those battles were not designed by him, nor indeed by any of the gesnerals in command of the three large Geroman armies. This is one of the inevita ble results of the modern use of very large armits. War always was, always must be; the able manipulation by the oommander of his im portant subordinates, and the playing upot the feelings, the wants, the very prejudices, as well as the ambitions and passions, of the rank and file. You have to find out what your army is daily thinking dft and lead that thought along the line you Wish it to travel. Count Moltke was a voluminous writer, and all intelligent readers, as well as sol diers, will enjoy much that he published. His private letters are fascinating, full of pathos, and admirable descriptions of all he saw in foreign countries. To English soldiers his work on the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-9 is perhaDs best known. An English translation of it appeared during the Crimean war, and, although it may be somewhat wanting in imagination, I can well remember the great impression it made upon me thdn. It is replete with useful criticism, and one is struck with the extreme care with which the topography of the theatre of war and of each battlefield is described. In this he closely resembled General Charles Gordon, one of whose most remarkable characteristics-and to which he owed much of his military success-was his intimate knowledge of the country where he operated. Moltke is said to have himself written mush of the official staff history of the. 1870-71 war. It has often been said that had he not devoted his life to strategy and the construction of a machinery for the most rapid mobilization of an army, this great soldier, chary of speech, would have* been an eminent writer on many subjects. Running through all he wrote, there is a calm moderation and an even justice, from which all exaggeration, all heated super latives are carefully eliminated. There is commonly a false surprise ex pressed when any general of ability is found who can write well. Why this should be I know not, for most of the great com manders wrote remarkably well. King David, Xenophon, Ciear, Monticuoulli. Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Berwick, Marshal Saxe, Frederick the Great, Napo leon, Wellington and a host of minor lights in all countries have left us a great deal that for all ages will be highly thought of. To them we may certainly add the name of the great Moltke. In his military writings he displayed a great genius for war long be. fore he had any opportunity of directing troops in the field. The great military writer is not. however, always, as he was, the best general when in front of the enemy. Of his voluminous writings, a letter of 1880, upon the so-called laws of war is very remarkable. It was an acknowledgement of a manual compiled at Oxford by the self. elected "Institut de Droit International." The Duke of Wellingtondescrlbed "martial law" as thewillof the general commanding and Moltke's letter is an able enlargement of that celebrated dictum. It should be learned by all those excellent philanthro pists who believe the day is nigh at haýd when the hungry lion will contentedly lie down beside the fat and help less lamb. "Pleretual peace Is a dream," he says, "and is not" even a beautiful dream. Warls an element in the order of the world ordained by od., In it the noblest virtues of mankind are de veloped--courage and the abnegation, of self, faithfulness to duty and the spirit of sacrifice. The soldier gives his life. With out war the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism." He adds what it will agree with: "The greatest kiidneess war is to bring it to a speedy conclsulo.0 For the views expressed in this letter he was somewhat roughly handled by the rad ical press of Germany. In 1881 he wrote a most interesting atl cle upon the battle of Konl grata, Wbih. has been recently published n Gerinm.a A translation of it will be found in aa n t of the United Service magaine, it it+