The New-Hampshire gazette and general advertiser. [volume], June 28, 1783, Image 1

About The New-Hampshire gazette and general advertiser. [volume] (Portsmouth [N.H.]) 1781-1784

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NEW-HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE.
CENERAL ADVERT I\S ER,
Vol XXVII.]
An ADDRESS of the CONVENTI
ON for framing a Conflitution of
Government for the people of New-
Flampfbire, to the [reemen thereof,
woted at their lass meeting, ViZ. on
the fir Tuesday of June 1763,
Brethren and Fellow Citizens, -
PO N examining the Returns,
made to us in Convention, res
pecting the last Plan of Government,
sent out for your consideration ; we aie
happy to find that every article,except
those which relate to the Executive
Department, is accepted by the people.
And, although ‘thereis a conficerab'e
majority for keeping the executive pow
er feperate from the legislative ; yet
there is such a diversity of feniitment
concerning the manner, and hands, in
which the fame thould be deposited,
that the Convention have thought pro
per to offer the following alternative
for your consideration, viz,
TuaT, instead of a Governor, as
proposed in the afcrefaid plan, there
thall be a President of the State, chosen
by the people at large, in the fame
manner, and with the {fsme qualifica
tions fas were therein required for a
t Governor ; that jin lieu of the nega
tive therein given to the Governor, the
President of the State (hall preside in
the Senate ; shall bave a vote equal
with any other member ; and (hall also
have a'cafting vote in cale of a tie.
Trax annually,upon the firft meet
_ing of the Assembly, two members of
the Senate, and three from the House
of Representatives, (hall be chosen by
joint ballot of both Houses, as an ad
vifzry Council to the President, for one
year ; who, with the President, shall
nominate and appoint all cfficers, civil
and military, within the State, whose
nomination and appointment were, by
the aforefaid plan, intrufted to the Go
-vernor and Council ; and, upon such
appointment, the President {hall com
mission them accordingly : Previded
always, That no appointment shall take
place unless three of the Council agree
thareto ; and not less than three of
‘the Council, with the President, thall
make & quorum for tranfa@ing other
business in the executive fdepartment.
Tre Members of the Council, shall
not intermeddle with making, or try
ing impeachments ; but :fhall them
iclves be impeachable, by the Houses:
obipit
SATURDAY, }une aB, 1783,
and triable, by the benate for mai-con
dudt, *
Tur President thall be Captain-Ge
neral and Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy; and (ball have and
exercise all the powers, intended by the
aforefaid plan, to be vested in the Go
vernor as such, |
Tue Prefident,with advice of Coun
cil, (hall have and exercise the fame
powers, as were therein given to the
Governor and Council ; except as is
herein before excepted.
TuaT the paragraph, in said Con
flitution, refpedting? theGover « 's fal
ary,be expunged; and that the 1 'refident
and Courcil be compensated for their
revices, from time to time, by luch
grants asthe General Court shall think
reasonable.
TuAT, in case of the death or re
moval of the President, the {enior Se
nator-shall have and exercise all the
powers herein given to the President,
until another President shall be cholen
and sworn into office.--- And in cale
of the death or removal of either of
the Courncil, the Senate and lHoufe
thall prccecd to fill up such vacancy
by a new choice, ~
Tug Convention were not induced
to offer the foregoing alternative, from
a convi&ion that the alteration propos
ed, is more consonant to the principles
of a free government, more conformed
to the bill of rights, or better calcu
‘lated to secure the liberty of the
fubjett.
The sentiments of the Convention
on this point, are notonly clearly ex
prefled in the thirty-seventh article of
the bill of rights; but the reasons there
for have been repeatedly and expli
citly stated in their addresses to the peo
ple. Every person acquainted with the
nature of government, and with the
designs and objeéts of the legislative
fudicial and executive powers, muit be
deeply convinced that in every free
constitution, these must be so diftribu
‘ted and arranged, as to prove mutual
chiecks on'the undue influence of ei
ther ; to effet which necessary and
important end, they must be vested in
different persons; like three equal pow
ers in mechanic, drawing in different
dire@ions,Jthey must, in such fitvations,
control and be controléd by each other;
' and consequently, while their force con-
S 5 : RN T ;
tinues equal and opposite to each other
must confine thewhole to one common
centre. But should you give any two
of the three a special relation, theywill
invariably aflume the fame direélion ;
and then the resistance of the third will
become infufficient to countera&t their
united efforts: So the nature and end of
the three before-mentioned powers of
government, being eflentially different,
and oppefed to cach other, in their ope
ration and « ffects, must be placed and
kept in difterent hands, in order that
cach may exeit it's proper irfluence,
and prevent incroachments. ‘
LecisLaTion bein the supreme
power in any government, the objects
of it must be various and numerous,
and its limits {o exten{ive, as to render
it almost impralticable to ascertain
them ; while those of the judicial and
executive departments are so accurately
defined, in every free State,that the least
deviation maybe deteted and punithed.
The will of the legislator being the
law of the fubjec, and the law of the
land the line of condu& for the Exe
cutive Magistrate, it is scarcely possible
to {uppofe that this Magiftrate,even if
pefpoticaily inclined, could destroy or
injure the libertics of the people ; while
the powers of legislation, and the com
mand of the wealth of every individu=
al in the State,are lodgedin. other hands.
But if both these powers were depofit=
ed in the fame hands,they might over«
turn the whole political fabric, without
the possibility of meeting an oppofitior
from the people, fufficient to prevent
their designs from being carried into
effed. |
Tur President, proposed in’ the
above alternative, is to have no check
upon the Legislature ; is rendered to-~
tally dependent on that body for his
fuppoit ; and is to have no exclusive
rightin the nomination of officers.
As more than a third part of the votes;
returned, were against a Privy Council
being cle@ed as proposed -in the last
plan ; we, concciving that it might be
more agreeable to the sentiments of the
people to have a Council chosen out of
the Legislature, have proposed that me
thod. Thisis done with a view of re-~
moving some objections, ntade by the
people, against the expence of a Privy
Council 2nd the powers ¢ the Chic§
Execcutive Magistrate,
N :
[Vs, 1391,