New-York tribune. [volume], September 12, 1915, Image 15

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F..D.TORIAL, DRAMA,
RESORTS.
IVTetti i0t?( ?ribttne
EDITORIAL. DRAMA,
RESORTS.
TWELVE TAGES.
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1915.
PART IM. TWELVE TACES.
PEACE AND THE
N
IF THE ALLIES WIN.
EW MAP OF EUROPE
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IF GERMANY WINS.
Basis on Which Germany
or the Allies Would
Make Terms
of Amity.
By FRANK H. SIMONDS,
Author of "The Great War."
TW mentirin of terms of peace, a few
?ja ?go. the Aral specific reference to ter
a*^ rearrangements, supplies an appro
?*?*'??? of. i ?-capitulating the in
,B*Win?'detaill in the new map of Europe,
?often discu--ed in the past year. But it
?"ai?! be more accurate to refer to the new
?*P*of Europe, for there are at least two
I***? of rival map makers, the Teu
??Kand the anti-Teutonic cartographers,
***?? tliey ar?? a- -r-parated by the
Wofwar.
"??re trun thr-.wn back upon a discus
^ of the two maps, of the Europe that
^'totne if Germai y wins, of the Europe
?* ?ill he constructed if Germany is
**'?*'?? Bttcb a consideration of the pend
H ?tions need not, then, transcend the
J*8**? of neutrality, and the purpose of
*? ?rticle is not to discuss the moral or
**t**7 weijrht of the two claims, but to
***??. so far as is possible, exactly what
?fltiin? are and what are the statistical,
*JP*I>hical and ethnological circum
*l the outset there are certain claims
1 n?sy be eliminated from the discus
* *wn the war broke out there was
^7**-k in Allied quarters of a partition
^???Tnany. The work of Bismarck was
* Ur,d<>ne ?nd "freedom" was to be be
7*J uPon the subject provinces of I'rus
? w doubtful if any one now believes
?av * Petition possible, and its desira
Sa *???* as dubious. It may be aa
?"* ?*?*? ? fair basis that the unity of
J**8?*? except fur Alsace-Lorraine, will
r*>t*r into the question of the map
r" ?Sereaft*r, even if the war -should
^<*rman disaster,
iv****-' aame process of reasoning the
aja,,/ pl*n8 f"r th.* partition of North
sj|i^nc' m*>* be dropped. Krancsj has
a?4?Tly prove<l ?*?*"*?* indestructible,
* ??ceded in the "terms" o? the
recent peace discussion, which certai
had German approval, that France is
be left undisturbed in Europe. Conrei
My victorious Germany might insist u]
a few rquare miles of the district ab
Briey, where the great iron mines are; 1
this may fairly be taken as the sum
Germany's territorial demands.
Apart from the question of Belgium a
Luxemburg, it ?a now plain that the gn
settlement will be chiefly concerned w
reorganizing Eastern and ?Southeast?
Europe, and it will be Russia and Aust:
who will be asked, as the result determin
to pay the costs of peace.
If Germany Win?.
Taking now the first of the two pos
ble terminations of the war, what will
the changes in the map of Europe
August 1, 1914, if Germany wins0 It
possible to make all sorts of estim?t?
based on the extent and character of tl
German victory. Thus it is impossible
make any forecast if we are to assume th
Germany is presently to beat all her foes
their knees and impose her terms on
Europe as completely at her feet as wi
the Europe of the first decade of the la
century at the feet of France.
But great as Germany's triumphs ha\
been there is no prospect yet of such
triumph, and the first tentative proposa
show no disposition to proceed upon sue
an assumption. A German victory no1
?may fairly be described as the success c
Germany and her allies in holding the tei
ritories conquered and defending Constar
tinople. Such a success would mean tha
Germany could hold out where she stand
| until exhaustion brought her enemies t
-the mood of peace making.
Now, on such an assumption it is plaii
that Germany would go to the peace con
gres?, the later edition of the Congress o
Vienna, which remade Europe a centun
jago, with certain well defined claims an?:
purposes. She would be in possession oi
much territory which she might claim as
the booty of war. She would have muer
more, Northern France, for example
which might be used as the basis for bar?
ter.
In this situation Germany would proba?
bly claim the right to hold Belgium and
Luxemburg, either absolutely, insisting
that they be incorporated in the empire as
are Bavaria and Baden, or merely demand
certain commercial and military privileges,
which would moderate the appearance
rather than ?hange the fact of her con?
quest of the Belgians.
I In the same fashion she would claim the
right to Kt up a Kingdom of Poland, con
.-?isting of all of the Russian Polish pri?
nces, which would he nn Austro-Gcrm:
protectorate and probably would be i
creased by the addition of certain Austrii
and possibly German territory populat
by Poles and a part of the ancient Poli
Kingdom. She might also demand Cou
land, with Riga, now partially occupii
by her armies; she might demand th;
Finland be restored to Sweden. This, wii
question? of indemnity and colonies, whic
do not concern us here, would be the sum <
Germany's demands for herself.
What Augtria Want?.
For Austria, Germany would ask otht
and quite as considerable concession
From Italy it may be guessed that thei
would be asked any extension of the Au
trian frontier which has proved of valt
In the present conflict. But it is wholl
unlikely that Austria would ask or desit
to take back Venetia and saddle herse!
with a new Irredenta problem. If Italy i
defeated now, the question of Trieste an
the Trentino may be regarded as settle
for years, if not forever.
What Austria desires is expressed in th
tentative peace proposals of a week ag
under the vague formula <>f Austria)
supremacy in the Balkans. This mean
two things. It means great territoria
changes; it means that Russia would hav
formally to renounce her pretensions b
influence as the protector of the Slavs o
the Balkan peninsula. This, it will be re
called, was the occasion of the present war
which resulted from Russian insistence 01
the right to protect Serbia against Aus
tria.
It is fair to assume that Austria woulc
| demand the right to occupy all of Serbu
land Montenegro. These states would be
'come either an integral part of the Haps
'burg kingdom or else a "protected" state
I which would be completely subservient tc
| Austrian will.
In the same way Austria would insist
upon a restoration of the Albanian king?
dom, an<! the eastern shore of the Adriatic
from Cattaro to Valona would pass under
?Austrian control, and Valona, the key of
?the Adriatic from the naval point of view,
'would become the new base of the Austrian
fleet
Greece, having so far resisted all Allied
efforts to persuade her to enter the war on
the Allied side, would probably be left un?
disturbed at the present time, but with
the Austrian forces st Guevgheli, with
Macedonia from .MonaMir to the Vardar
and Albania from Pr?s pa Lake to the sea
?in Austrian hands, all Northern Greece
would be at the meicy of the HapsburgT-i,
Sal?nica would be within the grasp
Vienna and Greece would become the me
vassal of the Austro-German alliance.
Austria would thus realize the dream
her statesmen since the events of the la
century resulted in her ejection first fro
Italy and then from Germany. She wou
become the master of the Balkans and ho
the key to the Near East.
Turki?h Profit.
For their Turkish ally the Austro-Ge
mans would first of all demand the undi
puted possession of Constantinople and ?
straits. They would insist upon the retur
to Turkey of the islands taken by Ital
during the Tripolitan War, possibly som
0? the islands taken by Greece in the Ha
kan War. British troops in the valley c
the Euphrates, Russian troops in the Ai
menian marches, would have to retire. A
to Egypt and Tripoli, they would h
claimed for Turkey if German succ?s
justified any such claim, but it is doubtfi
if this is even hoped for now by Berlin.
Bulgaria, frankly Teutonic in her sym
pathies, would doubtless be rewarded fo
her neutrality by permission to occupy cer
tain districts in Macedonia. She wouli
probably get back the Silistrian district
taken by Rumania, which is to have Bessa
rabia from Russia if the recent pro
gramme is carried through. But actual!;
Bulgaria would become a mere Teutoni?
VMttL
A mere buffer state between an Aus
trian Serbia and a Turkish Thrace, com
manding the one road from Berlin ant
Vienna to Constantinople and the East
Bulgaria would henceforth be at the mercj
of her great neighbors and in due cours?
of time sink to the level of the Serbia
which would exist after the German vie
tory. Greece would be in no different
estate.
As for Rumania, she is larger than the
Balkan Statel to the south. Berlin regards
her recent behavior with deep resentment.
But she is always to be reckoned with in
the Near East. To punish her would be
to insure her permanent hostility, and
some day, if Russia should again be able
to reopen the Eastern que.-ition, she would
be a dangerous ally of the enemy and a
possible base for Russian operations in the
Balkans. To give her Bessarabia and for?
give past offences would be the part of
wisdom, and this seems to be the German
plan.
The conquest of these regions by Ger?
man finance and industry has long been a
part of Germany's programme. Rumania
has already fallen under the financial
hegemony of Berlin almost completely. It!
would be the work of German statesmen
hereafter, by tariff and by diplomacy,
complete the conquest, to make Ruchan
nn outpost of Berlin, and it is idle to su
pose that this would not be done, or th
peaceful rather than hostile penetratii
would not be relied upon by the victorio
(itrman map makers.
Drang Nach Oaten.
Now glance at the map, and it will
seen exactly what the drift of all this Ge
man map making is. If possible Gc
nany will keep Belgium; commercially
is the true entrance and exit to German
If it can be held the absorption of Hollar
presently is inevitable. But for the presei
it may be impossible to realize this drear
The arguments for taking French territoi
are much less impressive. Unless Ge
many is beaten now, France will nev(
('uestion the possession of Alsace-Lorrain
and asid?' from this and Belgium there
no cause for quarrel between the two m
tions. France is only accidentally a fc
of Germany, from the German point c
view. Germany is even ready to mak
generous concessions, if only France wi
cease to be a foe and an obstacle. It i
England that is always the enemy.
As to territorial rearrangements in Ru
sian Poland, these are merely protectiv?
A vassal Poland, presently acquiring unde
German direction an army and a measur
o? independence, will be a bulwark again.
the future inroads of the Slavs. It wil
be an insurance against the future and th
end of the Russian Pan-Slav movement
because Poland will be a Slav force hostil,
to Russia. Finland will go to Sweden, i
at all, simply to bind Sweden to Germany
for only with German help could Swedet
maintain her hold upon Finland agains
Etattia hereafter.
So far the German programme is mod
est and goes little beyond the reasonabl?
expectations of a victor. But looking
south the great purpose is disclosed. A?
the German map makers would draw it
the whole of l'entrai Europe from the Bal?
tic to the .-Egean and the Straits, from
Hamburg to Constantinople, would fall un.
uer the sway or the domination of Ger?
many and her Austrian ally, who has
fclieady become subservient to German
will, or convinced that her future lies ?in
close association with Germany.
From Constantinople to the frontiers of
India and Egypt, Turkish territory
stretches, and Turkey, now the ally, is
henceforth to be the economic and political
colony of the Germans. Asia Minor
passes under German control, the Bagdad
railroad becomes the highway for German
commerce from Berlin to the Persian Gulf.
Here is a mighty colonial emoi:e, which
is at every point safe against British sen
power. Here is Germany's place in th?
sun!
The Great Dream.
Consider now what it will mean s
generation hence, if Germany, bavinf
entered into an alliance with Austria
which amounts to a union of the twc
states, shall be able to exercise economic
and military control from Berlin to Bag
dad. To drill the Serb, the Bulgar, th?
Turk, to exploit all the vast agricultural
and mineral wealth of these regions, tr
develop them, drawing from the railroad?
and public works that revenue which her.
management will insure!
These regions in past centuries hav??
been the seats of great empires and splen?
did prosperity. Who holds Constantinople
holds the gate to half Russia, and the Bal?
tic commands the other half. Russia in
?due course of time will have also to yield
i to the economic if not to the political
?sway of Berlin. Great as her future must
be, it will not be sufficiently great to per?
mit her to oppose again the nation that
holds all the doorways to Russian terri?
tory by sea and by land, save only that
on the t emote Pacifie.
And is there any reason why Germany
should stop at Suez ami the Persian Gulf?
India and Egypt have both been con
i i fron Asia .Minor. Can ar.y or.e
bci;e\e that Kngland alone could evei tu...i
India against German armies sent through
! German territory and along German rail?
roads until they were within striking dis?
tance? Would not the problem of holding
Kgypt become practically impossible if
German masses were to come through Pal?
estine by the Mecca railroad? The battle
between Berlin and London would but be
transferred from Belgium, from the
Strait of Dover to Suez, from France to
Syria and Palestine.
Seated at Suez, Germany would control
: the main artery of British imperial life.
?Once she had cut this her advance toward
i India could proceed with little fear of de?
feat from armies that would have to be
I sent by way of Good Hope or across the
! Pacific. Egypt taken, what is there to hin?
der German armies descending the Cap*
to-Cairo, opening a way for conquest and
commerce far down into Africa, always
with a nearer base for the armies and a
?shorter and surer route for supplies than
England would possess?
Beljrium, Northern France, Courland,
these are but minor details in the
great German dream. For her the ifsue of
the war is now to be decided at Constan?
tinople; her map makine, if peace were to
come, would concern itself mainly with
What the Warring Na?
tions Would Barter
For in Hvent of
Victory.
the Ralkans. with the road from Berlin by
Byzantium to Bagdad.
If the Allie? Win.
Turning now to the problem of th? new
map of Europe, if the Allies win, it is
plain from the outset that the change?
will be far less considerable. The war ia
between those that have and those that
m sire. Whatever the occasion of the war,
Germans have long believed and said that
they must fight for their place in the sun.
This place was occupied by other nations,
and these nations are now fighting pri?
marily to hold what they possess. They
are also fighting to prevent Germany from
acquiring her place in the aun, her great
Berlin-Bagdad expansion, because it means
the ruin of British and Russian aspira?
tions, the end of France and Italy aa
??reut pow.
Now, at least one-half of all the con?
cerns of the map makers, if they happen
to represent victorious Allies, will be to
block the German programme in the Bal?
kans; the other half will be to make inci?
dental changes in frontiers, based upon
ethnological or historical claims. These
changes may be briefly dealt with. To
Belgium, freed of German invaders, will
be ceded Luxemburg, which was unable
even to protest against German invasion
and is too small to be anything but an
invitation to German ambition.
To France will be a1 lotted Alsace-Lor?
raine. It is doubtful if the French, short
of complete exhaustion, would consent to
any peace which did not bring back their
"lost provinces." Great Britain is certain
to stand with France in this, because,
apart from all other claims of the French
upon the provinces, there atands the solid
c'aim. proved by the recent campaigns,
that Fiance can protect herself and Bel?
gium from German invasion only by posses?
sion of her old fortresses. Had French
armies stood at the Saar in the opening
days of August German invasion of Bel?
gium would have been impossible, because
..I the nsk. It was the German hold upon
the V?MfM) Strassburg and Met? which
covered this great offensive.
toniuuiftl ss l?li?, ssisa