New-York tribune. [volume], October 24, 1915, Image 17

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DITORIAL. DRAMA
M U SIC.
rs^
,.-*Av
*\4
SOCIETY, FINANCIAL, REAI
[.STATE, AUTOMOBILES
PAKT m rWBaVl PAGES
SrXDAY, OCTOBER .24, I913.
PAW III TWELVE PACK
UNDEFENDED CARIBBEAN CHIEF WEAKNESS OF LJ. S.
NIE \\\N TO PEACK AT \\Y PRICE IS ABSOLUTE PREPAREDNESS
Through It Europe Would
Strike for the World
Pr.ze, the Panama
Canal.
Bv PROF W-1. LF.DYARD CATHCART,
' e
ot the aavj smous American naval authority.
7,, /.. muta'? preaeatattaa at ;>n ade*
quHte ? i W I* a bt ?tir ht;niiig
entitled than '<? Ptotettor Cat hear ft.
4s a former nin.tr .?* i tir _B_H > _?. baa
VM?nt inn .i-- ea emlaent am.
thon'* la naval atattert.
T
.. : resent wealth of neany
s I 00.000. o
?ent ' ......
*? ! . a Canal it
? | |
? .. ? an?-Alaska,
Hawaii. Guam. Samoa and the Philippines?
ire i- - ? rs the lands of an empire. In
the Caribbean Sea and the North Pacific we
j,0*cj ? '?.irions which dominate those
water? It the Monroe Doctrine ire assert a
po'jcv M ^ren Stigmatised as an "in
?.rediilr _npet-ill?*IH_. tc the European world.
!. the Open Door?now dosing fast?we
.r.ge not only Japan hut every nation which
- ?*- a ioothold territorially on Chinese soil.
]n tfa - etfa century?wit':-. i*s tlagrant
? neutrality treaties, of Hague con?
virti?: sad - nciplcs of In?
? .tional law?what should be an adequate
lavy ior a country holding I -t pos?
. - ? ,h world-wide doc?
>H0U1 D WE RIVAL ENGLAND'S NAVY"
rtant questions as to the amount and
ter of our nav, ' not
tv_ as the ad?
? and the people ?rl
. . . rs
adequate
?ion ? -'-i'h menace to the
.tut- ? tance, these pi
?
both our trade
neutrals snd ti:e great increase in our
irry en that trade, which
rould brint;. Should we
? ? apable of disputing
? __ y.i making; this
?
IT? I .aval force
I ?east, to guard fully every foot of
iw hold in both oceans?
??? ? trong that it can be di
.Ite] t | ermanently in
Or. letting tht - Hawaii and
'.as.. ? ..ces of capture in sudden
7 a ' Oriental power, should we main?
te fleet, trusting to its su!_i
ei to protect the Pi
'.cast il leed?
Ar. , ?? compete with Great K:
saava would be financially extrava
?_ ?a. .litically i - ? ? at 'his time.
The cost 11 ?;er Reel h s hern t;reat. D l
__ last decadtj .0.000.000 has been
t?and vei a ?esults have
?esra.
As I national relations?for s nun?
r'.x do menace -.
rand of the si . I-'-,;.r times dur
"S ?ha? : -? v. : sen the two nations
'??as ihreati <? i the crisi was
??'tTte. mc and skilful diplomacy.
Tr.rou-h ut thi ex stance Monroe Doc
f ? ind has tacitly acqu.rsce.. in its
? ? ? en it
?ion.
In '<?' a ir like th? pr< must
r tup
f- .' open
"? ***_ 7orthern i ?rele;'. Am), I
otcnt reasons.
_U, social
?7r.tr.eu 1- ?? | C -. ? cx
? ? make future sr I ? Brean t?:rrn
? at this time. The e -istin ; con
' - I bave Ott-ers :n UM
The ?7 en Isl ps ol nations, hi srteer, are like
"ttr anmiti?
? . .r time t > ?r ke
,:r*n_i?-.]'-.. r ?.er old foe. RttS la; and a
>*lr*ri- ' ..rn her by the Euro
tin '?*'?' - .-??"? | v _ rt| to wre .t
?W hefen ny of the Far Last from her ally,
tam h: ? . While, therefore, both hit. ?v
?!"* tO! e teach that it would be un
ever to the continued friend
*P 0! tie century ol
s ln ksi ' : that at thie tiim - uld not
t prol Irm of the strate
h a enemy." Hence, her naval
?tngth need not now be a prime facto: in
own, although a!w ys it
ould be boi c ?*i mind that as matters
rtiih B 1er? * ?? ;'.". : e -.< i . e_ best ?I the
***** State | iejt nav I
"" Il continu' ' i ? ? Iky ol
*" and e . ? , topa
f-dist.
?? .
?at) lai
,JR *?'*' OF BOUTHBRM COAST
BASES FOR THE FLEET
g r ??'"I ! te*n cota-* Ol on the
4 'ma C. i ,.:??,, enemy extep Great Brit
^***d ' oiivrmr
?*c?it base for his fighting ships and trans
^ aWh s naval - fully developed
.'' "
r* ' ?
.' ,eP*?
! 6l?" h sho Id be a ? ?iir.tr.. n trat?
What, end it Oiould be i
fofrisoncd as to be self : since
t^*'?? ti r fleet will have to watt? it* force
"?'ding h From a navaI base shi| _
trikc to - .l?stame limite I only \?m tbr ti
tr-ey carry.
Halifax ind Bermuda are tiir only near
Btrategi? positions in foreign contiol win
are a possible menace to our Atlantic Coa
These ports can be made naval bases of t
tirst rank, and. ttom cither or both, continuo
naval operations ag.inst us would be possib
the ? which would depend en the re
tive strength of the two feel:.. Minor stra'
gic positions, subject to seizure by a supcri
enemy and? p-esent condition-.-'., are Provin:
town and Nr.rragansett and Delaware bay!
In New York Harbor, with its uniivall
facilities, and in Chesapeake Bay. with t'
:? rtii.cations now projected, the United Stai
has. or ?Brill have, northern and mid-coast nav
bases unexcelled in position, strength and r
sources. South of the Che-apeake, ho\.ev<
there is no Atlantic nort which meets the d
mands of a large fiet?t, although the little ba
rcn island of Key Vest would be ol rs
value not only in the daily supply of the shi]
(as in the Civil War), b'Jt as a base for d
* vers ar.d submarines.
As to the Gulf Coast: With the Strait i
Florida guarded by an effective force at Kt
West and the Yucatan Channel domin:tcd I
a fleet based on Guantannmo. in Cuba, whit
we control, the Gulf of Mexico becomes mil
tarily an inland sea which, with a powerfi
?? in ?he Atlantic and the Caribhe n. is ur
likely to meet the stress of war.
WHERE OUR CHIEF DANGER LIES.
V. ith a reasonably powerful fleet our .V
lantic Coast would be. BS a whole, easil
i.ucide<i from any enemy but England. Ba
as nav.?l mi legista have ; ointci OUI nivea*
y for years, "ur chiei danger d?-e;> n< t 1:
? e. lui in the Caribbean Sea. Captain Joh
Hood. U. S. N.. says:
"Then ? . le and slmoal certain nse?
theatre 01 ai tion in .;.y war t.iat v.e may ha
with ?tan nation will fx in the Carib
bean Sea o- waters adjacen? thereto, sime i
i- there we r ? weakesl and most vulnerable
with OU? present loi ; u-defended l.ne of com
mtmicationa from Hatteras v,a the-Windwan
nd other passages to the Panama Canal.
"It BfOuld be .- bold natior? that would maki
a direcl ir nt.il Bttack on our Atlantic sea
boar,"., where we arc stro- ?.et. and who e ad
, jaaCi.t waters are within the radius of our homi
. v. lei.s o r f.cet h d been annihilated 01
i*.ri\e*! irom the ocean."
A glance at the map will show our responsi
1 ilr.irs in ibis possil le wer arei. The Carib
1 e ei Lei is Ik -.ir.ded on the north by Cuba
whose independence we a:e pledged to defend
I ci mpri in ? the Haytian anc
Dominican republics, over which we now excr
use virtual protector tes, and by Porto I.ico
which we Own. Mexico and Central America
1 ound it m the west, and these, like the con?
tinent to the south, .nc covered by the Monroe
Doctrine. A thousand mile;; southwest ol
Poi o K* o lies Ci 1 ?n. the entrance to the
Panama Canal, which, as the !??-.teway to the
i nd the Pai E st. will make of the
Caribbean Sea a new Mcd terranean. with all
its stirs liva'ries in tr.-.de and war.
Of these t o e: /. !:-:it. I ?'..ahan said:
I.t.i COM kUOUa ch; ra? teristic; now are
t en political and military importance, i.i the
b re p a de 11 sense, as concernin, not only the
i o ?tries that border them, but the world at
lar?.,.*.'
1', r fifty years and more the history of the
Caribbean has l:ccn marlicd by European in
?riki-ie. Were it not lor ihe European war we
i-rotrd now have -4live ?ieinoi'.sira'.ion of this
e-ie in Hayii end Mexico r-ocAA With
? : ? 1 ? loomi Ian ,e n the near
B rhi it e--The Panama
. the chiei take il hkely ti7?*-. s
?rv m a military and 1 val sen.-e so weak
ours will be all. wed to hold for Ion?; its
proeenl pred .?...iai.ee 01 its coettad pos
BS 1.. this sunlit sea" ,
PROFESSOR WILLIAM LEDYARD CATUCART.
hu Brown Uriither..
It i- true that in Qcantanamo we hold
strategic position which. OW?H to .t.-. loc tio
or. the island of Cu:>._, is dominating, but thi
natural itronghi 1:1 is as e* undeveloped in it
fortifications and its equipment Puithcr, ther
are in this possible B_U arc a i It nine othe
strategic positions new ov.'.ci : y c ght .?ifier
rnt t ountries. Witl .;-. Break .set n 1 its un
developed ba-es Amcric. ;*ivec, sc nt 10 icen
t'- it . commercial and military future in th
Catiblean Sea.
THE PANAMA CANAL AS A liK't.EDEl
OF WAK.
The chief advantage of the Panama Ca.ia
in the event of existing or threatened w r seil
be tiiat?like the strategic railways of Ccr
many in land operations?it will enable nava
?enforcements to he transferred rapidly on in
tcrior lines from ocean to ocean. It t'iu*
shortens the passage to the Pacific by s.xty
days?time eno gh to win a deusive action or
our far-flung; military frontier there, cr, by th.?
presence of superi'-r force, to _vert war.
Further, in th event of attack on both coa-ts
it is ju..t possible ti*at a sufficiently powerful
American fleet rright defeat one enemy on the
Atlantic and then sweeping through the car.al.
destroy the other on the Pacific. This con?
ception seems more pleasing than 5>robable.
Another advantage of |-rirr-.r importance is
th.t the canal ?limin?tes the per taps unsolv
able pr.bl.m of fuel supply I y South American
neutrals in the pas ag* t ? _ possible war area
in the Pacific. As to this Captain ?i. S. Knapp.
U. S. N.. says:
"It (the canal) means the posribility of
sending ships from the Atlantic to almost ny
place where they will be needed in the Pacific
by a route that has fuel Stations under our flag
al?n,* thr entire distan?a, no t o of whi:h are
further apart than the fue! e_durance of cur
ccpital 'hip.; This is in SCO mous dvantagC."
To estimate the magnitude cf this advan?
tage one need but recall th.: t sum-: years ago,
when our battle fleet steamed .round the
world, it was attended by more than forty mer?
chant vessels Csnyiag fuel and supplies and
all flying foreign Hags. If su.den war h-*r\
come d'.:rin_ that glo te-girdling cruise these
transports would have I een transformed auto
tvi'tically into enemies or neutrals. In the
lat'er event -hey would have vanished at once.
leaving cur dmiral hard pressed to get his
'hip- hon e
It is impi?-'bable that ?hre.t naval attack will
ever be made on the canal. The heavy gun
and mortar I atteries at the entrances and sub?
marines and mine Balda in the sea approaches
a
vc ill prevent t'-at. The Canal Zone is, however
nearly fifty r_.il_s long and is only ten mile
aride, to that invaaion by land forces will b<
? if the zone is not very strongly fortifiet
and garrison! L "Advanced national outposts
like Maita and Gibrah r, must be (in strength]
ra'tars," says Mahan. But, a:
with f.ur home coasts, the canal's Brat line o
defence is the navy, and our ?leet should al
N ys i c strorg enough to keep an enemy iron
eve, get! ' ; nc_: enough for invasion.
With re 'an' to the future of the ranal then
are two ?acts v. rich canr.ot be ernhastzed toe
I '.o- ?1 . Pirat??iarrinc; the Monroe Doctrine
t'ere is no policy or possession of the United
State, "hi h is more iike'y ta breed war fot
its retention tl.an the world prize, the anal
Secondly?Should we be too v.e.k to defend il
in war. all of its military advantages wculd
pata to the enemy which took it. In that
event its construction will simply have weak?
ered m Buncaaarabty, for through it we shall
have opened a gateway for the nat ens of
Europe to I ur Pacific Coast and our overseas
possession* htyond
That these forecasts have sound baaes in
historv *he story ct the Suez Canal proves. It
uas -iiilt fcr Eeypt by France; it has passed,
seerr.irg'y for al! time, to Engl_n<l. The vitil
necessity for a British highway to India pre?
determined its ultimate ownership. Be^innmt;
with Gibraltar, Engl nd slowly throu h long
yc.rs acquired Malta, Cyprus, Perim and Ader.
The misiir? link was tue ca**al. ind Disraeli
secretly Lou-;ht a lar^e. almost a cor.tr 11 ng,
interest ifl its shares. Then, in 1832. England
entered Egypt "to resto c order" Now. in
19 .*. after uninterrurted accup ton. she pro
cl.ims a pr tec'.orate over that Ian 1 and sand,
and holds the canal in a grip that will never
-en.
OL'K HIGHEST PACIFIC . EK'.'TOKY
MOST t XPOSED TO INVA_ ? I]
Our Pacific state-, that is, the terri-ory de
perdent on that ocean for commercial cutlet,
comprise? s James G. Blame once said?"an
area of nearly 800,000 square miles larger in
extent than the German Empire and the four
Latin countries ? f Europe combined." Fur?
ther, ?n.lud ng Alaska, cur outl/ir.?; possessions
in the Pacific have an aggrcate rrea which is
more than one-fourth th t of the United St ?tes
proper and more than one-fifth that f t! I
w^o'r . minent of Europe.
The actual and potential wealth oi this vast
territory defies computation. On January li,
1915, the Legislature of the State of Washing?
ton forwarded a petitfm for coast defences to
the President and Congress, showing that th
appraised value of the taxable property in th
states of Washington and Oregon alone e*
ceeded $4.100,000.000. Alaska is now yieldirt
annually about six times its purchase price 1
$7,250,000, and its enormous resources hav
been but scratched. As to the Philippir.es
that "military blunder" of their critics?the
fotni. with their population of 8.000,000, the
tratle possibilities, their hardwoods, their a^r
cultural resources and their command of Soutl
en* China and the r_ast Indies, a rich territor
for which most great powers would gladly g
to war. Incomprehensible America, on th
contrary, intermittently proposes to leave th
group to its own feeble devices or to thos
of any grasping nation which may seize ii
This is "national self-abnegation" raised t
the limit.
The richest portion of our continental Pacifi
territory is that which is most exposed to bom
bardment, blockade and invasion. So far a
adequate defences go, it is the weakest part o
the whole frontier of this Republic. On the en
t re CO st we have but one great naval base
that on Pu^et Sound, whose incomplete t'acili
ties are growing slowly. In the eastern Nortl
Pacific Ocean we own every strategic point bu*
three, and the development of but one, Pear
Harbor, near Honolulu, is proceeding. In th<
Philippine- the only position which could hole
(or a time Bgainat attach is the little i.land o!
Ccrrefiiuur ? Manila B iy- The destiny of na
tiers has given the United States comrr.erciai
and military opportunities without parallel or
I and in the North Pacific Ocean. Thua far tlies?
o: portunities and their attendant dangers hav?
? had but l.ttie consideration by Congress.
OUR "?LOCK OF SHEEP" ON THI
PACIFIC.
In considering our possible dangers in the
Pacific Ocean the Russ^-Japanese War tea.hes
j inttructive lessons. The fundamental rcsom?
for Russia, defeat in that conflict were: L ck
of preparation of her fleet for war, inade?
quate equiprret.t of her naval base, Port Ar?
thur and the failure to concentrate her naval
strengt11 in t'.ic Par I-at, so that it w a
whipped in detail?firrt the Port Arthur fleet,
and then that which under Rojestvensky
steamed cut from the Baltic.
/'?Il of these conditions exist to day with re?
gard to our navy and its probable enemies. It
is gravely unprepared for war. lacKin? net only
Brat line ships, but many auxiliaries; it is
short of officers and men to a perilous degree;
its chief naval bases have had little or no de?
velopment, and the fleet is divided, with a naval
strcrgth in the Pacific which is inconsiderable.
The Pacific fleet, active and reserve, and the
A.i tic licet are composed of one old battle?
ship, the famous Oregon: two obsolete rr.oni
i? rs, Sevan armored cruisers, ten cruisers,
eleven uuncoats, fourteen destrcyers and
twenty submarines. This array items im
?'e-si.e, but tor facing a modern battle fleet
it is "paper strength"?simply fit only to "s'.-.ow
the Bag" with dignity in peace, and in war,
vhen theltered in safe har.ors. to soothe the
fea. .f some t mil. uncomprehending layrrcn.
In vid_ Ky each ol the e vessels is excel?
lent for ;ts day and kind, but tuc efle_-iv_ day
of the ItrOfl e-t of .hen? was long agi 2nd,
e:-:- e- : some of the destroyers and submarines,
not-.e o' them coull engage modem battlesh.ps.
. | most f rrr.ida. le ot t.aem are the six
12,..0-tcn armored cruisers, but they are of an
o'asolescent type, with a m.xed battery of four
8-i:.ch (model 1S99) and fourteen 6-inch guns,
thin .-inch belt armor _nd a speed of only
twet-.ty two knots. Hybrids tactically, they are
t- o -ve-ir- ?,. ? I t-foehipa and too slow to
t The r characteristics com?
pare sry y ifavorably with tho e of the dread?
nought i- ttls cruisers now serving i" the
British, German and J panese navic-:. For ex?
ample, the io'_: ve se'.s of Japan'- Kon. o class
each have a _ ?.;*\.i. emetu of tlJsmW I ... a
speed of twenty seven knots, eight 14 inch and
F'ee! for l?ic Coati ?Equal
to Defeating \n\ Foe Is
the Prim r> Need of
Adequate Defence?
.
sixteen d-inch guns sad l?-imh armer on belt
and turrets.
A single battle cruiser like this with its qu-ir
tet o' attendant destroyers BfOttjId Rive short
shrirt to our combined P .eets. if they
?*ere massed in the open Ocean?unless, indeed,
one ol oar de?troye- OS cot in a
lucky hit, which expericn e ahoars is more
than ? hundred t one :hunce. Out of rar.*je
-- '1- ,ht- crttisei Pik each foe at
r ire, That our I ild be fought
id skilfully < ? ?> it saying?for
that is the immemorial way of Amen, an naval
men. H.*t that brief action would be a massa
? re?like a tiger turned loose on a Mock of
sheep And yet this is our naval "strength"
on the Pacific!
-SOME PROBABLE "IPS' OF THE FU
TURF.
With regard to timely reinforcements from
Tlie Atlantic Coast there are several things
worth considering. In the nrst place, a ?lee'
starting from Guantanam?), passing through
the ca.ial and steaming at twelve knots M
hour would take fourteen days to reach S I
Francisco, nineteen days to Honolulu and
thirty-live to Manila. The last period, it not
the two latter, gives ample time fur a dci-ii-e
action to be fought?and lost by our BssssJl
naval force.
A?;ain. there is no assurance that the canal
' be open throughout at a critical tine
Owing to slides m the ?.uts it will be an unce:
tain waterway for years?perhaps always. Re?
cent press report^ ..t?te that owing to ft] I
the canal will be cJC4tad to trathc until No.en
her ! at the e r!ie->t.
Ptnther, nothing during the present WM
been more ??artiing ihan the e? ecive wo.
the soies, who made the
concre.e emplacements ?or great Oerman ??uns
in France before war broke, and who. if cur
rent rumor be credible, blew up the Bli
battleship Bulwark and the auxiliary cruiser
Princess Irene in their home harbors. Wouhi
men ?...pable of t.hese things find great difficult?,
ir. blocking the Panama Canal at a critical tirr.?
by exploding a land mine to make a slide, bj
sinking one of their own merchantmen with s
clockwork bomb hidden in her coal bunkers,
or by wrecking a pair of locks by explosive?*
dropped from the air?
If the c nal were thus blocked for a consid
?rable period, it would take?according to C n
tain J. S. McKean, U. S. N. late of the NaVal
War Colle.c?sixty days to get a fleet of for
ty-eight battleships from Culebra, Porto Rico,
around South America to Panama; the voy;e
would cost $6,000,000 in fuel, and I r tl.e car
riege of fuel and stores it would require 100
merchant vessels of 5 000 tons each, casting
550.000,000 total. With our present srif SBsTt*.
ficial policy toward our transoceanic merchatv
marine, it would be interecting to know jfSSt
where in the sudden stress of war any such
fleet of transports could be found.
I-'inaliy the closure of the European war un
questionably will bring new groupings of the
great po-ves. Japan, in her present aim for
lcidcr.h.ip in the Far East, wdl find Grejt Brit
ain'iojvast interests there opposing hes at every
s'.ep For many years there has been in Japan
an influential pro-German and anti-British fac?
tion, said to have been led by the late Prince
I;o and composed mainly of men educated in
Germany. This par*y ?ccms to be gaining,
and some o! server.; already find indications
that Japan is coquet! ng with Germany in
preparalio:i for eventualities. If the German
battle flc?t shall pursue to the end its present
co'irse of, !et us say, "strict neutrality" the
close o? the war will find that great fleet in?
tact. !s it impossible to imagine that then, or
soon after, Germany and Japan as allies might
make a smultaneoas atta?k on the United
States?one on the east coast, the other on
the v/est? From what source then will come
those vital Pacific reinforcements?
Less for defensive conflict than to avert wat
by the presence of superior force, it seems
clea?- that the United States should maintain
in, or within easy steaming range of, the Car
ibbcan Sea a fleet equal at least to that of any
probable European enemy except Engla.i'.
Less than this would he inadequate for the full
protection of our eastern coast and of the
Panama Canal and to meet the demands which,
more and more, the Monroe Doct.ine will im
pose for the display or use of strong naval
force.
Similarly, if there were no Panama Canal,
we should keep aiways in the North Pacific
Osean a fleet not of obsolete or obsolescent
vessels, but of modern battleships equal to
that o: any Oriental nation. The opening of
the cam. may have lessened the urgency foi
th.s BsMnewhat As to this naval suthoiities
differ. 7-.ut. owing to the great distances, the
possibility that the canal may be blocked and
the further possibility of simultaneous attack
on both coasts, it is evident that full security
can be assured only by a Pacific fleet able, un?
aided, to meet any probable foe there. This
does not mean that the Panama Canal lias not
incrc.se 1 the e!ie?tivcness of our navy. On
the contrary, an overwhelming force swung
swiftly through that shott iut may some day
preven?, a WBf who.-e .ost would be many
t h s . that oi the canal.
Ail 4 t i's : cans a great t'.vy. the second
largest m tue world; but better this?whatevei
be its ?.st?and peace than the dark ocean ol
olo'jd whuh singe? over desolate Europe to
?Jhy ?