New-York tribune. [volume], December 26, 1915, Image 19

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FDITORIAL, ART, DRAMA,
MUSIC.
Ntm' $<rrli i?ri?Mne
FINANCIAL, REAL ESTATE,
AUTOMOBILES.
PARTS III AND IV. TEN PAGE?
SUNDAY. DECEMBER 2f,, 1915.
PARTS III AND IV. TEN PAGES.
THE YEAR IN WAR-LOOKING BACKWARD AND FORWARD
The Purposes and Achievements of
the ?Allies and the Central
Powers and Their Cam?
paigns Compared.
By FRANK H. SIMONDS,
Author of "The Great War "
At the outset of any review of the military history of the year, it is
?tential to recall ?neu more two things, which inevitably lose their proper
??see In the day-to-day comment on the war. To pre.-erve a real perspec?
tif? of the value and meaning of the various phases and campaign? of the
wsr it 1? necessary to keep in mind the conditions of conflict, as fixed by
th? circumstances of the war at its outset, and the purpose, as contrasted
with actual achievement, of the several campaigns.
Thus, in the matter of the conditions, the Great War wholly resembles
?h? other coalition struggles of Europe, the wars in which other nations,
wit* relatively weak allieu, have undertaken to enforce their will, in a
military senee?there is no Intention of discussing here the political
?ipects?upon a group of nations collectively larger, richer and more
powerful. Viewed from this angle there is nothing inherently different in
this war from the Napoleonic struggle, and Germany is playing the part
d France.
Now, in such a struggle it has always been true, and German military
sTiters, notably Bernhardi, have always insisted upon it. that the single
vhsnee for victory lay in the crushing of the several foes forming the
coalition against Germany, before all were able to put their maximum
strength in the field. At the very least, they have argued that it wa.s
essential to crush one or two of the allied enemies to such an extent thai
they would be permanently crippled?that is. for the period of the war.
If one i<- to form any accurate estimate of the meaning of what has
.0 far happened in this world conflict, it is only possible to do so by view?
ing the several campaigns that have taken place from this angle. To
grasp the present state and the future prospects of the war it is impera?
tive that the observer answer the question : How far ha? Germany sue
eeeded in crushing any one of her foes? She has not eliminated any of the
four great powers arrayed against her. Ha:; she inflicted permanent in?
juries, which will cripple any one of these nations for trie period of ths
ear?
What Campaigns Mean.
This opens the discussion of the second point. German campaigns i
Issssaarily have been directed with the single purpose of destroying the
military power ?if the nation attacked. Germany has concentrated her
attention upon France, then upon Russia. She is n. w, it vould seem, turn?
ing her attention toward Great Britain, aiming at the Egyptian province,'
with the patent purpose of cutting the lino of communications which '
through Suez binds London with Bombay and Calcutta.
Now to take a parallel: In 1X05 Napoleon, facing a European coalition,
which Included Russia, Great Britain and Austria, and was bound to in?
clude Prussia, as the present anti-German group in this war was sure to
en?it Italy, had to solve the same military problem that faced the General
Staff of the Kaiser in August, 1H14.
Consider what he did. Breaking his camp at Boulogne, which he left
in September, 1805, he swept into South Germany. October 20 he cap?
tured one Austrian army at Ulm. On December 2 he defeated the Russians
snd Au'-trians at Austerlitz, and on December 26 there was signed at
Presiburg a treaty which eliminated Austria from the war. But Prussia
now took the field, and a year later, on October 14. 1806, Napoleon utterly
'iestrnyed the Prussian armies at Jena and Auerst?dt. The following
June he completed the work by defeating the Russians at Friedland and
the Peace of Tilsit, which followed, removed Russia and Prussia from the
fighting line of his foes.
Between the capitulation of Ulm and the victory of Friedland there
intervened nineteen months. On January 1 we ^hall ba seventeen months
?way from the opening skirmishes of the present conflict. Roughly speak?
ing, it is fair to compare the opening campaign of the Germans in France
with the Napoleonic episode that culminated at Austerlitz. Again, there
i? th? sane parallel between the German operations in Russia and the
Napoleonic campaign that succeeded at Jena. Finally tho operations in
&? Balkans may recall the third Napoleonic effort that won Friedland
and produced the Peace of Tilsit.
German Purpose.
German purpose, then, is patent. We know absolutely the reasons
that moved the fcerman General Staff to direct against the French in
HfBjgt, 1L+14. that human avalanche that swept through Belgium and
cam? down to the Marne. It was a deliberate, calculated, supreme effort
si dispose of f ranee before Russia was ready and before Great Britain
Sad begun to collect rolunteers. It was precisely the same sort of mili?
tary ar.d Strategie conception that Napoleon employed in the Austerlitz
campaign.
But there was no Austerlitz. On the contrary, the German army
*as checked, In g hack half the distance it had covered in France and
Paeaed down to trenches from the sea to the Jura Mountains. France
**? not eliminated, crushed, seriously Injured. Anglo-French losses
*?rs rot gieaW than German. The strategic purpose of the Germans
?*d been wholly thwarted. There was no Treaty of Pressburg, and Ger
":?ny wa* not able to turn, unhampered, to deal wi'h Ru-sia, as Napoleon
*d been able, to turn against Pnihsia.
The campaign of 1914, which, roughly speaking, stretches from
'?-?fuit 1 to January 1, which includes the German successes in Belgium,
^ ?ace-I.orra:r.e ar.d Northern France, and the Allied victories at the;
*r.(i in fi?mimtt W!l!- tn? check and counter check at the Aisne,
*ai fron-i a military standpoint an unqualified failure. The German Gen
*? .Staff ha. . *.s goal as utterly as Napoleon had achieved his in
'-isterliu campaign.
On th? pr/litir-al hide Germany had done bettej. She had occupied
!'! ?f Belgium ar.d V.400 square miies of French territory. She still
esa, arrant**?-'mm position?, If she should be able later to resume her
'^rations again?? franca, having dkpottd of Riis?ia. She alho pos-. I
'r*TKh and ?Igian territory industrial and mineral regions of ?
" rr
?"???laU value ar.d t>rnV-ry whir-h ?,h?t r0uld use a. the basis for bar- ,
**olojr( if the war should turn out to be a draw and peare should come,
* ?/ a fcsttM sa the battlefield, as in the Napo!e<,r ?,- fa?, but from
?nation, aa in the Wars of Louis XIV.
?st it la eeeamtial to recognize that the <.pe?ning eaUs?f*jfSj of Ger
J^7 *** ? ?"?Plata military failure, btssaOM it entirely failed toi
"*?**? et eteertrey Frauoe. I
At the opening of 191S German purpose was dictated by the cil
cumstancea in the East, circumstances which arose out of the weaknes
of her Austrian ally. In the opening months of the war, while German
was falling strategically in the We6t, Austria was failing tactically i
the Last. To put it simply, Germany was losing a campaign of in
vasi'u. ; 6he was leing thrown back, but without general route or any
thitii.' suggesting disaster on the battlefield; Austria was being over
whelmed on the field and her armies were being routed and swept Lefor
the Russians in disorder.
The mis-ion of the Austrian.?, had been to hold Ru3sia until Ger
many destroyed Trance. Austria failed. It wa? necessary for Ger
many, before the it?ue In France was determined, to send large force
:o the East to 6ave Austria. She had done tliis, but so menacing di
Russia remain and so weak liad Austria become that it was no longe
?iwSMi'le to give her main attention to the West; she was compelled t
turn toward Russia, leaving her own armies reduced to the minimum o
safety, to hold back the Anglo-French armii'.- in the West.
German purpose in the campaign of 11?15 is thus disclosed. She ha<
bolstered up Austria before the year ended and averted the imm?diat
peril of eollap.-e; but Russia ?as pounding up to the Carpathians, sendini
Cossacks into Hungary, threatening Cracow and successfully maintain
,ng the defensive in Poland, while actually occupying German territor;
in East Prussia.
Accordingly, Germany resolved to repeat against Ru-sia tlm opera
tion she had attempted against France the previous year. Her wholi
purpose for 1915 must be to dispose of Russia, as she had failed to dis
pose of France?to achieve Jena, having missed Austerlitz. If she couli
do this she might still hope to return to the West and finish the worl
that she had been unable to complete there.
The single test of German success in 1915 must be found by examin
ing what Germany did in the light of what she intended to, what she at
tempted to, what she strove with every energy to accomplish.
Check.
Viewed from this angio it is impossible not to recognue that German
failed again. She did not put Russia out. She did not cripple her a;
Napoleon crushed Austria at Ausierlitz and Prussia at Jena. Russia dir
not sue for peace as Austria had a century before. The German militarj
commentators and German publicists like Harden supply the best testimonj
available to prove that Russia is not ready to quit, that she is not so terri
bly crippled a? to be compelled to ask for peace, or even to deairo peace
at considerable cost.
On the other hand, it should he recognized that, taken as a ?Thole, th?.
German performance in Russia was in the military sense more profitable
Once you have recognized that in its main purpose it was an absolut/
failure, once you haw fixed clearly in your mind the fact that what Ger?
many attempted to do was to put Russia out, and that she did not do this
it is simple to estimate in terms of provinces conquered, citie* taken and
battles won the considerable achievement of the Germans.
If Germany had failed against Russia, as Napoleon failed at Leipzig
Austria and Germany would both have been invaded, the war would have
been lost for the (entrai Powers in the present year. And there was
widespread belief in Allied quarters that Russia would win; she had num?
bers, her Galician and East Prussian armies were far within hostile terri?
tory. In point of fact. German failure in the West had brought the fort?
unes of the Central Powers to a position that seemed desperate.
All this (ierman successes on the Dunajec, the Vistula and the Nie?
men changed. At the close of the campaign the Germans had thrown the
Russians not merely out of East Prussia and all but a tiny sliver of Gali?
cia, hut they had occupied all of Poland and most of Courland. They
had destroyed the great Russian armies that had faced them at the outset
and they were now confronted by inferior troops, poorly equipped and
deprived, by German capture, of most of their artillery. By her surcesse**
Germany had possessed herself of all the rreat Russian barrier fortWSMIi
and her own extern frontier and that of Austria were assured.
Allied Offensive Collapses.
At the beginning of 191r" what were Allied hope and purpose? Un?
questionably the Allied public believed, and many Allied military chiefs
expected, that the Grand Alliance would be able in the coming year to
complete the work of crushing Germany. Unquestionably France and
Great Britain planned to open the summer with a drive that would clear
France and Belgium. Russia had every reason to expect that her armies,
far in Austrian territory and beyond the eastern frontier of Prussia,
would pass the Carpathians and penetrate to Budapest.
All the things that the Allies hoped and planned came to nothing.
Russian failure, after the passing success at Pr/.cmysl, became unmistaka?
ble in the opening days of May, and Russian retreat did not end until
September. All prospects of a Russian offensive for many monthc were
nbolishod.
In the West th? situation differed only in degree. German purpose
did not go beyond holding the lines in the West and German purpose pre?
vailed. In Artois, in May and June, in Champagne and Artois in Septem?
ber, the Anglo-French forces won considerable local successes, measured
by men and guns captured, but they were devoid of other value.
Allied failure in the West was determined by the complete breakdown
of the Britibh. In May they were disclosed so destitute of ammunition
that all hope of a spring drive had to be abandoned. In September their
high command and subordinate officers proved to inefficient that a con?
siderable possible success was missed at Ixios. In sum. the British army
failed to arrive, and it", failure dictated the situation in the West,
On the other hand the situation in the West did materially improve
from the Allied standpoint, becauso between the Battles of Flanders and
those of Champagne and Artois there was allowed to the French and the
Briti?h nearly a year to reorganize their military machinery, to provide
the munitions, construct the wall of defence which now bars further Ger?
man advance. It enabled England to raise millions of men. whose ulti?
mate value, when they and their officers have been trained, cannot be ever
looked.
Two Ideas.
Two ideas were in conflict at the opening of 1910. The German idea
was to crush Russia, compel a separate peace and thus be free to turn
against the Anglo-French armies in the Wer>t, as Napoleon turned from
Austerlitz to Jena. The Allied idea was to exert such pressure upon
Germany from the West, and the East that under the combined attack
she would collapse inward. Both ideas failed utterly.
Vet it is essential to perceive that the failure of the German idea
may prove the more fatal in the end, because the German situation is
more gravely affected by the question of time than the Allied is. Thus, as
I pointed out at the start, given the advantage of numbers, wealth and
latent military force, the Allies were bound to win in the end, so far as
historical parallels have any weight, to far at German military teach?
ings of the period before the war were accurate, unle?s Germany could
get a decision in advance of the arrival of a time when the war became
one of exhaustion.
Germany's best chance wa? to w.n in 1914, when she attacked France.
She came close to succesa, but she failed. Her next best chance was in
1915, when p'ne turned against Russia. For many weeks it peemed po?sible
that 8he might succeed in the East, but she failed again. She did not
get a derision, which it was far more necessary to have in Itll than it
was in 1914, for the element of timo was going against her steadily.
Not only the element of time, for had Germany succeeded in France
or in Russia, she might have won the war in the larger sense; that is, she
might have imposed her will absolutely upon her opponents as Napoleon
did after Austerlitz and again after Friedland.
If i- rancK had been defeated at the Marne, if Russia had lost her
main army at Vilna, cr if it had be??n enveloped about Warsaw, the con?
sequence* cannot bo mistaken. If ?h by thinking of them that it is possi?
ble U) get a full meaaure of whit military writers mean when they say
that Germany hat'failed. |
As to the Allied failure, it is not worth much time dismissing th
because there never was a moment during the year when there war- a
chance that the Allied purpose could be realized. If the Allies hut
for a few month* for a decision in their favor in the year, they M
appreciated the fact that the maximum of success was to avoid .:i-a-tei
keep their coalition unbroken.
Navalism Vanquishes Militarism.
There was, however, one Held in which the Allies won a tremendo
victory, in my judgment far overbalancing the local victories of Gi
many in her French and Rua Ian rampalgns. The British fleet Ana
demonstrated its supremacy by meeting and abolishing the subtnan
peril; it assured to (ireat Britain and h< r allies the mastery of the oce
and it drew about Germany a the effects of which are reveal
.n all German new.-papers.
It is not accurate to say that Germany is starving, it may not
possible for the blockade to bring about German starvation; bu* hi
Germany been able to Isolate Great Britain. British starvation WO?
have come immediate!). More and more Germany will feel the har
?hipa ami discomforts that flow from the blockade--more and more the
will be privation; in addition, there i.s and must remain a complete sta
nation of the commote of Germany. She cannot buy or sell in the worl
Her fleets and her factories, her fields and her mine-, are unable to co
tribute through export trade to the eoste Of war.
British sea powi r WM the derisive element in the Napoleonic wai
The British fleet protected (ireat Britain and thus gave one nation ii
munity from Invs ?on. Other nations were defeated in the field ai
compelled to make p ate on iVapoleon'l terms, but Britain kept on t'ightii
and again and I lade coalitions which in the end weakened N
poleon and brought hi downfall.
Beading the battle news, looking at the map, we are ali impress*
with the greatness of German success and the vaatassa of her co
quests. Vet all her conquests are hardly of a greater value than t!
power to UN the sea. If die holds Belgium and Northern France, the
are not of groatl r value to Germany now than would be th? abilit
to use the Ma, and they arc not a disproportionate price to pay fi
British consent to use her merchant fleet again. If Germany cann?
compel Britain to abandon the blockade, she will have ultimately
per.Miade her. and she can only hone to persuade her by evacuatlr
Belgium and France.
The effects of sea power ure not to be seen on the map or in ar
careless estimate of war situations, hut no .-student of history can mi
lake the lessons of the pa t. The triumph of Germ?n militarism, meai
?ng by that the SUCCesl of th? splendid military machine of the German
tas fallen far short of the completeness of the success of British navalisn
Germany's Third Bid.
I have dwelt so far upon the past campaigns because I desire m
Nadara to understand my reason! for regarding the German campaigr
to the present moment ai failures. Twice Germany has undertaken, wit
her fullest military power, to net a decision. Had she won in either CM
as, she hoped and expected to win and as she came near winning, sh
could have hoped to win the war. Having failed, as she did, it was no1
left to German military leaders to devise a method for ending the wai
without losing absolutely, or losing all of the things that had been woi
things that did not in the aggregate permit her to win absolutely, but lei
her far greater in area and population and with a far better prospect fo
the future than she had in August, 1914.
It was no longer possibls after Vilna to win the war by a complet
tactical or strategic success,. It was inevitable that th* war would be los
unless the Allie? could be persuaded by a prolongation of the series a
German victories to make peace, thus giving o\er the idea of imposin
their will upon Germany. Germany could not defeat the Allies, but sh
could perhaps convince them that she was not to be beaten and that i
was the wiser part of statesmanship to abandon the idea of a victory b;
exhaustion and make terms.
It was clear that no terms would include permanent German occupa
tion of Belgium, of any portion of French territory. To such term
neither France nor Great Britain would or could consent. On the othe
'land, it was possible that neither France nor Great Britain would care t
continue the terrible struggle merely to restore Poland to Russia. F rano
might be placated by a re--mm of III I ' and the French-speaking portion 0
Lorraine. Belgium might be Indemnified by a purchase price for Belgiai
Congo, French Congo being the quid pro fate for Metz.
At the wor.->t, from the German point Of view, there might be a genera
sgreement to restore the boundaries of 191 1, save for the cession of th<
Trentino, Gorizia and Albania to Italy.
For their part, Germany and Austria could find compensation in th?
Balkans. If the AI las woald consent to sacrifice Serbia and agree tt
leave Turkey intact, there would still be a real reward for the great
sacrifices both had made and Germany's place in th*' sun would be assur?e:
in the Turkish Empire. But first of all it was necessary to obtain physical
control in the Balkans. Accordingly Germany made her third bid, thi:
tim? for peace, not conquest.
Complete Success.
In her third \enture Germany realized the maximum of success on
the field in the minimum of time. Her diplomacy had prepared thu way
for her soldier?. Bulgaria promptly enlisted, Serbia was crushed, the
weak Allied forces landed at Sal?nica came too late and were soon on their
way back, threatened with extermination. The Gallipoli operation wai
condemned to complete failure by the arrival of German ammunition at
the Straits. The road from Berlin to Constantinople, indeed to Bagdad
and the frontiers of Egypt, was open.
Having laid ?trCSS upon German failure in France and in Russia, it
is necessary to lay equal emphasis upon German success in the Balkan?.
Germany had a decision with Serbia in a brief time. Every obstacle was
overwhelmed in the field, while at Bucharest and Athens German diplo?
macy succeeded in preventing action i which might have imperilled the
whole undertaking, or, in the case of Rumania, enlisted a new enemy,
whose coming would have turned the Balkan affair into a disaster.
Now, this succe-s having been achieved, Germany by every possible
sign indicated her willingness to diseusi peace. She made clear that she
was no longer in the mood that displayed itself in Belgium, in France.
She had given over all thought of s nquerlng either France or Russia; she
recognized that Britain was still unharmed, that there could be no peace
that did not give France back all her own territory and possibly a portion
of Alsace-Lorraine. This mood, this spirit, is the best evidence of the fact
that Germany had appreciated her failure in the two earlier campaigns,
when success might have allowed her to ipaak M Napoleon spoke at
Pressburg or Tilsit, or as Ml em mies -poke at Vienna.
This mood was not in th- least a confession of defeat in the absolute
sense. It was the mood of Louis XIV in the Nimwegen Peace. He had
failed of his grander purpose, bal he had won campaign*, conquered prov?
inces, annexed towns; still, he felt the need of time to reorganize his
army, repair his rni-'akes. Accordingly, his terms were most moderate in
view of the existing situation. I'i the same way German armies were
undefeated and in the enemy's country; but the price of war had now be?
come disproportionate to the possible profit, and Germany was ready, on
her own terms but no! unreasonable terms, to end the war.
The New Phase.
We have seen that Germany has undertaken three great offensive
operations. She has undertaken them because, the advantages of numlers
and wealth being against her. she was empelled te force the issue and
reek by rapidity of movement and efficiency of organization to overcome
the handicap. In this she followed the example of Napoleon, who suc?
ceeded in this strategy at Austerlitz and failed and fell at Waterloo. In
this time Allied inefficiency and inferiority in organization have been such
that Germany has been able to take the offensive at will.
But we have also seen that the first offensive failed in France and
the second In Russia. The third succeeded beyond praise as a military
operation, but it also failed of its objective, for its objective was n-t
military, but political. It fuiled to produce the effect in the minds of
Germany's enemies that sho hons-d to produce, and in cons?quence they
declined all suggestions of peace. As to its military effect, it had
nana, ears as it Immediately eliminated a small Serbian army. It can1
Beginning of 1916 Sees Germany
Fighting for Existence and No
Chance of Peace on Prac?
ticable Terms.
Copyright 1915 ?
THE TRIBUNE-: ASSN.
only have sr. effect upon the Allied military prospects in the future as
it may prove the first step in an attack upon the niltlats Empire either
at Suez or in India.
With the rejection of German proposals for peace, not peace founded
upon German surrender, it should always be remembered, but peaco
butod OB a moderate realization upon German military successes in local
operations, the war enters into a new phase. It becomes deliberately and
unmistakably a war of exhaustion. The Allies have chosen to make war
for the deliberate purpose of crushing Germany, fully aware that they
could have peace on terms which would leave them practically intact
and with no serious diminution of their power. But such a peace would
leave Germany and Germany's ally, Austria, in the same situation.
In making their decision, which is the striking circumstance of the
closing weeks of 1916, the Allies have indicated that they are assuming
'he position which the opponents of Napoleon took in 1818 and 1814;
they are resolved to make no peace until Germany is again brought
back to the limits of the period before the war, until she is deprived of
all the profits of her campaigns, as France was shorn of all that she had
gained in th* war? of the Revolution and the Empire.
What the Allies Expect.
It II essential to recognize this fact and its importance heeausa
all that is to come will result from the decision of the Allies not to mako
peace on things as they are, not even to make peace on things exactly
M they were, fur France expects to have Alsace-Lorraine, and all tho
Allies mean that Serbia shall hav" Bosnia, Italy Trieste and Trrntino.
This determination is based "ton an unmistakable expectation of
victory. Nations do not continue a doubtful war when a reasonable
settlement is to be had unless they are satisfied that mor.' can lie gained
at a price they arc willing to pay. France, Russia, Great Britain and
Italy are all convinced that they can together crush Germany and her
allies. They are so sure of it that they have rejected a chance to make
peace.
Now, it is well to keep in mind during the t ..".* year exactly what
grounds the Allies have for expecting to win. We ?hall then see as the
war progresses whether they wire wrong or nj,rht; if they prove (tj
have been wholly uroiij?, it is certain that they will not persevere in
their course after their mistake has. been established. Twelve months should
tell the story. 1 do not mean that the Allii I will be able to conquer
Germany in that time, but I do believe that if they fail in that time t/?
make such progress a? to be able to envisage ultimate triumph they will
abandon their present mood.
Briefly, the Allies are ?.atisrted that German numbers have besruiror aro
about to begin to fail. They fix at 8.000,000 the sum total of man power
of the Germans, using every known method of calculation. They figuro
that Germany has now lost permanently at least ;!..">00,0oo and that be?
fore spring the total will be far past l.ooo.uoo. They know that it re
ijuires above 3,000,000 men to hold the German lines and that, another
1.000,000 is required for communications, garrisons and other services.
Austria's situation is even mote ?crimis. because her tii?,t nrnties were
routed and she has lost upward of IJbOOfiOt in pri-oners.
No such failing of resources affects the British or the Russians or
?he Italians; only the French are face to face with the Basins mi tune, and
British numbers are coming up to replace French STSlttf
The Problems of Endurance.
Thus Um Allies believe that by spring the Germans will probable
L.c compelled to shorten their lines somewhere. But such .*? ?tep, the
evacuation ?f France. Belgium or Poland, will be the sijrnal to all Europe- -
to the world that the end is in sight. It may come in April, but it
must come before autumn; this is the Allied calculati-n on ?YMch the
statesmen of four great nations are staking ali.
But attrition of men is only half; there is the question of food and
cf money. Germany is suffering?we have Harden'? word for this - be?
cause of food shortage; she is suffering from economic paralysis re?
sulting from the blockade, and she is compelled to find money in sums
disproportionate to her resources, compared with Great Britain or France,
when she has to act as the banker for Turkey and Austria. Add
to the failing of men the hardships and perils incident to eCOtsOSaic and
commercial paralysis and you have a conspectus of Allied calculation.
These calculations may be right or wrong. The Germans deny them
all. and none has been satisfactorily proven yet, but they explain the state
of mind that makes for war. German military writers, public men,
soldiers, are unanimous in their denial of such assertions; Germany in?
sists that she can outlast her foes; but it remain- for the next few months
(0 determine this, and until it is determined talk of pence i- idle.
Meantime, if the*e calculations are correct, a Turkish campaign
?-.gainst Egypt or even India, no matter how successful, will not affict
the outcome of the war, for it will not add to German numbers nor ma
i.rially reduce Allied strength. The fate of the Near East, the fate of
Africa and of A?ia, so far as Europe Is concerned, will be settled in
Europe. Tho decisivo thing is the purpose of military operations and
the degree to which they realize the expectations of those who frame
them. A German-Turkish operation in Egypt must succeed or fail as it
affects the Continental situation.
"Crushing Germany."
Last of all I desire to call attention to the reasons that have so far
acted to persuade the French, the British and the RwSfioi to ?top at no
sacrifice and pause before no German term?, howevi r moderate. London,
Paris and Petrograd believe absolutely that the future of the world will
be imperilled if Germany emerges from this war with thi slightest profit
in territory or population. They believe that only by bringing economic
ruin and military defeat in the most complet? fashion upon Germany can
they make certain for many decades to come their own security and -alety.
The Allies are in the mood that Europe adopt*<i toward Napoleon in
the latter year3 of the Empire. They desire to malt? an end to what they
conceive to be the German peril. All of the .'vines are animated ny tho
bitterest possible resentment, roused by what they believe to be German
conduct during the opening w**vk*? of tho war. They accept the reports of
atrocities in Belgium, Franco and Poland, and they are acting in the spirit
that belief in these things creates. It Is not possible to under.-tand the
war BOW without recognizing this statte of mind. It still dominate. Europe,
it still directs Allied na??onaI ser.timer t.
It is not nec<\-*-nry to share thi? nsOOd Of to approve it, but even in
studying the military situation, and much more in ?bodying the political
situation, it is Sinsntill to take the full ir.ea-ure of it. The AllttM expect
to win, they expect to cru.-.h Germany; but apart from all el.-e, the. anger
and bitterne?s that ?he pa.-t has provoked, the past as they see it. makes
them impatient of peace tall: while the remotest chati M to attain their
main put pose remains.
Another year of sacrifice without prospect of success may remore
much of this passion; it is hard to see how atnthing else can; this is the
point v?her>? peace prophecies fail and Americans, seeing only the outward
a-pi-cts of the war, go astray in their estimate of the true situation. Ger?
many is ready for peace on reasonable term?.; her opponents are not ready
for peace on any terms that leave Germany what she asks and will fight
to keep. Germany's enemies believe they can crjuah her; she doea not
believa she can crush them, but she is satisfied they cannot crush her. ;
8h?, not the Entente, is now fighting for existence.