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EDITORIAL ? FINANCIAL
ATTOM OBI LES Ntw ^tk ?Mwme C EDITORIAL ? FINANCIAL AUTOMOBILES PART m EIGHT PAGES SUNDAY? ?ULY 15, 1917 PAKT III EIGHT TAGES THE NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA First Results Have Only Minor Military Value?The Moral Kffect Upon Disillusioned Germany May Be Large By FRANK H. SIMONDS Author of "The Great War," "They Shall Not Pass" The Russian offensive has two quite unct aaOfOCto: the military, which rerm ?till of minor value, and the moral, wl miy easily bo at the greatest importai In the pr?s-*? t article I mean to disc .?? military and the moral aspects ? H indicate some of the possibilities t aao ??>' r*crcc;'f* nn,v vnat KU!"s*a I Mmg? again. As to the military aspect, it is ne?* ?iry to s a y a. the very outset that th yas been no repetition of the great s cesses of Brusi.off last year, either in early or late phases of the Galician ? Volhynian campaign. Measured by pi crers captured and ground gained, I Russian achievement still falls short t'r? fregteh Boeccao of last April, which ???sj recognized to have been local a without decisive or even satisfactory c< sequences. A year ago, beginning on June ?*?, t Russian armies in Galicia and Volhyr struck a wrioo of blows against the Ai trim armies which brought the latter ne to complete destruction. With the first * ta:k eas'w-;rd of the fortresses of Lut and Pubr. tho Austrian line was pierc r several places. In the early days ma: thousands of prisoners were taken, a' the ultimate consequence of the first su ess was a retreat from Dubno and Lut ??<? r.e of the ?Stokhod River, a retre o? more than forty miles in places ai Mil very wide front. Last Year'? Offensive A renewal of the offensive southward .?gust led to new successes and to tl tnipation of the Rukovina and a portk :'. Galicia south of the Dniester, inclu if the ?-ities of Czernowitz and of Stani ?u. In the first ten days of August tl Russia- ~ on either side of the Pniest? took nearly 85,000 prisoners and a va ??.?ire of material and munitions. Final] 'etwee- June and September the. Russiar ?aprured nearly 400,000 prisoners, togeth? ?.th enormous numbers of guns and ?reat veaHh of war material. All this great success was due to tr (?mplete-.?-? = <- of the initial victory. Afte the fir:-t days in June the question b< time plain; it was a question of wher ?I ??her the Germans would b? able t ?op the R im an flood which bad broke through the Austro-German dike and wa ?wirlir.g f'-ward toward the vital rail road paint nf Kovel. Whm they sur H in cheeking it before Kovel and a *?.-*.- ? -oke out to the southwan *ss\ r ?- lief tinea, rushed on througl Brody I Le mberg. Checked a last le?? (han forty miles from Lern ??r?. ..... through again to the soutl af thi th I ' r and engulfed ne? regions ?Gain? Slight by Comp?ri?on Now, ?>..- a? thp very outset tha '???'?'? '."Tensive in it1-' first day "? ' *'h:rg remotHy ?ugg?*:?tinf m h r- reaaHa of the Jun< If I ???ard of Lutsk anr ?tobno. ]? .-'-.und, just as all of ????ive -?,.,. .;? |?j th?? Weal have Wti | | . r -round, an?i ?? les?, irr.-virtar,?' ground, than thr Brit ?*?? ?'" thai Um Fnneh hetweei W?aons ?' ? ?Itrd in the i -? i priaaonero and a '*?*? **snot ? g? i*,?iow th- Bl -.* la April. I ? al atta--k will be ''??lowed by Othen which will make great ?I p?irh.: ?.,.,, in the Aus t%i'*'- - v, racunrim at Julv I do not ****?***' " bej point to a suc M,ul r' the Austro m*n ' - ?s ha? li it nail fa ?' " all who have follower) Wr-ter?. ? ' " ? irai began. In I an Bur **&'?* w,?h earh hour; it *ai daya he **B there was ?ny ggMmmMaung? ?f the pr>n ?*?*?*?? limit? tl the fcr-aataa a-fvaaeej in *b, l.'IV, m* had a halt ,n two days "'1,y '"' ? " ' 'f the A.yne and of 'h'**''Ni'4!.rr.,,i,-,r?i)|,? '" ' " ' ?7 grave **fr a' t? urne that th?-,e will bo an ?'*tt't4> ?? ?,f the military value of Ru,., *? '>t*te>..?. , whj?h may lead to dis-1 ?ppointment hereafter. The fact tl Russia has attacked when all attack the Slavs seemed unlikely has taken world by surprise, and the additional f that the Russians have gained ground s taken prisoners serves to heighten i impression that we are now to have ?* more Russian sweep like that to a through Lern berg in 1914 ?and towa Kovel and Lemberg in 191?. We m have it, but there is nothing in the fi movements to suggest that any such pr< ress is likely. It is a great thing th Russia has attacked; it may easily that Russia's return to the charge v, be a landmark in the history of the w? but up to July 9 the attack itself has or minor military value. An Old Battleground The point selected by the Russians f their first attack after so many mont of quiet is familiar lighting ground. Aloi the Zlota Lipa Brusiloff began his gre advance in August, 1914, which led t* rectly to the battles about Lemberg ai the first overwhelming Austrian defe? with the subsequent retreat to the Dun jec. ?\t the Zlota Lipa the Russian retre from the Dunajec the following summi came to a pause, although finally tl Slavs made their permanent stand a litt more to the east, about Tarnopol. On th front Count Bothmer made his long ar desperate resistance last summer, wh? his army, alone of all the Austro-Germa armies between the Pinsk Marshes an Rumania, held fast. The present positio of the Central Powers is but a few mil* behind the ground held when the 191 campaign began. The ultimate objective of the Rusria armies on this front is necessarily Lerr herg, forty miles to the westward. Wit unequal intensity the Russian attack ha developed all the way from the Lemberj Tarnopol Railway to the Dniester Rive at Halicz; it has even extended a littl beyond the river to the region northwes of Stanis'au. In this region the Austrc German position is a semi-circle ?Irawn o: a forty-mile radius about Lemberg. Fror this city a number of railroads extern westward fanwise. There is tht Northen Lemberg-Tarnopol line, the Lemberg Brzezany line, the southern line fron Tarnopol to Lemberg, which crosses th' Zlota Lipa just south of Rrzezany and i in German hands west of the river. Final ly, there i=* the Halicz-Lemherg line. Th only other railroad of immediate inter?s is the Lemberg-Rowno line, which come: southwest through Rrody, enters the Aus tro-German lines a few miles west o Rrody and joins the northernmost Tar nopol-Lember-r line at Krasne, twenty miles east of Lemberg. The chief Russian success wa- achieve? just north of Rrzezany about the town o| Kooitichy, which has no very great impor tance of any sort. Similar attacks to Uh south of Rrzezany were not as success ful. Taken together, they suggest an at? tempt to encircle Rrzezany. to draw a loop about it and compel the Germans and Aus? trian? to evacuate it. Such an evacua? tion would mean the relinquishment <>f all of the line of the Zlota Lipa, the south? ern portion "f which bas been in Russian hands sincO last autumn. In 1914 Brusiloff did compel the \,?a trians to give up the Zlota Lipa line, but they withdrew in goori order to the line of the Gnlla Lipa, a dozen miles to the ?-.p'-t, and there made their real defence Of Lemlierg. They were defeated on this line because they were outnumbered and Rru-iloff was able to gel around their right flank and turn them out of Halicz, the point a* which ?he Gnila Lipa ent?-rs the Dniester. No Pre?ent Military G?in Bal H II afctntlal to recognize now that a r.'tireme-it fr"in Bi/ezany to the Gnila Upa would be. of no immediate military consequence. Actually, the line of the Gnila Lipa, which is prolonged by the Bug River north of the Lemberg-Brody railroad, would be a retirement to the StrORffaot position from which to defend LrMBbOtrg Caol jraai all military observ? ers OXpattad that n? ? retirement would ultimately take place when the regrouping of the armie-f of the l entrai Rower* was ?ompleted. It did not take p!?.*e because, the Rumanian episode and the Russian, clUp-e followed suddenly and Uft the i AuBtro-GemnanB free from pressure. j The New Battlefield The ?olid black line shows the battle front. The broken line shows the old frontier between Austria and Russia It is quite easy to understand the siti ation if you place yourself, theoretically in Lemberg and turn your face eastwarr Twenty miles eastward is a highland, on of which flow two streams, the one nort to the Baltic, the other south to the Rlac Sea. At the point where they leave thi highland the two streams are hardly tivi miles apart; together they constitute ; harrier to Lemberg, a line of water be hind which armies could stand with even chance of success that ground could offer Now, if the Russians succeed in forcing this natural barrier ns they did in 1914, it is exceedingly doubtful if Lemberg could be ?iefended, for the next natural line || westward of the town. Ru* at no point ha\e the Russians reached this barrier. On the contrary, they are still struggling to get over a sec? ond natural line another twenty miles to the eastward, supplied by the Rivers Styr and Zlota Lipa, which also rise in the watershed between the Baltic and the Black Sea and flow in opposite directions. I'p to the present time the Russians have not succeeded in getting wfbt of the Styr from the highlands to the Galicien fron? tier, and the Austro-German forces are east of the ZloU Lips as fsr south ss Brzczany. It is only below this town tha they have forced the river crossing?*, bu between Brzczany and the Pniester th Russians have driven m a wedge tha brings them within sight of the city o Malii'Z and of thi? ('nila Lipa line. In the ne\t few days or weeks we ma; -rr- th? Austro (?prmans, under renewe? pressure, go hack to the Gnila Lipa ; the? may continue to hold the west bank of th? Styr or they may retire to the Bug, but even so considerable a withdrawal woul?" only mean retiring upon the position ir which they elected to defend I.omberg in 1 f* 1 -4 and from which they were turned out by superior forces and by a movement jiround their flank and south of the Dnies? ter. Since they expected to make this re? tirement last year and were only enabled to avoid it by the Russian collapse, we may calculate that the (entrai Powers have ??trongly fortified the Gnila Lipa line, and we may look for a desperate defence there. The Best Chance of Pro g res? So much for the military aspect. I have dwelt upon the geography because so little attention has been attracted to (?alicia for the last nine months. What we are teeing now is a Russian attempt to resume th? uork broken off last year?the work ot taking Lemberg. When that work came to an abrupt close last vear the Russian? had succeeded in throwing the Austro Gtrmani out of half of their line along the Zlota I.ipa, and the general view of military observers was that the balance* ! had become untenable, given a renewal of j the furious attacks of preceding weeks. This may explain the selection of this front by the Russians as the point at which to begin operations. Here, conceiv? ably, there is more chance of making prog? ress that will be visible on the map at once than at any other point. A real ad? vance would have an enormous moral effect both at home and abroad. But as late as ' July 9 there was no evidence that the Aus tro-Germaos would be compelled to retire, respite the Russian attacks, and Russian bulletins disclosed the capture of no posi? tions or towns of real importance. Before leaving the .nilitary side there i?. one other consideration I desire to em? phasize. We do know the* there has been disorganization in the Russian army, but we also know that there has been disor? ganization in the Austrian army. We know that all previous Russian attacks have bee.-, followed by Austrian collapses ?5 ? If Russia Backs Her Utopian Ideas on the Battlefield She, with the United States, Will Dominate Allied Councils Copyright 1917?The Tribune Association and the surrender of thonoando and e' hundreds of thousands of Austrians. T may or may not happen again, but it possible. If it does happen we may Ml Russian return to I.cniberr almost withi warning. But if it does not happen. I nothing yet to suggest a repetition of R sian achievement of ?>ne year or th years ago. an<i hence no teason to att? great importance to th? Russian offens as a military affair. Now, on the political an?! moral s the Russian offensive ha<- clear meanir and may have incalculable value. I many months the German people, w .diminishing hope, to oe sure, have loot toward the possibility of a separate pel . with Russia. This has m**ant the prom ' of victory in the war. because it has c? , vinced them that, given iheir submari ! campaign, they could hold their own on t I West until the Allies would have to ma a (ierman peace. And with the troc released from the Ka -t front they coi hope to overrun the Balkans and disp? of Italy, if not of France. Germany'? BUcktwt Moment There have been many fluctuations German views. A year ago, before t Rumanian campaign, (ierman prospe? were plainly black; there w-as a growi realization that victory was unlikely a that a drawn battle was the best th could be expected. But the Rumanian cai paign and the collapse of Russia chang all this, and th?* early success of the sn marine war was a further cause of n< ('erman optimism. But the eornersto j of this edifice of hope irai I separate pea .with Russia, and ?his cornerstone shaken, if not shattered, by the preso Russian attack. The entrance of the I'nited States in I th? war was not of gre."t immediate m ment if Ru re i a should retire. By the su marine the war might be won liefnre v could intervene effectively. But with tl United States in the war and Russia r I turning to the attack, the ?.ituatic changes abruptly and completely. Qe i many has not escaped 0*? immediate dai ger at the time when ?he has incurre 'eventual peril: she has acquired I new f< lat the moment when an old enemy ha I renewed his assault. It is entirely conceivable that the Russia attack will come to an abrupt close at an moment. We must remember that ther is a division of opinion in Russia ove Russia's proper course. A counter-revr . lution may to-morrow r store the po> = i j bility of a separate peace with German? I It is essential to guard against undu il optimism. We have be*??) ?(??appointed to often in the past not to'be warned now particularly when it comes to countff|| | upon a situation as little understood a I that of Russia to-day: nit yet it cannot b an exaggeration to say that if Russia COU ! tinues on the offenste Germany's positioi 'is to-day worse than at any moment. 11 I the war, and this fact must he at no di? tant time clear to the Germans ?Mmselvea If Austria Escapes As I pointed out BOnw weeks ago, th? Russian formula of peace without annex i ation has removed all real causo for wai I between Russia and Auvtria. Given ar ? ever increasing pressure upon Am ?tria by Russia, taken together with I internal disturbances due t<i Slavonic re ?volts, and it is manifest that a time maj I come when we shall MO Austria consider ling a separate peace wi*h the enemies ol ; Germany; we may, in a word, see th? eveape of Austria-Hungary from the mili i tary and political domination of Germany. : Should we see this, (?erman defeat would i be absolute and German aims an?! ambi ?tions bf half a century would be destroyed In Sofia, in Constantinople, quit*? a? ' much as in Vienna and Budapest, the Rus? sian offensive must have its moral effect If it continues. It would ha\e no such effect if the Russia of the Caaes was again threatening Eastern Europe with its might. But this new Russia carries no such menace to Turkey. Bulgaria or \ I tria. A Russia filled with Utopian dreams [ but impotent in the Sold would hardly bring her ancient foes to resign their i conquests and ad*-pt Russian prir.oip -? . ? But a Russia still profaning and p > ing her Utopian id??-?., ??nd at the same ?time strong in the field would de?nre a ; different hearing all over the world. W?s or Rus?i? to Dominate Peace Council Nor will Russia's aUie- be able to disre ? gard Russian ideas and ideals if Russia i is able ts> resume her plnce in the battle ?line. In point of fa?*t. I am ntisft'ed that either the United State* or Russia will in i the end dominate the Allied eotmcfll and ?exercise a controlling influence ?>n the set? tlement of the world eonfliet. If R?sala I does not go on with the battle ?he will ? not be able to exercise much direct influ? ence, however costly her withdrawal may Ibe to all the rest of the nations fighting Germany. If we do not send armies to [ Europe the Allies may he beaten, with Russia out; but if we do send armies our voteo must be heard and our influence must be recognize?!. An.) it is worthy of note that in most respect:* the war aims of this country and Revolutionary Russia are near together. Ru??ia ? Future Uncertain It is idle to spccula'e much about the future so far a? Russia is concerned. We may have a counter-revolution which will place the extreme radical and pacifist ele? ments in contri'l and bring an immediato peace. We may have a t* itimph of the old regime, with similar results. We may have the rise of a wholly new military dictatorship of the Napoleonic type, which ' may make Russia a (root peril rather than a great aid to democracy, even though this military dictatorship is tViindcd upor *ic? tories achieve.) at German expense. To-day we can only see that the return of Russia to the battle line is an event of relatively minor military importance, given the present battle evidence, but of almost incalculable moral weight if it is the authentic sign of settled Russian de , termination to fight the war through. Rus? sia has not yet renewed the triumphs of ; 1914 and 1916; she has not yet given promise of such successes. She has merely displayed a will to tight, which, if main? tained, must shorten the war, as it must make much more patent t?. the world the hopelessness of the German position. Rut in returning t<> the battle line Revo lutionary Russia has nssrmcd a n?le that must not he mistaken. Her voice in the making of peace after war will be com? manding; we shall have a different kind of peace than any we believed possible a year 'ago if Rif-sia keeps on and holds to her present principles. No Sure Fact* ?? to Ru??ia Meantime, it is essential to ke?ep in mind hew- little real evidence we have yet I**? ?guide ris as to Russia, ?f may be weeks Of months before we know definitely what to expect. We have i". the Russian offen? sive only ? promise, brilliant, but by no means ?olid. We have in the Russian mili 'ary achievement noth ?' hut the evi?lence that a portion of the Russian army can light and will. We mav remember that. Vnlmy, on the military "-i?!?* and as a battle, was nothing bul a prolonged cannonade. Koniuchy was incomparably more than this. Vet Valnv oral on? of the decisive battles of the world and Koniuchy may be another. We mu?t reckon with th>* possibility that Germany will now* repeal her triumph ,-gainst Rumania at tie exprMMS of Rus slan armies, which despite all rosy reports ha*. ?? been terribly ?1 i ?orra t. i zed by the rev olution. We may sat the Kai?er in Petro? grad by Christinas, n m saw him in Ruchares? last yea?. ? do not belice the Germans have the men < r the munitions ia ri'-k it. hut thoy mav have. Rut, recog? nizing the evil pouibilitiet, we can the more justly r?cognize the great gain in hopeful possibility resulting from the of ?'??n-ive whi'*h has made Keronsky the most conspieuotis statesman in Europe, one of the very few civilians who have earned lame "tn a war that ha? been so fatal to itatesmen. A I read Ibeos proofs there 1- an? nounced a new Russian success south of the Dniester River and a material a<ivanco in the diiection of Holicx. It is too early to ay how imp.r'ar ' this advance is, hut it i- plain from a glanc? at ?he map that a :??' ful advance by the Russians south of 'he Dniester River to a point west of ?he Gnila Lipa River will in fact turn the e ..f the Gnila i.:pa and the Rug, which I have already deMerilwd. The early report*; ?>f the present Rus? tan advance indicate 'lia', they have rea? hod the Lukwa Ri'.er, but have not passed it. Lour or Uve miles west of the 1,'iF.wa is the Lomnica River, to which the ferm?t*.-* an i A;.-trian** seem now to be/ retreating. This actually prolongs the Gnila l.ipa-Bug line from *he Dniester River to 'he Carpathians. Should the Rus? sians s ne?-e?| ?i ? ? ? .- *h:? river, then hey would he on the flank and rear of all the German and Austrian troops defending Lemberg, and we may see a collapse of the entire Au-tro-('erman front before lem? berg folly analogous to that which followed Rrusiloff's ? ?!? ?<??? :il operation on this .-ame ground in the hattles before Lemberg in the opening days of the Galician cam? paign of 1911. The real test of the Rus? sian success in this ,iew operation about Halicz will be had when we discover v.heth?*r the Russians have been able to pass the I.ornni?.? Rive?*. If. as the Asso? ciated Prcas bulletin announces, th? Au-tro-German line has actually been brearen, we may see some such success as followed a similar breaking of the Aus? trian line about Lutsk and Dubno last year, which wa? the prehnle to the great onrush of the Russians.