New-York tribune. [volume], July 29, 1917, Image 19

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DITORIAL ? FINANCIAL
AUTOMOBILES
PART HI EIGHT PAGES
?ftto ?or?k STntane
EDITORIAL ? FINANCIAL1
AUTOMOBILES
SUNDAY. JULY 29, 1917
PART III EIGHT PAGES
THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WORLD WAR
\ Severe Disappointment to the Allies
in Comparison With Early Expecta?
tions?Hopes Which Were Never
Well Founded
By-FRANK H. SIMONDS
Author of ?The Great War," "They Shall Not Paw"
Measured by the expectations on tl
?nd anniversary of the outbreak c
World War. there is no mistaking th
?hit the third year has been a bitter i
?ointment to the Allies. Recall for
ment the situation on the first of Ai
1916. At that moment the Russian
?j**e in Bukowina and Galicia had
rtsied ?H previous achievements in t
wtrfare on the Allied side. The arm
?jruuk'ff were pushing forward still
Kovei and I.emberg seemed equally in
?-??r. Th ! Russian attack had begu
June. All through July the British an
French at the Somme had pounded on
ing thousands of prisoners, many guns
it last were making an appreciable ch
in the battle lines in France. On Augi
the Italian guns were already active,
??ring for that attack which in a
(iys was to win Gorizia. Already
irorld be*ran to suspect that Rumania
00 the point of ent?rine the Great 1
Men began to talk of the liberatioi
trance, the fall of Trieste and of Lern
*:.d the restoration of Allied fortune?.
Disappointed Expectation?
clear now that none of these
petat were tw be realized in the I
;ear. and it is equally clear that tl
never v a - any great chance of their b<
luli-ed. In the first and secend year
he ??? r German*; had created that Mil
which was the dream of her po
?n.?. af her statesmen and of her sold;
?-??lty years before tha outbreak
he w&t, and in l!4l".-*17 there was I
I to the Allied arms the strength
e;?<, down the treii'h line? which G
Usant ha?i stretched along her fronti
?nd bey? nd. as Rome erected simiiar fe:
lines to the barbarians betwi
the Rhine an?i the 1'anubt.
We saw in this year 1910 one hope af
mother crushed : Rumania laid in ruii
th? Russian offensive beaten down ; 1
/Hied drive for (ambrai, St. Quen*.
Douti stopped on the western .-?ide
Bt paume.
And at the end one saw Germany pi
poaing peace, while the whole world f
tit first time began to question whethi
?fter all, it was possible to conquer G<
**>*?*?; whether, after all, a draw in bat?
tai a white peace were not the limits
Ntai! ?
One m ire disappointment there was
th? Russian Revolution, which was hail
?? rtatoring Ruaala'l battle line to tl
Allies and ;. disposing of the corni]
?Omannff a?e-ts and tools who sought
Mke their peace with Germany and betrs
'?--at Allied cause. Instead, through lor
weeks wt saw Russia, having been redeem?
?T r*\olution. hesitant, doubtful at 1
?kether she should retake her place in tr
??ttle line, while goings and comings 1?
ti'Hn Russians and Germans, fraterrnizin
--ttween Russian and German soldiers i
-he front, all suggested that a separat
r*?tre was at hand.
Th? Turn o? th? Tid?
As the present year ends we see th
??tri of the tide. The United States ha
tr.tered the war, bringing vast resource
ti men and money. Russia ha? returned
?t leaat temporarily, to the firing line. Ii
Germany a political unrest it now claim
?"9 attention, and for the first time then
?? a possibility that what hat happened ii
F?Mia may, in tome measure, happen ii
???nritriy, and that those who made thi
"ar and would carry it on may lie sepa
t***? from the people, who, while they con?
tented to the war, have now grown weary
**?? ?ti lacrificet.
W the year 191?S-*17 ont may perhapt
?y accurately that the btjginnlng and th?
*?*d were the raott hopeful momenta for
?**? Allied caute. Between thete two pointt
'-* a-?m? of tht bitterett ditappointment?
*M military hittory.
Pint among tha operationi of impor
***** in tht latter half of latt year wat
?*? Battle of th? Somma. It had proceeded
?it? fury til through July. When tht
**-h*d year of th? war opened it remained
?**?1 a baffling purzle to all who obae*rv?d It
* * dtttonc?. With ralatlrely little
****** in gtMMM?, tha Brttlab and tha
I i rench armies fought it out for moral
premacy. The new British army, gr?
not yet trained in modern warfare or m
j r.rn weapons, passed through the furn
; trom July to November, from the bio?
repulse of Gommecourt to the triumph
success of Beaumont Hamel.
When the Battle of the Somme \
over the British army felt itself m
than the master of the German an
With the French it had taken 85,000 pi
oners north and south of the Somme, s
the British share was the larger,
had pushed the Germans back in pla<
six or seven miles, and in the followi
spring the German retreat was to demi
strate that the Battle of the Somme h
imperilled German security from An
to Soissons. Had the weather been mc
favorable probably the retreat would ha
come last fall, but when it did come
demonstrated the superiority of the m
British army over what was left of t
old German army?a superiority unm
tckable, but yet far from sufficient to i
sure a speedy decision.
While the Battle of the Somme was
its height Italy struck out toward Goriz
in August, pushed forward across t
Isonzo River, climbed up onto the Car
Plateau, took thousands of Austrii
prisoners, captured the city of Goriz
i?nd won the first great military battle
the history of united Italy. Yet there m
no morrow to this success. On their rea
ward lines the Austrians checked tl
Italians. Trench warfare was resume
Trieste was not captured, nor has
fallen yet, although the spring has set
a new Italian offensive.
A Propitiou? Outlook
Whiie the Italian attack was bei/i
carried forward there broke out in Bi
kowina and Southern Galicia a ne
Brui-iloff stroke. Pushing forward sout
of the Dniester from Czernowitz to Stai
islau?over eighty-five miles?the Rui
sians now threatened Lemberg from th
south as they had threatened it froi
I utsk and Brody on the north in .June. 1
ten days they captured more than 80,00
prisoners, bringing their total capture
lor their Kastern offensive from June 1 t
400,000. Never in the course of the whol
war had the Allied outlook seemed* s
propitious as it did in August and Sep
temper, 1??lt??. And in this time came ih
sudden and dramatic entrance of Rumaiu.
into the battle line. What everybody hai
long expected when it came surprised th
world. Suddenly Rumania declared wa
and sent her armies across the Transyl
vanian Alp3 into Hungarian territory
For several weeks there followed brillian
advances by the Rumanians. Gities an?
ti.wns fell; more than a third of Transyl
vania?all that section which lies bctweei
the outspread arms of Moldavia and Wal
lachia?fell to the new belligerent.
But then came the heavy change. Sud
denly a great Turco-Bulgar-German arm:,
from the south of the Danube commander
by the redoubtable Mackensen, who hac
won the Dunajec the year before, began tc
push forward into the Dobrudja, driving
before it the weak Rumanian guards, until
it passed the railroad line going from
Constanza to Bucharest, and occupied the
province of Dobrudja, which had long been
the object of Bulgarian ambition.
Worse was now to follow. Under i"al
kenhayn, who had been succeeded by Hin
denburg as chief of staff, a great German
army pushed southward, defeated the
Rumanian army in Transylvania heavily,
and then suddenly, almost without warn?
ing, hurst into the plains of Rumania
through the Transylvania passes. Almost
before the world had realized what had
happened, armies from the south and the
north were encircling Bucharest and
routed Rumanian armies were fleeing
eastward toward Russia, while Ferdinand,
himself a Hohenzollern, had taken the
read to exile followed by so many kings in
this struggle.
A Great German Victory
There never wat any more swift, sure,
decisive victory in military history than
; that of th? Germant over Rumania. It
came at a point when German prospects
teemed detperate. It waa won by heavy
i artillery againtt amall guns. It was won
' by veteran troops against ill-trained re
' emit?. It was won by a great nation
which had been three years at war against
; a ?mall nation which had had no war
; training. But nothing could rob it of it!
I moral effect All over th? world the fall
?of Buchar??t wa? taken as an authentic
?ign, If not of German victory, at leatt
of th? fact that Germany could not be
j conquered.
1 Thia Balkan episodt waa term mated l" y
Western Front, 1916-,17
The solid black shows ihe territory gained by the French and Briliuh
from the Germans from the begi.-.ning of the Battle of tha Somme to th??
present time. The thin blacl. line shows the present front. The single
German gain is indicated by the sc?d black patch just north of Nieuport,
where the battle front touches the North Sea. Southeast of Verdun there?
has been no change.
a minor effort on the part of S.irrail
army from Sal?nica, which did, in fae
reach and pass Monastir, but there i
stood and still stands. All hope and possi
bility that the Balkans had held out fo
the Allies in 1914 and 1915, and rinall
in 191R, when Rumania came in. h?.>
now vanished. Rumania and Serbia
which had allied themselves with the ene
mies of Germany, were in ruins, Serbii
totally in the hands of the enemy, Ru
mania for the greater part, and little Mon
tenegro shared the Serbian ruin. Bui
garia had decided for the Central Powers
and her armies now occupied province!
torn from her at Bucharest, and, in addi
tion, lands long coveted. In Greece al
that the King could do was done for Ger?
many. A Greek garrison surrendered
Greek cities and Greek province?, to the
Bulgar, and King Constantine contemplat?
ed a blow in the rear against Sarrail's
army at Monastir.
It was at this time that Germany,
choosing her moment with supreme skill,
proposed that there should be peace, open?
ing the way to an end of the conflict
which should not be unprofitable for ner.
But this German offer was rejected. The
Allies returned to the war, having clearly
foreshadowed a determination to fight on
until the Mitteleuropa that Germany had
created from Berlin to Bagdad and from
the Meuse to the Dwina was destroyed.
Failing thus to achieve her end by ne?
gotiation, Germany had recourse to her
latt remaining weapon, the tubmaririe.
She wat now outnumbered In Europa <jn
every front. Sh? was outgunned in the
Weit. Htr material rttourc?? w?r?j
shrinking at home. Her future econoni
prosperity wa~ being doomed as one T:a
ti')n after another entered the coalitioi
against her and became participant
equally in arrangements that would las
after the war. On February 1 Ger
many announced that she purposed t<
fcink all ships, with exceptions that wer?
only illusory and, for the United States
humiliating. The German decision meanl
one thing. It meant that the German?
believed that only by one method could
they win the war. They could no longer
win it by military decisions, although
they mifv*ht be able to hold their lines for
long months, perhaps for years. It meant
that, the power of the offensive on land
having par-sed away from them, they
would have recourse to an offensive on
the seas.
Hardly had the German decision been
made when Russia was temporarily elim?
inated from the war by an internal revo?
lution which shook to the very bottom all
hat social and military organizations, and
the entrance of the United States into
the war on April 6 could not seem to
the Germans to be a counterpoise for the
retirement of Russia.
German Hopes
In April of this year Germany could
again expect, if not ?ho triumph looked
for at the (??ginning of the war. if not
the decision expected at Verdun, still a
substantial victory following a separate
peace with Russia and preceding the time
when the United States could arrive with
MR arms on the field of battle. And there .
waa throughout Germany s profound op- [
t
Stability of the Central European Empires Still Unshaken?
A Military Victory Still Possible if the United States
and Russia Play Their Parts?Prospects
of the Coming Year
Copyright 1917?The Tribune Astociation
timism, in the mid-st of misery, basad up
on the hope held out by the submarin*
j programme and by the prospect of a sepa
I rate peace with Russia.
What has happened since we all know
As the campaigning season approachec
and the German army was forced to re
tire from Arras to Soissor.s, giving ovei
the ground threatened by the British a*M
i the French offensive at the Somme?
thraatanad primarily by the expansion ol
the British lines and by the never ending
intensity of British artillery pounding?
I we saw at last an actual and considerable
change on the Western front. Nearly
a thousand square miles of French terri?
tory were evacuated, and there was a
forward move of the Allies unequalled
since the Marne.
British Procrees
Yet the limits of this gain were ciearly
indicated. By leaving a district from ten
to fifteen miles deep the Germans had
postponed any possible attack on this front
lor many months. They had turned the
country into a desert. They had destroyed
every means of communication, every vil?
lage. They hacked down fruit trees and
destroyed the magnificent old trees along
the roads. The consequence of this was
that from the Aisne to the Cojeul, from
Solssoni almost to Arras, there had been
created before the new German line a
raoat of desolation, which ha?i first to ne
passed by the builders of British rail?
roads before the army could arrive. New,
after four months, there has still been
r.o attack on this front, save only around
Arras.
Yet this Arras offensive, which flamed
forth on April 9, demonstrated a new
.superiority of British arms and British
weapons still unsuspected. A gain of,
live miles at the maximum on a fron* of
fifteen, 22,000 p.iaoners and more than
:i00 guns, many of them heavy?these
..-?re the fruits of the first British offen?
sive of 1 'J 17, compared with the far more
dearly purchased and, by compariso
meaere gains of the preceding year.
And in June we ha?l a new British o
fensive about Ypres?a new and ?*ompie;
suecos?-, retaking all the heights ritl
to the defence of the German lines as the
existed and necessary to the Allies as th
1 asi? for a new offensive. Seven thovisan
prisoners and many guns?a quick. smn?!i
big iriuiTiph accomplished with the accu
racy of an engineering experiment. Thi
wa.* the third Battle of Ypres and this wa
the final demonstration of British supe
riority over the German?a superiority n<
longer questioned, but not yet sufficien'
to overcome the advantages of the defen
sive in the endless lines of trenches an?
the enormous amount of machine gun;
which the Germans had prepared.
On the French Front
Turning to the battle between the
French and the Germans, the picture is
not the ?ame. When the present war year
opened the French before Verdun were
standing almost in their last ditch. Vaux
had fallen in June, and the Germans had
reached the ditch of Souville. A little
further gain, and it seemed as if, after all,
\ erdun would terminate in a German
victory.
The Allied offensive at the Somme In
July prevented this, but it was not until
August that German pressure at Verdun
bagan to fall off, and in October and No?
vember two French offensives retook
Dounumont and Vaux, cleared the circle
oT hills and regained the vital ground
lost in February and March of 1916. De- j
cember saw the finish of the Verdun epi- ;
sode. A great victory had been won.
In the two offentives about Verdun of
October and November th? French took!
!8,000 prisoners and many guns, and th
victory brought the victor. Genera! Nivel!?
to the attention of the worM. Joffre wa
visibly weary, and in due course of tim
he took the r?le of Marshal of Franc?
and Nivelle succeeded him as commande
in chief. Nive'.le's success at Verdui
raised hopes that he would be able to ex
pand this success on a wider front
France, so long weary, looked forwan
to the campaign of 1917 with much ex
pectation.
This expectation was not realized. Thi
French offensive, beginning on the 16tl
of April, was one of the most cruel dis
appointments of all to the French people
Important ground was brilliantly taken
Nearly 30,000 prisoners, more than 10(
guns of one sort or another, were captured
But the casualties were terrific, and thi
impossibility of a sweeping advance wai
soon recognized. Nivelle and Mangin bar
expected to enter Laon, but nine mues
from Laon their advance was checked
They had planned to take Brimont, bul
Brimont still holds out. They had planned
to disb'.ock Rheims, but thousands of shells
are falling each week into the martyred
city.
The result was another staff cha*?-?*,
Retain came back to command the French
army. The French army passed from the
offensive to the defensive, and the French
people sat down grimly to endure another
disappointment and another winter of
war. By the first of July the French
dead numbered a million; the dead and
those permanently eliminated from the
firing line passed two millions, and one
could say that upward of a third of the
man power of France had been used jp.
in Rust??
After the revolution Russia long lin?
gered in the throes of social agitation and
domestic disorder. It was not until July
that there was a sudden righting, and a
Russian offensive, first north and then
south of the Dniester, revived a part
but only a part?of the glory of 1916.
The Allies, who had expected nothing, re?
joiced at a Russian victory, but even as
it perceived the greatness and the moral
value of the Russian offensive, the entire
opinion of the world recognized the dif?
ficulties in front of another sustained
effort. After taking nearly 10.000 prison- !
pis and a vast store of material?after
reaching and passing the Austrian head?
quarters at Kalusz? the Russian advance
was stopped at the Lomr.ica River in the
third week of July, where it remains
?vhen these lines are written.
We have here, then, the measure of th
year of war. Fir.^t of al!, a grand concen
trie attack upon the Central Powers, begu:
I y the Russian? in Volhyiria and Galicia
taken up by the British and French at th
Sonuna, ?carried on by Italy at Gorizia
and brought to a final climax by nev
Russian efforts in Galicia and the Ru
manian invasion of Transylvania. Thai
followed ihe shilling triumph of the Ger
mans in Rumania. Not only bad they es
caped deadly peril on all fronts, bat in th?
moment of their greatest danger the Ger
mans had levelled a fatal stroke against
? new foe.
The Allied offensive of 1917 was
changed in its character, if not prevented
by Russia's collapse. We have not vet
seen and we may not see such a general
attack as came last year. We may see
a perpetuation of the calm until the tara
campaign of 1018, when newly organ1 zed
American armies and reorganized Russian
troops may be available. Or we may see
one or more British offensives like Arras
and the third Ypres. But despite Russia's
return to the charge, it seems to me un?
likely that there will be repeated the ef?
forts of last summer to beat upon every
front at the same time. It must be rec?
ognized that were peace to come to-day
on the map of Europe the German victory
would be unmistakable. Provinces, prin?
cipalities, cities, swept into the German
lap in the campaign of 1914 and 1015,
remain there still. Even the British of?
fensive which rewon Bagdad and wiped
out the mess of I*. ; ?-'-Amara has only
touched the fringe of Germany's Mit?
teleuropa. Another British army, at the
door of th? Holy Land, is still but a re?
mote threat. From Antwerp and Brussels
to Warsaw and Vilna; from Hamburg
and Bremen to the marches of Jerusalem
and to the upper reaches of the Euphrates,
the German will prevails.
The campaign of l'.'lii was an effort
to break down the walls of the great ("en?
trai European empire which Germany
and her allies had construct??!. As sjch
it was a failure. As such the campaigns
since have been failure?. The edifice still
stands, and if the submarine threat, which
was to bring Britain to her knees in three
months, has failed too, one must at least
confess that the hope of starving Ger?
many has again been postponed another
year, and whatever the extent of the new
harvest Germany has at least lasted to it.
Possibilities of the Futur?
There remains the question whether the
Germans will now content themselves to
evacuate the conquered lines ?to return
to the conditions of 1914?<ir whether they
will insist upon preserving their Middle
Europe. With a Germany in possession
of what Germany now holds the Allies
cannot make peace. Any peace would
be but a preparation for a world domina?
tion by Germany. The military problem
of the campaign of 1917-'1X is unmistak?
able. It must be to break in the dikes
erected about this Central European em?
pire. Failing this, it must be to apply
steadily and unceasingly swell pressure
on the outside that the demands for peace
within shall ris?.? until they can no longer
be silenced. That Germany is war weary
no one can doubt. That Germany is so war
weary that she is prepared now to sur
iender her conquered lands and that she,
i?; also prepared to surrender Alsace-Lor- |
raine, indemnify Belgium, give over Ger?
man Poland seems to me unlikely in the
extreme.
Actually, the German General Staff set
forth for itself in .July and August, 1916,
the task of holding through, and one it
obliged to recognize that, however terrible
the strain, on August 1, 1917, the Ger?
man is still holding through. Nor can
one mistake the gravity of the new sub?
marine war. Germany has been wr?jng
in believing that after three months of
unrestricted submari-ne warfare England
would be brought to her knees, but there
are few naval experts who believe that
if the submarine ravages continue unre?
stricted England can fight much after
October, 1U8, or fail to make peace by
negotiation within a brief period after
that date.
For myself, I am satisfied that we art
entering into the last year of the war.
We may have a military decision between
now and the end of the campaigning sea?
son of next year. If we do net, I do not
telievc the war will be ended by a mili?
tary decision. We shall not have a military
decision if Russia quits the battle line and
the United Stat?*s fails to make a prompt
and great, effoit, supplying in some part
the Russian dafactiOB.
America'? Re*pon?ibilitie?
I bei ?eve a military victory must now
come to the Allies, if Russia and th?
United States do their part. I believ? it
May come to the Allies if the United States
measures up to her great task and her
obvious d'ity. But I do not believe that
the element of time is any longer an illy
cf the enemies of the Central Powers. I
believe that unless the submarine menace is
en ir-d the Allies cannot go longer than th?
end of next year. And I do not believ?
that without great American reinforce?
ments a military decision will be had.
The German army is no longer the
army of lyl4. German resources are
fading and falling. Yet during the war
of the Spanish Succession Louis XIV faced
the great coalition under equal disadvan?
tages and managed to avoid the partition
I of his country and to achieve a peace with
' out indemnity or annexation. If the Ger
mans can last until the snow flies ne?
autumn they may be able to do the sum?
: thing. Whether they will be able to da
; this or not depends very largely upon th?
United States and Russia, and only a blind
and foolish man, whatever his hopes, would
placa great reliance upon Russia.