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The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, July 27, 1898, Image 2

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IB 2 THE SOtf, IVEDNfiSBAY, .JULY 27, 1898. , ' J
HSR .
iHp the New York having conspicuous
BC I bare In the Tlotorr. the reports Indicate that
Jjm I the greatest oredlt will bo to the battleship
jH Oregon and the converted yaoht Gloucester,
Bff The Oregon's performance wai wonderful;
Bih both Bampson and Bchley ear that The
i Brooklyn made a flno record for sun
Bft nerr and speed. If any discrimination
if m to tho relative work of the various vessels en-
I ft sagedcanlmmadoaftoraroadlngofthereports,
iE f ' the lion's ihnro must go to tho Gloucester, oom-
8 1 ft i manded by Lieutenant-Commander Illchard
, III S . Walnwrlght. to whom Admiral Bampson gives
j I'l ; j moat of tho credit for destroying tho destroyers
' t M '" ' Wnton nnd Furor, not neglecting to eay. how-
iiL aver. Hint tho Iowa, Indiana and Texas mado
j M 1 them sufror soroly before the Gloucester
fi jM ended tholr careers.
im The eovornl reports follow;
' p I i Ailmlrnl Smpion'i Report.
" I S ' U. B. FtAcmnir New Yonic. Fin" Bate. )
t 'f . OfTflAtJTIAOO DltCVHA. fllbn. July 15. 1. I
f. i Bm:l. I havo tho honor to mako the follow-
r lng report upon the battlo with nnd the de-
' structlon of the Hpnnlsh squadron, commanded
I " n by Admiral Cervorn, off Santiago do Cuba, on
1 Bundny. July 3,1BT8:
2. Tho enemy's vessels camo out of the har
'J ; r bor between 0:rr nnd 10 A. M.. tho head of tho
I column appearing nround Cay Bmtth nt 0:31.
and emorglng from the channel five or six
minutes later.
8. Tho positions of tho ver.sols of my com
mand off Bnntlngo nt that moment were as fol
lows: The flagship Now York was four mllos
east of her blockading station and about soven
r miles from the harbor entrance. 8ho had start
ed for Blbonoy. whero I Intended to land, ac
companied bysovoralof my ataff, andBototho
front to consult with Gen. Shatter. A dlseus
tonof thssltuntlon.and a moro doflnlte un
atandlng between us of tho operations pro
posed, had been rendered neeessnry by the un
expectedly strong reslstnnco of tho Spanish
garrison of Santiago.
. I had sont my chief of staff on shore tho day
beforo to arrnngo an Intcrvlow with Oon. Shat
ter, who had been Buffering from heat prostra
tion. I made nrrangomenta to so to his head
quarters, nnd my flagship was In Hie position
mentioned nbovo when the Bpanlsh squadron
, appeared In tho channol. Tho remaining veB-
i IW? "' I Ml y"sro 'n or near H'e,r usual blocknd-
j fjtg jl InB positions, distributed In a eeml-olrelo
I Ka? t About tho harbor entrance, counting from ths
' U& ' eastward to tho westward In tho following
& Hi ' order: Tho Indiana about a mile and a halt
I jjsf from tho shore; tho Oregon In tho New York's
' Wk k- pUoo ; betwoon thoso two, the Iowa, Texas, and
I SSr (Brooklyn, tho latter two miles from tho shore
t War ' ' weflt ot 8antla60. T'10 distance of the vessels
I mM.- from the harbor entrance was from two and
I mul one-half to four miles, tho latter being the
I EK ' limit of day-blockading distance. The length
i MM ' ne arc rorme' Dy tno sblps was about eight
( RjK miles. Tho Massachusetts had left at 4 A. M.
w ' 'or Ouantanamo for coal. Iter station
i MjL was between tho Iowa and Texas. The
t kl' tmxlllarles Gloucester and Ylxon lay cloia
I x$ no 'and nn noaror tne riar',:r entranco
I E ' thaD tno lnrso vessels, the Gloucester to tho
Sfc '' eastward and the Vixen to tho westward. The
!jv ' torpedo boat Ericsson was In company with tho
fUgshlp, and remained with her during tho
31 chase until ordered to discontinue, when she
ift" rendered vory efllclent service In rescuing
, 'm prisoners from the burning Vizcaya. I Incloso
I ijK ' a diagram showing approximately (he posl-
I W tlons of the vessels as described above.
II W , SPANISH VESSELS APPEAR.
I 1 ' 4. The BpanlBh vessels came rapidly out of
JM ,' the harbor, at a speed estimated at from 8 to 10
I i 16 knots, and in the following ordor: Infanta Ma-
I ft v ri Teresa (flagship). "Vizcayn. Cristobal Colon
t and tho Almirante Oquendo. The distance be
j , K '; ; tweon these ships was about 800 yards, which
I ' II ' means that from the time tho flrst one became
W, ! j vlslblo In tho upper reach of the channel
H J. until tho lost one was out of the har-
t i T an 'norTB ' only about twelve minutes
S J3- i I elapsed. Following the Oquondo, at a distance
3 ; i ; of about 1,200 yards, came tho torpedo boat
u iip -t destroyer l'luton, and nftor her the Furor. Tho
i 5 armored cruisors. asrapidlyostheycould bring
I M ' their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon
' re: .' j the blockading essols and emerged from tho
X IS" ' I channol shrouded In the smoke from their
II j ' Bnns.
s i ) !t ' "'10 mon ' our nn'ls '" 'ront f the port
i W- ' Were at Sunday "quarters for Inspootion." Tho
B i ff - ' signal wns made simultaneously from several
f tg C vessels, "Enemy's Bhlps escaping." and general
I Quarters was sounuou. The men cheoreu as
1' they sprang to tholr guns, and Qro was opened
I probably within eight minutes by the vessels
li' Whose guns commanded the entranco. The
, , New York turned about nnd steamed for tho
escaping fleet, flying the signal. "Closo In
" ' toward harbor entranco nnd attack vessols,"
,' v and gradually Increasing speed until toward
r i the end of the elinso she was making 1(1 K
I I knots, and was rapidly closing on the Cristobal
', Colon. Bhe was not. at any time, within tho
i " rango of tho heavy Bpnnlsh ships, and her only
:' I part In the firing was to receive tho undivided
$ " fire from the forts In passing tho harbor en-
. '; franco nnd to fire a fow shots at one of tho do-
Btroyers. thought nt trie moment to be attompt-
i tng to escape from tho Qloucostor.
;J 0. The Bpnnlsh vessels upon cloaring the har-
5' bor turned to tho westward In column, lnoreas-
f; InBthelrspeodtothefullpowerof tholrenglnes.
- I The heavy blockading vessels, which had olosed
i' !,' In toward the Morro at the Instant of tho
. I1 enemy's appearance, and at their best speed,
v delivered a rapid Are, well sustained and
R fc destructive, which spoedlly overwhelmed and
; ellenced the Bpanlsh fire. The Initial speed of
J B the Spaniards carried them rapidly past tho
K blockading csbo1h, and tho battlo developed
J K Into a chase. In which tho Brooklyn and Texan
t bad at the start tho advantage of position.
TheBrooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon,
teaming with amazing spood from the cora-
moncement of the action, took flrst placo. The
Iowa and tho Indiana having done good work,
and not having the speed of the other ships,
' '; were directed by mo. In succession, at about
f f ths time the Ylzcava was beached, to drop out
P' of 'the chaso and resume blockading stations.
f K tthese vessels rescued many prisoners. The
I Vixen, finding that the rush of the Spanish
K ships would put her between two fires, ran ont-
tr g side of our own column and remained thero
' during tho battle and chase.
,, j pbajsk ron Tne oixiucertkb.
. 7. The skilful ImmHIng and gallant fighting
! Of the Gloucester oxolted tho admiration of
1, i every one who wltnessod it and merits the
is ? eommendatlon of tho Navy Department. Bho
""!, f ( la a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary ves-
m . f el the yacht Coraalr and has a good battery
W 'l of light rapld.flro guns. Bho wns lying about
y? ft i, two mllea from tho harbor entranco,
m v tl8 southward and eastward, and Imme-
jSy i v dlately steamed In, opening flro upon the largo
8? is ships. Anticipating the appearance ot the
l' f I l'luton and Furor, tl.o Gloucester was slowed,
af j thereby gaining moro rapidly a high pressuro
& i f of steam, and when the destroyers came out
m f- she, steamed fortheraat full speed, and was
mi , i able to oloso to short range, where her fire was
V fej'l t f aoourate, deadly, and of great volume.
I Hk J a During this fight the Gloucester waa under
,r Rf . 1 the fire of the Hocapa battery. Within twenty
'j, Br ' f minutes from the time they emerged from San-
:'. H x " tlB harbor the careers et the Furor and
Ik i, the Fluton were ended and two-thirds of their
KBf I' 4 PoPl9 killed. The Furor was beached and
IK& sunk in the surf; the Fluton sank in deep
fe K'' ' F 1' wter a few minutes later, The destroy-
Ew p f ers probably suffered much Injury from
IE, Bp V. k the fire of the secondary batteries ot
R' &' I the battleships Iowa, Indiana, and Texas.
H K' fc 7et I think a very considerable factor in their
Pj Bj; 1 ' m speedy destruction was the fire, at close range,
ht By' ' K of the Gloucester's battery. Alter rescuing the
L-i Bjj-' i snrvivorsof the destroyers, the Gloucester did
1H 'g v excellent senlce in landing and securing the
K Bj- I ff ?w ot the Infanta Maria Teresa.
h Bf. J, 1 XXD OF THS TEttESA AMD OQUENDO,
y'Rjt 8,' The method of escape attempted by the
f'H t K Bpanlardi. all steorlng In the tame direction
li Hjf ( I psA tD formation, removed all tactical doubts
f B i' ff dlfnoultlea, and made plain the duty of every
MWL i. poltsS iBUUm vaasel to close In, Immediately
engage, and pursue. This was promptly and
effectively done. As already stated, ths first rush
of the Bpanlsh squadron carried itjiast a number
of the blookadlng ships, which could not Imme
diately work up to thelrbestepeed j but they suf
fered heavily In passing, and the Infanta Maria
Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on
fire by ahells fired during the flrst fifteen min
utes of the engagement It was afterward
learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire
main had boon cut by one of our first ehots
nnd that she was anable to extinguish the fire.
With large volumes of smoke rising from their
lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both
fight and flight, nnd ran In on tha beaoh tho
Infanta Maria Terosa at about 10:15 A. M. at
NlmaNImn, six and ono-halt miles from San
tiago harbor entranco. and the Almtranto
Oquendo at about 10:30 A, M. at Juan Gon
Ealos, sovon mites from tho port.
0. The Vizcaya was stIU under the fire of the
leading vessels: the Cristobal Colon had drawn
nhead, leading the chase, and soon passed be
yond tho rango of the guns of the leading
American nhlps. Tho Vizcaya was soon sot on
fire, and at 11:15 she turned Inshore and
was beached at Aserradero. fifteen miles from
Santiago, burning florcely. nnd with nor ro
sorves of ammunition on dock already begin
ning to explode. When about ten miles west
ot Santiago the Indiana had beon signalled
to go baok to the harbor entranco, and
at Asorraderos tho Iowa was signalled
to "resumo blockading station." The
Iowa, assisted by tho Ericsson and tho
Hist, took off tho orow ot tho Vizcaya, whilo the
Harvard and the Gloucester rescued thoso of
the Infanta Maria Teresa and tho Almtranto
Oquendo. This rescue of prisoners, including
tho wounded from the burning Bpanlsh vessols,
was the occasion of some ot the most daring
and gallantconduct of the day. Tho ships wero
burning foro and aft, their guns and rcsorvo
ammunition wore exploding, and It was not
known at what moment the Are would reach
the main magazines. In addition to this a
heavy surf was running just inside of the Bpan
lsh ships. But no risk deterred our officers
and men until thelrworkot humanity was com
plete. BUNNIHO DOWN TUB COLOK.
10. There rematnod now of the Bpanlsh ships
only the Cristobal Colon; but she was their
best and fastest vossel. Forced by tho situa
tion to hug the Cuban coast, her only obanco of
escape was by; superior nnd sustained speed.
When the Vizcaya went ashoro the Colon was
about six miles ahead ot the Brooklyn and tho
Oregon: but her spurt was finished and tho
American ships were now gaining upon her.
Behind the Brooklyn and ths Oregon came the
Texas. Vixen and New York. It was evident
from tho bridge of the New York that all tho
American ships were gradually overhaul
ing tho chaso and that she had no
chance of escape At fifty minutes past twelve
the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened Are and
got her range, the Oregon's heavy shell strik
ing beyond her, and at 1:20 she gavo up
without firing another shot, hauled down her
colors and ran ashore at Illo Torqulno, forty
eight miles from (Santiago. Copt. Cook of the
Brooklyn went onboard to receive tho surren
der. Whilo his boat was alongside I came up
in the New York, received his report, and
placed tho Oregon In charge of the wreok to
savo her. If possible, and directed tho prisoners
to bo transform! to tho Itesolute, which had
followed the chaso.
Commodoro Schley, whose chief ot staff had
gone on board to receive tho surrender, had
directed that alt their personal effects should
bo retained by tho officers. This order I did
not modify. Tho Cristobal Colon was not In
jured by our Arlng and probably is not much
injured by beaching, though she ran ashoro at
high speed. The beach was so stoep that she
came off by the working of tho sea. But hor
soa vahos wero opened and broken, treach
erously, I am sure, after her surrondor,
and despite all efforts sho sank. When It
became evident that she could not be kept
afloat, she was pushed by tho New York bodily
up on the beach the New York's stem being
placed against her for this purpose, the ship
being handled by Capt. Chadwlck with ad
mlrablo judgment and Bank in shoal water
and may bo saved. Had this not been done
she would have gone down In deep water, and
would have beon, to a certainty, a total loss.
11. I regard this complete and important vic
tory over the Spanish forces as the successful
finish of several weeks ot arduous and close
blockade, bo stringent and effective during the
night that the enemy was deterred from mak
ing the attempt to escape at night, and delib
erately elected to mako the attempt In day
light. That this was the caso I was informed
by the commanding officer of the Cristobal
Colon.
METHOD OV DLOCXADINO.
12. It seems proper to briefly describe hero
the manner in which this was accomplished.
The harbor of Santiago Is naturally easy to
blockade, thoro being but one entrance, and
that a narrow one ; and tho deep water extend
ing closo up to the shore line presenting no
difficulties of navigation outside ot the entrance.
At the time of my arrival beforo tho port, Juno
1, the moon was at its full, and there was
sufficient light during the night to enable
any movoment outside ot the entranoo to bo
detected; but with the waning of tho moon,
and the coming of dark nights, thoro was op
portunity for the enemy to escape, or for his
torpedo boats to make an attack upon the
blockading vessels. It was ascertained with
fair conclusiveness that the Merrlmac, so gal
lantly taken Into tho channel on June 3, did not
obstruct It.
I therefore maintained the blockade as fol
lows: To the battleships was assigned the
duty. In turn, of Hunting the channel. Moving
up to tho port, at a distance ot from one to two
miles from tho Morro dependent upon tho
condition ot the atmosphere they threw a
searchlight beam dlreotly up the channol and
held It steadily thore. This lightened up the
entire breadth of tho channel for halt a mllo
inside ot the entrance so brilliantly that
tha movement of small boats could bo
detected. Why the batteries never opened Are
upon the searchlight ship was always a matter
of surprise to mo; but they never did. Sta
tioned closo to the entrance of the port were
threo picket launches, and, at a Httlo distance
further out, three small picket vessels usually
converted yachts and, whon thoy wore a all
able, one or two of our torpedo boats. With
this arrangement there was at least a certainty
that nothing could got out ot the harbor un
detected. Attor tho arrival of tho army, when tho situa
tion forced upon tho tipanlsh Admiral n de
cision, our vigilance inoreusod. Tho night
blockading dlstanco was reducuU to two miles
for all vessels, and a battleship was placed
alongside tho searchlight ship, with her broad
side trained upon the channel In readiness to
Are the Instant a Bpanlsh ship should appenr.
The commanding officers merit the greutest
pralso for the perfect manner in which
they entered into this plan und put it
Into execution. Tho Massachusetts, which
according to routine was sent that morning to
coal at Guantanatno, like the others had spoilt
weary nights upon this work, and deserved a
better fato than to bo absent that morning. I
inclose, for tho information ot tho dopartment,
copies of orders and memorandums Issued
from time to time relating to the manner of
maintaining the blockade.
13. When all the work waa done so well It is
difficult to discriminate iu praise. The object
of the blockade ot Cervera's squadron was fully
accomplished, and each Individual bore well his
part iu it tho Commodore in command on the
second division, tho captains of ships, their offi
cers and men. The tiro ot the battleships was
powerful and destructive, and the resistance ot
the Bpanlsh squadron was, in great part, broken
almost before they had got beyond the range ot
their own forts. The line speed ot the Oregon
enabled her to take a front position in tbechuse,
and the Cristobal Color! did not give up until
the Oregon had thrown a 13-Incb shell beyond
her.
OREOOJl'a BUILIJANT BECOBD,
This performance adds to the already bril
liant record ot this fine battleship, and (peaks
highly of the skill and care with which her ad
mirable efficiency has been maintained during
s tarries unprecedented la the hlntory oX tss-
1 A
sets of her olass. Ths Brooklyn's westerly
blookadlng position gave her an advantage In
the chase which she maintained to the end,
and she employed hor fine battery with telling
effect Tho Texas and the New York were
gaining on the chase during the last honr. and
had any accident befallen tho Brooklyn or the
Oregon would have speedily overhauled the
Cristobal Colon.
From ths moment the Spanish vessel ex
hausted her flrst burst ot speed the result was
never in doubt Bhe fell, in fact, far below
what might reasonably have been expeotcd of
ber. Careful measurements ot time and dis
tance give her an average speed from the
time she cleared tho harbor mouth until tho
timo she was run on shore nt Bio Tarqulno
of 13.7 knots. Nolther the Now York nor the
Brooklyn stopped to couple up their forward
engines, but ran out tho chase with one pair.
Betting steam, of course, as rapidly as pos
sible dn all boilers. To stop to oouplo up the
forward engines would have meant a delay ot
fifteen minutes, or four miles in tho ohase.
14. Several of tho ships were struck, the
Brooklyn moro often than tho others, but very
slight material Injury was done, the greatest
being aboard tho Iowa. Our lots was one man
killed and one wounded, both on. the Brooklyn.
It Is dlffloult to explain this Immunity from lost
ot life or Injury to ships In a combat with mod
ern vessels of the best type, but Bpanlsh gun
nery Is poor at best, and tha superior wolght
and accuracy of our flro speedily drove the
men from their guns and silenced their flro.
Tlils Is borno out by the statements ot pris
oners and observation. The Spanish vessels,
as they dashed out ot the harbor, were covered
wlMi ihA nmnV frrtm thnlrown ffunfl. but this
Positions of United States ships when the Spanish fleet came out. and positions ot Spanish
ships nt the end of the light From a diagram itnt bu Admiral Sampson in Ms report.
speedily diminished in volume and soon almost
disappeared.
The Are from the rapid-fire batteries of tho
battloshlps appears to have been remarkably
destructive. An examination of tho stranded
vessels shows that tho Almirante Oquondo, es
pecially, had suffered terribly from this Are.
Her sides are everywhere pierced and her
decks wore strewn with the charred remains ot
those who had fallon.
15. Tho reports of Commodore W. S. Bohley
and of tho commanding officers are Inclosed.
16. A board appolntod br me several days ago
has mado a critical examination of the stranded
vessels, both with a vlow of reporting upon the
result of our flro and tho military features In
volved, and of reporting upon tho ohance ot
saving any of them and of wrecking the remain
der. Tho report ot tho board will be speedily
forwarded. Very respectfully,
W. T. Sampson,
Bear Admiral V. B. Navy, Commandor-ln-Ohlet
U. B. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
Tns Secbetabt or the Navt. Navy Dopart
ment Washington. D. 0.
Inclnnres In the Beport.
Tho Admiral mado these lnclosures In his re
port: OKDEn Or BATTLE.
V. B. Flagship NewYobk. FimtBate, 1
Off Haktiaoo de Cuda, June '2. 1808. 1
The Aeot off Santiago do Cuba will be organ
ized during tho operations against that port
and the Spanish squadron as follows:
Fibst Squatjbok Under the personal com
mand of the Commander-In-Chlet: New York.
Iowa, Oregon. New Orleans. Mayflower. Porter.
Second Squadron Commodore Bohloy:
Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead.
Vixen.
Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned
bythoOommander-ln-Chlef. The vessels will
blockade Santiago do Cuba olosely. keeping
about six miles from the Mono In the daytime
and closing In at night, the lighter vessols well
In shore. Tho flrst squadron will blookade on
the east side of the port ond the second squad
ron on tho west side. If the enemy tries to
escape the ships must close and engage as
annn nnnnsslhle and endeavor to sink his ves
sels or forco them to run ashore In the channol.
It Is not considered that the shore batteries are
of sufficient power to do any material Injury to
battleships.
In smooth weather tho vessols will coal on
station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or
for other duty, the blockading vessels on either
sldo will cover the auglo Uius left vacant. Very
respectfully, W. T. Bampson,
Rear Admiral U. 8. Navy. Commander-in-Chief
V. S. Naval Force. North Atlantio
Station.
memorandum no. 13.
U. B. FtAosniP New York. First Bate. 1
Orr Santiago de Cuba, June 7. 1808. 1
Aftor careful consideration of tho various
schemes of maintaining an effective blockade
ot Santiago dn Cuba at night which have been
advanced, I have decldod upon the following,
which will be maintained until further orders:
Tho weather permitting, three (3) picket
launches, detailed from the ships ot tho squad
ron euoh evening, will occupy positions one
mile from the Morro, one to the eastward, one
to the westward and one south ot tho harbor
entrance. On a circle drawn with a radius of
two miles from tho Morro will bo stationed
three vessels, the Vixen to the westward, from
one-half mile to one mile from the shore ; the
Buwaneo south ot Morro and the Dolphin to tho
eastward, botween ono-halt mile and one mile
from the shore. Tho remaining vessels will
retain the positions already occupied, but they
will take especial care to keep within a four
mtlo circle.
All vessels may turn their engines whenever
de slrablo to keop them In readiness for Imrao
dlato use. nnd whilo doing so may turn In a
small circle, but without losing proper bearing
or distance,
The signal for an enemy will be two (2) red
Very lights fired in rapid succession. It the
enemy Is a torpedo boat, thoso two red lights
will bo followed by a green light.
I again call attention to the absolute neces
sity of n closo blockndo of this port especially
at night and in bad weather. In the daytime.
It clear, tho distanco shall not be greater than
six miles. At night or In thick weathor not
more than bur miles. Tho end to be attained
justifies tho risk ot torpedo attack, and that
rl.ek must be takon. Tho escape ot tho Bpanlsh
vessels at this juncture would bo a serious blow
to our prestige, and to a speedy end of tho war.
Attention is callod to tho provisional signals
established by General Order No. 0. Very re
spectfully. W. T. Sampson.
Bear Admiral U. B. Navy, Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Force. North Atlantio Btatlon.
memorandum no. 14.
U. B. FtAasnip New Yori. First Bate, )
Orr Bantiaoo de Cuda, Cuba, I
June U, lBttti. )
During tho dark hours of tho night searoh
lights will be used as follows:
The Iowa, Oregon and the Massachusetts will
tako turns ot two hours each, i. t., from dark to
8 P. M and from 8 V. M. to 10 P. M, Ao In
keeping one searchlight dtrecUy on the harbor
entrance, maintaining carefully during that
time their blockading positions. Should a ves
sel's lights fall the noxt In order will at once
take up tho duty.
The picket launch and vldette, stationed
south ot the Morro, will move to one aide orthe
other sufficiently to get clearot the beam ot
light.
Tho vessels on each flank, the Brooklyn and
the Texas on the western side, the New York
and New Orleans on the eastern aide, will take
two hour turns In using one searchlight from
time to time on the coast line, swinging it
toward the Morro, but avoiding the illumina
tion ot the flanking vldetteson ths lnslds line.
Ths light should never be turned oS mors than
a
HriHBHBPBBmBBBBHB
five minutes at a time. From time to time the
horizon outside will be swept
Attention is called to bad and careless han
dling of searchlights. Last night some of the
lights were kept high in the alp and were again
swept rapidly from sldo to side. Under auoh
circumstances a searchlight is worse than use
less. The beams must be directed to the horizon,
and must be moved very steadily and slowly.
Not lest than three minutes should be em
ployed In sweeping through an aro of 00 de
grees. The best war to discover a torpedo boat Is by
Its smoke, and even this will not be seen unless
thee light It very well handled. Very respect
fully. W. T. Bampson.
Bear Admiral U. B. Navy, Commandor-ln-Chlot
U. 8. Naval Force. North Atlantio Station.
MEMORANDUM K0. 17.
U. B. FLAosntr New York, Fibst Rate. )
Orr Bantiaoo de Cuba. Cuba 1
June 11. 1808. )
Bibs When on the blockade vessols will, un
less for some special temporary reason tor the
oontrary, habitually head toward the land
Instead of oteaty y-om it Vory respeotfully,
W. T. Bampson.
Bear Admiral U. 8. Navy, Commander-in-Chief
U. B. Naval Force. North Atlantio Btatlon.
The Commanding Officer, U. B. B.
memorandum no. 18.
U. B. FtAosnip New York. Fibst Bats. I
Orr Bantiaoo de Cub a. Cuba. Juno 12. 1808. 1
Bin: 1. Whilo blockading the Spanish fleet In
Bantlago de Cuba vessols will horeaftor main
tain a blockading dlstanco of four miles during
the daytime.
2. This distance will not be exceeded exoept
by permission or under special olrcumstanoes.
Very respeotfully, W. T. Bampson.
Bear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Force. North Atlantio Station.
The commanding officer U. 8. 8.
MEMOBANDUM NO. 20.
V. B. Fx-Aosnrp New York, First Bate, I
Orr Bantiaoo de Cuba. Cuba, June IS. 1808. 1
Bib: 1. Tho Commander-in-Chief desires
again to call the attention ot commanding of
oers to the positions occupied by the blockading
fleet especially during the daytime, and it Is
now direoted that all ships keep within a dis
tance of the entranoo to Santiago ot four miles,
and this distance must not be exceoded.
2. If the vessel Is coaling or Is otherwise re
stricted in her movements she muBt neverthe
less keop within this distance.
3. If at any tlmo tho flagship makes signal
which is not vlslblo to any vessel, such vessel
must at onco approach tho flagship or repeat
ing vosaol to a point where she can read the
signal.
4. Disregard of tho directions which have al
ready been given on this head has led to end
less confusion. Many times during tho day tho
floct Is so scattered that It would bo perfectly
possible for the enemy to corao out ot the har
bor and meet with very little opposition.
5. The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict
attention will bo given this order. Vory re
spectfully. W. T. Bampson.
Bear Admiral. U. S. Navy, Commander-ln-
Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantio
Btatlon.
The Commanding Officer. U. 8. S. .
commodore scnLEx's bepobt.
This Is Commodore Behloy's report:
North Atlantic Fleet. Second Squadron, )
U. S. Flagship Brooklyn,
Guantanamo Bat. Cuba, July 0, 1808. )
Bib: 1. I have the honorto make tho following
roport of that part of tho squadron under your
command which came under my observation
during the engagement with the Spanish fleet
on July 3. 1808.
2. At 0:35 A.M. Admiral Cervera, with the
Infanta Maria Theresa. Vizcaya, Oquendo,
Cristobal Colon andtwotorpodo boat destroyers
came out of the harbor of Santiago do Cuba In
column at dlstanco and attempted to escape to
the westward. Signal was made from tho Iowa
that the enemy was coming out. but his movo
ment had been discovered from this ship at the
came moment. This vessel wai tho furthest
west except tho Vixen. In the blockading line ;
signal was mado to tho western division as pre
sorted In your general orders and thero was
immediate and rapid movoment Inward by
your squadron and a general engagement at
ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying
to 3,000 until the Vizcaya was dostroyed about
10:50 A.M. Tho concentration of tho flro of
the squadron upon the ships coming out was
most furious and terrlilo and great damage was
done them.
3. About twenty or twenty-flvewnlnutes after
tho engagement began two vessels, thought to
be the Teresa and Oquendo, and since verified
as such, took Are from tho effective shell Ore of
the squadron and were forced to run on the
beach some six or seven miles west of tho har
bor entranoe, where they burned and blew up
later. The torpedo boat destroyors wore des
troyed early in the action, but the smoke was
bo dense In their direction that I cannot Bay to
which vessel or vessels the credit belongs.
This, doubtless, was better seen from your
flagship.
4. Tho Vizcaya and Colon, perceiving the dis
aster to their consorts, continued at full speed
to tho westward to escape, and were followed
and engaged In a running Acht with tho Brook
lyn, Texas, Iowa and Oregon until 10:50, when
the Vizcaya took Are from our shells. Sho put
her holm to port, nnd with a heavy list to
port stood In shore and ran aground
at Aserradero, about twenty-ono miles west
of Santiago, on fire fore and aft and
where sho blow up during the night.
Observing that she had struck her colors,
and that several vossols were nearlng her to
capture and save her crow, signal was made to
ceaso llring. Tho Oregon having provod vastly
faster than tho othor battleships, sho nnd tho
Brooklyn, togethor with tho Toxasand another
vessol, which provod to be your flagship, con
tinued westward In pursuit of tho Colon, which
bad run close in shore, evidently seeking some
good spot to beach If sho should tali to elude
htr pursuoss.
t. This pursuit continued with Incroaslng
speed In the Brooklyn. Oregon and other ships,
and soon tho Brooklyn and the Oregon wero
within long rango ot tho Colon, when tho Ore
gon opened Aro with her 13-lnch guns, landing
a shell close to the Colon. A moment after
ward the Brooklyn opened llro with her fl
inch guns, landing a shell just nhead of hor.
Several other sholls wero Ared at tho
Colon, now In range ot the Brooklyn's
and Oregon's guns. Her commander. Boe
ing nil chances ot escape cut off and
destruction awaiting his ship, Ared a lee gun
and struck her Aug at 1:15 P. M and ran
ashore at a point some fifty miles west of San
tiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up
rapidly at the time, as were also tha Texas and
Vixen. A little later, after your arrival, the
Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the
Brooklyn and the Oregon, was turned over to
you as one ot the trophies ot this great victory
ot the squadron under your command.
0. During my official visit a little later. Com
mander Eaton ot the Itesolute appeared and
reported to you the presenoe of a Spanish bat
Ueshlpnear Altares. Your orders to me were
to take the Oregon Brooklyn? and go east
ward to meet her, and this was done by the
Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel report
ed as an enemy was discovered to be the Aut
Itrian cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, seeking the
Oommander-ln-Ohlef.
7. 1 would mention loi your oontldtraUoa
HOBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBi
that the Brooklyn occupied ths most westward
blockading position with tho Vixen, and being
more directly In tho routo taken bx1tho,8pantsh
squadron, was exposed for some minutes, pos
sibly ten, to the gun Are of three of ths
Spanish ships and the west battery at a
range ot fifteen hundred yards from the
ships and about three thousand yards from
the batteries, but the vessels of the entire
squadron closing In rapidly soon diverted this
flro and did magnificent work at close range.
I have never before witnessed such deadly and
fatally accurate shooting as was done by the
ships of your command as thoy closed In on tho
Spanish squadron, and I doom It a high priv
ilege to commend to you for such action as you
may deem proper the gallantry nnd dashing
oourago, the prompt decision, and tho skilful
handling ot their rospeotlvo vessols ot
Capt Philip, Capt Evans, Capt. Clark, and
especially of my chief of staff, Capt Cook, who
was directly under my personal observation,
and whoso ooolness. promptness, and courage
were ot tho highest ordor. The dense smoko
of the combat shut out from my view the Indi
ana and the Gloucester, but as these vessels
wore closer to your flagship, no doubt tholr
part in the confltot was under your immediato
observation.
8. Lieut. Sharp, commanding ths Vixen,
acted with oonspiouous courago; although
unable to engage tho heavier ships of the
cnomywlth bis light guns, nevertheless was
close in to the battle line under heavy flro, nnd
many ot the enemy's shot passed beyond his
vessel.
0. I bog to Invite special attention to tho con
duct ot my Flag Lieutenant James II. Bears,
and Ensign Edward UaCnuler. Jr.. aide, who
were constantly at my side during the engage
ment and who exposed themselves fearlessly In
discharging. their dutlos; and also to tho splen
did behavior of my Booretary, Lieut. B. W.
Wells, Jr., who oommandod and dlreotod tho
fighting ot the fourth division with splendid
effect
10. 1 would commend ths highly meritorious
conduot and courage in tho engagement ot
Lloutennnt-Commandor N. E. Mason, the ex
ecutive offioer, whoso presence everywhere
over the ship during Its contlnuanoo did much
to secure the good result of this ship's part In
the victory.
11. The navigator. Lieut A. 0. Hodgson, and
the division officers, Lieut T. D. Griffin. Lieut
W. B. Bush. Lieut Edward Simpson, ILIout. J.
G. Doyle. EnBlgn Charles Webster, and tho
junior divisional officer were most steady ond
conspicuous In every detail of duty, contribut
ing to the accurate firing of this ship in hor
part ot the great victory of your forces.
12. Tho oflloers of the Medical. Pay and En
gineer and Marine corps responded to ovory
demand of the occasion and wero fearless in
exposing themselves. The warrant officers.
Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H.
Warford and Gunner F. T. Applegate, wore
everywhere exposed In watching for damage,
reporta of whloh wore promptly conveyed to
me.
I neves arm vxd wrrn a. braver crew.
13.1 havo never In my life served with a braver,
bettor or worthier orew than that ot the Brook
lyn. During the combat, lasting from 0:35
until 1:15 P.M., much of the tlmo under Are,
they never flagged for a moment and wero ap
parently undisturbed by tho storm of projec
tiles passing ahead, astern and over the ship.
14. The result of tho engagement was tho
destruction ot tho Spanish squadron and tho
capture ot the Admiral and some thirteen to
fifteen hundred prisoners with the loss of sev
eral hundred killed, estimated by Admiral
Cervera at 000 men.
15. The casualties on board this ship woro:
G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns,
fireman, flrat class, severely wounded. Tho
marks and scars show that tho ship was struck
about twenty-flve times and she bears in all
forty-one scars os tho result of her participa
tion In the groat victory of your force on July
3, 1808. Tho Bpoed-cono halliards woro shot
away and nearly all the signal halliards. The
ensign at the main was so shattered that In
hauling It down at the close of the action It-fell
In plecos.
VICTORY "BIO ENOUGH rOB ALL Or US."
10. I congratulate you most sincerely upon
this great victory to the squadron under your
command, and I am glad that I had an oppor
tunity to contribute In the least to a victory
that seems big enough for all of us.
17. I havo tho honor to transmit herewith
tho report ot the commanding officer and a
drawing in profile of the ship showing the lo
cation of hits and scars; also a memorandum
of tho ammunition expended and the amount
to fill her allowance.
18. Since reaching this place and holding
conversation with sevoral of the Captains, viz.,
Capt. Eulate ot the Vizcaya and the second in
command of tho Colon, Commander Controras,
I have learned that the Spanish Admiral's
echemo was to concentrate all flro for a while
on the Brooklyn, and for tho Vizcaya to rnm
her. In hopes that It they could destroy her the
chance ot escape would be Increased, as it was
supposed Bho was tho swiftest ship ot your
squadron. This explains the heavy flro men
tioned and the Vlzcaya's action in the oarller
moments ot the engagement The execution
ot this Purpose was promptly defeated by iho
fact that all tho ships of tho squadron ad
vanced into olote range and opened an irre
sistibly furious ond torrlflo Are upon the ene
my's squadron as It was coming out of the har
bor. 10. 1 am glad to say that the injury supposed
to be below the water line was due to a water
valve being opened from some unknown cause
and flooding the compartment. The Injury to
the belt Is found to be only slight and the leak
small.
20. 1 beg to inolose a list of the officers and
crew who participated in the combat of July 3,
1808.
21. I cannot olose this report without men
tioning In high torms of praise the splendid
conduct and support ot Capt. 0. E. Clark of the
Oregon. Her speed was wonderful and her ac
curate fire splendidly destructive. Very re
spectfully, W. 8. Schlkt,
Commodore. United States Navy, commanding
second squadron. North Atlnntlo fleet
The Commnnder-ln-Chlot United States naval
foroe. North Atlantio station.
Capt. Evans's Beport.
This is the report of Capt. Evans of the Iowa:
U. B. B, Iowa. First Bate. i
Orr Santiago deCuba. Cuba.July 4, 1808. J
Sir: I havo tho honor to make the following
roport of the engagement with the Bpanlsh
squadron off Bantlago de Cuba on tho 3d ot
July:
1. On the morning of the 3d, while the crew
was at quarters for Sunday Inspection, the
leading vessel ot the Bpanlsh squadron was
sighted nt 0:31 o'clock coming out of tho har
bor of Bantlago de Cuba. Signal "Enemy's
ships coming out "wot Immediately hoisted,
and a gun fired to attract attention. Tho cnll
to general quartors was sounded Immediately,
the battery made ready for firing, and the en
gines rung full speed ahead.
2. The position of this vessol at tho time of
sighting the squadron was the usual blookad
lng station off the entranoo of the harbor:
Morro Castle bearing about north, and distant
about three to four miles. The steam at this
time In ths boilers was sufficient for a speed of
five knots.
3. Aftor sighting the leading vessel, the In-
You Can
Get Tired
By worldntr hard, and then you can tret
rested again. But If you aro tired all the
time It means that your blood is poor.
You need to take Hood's Barsaimrllla, the
(Treat cure for that tired feeling because
it is thecreatenrlcher and vitalizerof tho
blood. You will And appetite, nerve,
mental and digestive strength in
Hood's Sarsaparilla
America's OreaUtt Medicine,
HoaJrai4ttM&aseladiiftUoii, 2&.
BBBBBBBBBBBBMBBBHi
fanta Maria Teresa Admiral Cerrera's flag
ship). It wat observed that she was followed in
succession by the remaining three vessels of
the 8p4nlsh squadron, tho Vizcaya. Cristobal
Colon and Almlranto Oauendo. The Bpanlsh
shins moved at a speed of about eight to ten
knots, which was steadily Increased as they
cloared the harbor entranoe and stood to the
westward. They maintained a distance of
about 800 yards between vessels. Tho squad
ron movod with precision and stations wero
well kopt
4. Immediately upon sighting the leading
vessel Arcs wero spread, and the Iowa headed
toward the loading Spanish ship. About 0:40
the flrst shot waa Ared from this ship, at a dls
tanco of about 0,000 yards.
Tho course of this vessol wat so laid that the
range spoedlly diminished. A number of shots
wore fired at ranges varying between 0.000 and
4,000 yards. Tho range was rapidly reduoed to
2.500 yards, and subsequently to 2,000 and to
1,200 yards.
5. When It was certain that tho Maria Teresa
would pass ahead of us. tho helm was put to
starboard and the starboard broadside deliv
ered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was
then put to port and tho ship hendod across
tho bow of tho second skip, and as she drew
ahead tho holm was again put to starboard,
and sho received in turn the full wolght ot our
starboard broadside at a rango of about 1,800
yards. Tho Iowa was again headod off with
port holm for the third ship, and as she ap
proaohod tho helm was put to starboard until
our courso was approximately that ot the Span
ish ship. In this position, at a rango of 1,400
yards, tho Aro ot tho entire battery. Including
rapid-Are guns, was poured Into the enemy's
ship.
0. About 10 o'clock tho enemy's torpedo-boat
destroyors Furor and Pluton wore observed to
havo loft tho harbor and to be following the
Bpanlsh squadron. At tho tlmo that thoy were
observed, and. In fact most of the time that
they wore under Are, thoy wero at a distance
crying from 4.500 to 4,000 yards. As soon
as they woro discovered tho secondary battery
of this ship was turned upon them, whilo ths
main battery continued to engage the Vizcaya,
Oquendo and Maria Teresa.
The Are of tho main battery of this ship
when tho range was below 2,500 yards was
most effective and destructive, and after a con
tinuance of this flro for perhaps twenty min
utes It was noticed that the Maria Teresa and
Oquendo woro in flames and woro being head
ed for the beach. Their colors wero struck
about 10:20. and thoy were beached about
eight miles west of Santiago.
7. About the samo time (about 10:25) the Are
of this vessel, togethor with that of Hie
Gloucester and another smaller vessel, proved
bo destruotive thatono of the torpedo boat de
stroyors (Pluton) was sunk, and the Furor
was so much damaged that she was run upon
tho rocks.
YIZCATA BTBIXES HEB COLORS.
8. Aftor having passed, at 10:35. the Oquendo
and Maria Teresa on flro and ashore, this ves
sel conttnuod to chaso and Are upon the Viz
cayn until 10:38. when tho signal to ooose firing
was sounded on board. It having been discov
ered that the Vizcaya had struck her colors.
0. At 11 the Iowa arrived in tho vicinity of
the Vizcaya, which had been run ashoro, and
as It was evident that she could not catch the
Cristobal Colon, and that the Oregon. Brook
lyn and Now York would, two steam cutters
and threo cutters wore Immediately holstod
out and sent to tho Vizcaya to rescue her crow.
Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large
numbor of officers and men of that ship's com
pany nnd placing many of them on board tho
torpedo boat Ericsson and the auxiliary de
spatch vessol Hist
10. About 11:30 the New York passed in chase
of the Cristobal Colon, which was endeavoring
to escape from tho Oregon, Brooklyn, and
Texas.
11. Wo reoelved on board this vessel from
tho Vizcaya Capt. Eulato, the commanding offi
cer, and twenty-three officers, together with
about 248 petty oflloers and men, ot whom
thirty-two were wounded. There were also
received on board Ave dead bodies, which were
immediately buried with the honors duo to
their grade.
12. The battery behaved well in all respeots,
thodnshpot ot the forward 12-inoh gun, dam
aged In the engagement of the 2d. having been
replaced tho same day by one of the old dash
pots, which gavo no trouble during this en
gagement. 13. Tho following is an approximate state
ment of the ammunition expended during the
engagement. A more exact statement cannot
bo given at this tlmo :
31 12-Inch seml-A. P. shell, with full oharges.
35 8-Inch common shell, with full charges.
251 4-Inch cartridges, common shell.
1.050 0-pounder cartridges, common shell.
100 1-poundor cartridges, common shell.
INJURIES TO THE IOWA.
14. This ship was struck in tho hull, on the
starboard side, during the early part ot the en
gagement by two projectiles of about U-lnch
calibre, one striking the hull two to throe feet
above the actual water lino and almost
directly on tho line of tho berth deck,
piercing the ship's sldo between frames
0 and 10, and ths othor piercing tha side
and the coffer dam botween frames 18 and
The first projectile did not pass beyond the
Inner bulkhead of the coffer-dam A 41-43. The
hole made by It was largo and ragged, being
about sixteen Inches in a longitudinal direction
and about seven inchos in a vertical direction.
It struck with a slight inclination aft and per
forated the cofferdam partition bulkhead (A
41-43. 45-47.) It did not explode, and remained
in the coffor-dam.
The second projectile pierced the side ot the
ship and the coffer-dam A 105, the upper edge
of the hole bolng immediately below the top of
the coffer-dam, on the berth deck. In compart
ment A 104. Tho projectile broke off the
hatch plate and coaming of the water
tank compartmont exploded and perforat
ed the walls of the chain locker. The
explosion created a small fire, which was
promptly extinguished. The hole In tho sldo
mnde by this projectile was about Ave feet nbovo
tho water line, and about two to three ffet
above tho berth deck. One fragment of this
sholl struck a link of ths sheet-chain, wound
around tho 0-pounder ammunition holtt cut
ting the link in two. Another perforated the
coffor-dam on tho port side and slightly dished
the outsldo plating.
Theso two wounds, fortunately, were not of
Berious Importance, Two or throe other pro
jectiles ot small calibre struck about the upper
bridge and smokestacks. Inflicting trifling
damage, and four othor small projoctiles
struck tho hummock nettings and the side aft.
15. There aro no casualties among the ship's
company to report. No officer nor mon was In
jured during tho engagement.
18. Aftor having received on board the res
cued crew of tho Vizcaya. this vessol proceeded
to the eastward and resumod the blockading
station In obedience to the signal made by the
Commandor-ln-Chlot about 11:30.
17. Upon arriving on tho blockading station
the Gloucester transferred to this vossol Bear
Admiral Cervora. his Flag Lieutenant and the
commanding officers of the torpedo-boat do
stroyers Furor and Pluton, and also one man of
the Oquondo's crow rescued by the Gloucester.
18. Naval Cadets Frnnk Taylor Evans and
John E. Lewis and flvo men belonging to tho
Massachusetts were on board the Iowa when
the enemy's ships camo out They were sta
tioned at different points and rendered efficient
service.
10, Tho oflloers and men of this shlphehaved
admirably. No set of men could have done
more gallant senlce. I take pleasure In stating
to you. sir, that the coolness and judgmentof
the executive officer. Lleutenant-Commander
Itaymond P. Itodgers. deserves, and will. I
hope, receive a propor reward at the hands' of
the Government. The test of the executive
officer's work is the conduct of ship and crew
in batUe ; in this case it was simply superb,
The coolness of the navigator, Lieut W H
Bchuetxe.and of Lieut F.K. Hill, in charge of
the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are
worthy of the greatest commendation. Other
officers of ths ship did not coat uadti tar par.
eonal observation, but ths remit ot ths action U
shows how well they did their duty. m
"OENTLB AS AMERICAN WOMXN." TO.
I cannot express my admiration for my mas "W
nlflcent crew. Bo long as tho enemy showed 9
his flag they fought Hko Amorloan seamen ; but M
when the flag came down they were as gentle
and tender as Amorlcan women. H
20. In conclusion, sir, allow me to oongratn- M
late you on the complete victory achieved br W
your fleet Very respectfully, H
It D. Evans. H
Captain, U. 8. Navy, commanding, H
To the Oommandor-tn-Chlet U. B. Naval (
Force. North Atlantio Btatlon. H
Capt. Clark's Ileport. HJ
U. 8. B. OnEooN First Bats. 1 H
Orr Bantiaoo de Cuba, July 4. 1808. I
Bin: 1. 1 havo tho honor to roport that at 0:30 HJ
A. M. yesterday tho Spanish fleot was dlscov- HJ
end standing out of the harbor ot Bantlago da (B
Cuba. Thoy turned to tho wostward and MB
opened fire, to which our ships replied vigor- JsJ! .
ously. For a short tlmo thore was an almost 'ljjf
continuous flight ot projectiles over this thin, H
but when our line was fairly engaged, and the
Iowa bod made a swift advanco as It to ram or H
closo, tho enemy's flro bocamo defecttvo tn H
train at well as rango. Tho ship wns only to
struck three times, and nt least two of them D
wore by fragments ot thellt. We had no H
casualties. D
2. As toon as it waa evident that the enemy's
ships wero trying to break through and escape il
to the westward we went ahead at full speed m
with tho dotormlnatlon of carrying out to the H
utmost your order: "If tho enemy tries to w
escape, the ships must close and engage as soon
as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or .
force them to run ashore." We soon passed all 'fl
of onr ships except the Brooklyn, bearing tha Bj
broad pennant of Commodoro Bohley. At flrst JH
we only used our main battery, but when It was ffl j
discovered that tho onemy'a torpedo boat were B t
following their ships we used our raptd-flro B
guns as well as the 0-Inch upon them with tell jjj '
lng effect. M
As wo ranged up near the sternmott of their n
ships she headod for the beach, evidently on HI
flro. Wo raked her as wo passed, pushing on for ji '
the next ahead, using our starboard guns aa jtl
thoy woro brought to bear, and before we had m
her fairly abeam she, too. was making for tho m
beach. The two remaining vessels were now fa
some distance ahead, but onr speed had In- eu
creased to 10 knots, and our flro, added to that W
of theBrooklyn, soon sentanothor, the Vizcaya, 9
to tho shore in t flames. Only tho Cristobal Jjj
Cblon'was'loft. and for a time It seemed as If sho ffl
might escape, but when we opened with our m
forward turret guns and the Brooklyn followed H
she began to edge In toward the coast and hor m
capture or destruction was assured. As she B
struck the beaoh her flag came down and ths U
Brooklyn signalled "Ceaso firing." followlns H
with, " Congratulations for ths Brand victory I n
Thanks for your splendid assistance." fil
3. The Brooklyn sent a boat to her, and when Jl
the Admiral came up with the New York, J
Texas, and Vixen sho was taken possession of. M
A prize crow was put on board from this ship fl
under Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell, tho ffi
executive offlcor. but bof ore 11 P.M. the ship, &
whloh had been filling in spite of all efforts to
stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as tho W
crew loft sho went over on her side. 1
enthusiasm on the obeoon. M
4. I cannot speak in too high terms of tha
bearing and conduct of all on board this ship. J
When they found tho Oregon had pushed to tho B
front and was hurrying to a succession of oon- J
fllcts with the enemy's vessels If they could bo HI
overtaken and would engage, their enthusiasm H
was Intense. II
5. As these vessels were so muoh more hear- JS
lly armored than the Brooklyn, they might
havo concentrated upon and overpowered her.
and consequently I am persuaded that but for a
the way tho oflloers and mon of the Oregon !
etenmed and steered the ship and fought and
supplied her batteries, the Colon, and perhaps M
the Vizcaya, would have escaped. Therefore I a
feel that they rendered meritorious service to Jv.
the country, and while I cannot mention the yy
name of oach offioer and man individually,-! am ,j
going to append a list of the officers, with their U
stations that thoy oocupled, hoping that they y
may bo of service to them should the claims of Vt
others for advancement above them ever be ;
considered.
J. E. Cooswell. Lieutenant-Commander ; had ft
general charge of the batteries. K
B. F. NicnoLsoN. Lieutenant: handled tho ?j
ship, plaolng her as I dlreotod. 1
W.H.Allen. Lieutenant; In charge ot am- N
munition supply. In
A. A. AcxERMAif. Lieutenant: in charge ot n
aftor 13-lnch turret.
E. W. Ebeble. Lieutenant jr. gr. ; In charge ot
forward 13-lnoh turret n
C. JL Stone. Lieutenant ir. or. : in chares of M
0-Inch battery. B
L. A. Bosiwicx. Ensign; aloft giving ranges m
till we closed, then in charge of torpedoes. il
0. L. HuBSEi.Enslgn ; In charge of lO.a-pound- a
or. 11. B. F. guns. 13
B. Z. Johnston, Ensign ; In ohorgo ot signals s
and aid to Captain. il
B. Dickins. Captain XT. 8, M. 0. ; In eharse of II
marines and 4.0-pounder It It. F. II
, A. It. Davis. Second Lieutenant U. 8. M. C, t 8
in chargo of 4.0-pounder IL B, If. and 2.1- A.
pounder. "
II. E. Yasnell. Naval Cadet; In charge port I
after 8-inch turret a
L. M, Ovebstbeet, Naval Cadet; In oharse of 9
starboard forward 8-lnch turret fl
0. B. Miller. Naval Cadet; in oharse of port H
forward 8-lnch turret jo
S. G.Maoill, Naval Cadet: In oharse of 0-lnoh 1
gun. y
O. B. Kemptf. Naval Cadet; In oharse of star- 1
board 8-lnch turret aft N
, P. B. Dukoan. Naval Cadet; In forward 13- 0
lnoh turret. H
E.J.BADLKB, Naval Cadet ; In forward ohaln 1
of supplies. M
E. 0. KALBrua, Naval Cadet; In after 18-Inch
turret I
ILL. Brinseb, Naval Cadet i la after ohaln 1
of supplies. I
0. B. Hatch. Naval Cadet; at secondary bat-
O. BnAcxroBD, Naval Cadet j In torpedo dlvt- V
elon. t
B. W.Millioan, Chief Engineer t In eharga n
of machinery. U
O. N. OrrLET. Passed Assistant Englnteri in B
starboard engine room. a
J. M. Beeves, Assistant Engineer; In port I
englnoroom. I
F. Lyon. Assistant Engineer t In charge of i
Are rooms.
II. N. Jenbon, Naval Cadet : in after hydraulto I
pump room. f
, W.D, Lkaht. Naval Cadet; In forward hy- !
draullc pump room.
F. 0. Dunlap (acting) Assistant Engineer; in '
starboard englno room. I
IJj .A. Loverino. Burgeon; in oharge of hot-
W.'n. Gbove. Assistant Surgeon : transport- ' .V
Hon of wounded. T J
B. It. Coliioun. Paymaster: with surgeon. 1
old to wounded. jjt
J. P McInttre. Chaplain ; with surgeon, aid I
to voundod. tjk
a '1: Hi' MuBPnT- Pay dork ; aid to wounded. In f
0-Inch compartment.
John Costello, Boatswain: in central tta- '
tlon. w
Ar i WlUMB aunnr: In Powder division. K
Blon ' P9n powder dlvl
Ve'ry respeotfully, O. E. Clarx.
m. Captain. U. 8. Navy. Commanding.
SUBSTITUTION
the FRAUD ot the day.
See you get Carter's,
Ask for Carter's,
Insist and demand
GARTER S Little Liver Pills.
The only perfeot '''
Liver PilL
Take no other.
Even if
Solioited to do so.
Beware of imitations
of Same Color Wrapper
HEIX
i

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