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Kll r " T THE SUNV SUNDAY JXOTARY 29, 1809. t ,
stii' if i ' ' '
Kj i; "4 50,Vtf JWfflF noons.
wnli Sit I
Kb 21 .
il Bt'i History of the Clrll TTar.
a j! . TV have reee lved thesoeond partof 27le Slorv
jj 81 f ! CMl trar. by Joitjf Copmak Boris (Put-
(j j nam). This volume Is dovotcd to tho events
A ml of 1802. Including (ho Peninsula campaign.
Il fln tha assumption of tho offensive by Loo In tho
"Si East, tho battle of Antletnm and Fredericks-
J! j bnrg. and the contemporaneous operations In
i Sjt , the'TYest. Tho render who recalls tho thor-
p jfj! onghness of research and tho sobriety of judg-
.1 MI moot which were exhibited In the flrstpartof
this work will be Interested In learning the
'. ijj eoneiuslons.reachcd by Sir. Hopes with regard
t Ml to many qiifstlons raised by tho campaigns
!, hero discussed, questions that hae provoked
' much heated controversy. Wo shall Indicate
l m ome of theso conclusions In their order, refer-
ij j(fj ring tho reader to tho narrntlvo Itself for most
iLi . ; i of the dat on which they are based.
1 i m
H .m i.
It -ml Dd Oen. Grant fall to profit by the defeat of
'l i'ft to Confederates on tho second day of the
i iff battle of Hhlloh or rittsburg Landing' Mr.
il 4fl llopea'a answer to thl question will bo found
j 'i on pages P0-0'. There was no reason, ho
' ifjl thinks, why Gen. Orant should not. promptly
i M and unremittingly. h.io followed up his beaten
t '!! antagonist. It is polntod out that two more
1 IfjJ divisions of Buell's tirmy, those of Wood nnd
'If Thomas, woro dhcctly In the rearof Orant's
' itj force-part of Wood's. In fact, was In tho second
' iff day's flclit nd'tlne inoro than 12,000 men to
,! (lis, tho 20,000 soldiers of tho Army of tho Cumber-
if 'M land, nlready on tho Held. Wo are also re-
i JjH minded that Lewis Wallace's division or tho
; jjj Armr of the Tennessee wan In fine order: nnd
,j .'jj that, in n day or two. considerable accessions
I IHj might bo expected from tlio oilier divisions
. 'ifg of tho Army of the Tennessee. "It was,"
, 'l In fine, "a chso where tho enemy were in
!; m fullretreat. nnd Hint, too, after hating lost very
I U j heavily In one battle and bolng dofonted in tho
l; ij second: there could havo boon no doubt at all
)l In tho mind of nny military man that tha Union
I I ' ji'j army, so largely composed ns it now was of
III jjj- fresh nntl Victorious hoops, was in vnstly bet
II off tor condition and spirits than the Confederate
SB J !! army could possibly have been. A Ooncral
j i!i Who was eciual to tho task of .oelnc tho facts In
Iih the sober llcht of stroiiB probability would
if , (' have felt not only justified but oblised toaet
j , With Vlcor In this etatoof thliiKS. Hut Orant
!'" did not net nt all. lie utterly failed to sobo tho
Ml 'il opportunity" Mr. Hopes coes on to express
l r tho opinion that no bettor nppoitunity than
' that hffordeil nt Slilloti v,as over presented
jj j f to a Jr'edeial fleneial ilurinc the war.
iiMl BrliBlt, tho mornlni; after the battle,
I" li5 reported to lleaiireennl, tho Confeder-
fjjil ate eommniider, that bis troops wore
i JijJ "utterly dlorunni?ed and demorall7ed:"
B,' , that the road was "almost impaasablo:" that
I I l there wero "no provisions and no foraeej"
t ! ' J that tho "artillery was bemc loft all alone tho
lit road." llreeklnridjjo. who commanded tho
! if '' rear Runrd. wrote that eoiilne to llracc: "My
filf ! i'H troops are worn out. and I don't thick can bo
flj i H relied on after the first olley. Thero Is two
!fl I' IB days' food, enouch for the men, but the horses
j t"i arealnkltic rapidly for want of forane." Mr.
II 'l .B Bopos's deduction from these data runs ns fol-
! Sj S lows: "With the Confederate army In this con-
'ijM dltlon. it Is not difficult to conjecture what
! ilf would hne been the icsult of n ieorous jmr-
j j.jj j ault. If made by Orant at tho head of the
j jjjj j 40.000 troops, most of them fresh, which for-
j S j i j tune hud placed at bis disposal."
Sill V'l What Orant's army was dolnc nt this time,
Jjjlji ao far ns could bn seen by n Confederato
I jjlj l oftlcer sent out with a Hair of truce, was thus
I yi j reported to Ileauregard's chief of staff:
JjK , j ""He (the oftlcerl says that, ns far ns ho
jjfUj ij could observe, tbev Itho I'ederalsl soemod to
w i!L j b burylnc dead, looking aftor wounded and
jjj ; y puttinc their enmps to rlehts.' " In his own
l' 8 book, Oen Ornnt refers to his conduct at tho
a 1 j a tlmo In tho followinc words: "I wanted to
lH'iil pursue, but bad not the heart to orderthemen
Jll'SlI ,Tho ha' ,ouent 'lesperntoly for two days,
j 111 j j lylnc'in the mud and rain whenover not flght-
JP'-ISJ inc. and I did not feel disposed to positively
jj order Buell. or nny part of Ills command, to
1 jl'lif'i pursue. Althoucb tho senior In mnk at the
I II 14 1 time. Iliad boon so only a few weeks. Iluell
iP'jfj'lf wa8' nnd nai' been for some time jiast.
lij'MF n department commandor. while I com-
! M as mandod only a district." Our author's
lift?' corriment on this btatament is: "Orant
I t?$il! entirely failed to rise to tho helcht of
j M t'f. J this occasion, and his excuses are of no weicht
j ''ill whatever." Mr. Hopes proceeds to show that.
J H !il B a matter of fact, Wallace's division and tho
I 'M il "Te "v'"'ons ' linoll bad undergone no hard-
I Hail ahlps wortli mentlonlni:; on tliom, as Oen.
fi 111 Orant well knew, would hao fallen tho fntleuo
I If Iw ' n8 Pursuit. It is, moreover, pronouncd in-
I if ffili excusablo for Grant to mention tho fact that
I ?! Pi Buell had been under his command only a few
IHrE weeks, when It was possible to completo tho
Jl Uil defeat of tho enemy by ordering Immediate
il Hilf BDd Vleorous action. ISuoll, ns Grant well
'! HHifl knew, -was tho last man In the army to disobey
jjj jSfj'jj his military superior. "Orant, in truth, does
ill rlH not mean to be understood as fearine that Buell
jjlM would disobey liliu if ho eavo tho order: ho
"1 Jjfl'a only means to say that ho felt some embarrass-
"ijj' ment, In vlowof Buell's late, position in the
3! Il'llf aervlco. In clvlnc him tho order. But bow can
iij illj afeelineot this kind, so entirely opposed to
'if 1 in the principles of military duty, exonerate tho
ill D officer In charcofrom exortlnc all his official
;j ' I powers to carry out the plan which commends
Ljl J ,B itself to his judBment?"
ij &, ijj It will bo remembered thut. soon after the
jjj ;B'S,b battle. Con. Hnlleck, tho head of tho dopart-
jjj 53 If) raent, arrived at I'lttsburn Landing and
II 1'lli assumed command of tho army there, which,
11 'i before the end of tho month, was lu
ll SbF creased by reinforcements to overlOO.OOO men.
lillr Whatusedid Hnlleck make of his resources?
ill f 1 Ijj Mr. Ropes's reply will bo found on paces 04-1K5.
41 t! Rib' It fs not disputed tliattho spriniccampalenof
JJijiKJ!' the Western Federal army hua accomplished a
"il W' (treat deal, but our author maintains that It
Jl v I'l '111 "ot accoml,"9,lp,ln'l "iat miirht justlyhav
3J I 'I I been expected. "It was, assuredly, a crett
i'H I I I thlntr to have calned control of Kentucky
4 I, , ' and of western and middle Tennosseo, and to
l jj I ft havo opened the Mississippi Illver as far as
jj 1 1 Vlcksbunr. But tho Confederate Army of the
II i I 1 'West still remained intact. To destroy tills
jlll'l armr was now the remaining task of Oen.
Jj i Halleck. This task he had really never at
Pi ta H tempted to perform, and, even now. when he
ii was at tho head of more than 100,000 excellent
j a troops, commanded by some of the most skil-
wi ful flenorals In thosorleeof tho UnltedRtates,
irf ft he dollberatoly turned aside from Its accom-
SO pllshment." Mr. Hopes Insists that it was pos-
'liff a "lb'e r '"ow ur" t,1B nrmy of Beaurecard In
Silf ft June. 1W12, as closely as, In April, lHUTi. Grant
'RBill! n' Meade followed up the army of Leo.
t'S jj Halleck, howevor. was satisfied with what had
fill been done. "And lie was Incapablo of reallz-
j ft j Inuthatso lone as the army of Donurecard
il 1 1 was left unhiirined In truth, until It should bo
fill $ R destroyed It was porfeetly posslblo for it to as-
'lilfri BUmotheofTonslvo. nnd to recover much, anil
kKE no one could say how much, of nlmt now np-
V I 1' peared to be lost to tho Confederacy. Ho wns
M I')!'' blind to the lesson of the creat mastors In tho
il Sfij, artofwar. Ho utterly failed to see that with
m SB' an Brm7 twice as lurco ns that of Ids opponent,
1 111 aahlaarmy now was. It was within his power
S ;1 tocruih the Confederate eauso In the West."
lill "
9B About a quarter of the volume is devoted to
1 lu the account of MrClellnn'e Peninsula cam-
iI palen. The author's conclusions are summed
'I'lfS up on pne08 '-'l,s"21-- T '-'' often lout
I f if aicht of, Is recalled that the los BUlTeied
i I f IB by hB Collfed,n,0, ,n killed, wounded, and
i If P mlsslnc durinc tho "Soen Dayh'flcht" wns
i I itfi arser vi7 more tnan .(XX) than that exporl-
If f eneed by tho Federals. This Is explained by
1 Slt tho fact that in all the eni:nements the Con.
' Ik l federates worn tho nttnekinc party. Tho I'nlon
'I'll army lost llfty-two rums, the Confederates only
KH'iI two. Colors wore captured by lioth sides, but
W)i not many. On tlie whole, Mr Hopes coiihlders
j;jt, that thn successes in battle wero pretty equally
IKlBi dlvltjed. Tho Confederates had won the battle
1 ill of Gaines's Mill on the 27th of June: they were
1 11 unsuccessful at Allen's Farm and Kavaeo
IHIl Ptatlon on tho 20th. Tho battle of
SIM Olendale. on the 30th. was a very seero action :
Sffflfi but wlj"e "l0 Confederates routed one of the
IBIm., n.J li , x ,,,.,.,.
I Federal dMslona and captured ome rune. our
author thinks that they gained no decisive
tactical success, and that, strategically, the
battlo was a success for their opponents.
On tho field of Malvom Hill. July 1. whore the
fighting ended, the Confederates sufTorod n
total repulse, with very sovoro loss. Neverthe
less, It Is acknowledged that the moral and po
litical effect of the wholo eerlesof movements
and battlos during the "Hoven Days" was en
tirely to the advantage of tho Confederates.
" There Is no denying that by those operations
Gen. McClellan had boen forcod to glvo
up his position on the Chlcknhomlny, whore
ho wa within sight of tho steeples of
lllchmond, and to retire, followod. pursued. In
fact, by his enemies, to tlio Illver James, at a
point twenty or thirty miles from tho Con
federate capital. Ills losses In men, and par
ticularly the number of 'missing,' which ag
gregated over 0,000, the destruction of many
valuable stores at White House and on the
railroad, and his loss of over flflv Runs; all
theso things nffoctod tho minds of peoplo
North and Houth. The abiupt chango In tho
part played by tho Federal General from tho
role of an Invader to that of n rotroatlng and
pursued enemy was too dramatic not to arrest
genoral attention, It was In vain that careful
obsencrs pointed out to thoNorthorn publlo
that the Union army had fouuht ns bravely
and, on tho whole, as successfully us Its ad
versaries, that It had lost fewer men, and that
It was now In a much bettor position In a
strategical sense than It was bofore thofioven
Days' battles began: theso considerations
sounded like attempts at excuse and palliation,
and they woro Impatiently disregarded." Wbllo
Mr. Ilopos holds, howecr, thnt tho popular
criticism was not fully warranted, he docs not
deny that the Peninsula campalen.up to this
point, had resulted In failure, and that thero
was no probability of a speedy renewal of of
fensive operations by tho Army of the Potomac
It Is well known that tho outcome of tho
Tonlnsula campaign was to mako Gon. Loo tho
hero of the hour In Richmond. Mr Hopes
thinks that ho deserved to bo. " By boldly an
ticipating his antagonist in taking tho Initia
tive, tho moment Jnckson's arrival from the
Valley enabled him to do so. he had, by attack
lug tlio lino of communications ol the Federal
army at Whlto House, forced McClollan either
to flel.t him on tho north side of tho Chleka
homlny orto letlro from tho neighborhood of
tho capital In search of a now base of opera
tions. McClollan chose tho latter course: and.
In tho difficult and perilous movement which
tliln choice rendered Imperative. Lee was ablo
to inlllct losses upon nnd to make capturos from
his ndversarv. who was compolled by tho
nccossltlosof the case to retire to a point on tho
James Illver several marches from Blchmonil.
Tho Confederate cause was rclleed from n
pressing danger and tho public gratitude was
deep and hearty."
The intorestlnc fact is noted that Gen. Lee
himself was far from being satisfied with his
success. " Under ordinary circumstances," ho
says In his report, "the Federal nrmy should
have been destroyed." Mr. Hopes Is unable to
see why such an expectation should havo been
cherished. "Oen. Loo began tho campaign by
putting hlmsolf in a position where, owing to
tho situation of the ground, he could not ob
servo the movements of his antaconlst Nor i
was this all. Tho larger part of his army wns
separated from that of his adversary by an un
fordable river, so that his antagonist inevitably
hud thn start of him in any movement of over
twenty-four hours. In fact. If McClellan
had elven his orders for the retreat to tho
James at mldnlcht of tho 2i!th, Instead
of waltlnu (for no reason whatever) until
mldiileht of the 27th: in othor words,
if ho had rccocnlzed as early ns the
facts warranted that his communications with
White House were lost, and thnt tho sooner ho
started for the James the better. Oen. Lee
would not have been ablo to catch up with him
at all." This delay is pronounced McClellnn's
Croat fault in tho campaign. On tho other
hand, cortaln errors are Imputed to Leo. We
are told that he failed to reeosnire. first, that
mttM, amnllAT fare thnn fhnf xvhlnh hn Knil
amucn smaller lorce tnan tnncwnion no nan
assembled on the north bank of tho Chlck
nhomlny would hnvo compelled the abandon
ment of tho Federal communications with the
Pamunky, nnd, secondly, that McClellan's
most probable recourso in that emergency
would be to seek a base near Mal
vern Hill. Mr. Hopes suitgests that. If
Lee had correctly vlowed theso elements
of the problem before him. ho would havo re
tained the creator part of his army in the lines
of Itichmond. nnd thus would havo been able,
by menns of his cavalry, to interfero most se
riously with the possession by the Federal troops
of the roads to tho James Itiver, and, also, to
bring a much larger force to bear upon tho
Federal columns, on their flank march to tho
James, than he actually succeeded In doing.
"Itistruo thnt. had ho adopted this course.
Portor would not have been beaten nt Gaines's
Mill; but tho actual loss in killed, wounded
and prisoners inflicted on his corps was
tho only dnmaco sustained by the Fed
eral array from this defeat, Tho Fifth
Corps, by Its prompt movement to Mal
vern Hill, secured that all-Important position:
and, on the day of the battle, It held Its
own as tenaciously as if it had neer
been defeated at all. The loss suffered
at Gaines's Mill wns a matter of ery small
consequonce to tho Army of tho Potomac.
But. U Gen. I.eo had had, at fiavace Station and
Glendale, more men under his hand, these ac
tions might, very possibly, han turned out
vory serious defeats for the Fedoral armv. That
Lee's force on these two critical occasions wns
so Inadequate, to tlio needs of the opportunities
presented was mainly due to his hnvlng. on the
20th and 27th of June, put the creator part of
his army on the north bank of tlio Chicka
hominy, in tho b"liefthnt McClollan would re
treat, not to tho James, but to Fortress Monroe,"
To the chapter on the Peninsula campalcn
are appended some notes In which the author
expressos the conviction that Oen. McClellan
had no just cround of complaint agninstthe
Administration because, tho President dotalned
McDowell's corps In tho neighborhood of
Washington, on learning from the report of Gen.
Hitchcock and Gen. Thomas, that Oen. Mc
Clellan had not left for the defence of the capi
tal the force which the corps oommanders had
considered necessary. "In our judgment,
taking aceout t of tho great uncertainty which
must always attend offensive military opera
tions undertaken by inexperienced command
ers in control of armies which are put into the
field for tho first tlmo, and, considering the
Immense Importance, from a political, as well
as a military, point of view, of retaining a
secure hold on Washington, the Government
was perfectly right."
III.
It Is with discrimination and good temper
that Mr. Ropes discusses the unsuccessful
operations under Gen, Popo In Virginia. At
tention is directed to tho fact that neither Hal
leck nor Topo seems ever to havo crasped
firmly tho naturo nnd the limits of the task
which Pope's forces in Virginia should hnvo
striven to accomplish whilo McClollan'anriny
was being withdrawn from tho peninsula. In
our author's opinion tho task was a simple one,
namely, to delay Lee as long as possible and to
refuso to flcht him (unless, of course, somo
creat emergency should nrlso or somo wonder
ful opportunity occur) until tho two armies of
Popo and McClollan should bo united. To this
task, which was of primary Importance to tho
Federal Government, Halleck added nn
other, and n wholly Inconsistent one, thut
of preserving tho Government property nt
Fredericksburg and Aquln Crook. Hence, ho
allowed Popo to push out as fnr as tho Itapl
dan. whero he eumo within an ace of being
routed, and was obliged to retreat in hasto to
tho Rappahannock. Mr. Ropes deems It but
justice to Popo to say that, after that Genoral
had been forced back, bo saw tho situation
more clearly than did Halleck, nnd that, proba
bly, ho would we welcomed reeelvlnc per
mission to retiro toCcntrolllo. In regard to
Pope's battles, whllo our author justllles him
In attacking on Aug. 20, supposing, as he did,
that ho had only Jackson to deal with, he Is
chargod with going counter to his rM In at
tacnc the united forces of Lee on tlio next
day, Defore Sumner and Franklin bad joined
him. On the other hand, Halleck'fl effort for
the preservation of the Government property
nt Fredericksburg and Aqula Creek resultod
In uttor failure. Both plaocs were abandoned,
and not only woro tho warehouses burned by
tho Federals, but also tho bridges on the rail
roads and the wharves at AquIb Creek.
Whllo, howovor. It Is undeniable that Gen.
Lee'e operations nt this tlmo wero auccossful.
Mr. Ilopos considers that hla successes were
due much more to tho ability with which ho
Improrod tho mlstnkos of his antagonist
than to any advantages which he procured for
himself by tho hazardous strategy which he
employed. Thus, although he was able to at
tack Pope's army nt a disadvantage on Aug,
no. 1802, the only tlmo when he did attack It,
this was not duo to nny previous moements of
his own, but solely to Pojie'a making thomls
tako of assaulting Jackson's position that same
aftcrnoon.under the Impression that he was
retreating, and of persisting In tho assault,
after ho Knew that Lee wns preparing to move
In force upon his left nnd his communications.
Of theso mlstnkos Leo promptly availed him
self, and thus won a victory, but tho
separation of Jackson from tho 'main body
of tho Confederate Aimy, throo days bofore,
had nothing to do with tho mlstnkes com
mitted by Gen, Pope on the field of battle. As
n matter of faet, Oen. Pope, though ho had met
with no success, had not been beaten In tho
battle of Aug. 211; ho could perfectly well havo
taken up a defonsUe position for tho following
day : If ho bad been attaokod, he ought to havo
boon able, with his superior numbers, to main
tain himself till reinforced and supplied. Mr.
Hopes can seo no renson to think that ho would
not have been ablo to do so. Popo's defeat on
Aub. .10 is attributed exclusively to bis faulty
manneemonton tho field: and. although there
can be no doubt that tho nsslstanco of Sumner
and Franklin would ha been most valuable,
as, indeed, would have beon that of Banks, who
was not oven summoned to his aid. It Is pro
nounced Incorreot to say that Topo was do
feated becauso lie did not havo a sufficiently
large force under him.
It is evident that tho nuthor of this book
places tho responsibility for tho reverses en
countered by tho Union arms In VIrglnlnat the
end of August, 1H02. upon Halleck rather than
on Pope. "In tho first plnco. Gen. Halleck'sde
fleiences ns n Goneral-ln-Chiof woro every
where painfully apparent It Is plain that ho
had no dellnlte policy of his own. Tho bring
ing up of Kuninor fioin Aquln nnd the posting
of his corps along tho linos of Washington wore
both Buccestlonsot McClollan. Halleck con
fessed himself ignorant of tho stato of the do
fonces of tho eapltal. Ho, indeed, sont Frank
lin out nt last, nnd wanted tosend him eaillor.
but his purposes In so dolnc wo:o vory vnguoly
and somewhat inconsistently defined. Had
ho seriously Intended that Franklin, as
soon as ho arrived from the peninsula,
should go out to reinforce Pope, ho could cer
tainly, ono would think, before McClellan ar
rived at Alexandria. hne provided him, out of
the stores of tho eapltal. with all the necessary
artillery nnd transportation. An nblo nnd
efficient officer in bis place would hnvo decided
views on nil these olnts, and, armed with tho
powers of a Oenornl-in-Cblef, would hno car
ried them out." Mr. Ropes Is not one of those
who bellevo thnt Gen. MeClell.in, ns has been
so often chnrced. dollberatoly hold back the
two corps of Sumner and Franklin from colng
to Popo's army for fear that, wltli their assist
ance, Popo would gain a victory. Rather was
he afraid thut theso corps would bo sacrificed
in a futile attempt to enable Popo to withstand
Leo's army. Tho faet Is recalled that on Aug.
20 McClellan wrote to the President that cither
nil mallablo forces should bo used to open
communication with Toro or that he should bo
left "to cet out of his scrape," while all means
should bo used to mako Washington perfectly
safo.
IV.
In reenrd to tho Confederate Invasion of
Maryland, which presently followed, the opin
ion Is expressed that Gen. Leo's forces were br
lull in o pi rftmjii uini. unit, -i.vu n iuiucb ttoio ur
no means In a lit state to undortako such a
movement. This assertion is based upon evi
dence furnished by Leo himself. "The army,"
so wrote that officer to President Davis on
Sept. 3. "Is not properly equipped for an Inva
sion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of
tho material of war, is feeblo In transporta
tion, the nnimals being much reduced, whilo
tho men aro poorly provided with clothes, and.
In thousands of instances, destitute of shoes."
Tlio Confederate troops, however, wero in high
spirits, and full of conlldenco in their com
mander, for which renson Loo decided to tnko
aihnntaco of tho favorable elements In tho
military situation and to cioss the Poto
mac. It is recognized that ono of tho
reasons which mar well havo welghod with
Gen. Leo in favor of this couiso of action was
tho hope that tho presence of the Confederato
armv in Maryland might arouso tlio peoplo
of that State, or a largo pait of them, at
any rate, to rise against the United States and
declare tbeirStnlo independentof tlio Union,
huch mi uprising could hardly fall to hamper
tho movements of the Federal armies, and to
diminish their available strength for actual
combat. It is pronounood, howovor, a mistake
to suppose that tho invasion of tlio North was
undertaken tolely or mainly for tho eiToct
which it was surmised It might produce
on tho peoplo of Maryland. Apart from nny
political change In the attitude of that popula
tion. It seemed eminently desirable to exhibit
tho spectacle, of n Confederate army freoly
traversing t ho toll of tho States w hlch remained
in tho Union. Tho effect which this might
hnvo on Northern sentiment, and. also,
on foreign opinion. In the direction
of Indicating the Impossibility of the
North's accomplishing the tremendous task
of subjugating tho South, was likely to bo of
very groat consequenco. Tho party In the
North which had always believed In this im
possibility) would certainly havo its belief for
tified when an Invasion of the North was sub
stituted for an invasion of flu South; and the
chance of foreign interfereneo to stop a war. In
which it should seem plain that the North had
no reasonable clianco of achieving such a de
cisive and overwhelming victory ns alone
would justify a continuance of the struggle,
could not but bo materially Increased.
Mr. Ropes's comments on tin battle of
Blinrpsburc, orof Antlotam, will be found on
pages 370-370. This was, undoubtedly, ono of
the bloodiest battlos of tho wnr, and tlio author
deems it likely that more men wore killed and
wounded on Sept 17, 1802, than on nny other
single day in tho whole war. The Confederato
lo-b Is hero computed at probably 8,000 men
or more: thut of the Union army, nt 12,410.
Euch side lost about one-quarter of the troops
aetually engaged, for the Confederate infantry,
in which occurred nearly nil the casualties,
"did not exceed 31,200 men, or thorenbouts,"
whilo tho First, Second, Ninth und Twelfth
Corps, which wero tho only troops put In by
McClullnti. "numbered about -10,000 men,"
Mr. Hopes Ins-lnts, howovor, thnt "to got a cor
rect Idea of the management of the battle, all tho
troops within reach on both sides should bo In
cluded, Adding tho Confederato cavalrynnd ar
tillery to their infantry, therefore, wo have a
total of 30,200 men ; and, adding the Fifth and
Sixth Corps, nnd the cavalry and artillery, to
the 4tt,000 Federal troops already enumerated,
wo arrive at a total of about 70,000 men, The
battle of Sharpsburg, consequently, was in
every light most creditable to Gen, Lee and his
army, whether wo regard hls31,200 infantry as
contending with tho 1 edernl 4(1,000 Infantry,
or whether wo admire his intrepidity In stand
ing to light an unny of 70,000 with less than
40,000 mi)!), uot all of whom, in fact, were with
him at tho commencement of the action." Of
den. I.ee'h management of thn battlo our au
thor has nothing but praiao to utter. Neither
does ho thinl' that any troops liuvn more fully
justified the reliance placed upon them by their
leader than tho Army of Northern Virginia
nt bharpsburc. Wo aio reminded that Lee
Intended to trv his men again. Urged
by both Longstreet und Jackson to reeross
tho Potomnoon the night of Sept. 17. he re
fused, and, instead, endeavored to arrange for
an attack on the Federal right wing the next
day This turned out to be absolutely Imprac
ticable, and the Confederate army had to con-
tent Itself with remaining In Ita lines and
awaitln the action of the Federal General.
"McClollan had some 24,000 troops, which
had not bcon sorlously engaged, on tho 17th.
Early In the morning of the 18th. Couch
brought up his division, nominally 7,218
strong, nnd by 11 A. M. Humphreys arrived
with his division of 0.000 men. Franklin
strongly advlsod an attack. He wan the only
one of the Union corps commanders who rec
ognized the Importance of the high gio.ind
held by Stuart, and he desired to begin by
driving htm and his artillery from It. Franklin
would thus havo placed his troops on tho ox
tremoloftof the Confederato lino. McClellan
decided, howovor, not to renow the battle."
Our author's view of this decision Is thnt
the 12.000 fresh troops of Couch and Hum
phreys far outweighed any accession to the
fighting strength of tho Confederate nrmy
which Gon. Leo could possibly have received
from the return of stragglora. "That Mc
Clellan had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by renewing the battlo seems to us very
plain, nor can we bring ourselvos to entertain
a reasonable doubt as to tho result If he had
recommenced tho fight." The outcome of the
first Invasion of the North was thnt, on tho
night of Sept. 18, 1802, Leo recrossod the Po
tomno at Boteler s Ford, Just south of Sharps
burg, having lost "13 guns, 30 colors, upward
of Ift.OOO stand of small arms and more than
0.000 prisoners." Tho Federal nrmy had not
lost a gun or a color. Glory. Indeed, tho Con
federates had gained by fighting against odds
tho battle of Sharpsburg, but they had gnlned
It at fearful risks. The prostlgo of victory re
mained with McClollan. who. after a few weeks,
followed the Confederates Into Virginia.
V.
It Is well known that Gen. McClollan re
mained inactive for moro than five weeks
after the battle of Sharpsburg, and that on
Nov. 5, 1802, he was relieved summarily from
tho command of tho Army of thn Potomae
nnd Gen, Burnslde was appointed In his
place, Mr, Ropes points out thnt nothing in
the correspondence between Mr. Lincoln
and Gen. McClellan had indicated that such n
crisis wns at hnnd. The lottcrsof tho Presi
dent had been considerate, kind nnd friendly.
Our nuthor Is inclined to seek nn explanation
of the change In Lincoln's attitude toward Mc
Clellan In the culmlnntlon of the movement
against McClellan and Fitz-John Porter, which
had Its origin In tho events of the latter part of
Topo's campaign. "Wo draw this Inforenco
from tho fact that in tho same order which
relieved McClellan, Fltr.-John Portor was also
relieved from the command of his corps.
Ho waB soon after tried for dlsobedlenco
of oiders nnd misconduct in the pres
ence of tho enemy on Aug. 20. 1802. and
was cashiered. Many years afterwards ho
obtained a rehearing of his case, wos fully and
handsomely vindicated, and, in 1880. was re
stored to tho army. But at this tlmo. In the
autumn of 1802, there was a very blttor feollng
in influential quarters in Washington against
both McClellan and Porter, nnd tho order of
Nov. r. removing them both from command,
wns tho result of tho hostility to them. In the
case of McClellan, however, there wero other
reasons." Two of these are given onpages430
437 The fact is recalled that after Sharpsbum
McClellan repeatedly expressed tho opinion
thut his soldiers wore not in condition to under
take another campaign, or to bring on another
battlo. Mr. Ropes deems It altogether probable
that In most, If not nil, of the partlculors men
tioned by tho General, tho army of McClellan
was actually suffering from tho deficiencies
alleged. It Is pronounced oqually clenr, how
ever, that tho army of Gen. Loe could not bo in
much bettor condition than that of McClellan:
in fact, it was pretty well known that the North
ern nrmy was far better supplied than wns that
of Leo with everything necessary for n cam
paign, except, perhaps, horses for tho cavalry
and artillery. "Hence, the President and tho
Secretary of War could not arrive at a cordial
understanding with Gon. McClellan. His com
plaints seemed to them unnecessary and far
f.ilnltn.l nnd tltnv Alpn nucnAntntl lhlf 1ia linil
letcnou, ana nicy even suspecteu mat no nau
no sorious intention of engaging the enemy
that autumn. Tho tone of his letters, also, was
that of an officer who proposed to do exactly as
he thought best. He did not always answer in
convenlentquestlons.oroxplaln why ho did not
carry out his orders." Mr. Ropes suggests that
another circumstance must have contributed
to the cravo and increasing distrust of Gen.
McClellan on the partof the President nnd tho
Administration. "This was the well known
opposition of the General to tho course of tho
Government In regard to the emancipation of
the slaves. It was, it is true, nono of McClel
lan's business, as n General in tho nrmy, to
tnko any part in tills or any other political
question. But McClellan entertained such in
ordinate ideas of his own Importance and of
tho advantages which his position in tho flold
gavo him of judging tho effect upon tlio course
of military events of any Interfereneo by tho
Federal Government In tho direction of
abolishing slavery, that he had already
written to Mr. Lincoln on July 7, from
Harrison's Landing, a most extraordinary
letter on the political situation. Hence,
when tho President put forth his procla
mation of Sept 22, flvodays after the battlo of
tha Antletnm. announcing his intention to free
all the slaves In those Stntes which should, on
Jan. 1, 1803. bo in insurrection, it was natural
tosuspoct that McClellan's opposition to any
Mepof tho kind might cnuso dolay in tho ad
vance of tho nrmy. Wo do not ourselves bo
lievn that this feeling influenced McClellan's
action In tho slightest degree, but It can bo
easily seen that such a suspicion might wldoly
prevail." In a footnote, Mr, Ropes directs at
tention to the fact thnt, on Oct. 7, McClellan is
sued to his nrmy an excellent genoral order
onjolning ncquleseenco In any policy which tho
Administration might adopt.
Our author's final judgment on tho change
of commnnders. which was effected by the or
der of Nov. 5. Is expressed in unqualified terms.
He thinks that" McClellan ought not to havo
been removed, unless tho Government wore
prepared to put In his place some officer whom
they knew to be at least his equal In military
capacity. This, assuredly, was not thoeasoat
this moment. No one. In or out of tho service
had ovor considered Burnsldo as able a man as
McClellan. His apiolntment was n genuine
surprise to every ono at nil acquainted with
military affulrs. Ills recent shortcomings at
tho battlo of Shnrpsburc wore tho conimon
tnlk of the officers nnd soldiers, who all be
lieved that If Burnsldo bad beon cnergetlo
and skilful the bridge would havo been
carried, and Antlotam Creok would havo
beon fordod In the morning nnd Leo would
have been defeated In tlio afternoon." Mr,
Ropes deems it by no means easy to
justify Mr. Lincoln's nction In this mat
tor. "It maybe true that no one of tho Generals
had ever beon specially marked out. In tlio
opinion of tho army or of tho public, as a pos
sible successor to McClellan, but we ballot n
that the selection of Franklin would have met
with the widest approval, anil would have been
decidedly thn most judicious appointment
which the Government could hnvo made." Ac
cording to Gen, Slocum, this was tho Presi
dent's opinion; but tho opposition to Franklin
on political grounds was too strong. Our
author, for his pait, Is convinced that "Frank
lin, like McClollan, wns a safe and careful com
mandor: he had recently shown at Sharpsburg
unmistakable evidence of possessing n true
appreciation of tho real mllltnry situation on
tho Hold of battle, and wo havo always boen
surprised that his nnme was not tho ono so
lected for tho vacant placo of commnnder of
tho army. Ho wns, without question, fnr
superior. In point of ability, to Burnslde,
Hooker and Sumner, and It wns to bo
expected thut tho selection would bo mnilo
from theso four Generals, Ilurnsldo's success
ful expedition to Noith Carolina, howovor, told
much In his favor, and It Is not likely thut
olther tho President or tho Secretary of War
possessed, elthor then or at any subsequent
time, any menus of ascertaining the opinions
of tho best men in tlio army respecting the
merits of tlio leading officers. Burnsldo him
self, as Is well known, accepted the position of
commander with tho greatest reluctance. He
assured the officer who brought him tho order
that he did not consider h'.muelf oqunl to the
responsibilities which the command of the
armrlnvolved: but he allowed himself to bo
overporsuaded, and set himself, after a day or
two, to devising n plan of operations."
The result of tho experiment with Burnslde
Is well known. On Dec. 13. 1802. tho Army of
tho Potomac, suffered a disastrous defeat nt
Fredericksburg, nnd on Jan. 25. 1803. Gon.
Burnsldo was suiorseded by Gon. Hooker,
Tho only Important reason given by Burnslde
for fighting tho battle was thnt ho thought that
the troops which Gen. tea had sont down the
river to opposo the landing of tho Federal
army In that region had not returned. It Is
truo that Gon. Loo did not recall these troops
until tho last momont. He showed on this oc
casion, as on several others, a singular laok of
caution. Tho divisions of Knrly and G. II. Hill
did not arrive on tho field until the morning
of the 13th. nnd to reach the field then
they had to march all night. Mr. Ropes con
siders that "Burnsldo wns not Justified In at
tacking such a position as that which Gen. Lee
occupied nt Fredericksburg, simply by assum
ing that I.eo might unnecessnilly hnvo delayed
tho assembling of his army. It may bo ad
mitted that this delay on Leo's rnrt wns. per
haps. In viow of the known facts, rather to be
expected: nnd thnt, had Biirnsulonttncked him
on Dec.12, ho would havo had, pro fnnfo. a bet
ter chance of success. But. as we have shown,
the position was a vory unfavorable one for tho
Union army, nnd even the nbsonceof two di
visions from tho Confederato line oflbattlo
woullnothavo compensated Burnslde for tho
radical defocts of thn situation as viewed from
tho Federal point of view."
VI.
Two chapters are allotted by Mr. Ropes to the
resumption of tho offensive by the Confed
erates In the West, and to tho bloody but In
decisive battlo of Murfreosboroiigh. In tho
courso of his review of tho Confederate In
vasion of Tonnessoe, In the summer and
nutumn of 1802. orlr nuthor ralsos the ques
tion whotherlt would not have boen wiser for
the Confederato Oovornment to send 25.000 or
30.000 men to Virginia ns soon ns It became
plain thnt Halleck was not proposing to take
the offenslte with vlcor, say by June 15. Tho
opinion Is propounded thnt "such nn addition
to Loe's army In the Seven Days' battle might,
very possibly, havo given him ndeolslvo victory
over McClellan. A deolslve victory was a neces
sity for thn success of the Southern cause : for,
as the United Statos bad taken tho position
that the South was In rebellion, the military
necessities of tho Southern Confodorncy wero
not detormlned by tho political attitude as
sumed by tho Southern Stntes. but wore, for
nil practical purposes, exactly what they would
have boen If tho Southern people, like tho peo
plo of the thirteen colonies In 1770, had con
coded that they wore, strictly speaking. In re
bellion. Thnt Is to say. tho United States In
1801. Ilka Great Brltnln In 1770. woro not
waging wnr to obtain accessions of territory, or
commercial or political advantages, but to put
down nnd crush out all opposition what
ever. This attlturto of tho United States
mado tho obtaining on the part of
tlio South of a success as slgnnl and
deelslvo as that of Saratoga or Yorktown an
almost necessary condition of tho achievement
of her independence. Without a success of
this magnitude It wos not to bo expected that
the Southern Confederacy would either gain
recognition in Europe or convince the North
that it Pad undertaken an Impossible task."
As a matter of fact this view of tho funda
mental conditions of the war socms never to
have been adopted by President Jefferson
Davis. Only once or twice wero serious efforts
mado to concontrnto large numbers of troops
for n particular campaign: tho usual practice
in the South, as well as tho North, was to let
each department tako care of Itself.
Of the battlo of Murtreesborough, or Stone
River (Dec. 31, 1802). we read on pago 431 that
few engagements ever fought have better ex
hibited soldierly virtues. The Confederate as
saults wero conducted with tho utmost gal
lantly nnd with untiring energy. They wero
mftt trtlli pmnt pnnlnnca nnd ricnlnllnn ' 'Th
met Willi great coolness nna resolution. The
recovery of the Union army, so nearly routed,
was wonderful, and assuredly could not havo
been accomplished hnd there been any waver
ing or laek of confidence on tho part of the
high officers or any demoralization on the part
of the soldiers. The Confederates had a right
to claim n victory, for they had taken twenty
eight guns and about 3,700 prisoners. Still,
the Federal nrmy was, for all practical pur
poses, as strong ns over. Tho truth is thn
Confederates wero not numerous enough to
complete their victory." Tho Federal command
er, Cien, Rosecrans, Is hero held responsible
for the fact that tho Union army should havo
been beaten at all, and especially that It should
havo been brought so near tonn actual rout.
"Had bo carefully weighed tho Information as
to tho position of the Confederate forces which
ho recoiveilon tho nfternoon before tho battle,
nnd hnd ho then carefully disposed his right
wing so as to meet tho assault which It was
plain Bragg intonded to make tho next morn
ing, he could have saved his army from the peril
to which It so nearly succumbed. It may surely
be expected of a commanding General who Is
about to light a great battlo that ho should ar
range his nrmy In accordance with his own
best judgment. Ho has the power to do this,
and no ono candoubtth.it It Is his duty to exor
cise Ills power. Yot Rosocrnns nt Murfrees
borougli fulled to insist thnt his right wing
should bo urrnnged In accordance with his
own judgment." Mr. Ropes thinks that ho
may havo boen too nuxious to carry out his
own plan of attack to glto their due impor
tance to thoso parts of tho line of battlo which
woro not under his own eye. " Very possibly,
ho did not care to overrule tho opinion of a
good officer, such ns McCook was. In reenrd to
tho disposition of his own troops. At nny rate,
ho made the great mistake of submitting his
own j'udgmont on a matter of vital Importance
to that of one of his corps commanders."
M. W. II.
The Original ComtltuenU of Rncllau Liter
ntttre. It Is a thoughtful and suggestive book which
bears the title of English. I.ilrraluri from the
Ilftlnnlng to thf Xnrrnan Conquest, bySioproBD
A. Brooke (Macmlllnns). Tho scope of tho
work Is somewhat wider than the title Implies,
forn preliminary chanter Is allotted to pre
Romnn Britain and to the Roman occupation,
whllo In a concluding chapter is traced tho
reoordof Old English as far as tho beginning
of tlio thirteenth century. For the dnta on
which the author's views are based, wo must
refer the reader to tho book Itself. All wo shall
note hero nre the conclusions at which he ulti
mately arrives, except that a word should bo
said about somo facts recalled In the Initial
chaptor.
Can It be said that the Roman occupation of
Britain exerted any Influence nt all upon the
developmental English literature? Replying
to this question, tho author reminds im that,
under Vespasian, tho Govnrnmont established
In tho island by Agrlcoladrevv all tho Biltlsh
chieftains below the Forth and the Clyde with
in tho cliclo of tho Roman peace. Tho lino of
forts which Agricolu set up between Olnsgow
and Edinburgh was mado Into a wall by An
toninus In A. I), 140; while Hadrian, twenty
years before, had built nnothor wall further to
the south, tho ruins of which now stretch
botween Newcastle and Carlisle, Theso
liugo walls, with their forts nnd tow
ers, the fortifications with which tho Ro
mans onenmpassod their towns, their white
stono buildings, the temples, theatres nnd
publlo baths, tho rich country bouses
nnd tho mtigulflcent roads with which they en
dowed tho land wore marvels to tho partly clvl
llred Britons, Thoy seemed still more wonder
ful totlio Anglo-Sujon Intudeis. Early English
poetry Is full of alluniiiiis to these "works of
giants;" and one of its fluent elegies describes
tho walls, the gatns, the crumbling towers, the
heapof shattered houses, the pillars nnd pin
nacles, tho market place, and the marblo baths
of Bath, or perhaps of ( aerloon on Usk, built
bythosocond Augusta lotion, the noble town
which, In literature. Is " towered Canielot." In
this way tho Romans may ho said to havo loft
somo faint trace on English letters. It was tho
Romans, also, who brought Christianity Into
Britain, and British Christianity has slightly
entered Into English lltoratnro. I ' '"
the legends ot naints. as. for M"n"le. or
Alban of Verulam. handed down from tho dara
of tho Roman occupation, that we find vestiges
of the Influence on English lltorntoroof tho
Christianity which Brltnln owed to HomntiB.
Tho chief story Is that of Helena and hor in
vention of the truo cross." Constantino, who
was proclaimed Emporornt York, was tho son
of Helena, the daughter of n Daclan Innkoepor.
whom legend mado Into a British princess.
One of Cynowulf's noblest poems cclobrato
the dream and victory of Constantino, the voy
age of Holena to Jerusalem nnd hor dlacovory
of the rood s nor Is tho story unrepresented In
the later literature of England.
On the wholo. howover. tho Influeneo of Brit
ish Christianity on English literature Is all but
Imperceptible. The slaughter which the Eng
lish heathen made of the Britons and the de
struction of the British shrines In the first hot
years of the conquost loft only n fow traces of
the Roman civilization nnd of British Chris
tianity. V. Is siuFuosted that Cantorbury may
--a -. - . ll.Blsllnh Alt II fit llSt SI
have retalnod a romnant or Christian cnurcnos
and schools. It Is certain that Roman civiliza
tion and 'hrlstlanlty remained nlivo In Wales,
but where tho English heathen passed, ruin
was on their right hand and tholr left. When
England. In Its turn, becamo Christian, the
momoryofthe cruoldnysof the conquest kept
the British Church apart from the English,
and when, eventually, the Britons woro ab
sorbed Into the English, they becamo children
of the Latin, not of tho British Church,
I.
Let us pass to tho chapter In which tho nu
thorconslders tho four national characters, to
wit. the Anglo-Saxon, tho Celt, tho Dano and
the Norman, which wero blonded to form tho
beginnings nnd to continue tho llfo of English
literature. It is Mr. Brooke's conviction that.
In cortaln features, the Anglo-Saxon spirit ex
celled that ot olther tho Colt or tho Dane. Ho
finds these features exhibited In tho mnklng
and sclonce of government: In tho establish
ment of law and organization of order: In tho
consolidation of a village, a town, a Stato; In
the creation and development of freedom: In
tho founding of national life on home llfo; in
tho sense ot duty: Inthecnpaelty for obedience
to a leader : In tho power of holding together In
unity; In tho willingness to sacrifice Individual
nlms to n collective cause: in perseverance
and onduranco: In tho conduct ot wnr: In
tho lovo of adventure, nnd, finally. In tho
passionate desire to discover and selzo
now worlds. These, It Is submitted, aro tho
powers which construct, sustain and expand n
nation. They donot.of themselves, however,
create n great and varied literature, such ns
England evolved at last. Tho Anglo-Saxon by
himself wns capable of producing good proso
on nil praotlcal subjects, excellent and nccu
rate history, practical works on sclonce, closo
criticism, religious, moral or philosophical dis
course, a tender, deeply foit religious poetry
nnd narrative pootry of disproportionate
length. Ho also had a happy turn for lovo
songs. By hlmsolf alone, howovor, tho Anglo
Saxon was entirely Incapable of producing tho
literature of England, nnd. In Mr. Brooke's
opinion, thoso who proclaim that ho has done
so cannot have looked Into the facts of tho
matter.
Two Important things, no doubt, he did
secure. By his dominnnco In tho qualities
which make a free and settled national llfo ho
assured to us ns tho vohicleof literature tho
English langungo. tlio most capablo and flexi
ble Instrument or literary expression which
exists in tho modern world. After n long
strugglo ncalnst French. In tho courso of which
It nnnexod a largo French vocabulary, and.
after putting under contribution both tho Dan
ish and tho Celtic lancunges. tho English
tongue, enriehod from many qunrters. estab
lished itself as tho most fitting menns of rep
resenting tho thoughts, emotions nnd Imagina
tive work of tho mixed people of England.
Another great thing which the Anglo-Saxon
did for English literature may bo regarded ns
tho outcome of the strong nntion-construet-
...tu uubvuma v, tut? puuut iiuiiuij-uuiiniruct-
Ing powers to which we havo referred nbovo.
Theso powers made n sure and steadfast foun
dation for all thought ; they laid on all emotion
a restraining nnd directing hand, under which
its Are ceased to blazn, but crew whlto hot;
they acted on tlio work of the lmnglnntlon so
as to purify, chasten, educato and guard it
from extravagance. They did for English
literature what training does for tho runner.
Acnin and again It ran wild, but agulu and
again tho English nntlonnl powers brought It
back to tho dignity, simplicity nnd tomperanco
of truo art. Those powers have from tho be
ginning passed througli our literature ns
strength. given It the faculty of continuance
nnd. by their mnstory. enabled it toassimllato
and transmute the excellences of other litera
tures. Mr. Brooko consequently deems it fair
to call tho literary result not Celtic or Danish,
much loss French or Itnlinn, but English. Tiio
dominant noto in tho lltornturo of tho British
islands is tlio English note.
II.
Just ns there are persons who think English
literature a purely Anglo-Saxon product, so
others would derive ail Its excellences from
tho Celt. The latter viow is pronounood as fnr
apart from tho truth as tho former. In our
author's judgment, tho Celt by hlmselr Is ns
incapablo as would havo beon tho Anglo
Baxon of producing tho magnincentnnd varied
literature which Is known to the world as Eng
lish. It is acknowledged, nevertheless, that
tho formor brought to the evolution of that
great creation a number of eloments without
which it would never havo become what it Is.
For long centuries tho spirit of tho Celt was In
timately mingled with tho spirit of the Anglo
Saxon, from home to home, from town to town,
fiom county to county, over tho north
west and southwest of England and over
tho wholo of tho lowlands of Scot
land: nay. oven, througli Its antecedent
admixture with the Danes. It eventually in
fluenced the eastorn and midland counties of
England. It brought with it Into the English
peoplo and wove Into their nature and litera
ture a sad ideality; n penotratlvo and mystio
Imagination, especially pleased with and natu
rally abiding in worlds beyond tho sonses. it
brought copious Invontlveness; great lovo of -melody
and of Its most subtlo changes, both in
muslo and poetry; u fiery Impulsiveness, at
tended by a swift reaction Into depression : n
rootof romantic melancholy; n passionate lovo
of women; a dreamy union with tho llfo of
nature: a great power of animating Inanimnto
tilings and of quick shaping into foun what was
folt and thought: asntlrlo vein which tended
to bo sav.igo In expression nnd reckless of
fuct; n capacity for self-mockery ; u care
lessness of tho conventional; n reek
lessnosB of tha present, nnd, especially,
of tho future; a floreo individuality which, in
politics, disllkod Inw.nnd.in literature, ovlneed
nn exces-ito self-consciousness; a genoral In
nttetitiveness to criticism and II feeling as of
one bolonglng to another world mid half lost
in this; it belief that there wag nothing on this
enith worth much trouble or much intensity,
Certain of theso elements kept tho Colt from
the closo study ol great models, tho hard nnd
perslstont work, the boundless humility before
Ideal beauty, the rigorous rejection of the su
perfluous, tho resolution to possoss great mat
ter of thought a well as dopth of emotion,
which nre both needful for the attainment of
perfection In artistic work, It was not till his
powers were mixed with thoso of tint English
that such perfoction could bo attained. By
himself tho Celt would have boon ns Incapablo
ns would have been tho Anglo-Saxon of pro
duclug tho wholo of English literature.
It Is eoncoded by Mr. Brooke, however, that
tho powers which tho Coltlo nature caused to
mlnglo with the Anglo-Snxon nature wore of
tho highest taluo for every class of metrical
composition for tho melody of poetry, for Its
lyrlo changes nnd for Its subtle rhythms. Wo
nre reminded that a JiOBt of our rhythms are
derived from Irish motors, sometimes directly,
sometimes transmitted through Fra neo, sonic
times through Italy, sometimes through Lntln
hrmns. To these powers English poetry owes
much of its fanciful charm, Its love of legend
and fairy lore. Its quaint or magical surprises.
Ita self-conscious melancholy, Its satiric laugh-
ili, Ifc.rtiiji.ihfui1r4l?iilhift itkik&htj ,'-.)TAtt.Ali.. .1i
ter. Ita lavish use at times of color. Its love o
naturo and of solitary communion therewith.
Its Impersonation In inventive detallotnature'i
monstrous and graceful rowors. The Com,
elements did nearly as much for English press
To It thoy gnvo IU spontaneous movomctitj'
Its subtlety, its mystery, sadness, mockery and'
color. Stonllng down from gonorntlon to gen.
oration Into the Anglo-Saxon nnture. the Coltla
olemonts tnado their way till they were Intl.
mntoly Interwoven with tho Anglo-Saxon pow. f
ers. Tho latter. In turn. Inf usod Into tho Celtla
constituents tho force, tho intensity, thn moral
onergy, tho porsovoranco, tho solemnity nil
(serious humnnlty whloh were ncoded terror,
manentand finished art. Separately, thoOU
or Anglo-Saxon would havo proved Inadequu
for tho creation of English literature. Xo
gothor. thoy woro adoqunto; together, they
croatod It To our author's mind no mixturt
In tho world Is so good for tho best work In
pootry nnd In prose ns tho mixture of tho Celtle
nnd tho Teutonic spirit. Tho mixture, more.
over, wns chemical, not mechanical; llko ll
natural mixtures destined for fine and liti.
HUM.,, -v....- . --.. ..-. .- w ul, ,usuilf
UBO.'ltwns completo.
Mr. Brooko regards as curiously futile th
attempts that hnvo boon mado by English anil
Irish nationalists to detach nnd Isolnto whatii
Coltlo or what Is Anglo-Saxon In English litor
aturo. Ho knows of no product of English
pootry or proso In which Anglo-Saxon and Cel.
tlo olemonts nro not closoly blended, thoujh
tho proportions of tho sovernl elements vary
Indefinitely In different worus. Thoso booii
aro pronounood tho best In which tho ndmli.
tnro is most oqunllzed throughout; whentht
admixture Is most unequal, tho book, consld.
orod ns literature. Is less good than it might
havo been. This Is as true of phasos and tran
sient outbursts ns It Is of periods. Atnotlnn
wns early English literature freod from Colli
Influeneo, except, porhnps, during Its revival la
Wossox, under Alfred. Altrlc nnd their dl.
clplos. a revival marked by abseneo ol
InuiRlnntlto work and by a swift decay. )
Tho Northumbrian literature, which preeeihd
Alfred, aroso In lands dooply Imbuod with
Collie thought and feeling. When the Bansi
settlod In eastern England their literature,
both of Saga and of religious myth, had beea
already strongly Influenced .and modified by
tho Celtic. Whon tho Normans came, t
noticeable that tho lays of Roland and Charl.
mngno did not enter with any energy Into the
literature of England. Of all the romanth
cycles. It lonst Interested Englishmen. Tha
cycle whloh emorgod Ilrst nnd wns most devel
oped In England, nnd which has clung to ths
henrtof English literature up to tho present i
day tho Arthurian cycle Is of Celtlo origin, I
and steoned through nil Its French. German j
nnd English outgrowths, In tho Celtic spirit. I
it was brought by tho Normans from Brittany, 9
wns ministered to from Its source when ths I
Normans conquered South Wales: and finally.
In tho resurrection of English lltornturo at th
beginning of tho thirteenth centurv n Celtle
tales wns estnhllshod at the head of the litera
ture of England.
III.
English literature, however. Is not the out
come of tho Anglo-Saxon nnd tho Celtlo spirit
only. Llko thoso atomic compounds whleh
nre formed by the addition to their two main
elements of n nmiibor of other elements la
much smnller proportion. English literature
incorporated with Itself Danish. Noise, Nor
man. French. Italian, Spanish and Oriental
elements; nnd, owing to its Incessant nnd ad
venturous pushing forth into all rartsottlu
world, took Into Itself a multitude of hetero
geneous matters which wero mixed with it
from tlmo to time, but tho transient impulse?
of which soon ceased to booporntlve, Ths
Dane and (Norseman, both of whom had devel
oped a well-organized literary class, brought
to English literature their Sagas, both mythi
cal nnd historical, and n passionate love for
recording in long stories tho mighty dedof
warriors who grew Into mythical heroes. Thi"y
not only told tho tnles of their own folk, but
tholr energy revivified, while absorbing, the
ntnrlnn of tlin nmintrioa thutr invndftrl Wiiara
sioriesoi mo countries tnoy invnuoa. vvners
thoViklngcame, llfo came: and hltintcnsltyof
Ufa not only rosuscltnted the folktales of the
lands conquered by him, but mixed them with
hlHown and developed them Into a Tariod hot
of adventurous narratives. No attempt Is mad '
by Mr. Brooko to trnee. before tho Norman enn
quost. tho Inlluonco of tho Norseman and tlm
Dano on English literature. Ho lias no doubt,
however, thnt the vital strength added to the
largo portion of England occupied by tho Danes
must havo exorted n potent effect on the growth
nnd work of English literature. It should,
howovor, bn borne In mind that, by tho tlms
tlio Danes had 'cttled in England, tho ele
ments nctlvo In their literary productions had
lsoon closely mingled with Celtic elements.
Tho Danish contribution, therefore, to the soil
of English lltornturo was itself almost as much
a mixture of Coltlo nnd Teutonic matter a
English lltornturo in its entirety became.
Into this river of varied constituents flowed
tho Norman stream, which, itself, derived Its
waters from three sources, to wit: Tho origianl
Norse, tho French (partly Gaulish and partly
Latin) and tho Colt. All these, together with
an Eastern strain, cooperated to produce ro
mance, which, vitnlized through ovory vein by
the Norman energy and enchantod with th
Celtic legend and spirit of Armorica and Wales,
poured in full volumo into tho Anglo-Saxon
nnd Celtic admixtures, and for n century nnd
half dominated English literature. Along with
them camo Into England tho now Latin learn
ing prized by tlio Norman, and added a great
body of historical and thoo'ogienl thought to
the soil in which English proso wns afterward
to grow. Also entorod tho soil at this time, but
took no deep root therein, cortaln purely
French eloments, tho so-cnllod esprit Ganloit:
audacious and salacious gayety: tho loose an 1
llvolytaloof lovo; a gross wltjastrange rains
ling of sexual passion with tho love of Chrl't
and the Virgin; a logical porslstencc, especially
In theological argument; an increased affec
tion for allegory and a Latin love of philos
ophy. It Is not the purpose of this book to dcscrlbt
what other influences afterward added thorn
selves to tho river of English literature; bow
Italian contributions woio injured into it: how
new nnd varied streams came from France: bow
Spain, Italy. Germany and Franco, again and
agnln, brought froh and animating Impulsos
Into its over-increasing flood, but were. In no
casos, reproduced In English literature until
they had been digested, absorbed nnd changed.
Wlmtev or changes took place, however, what
ever now cloiuontH were nddod to tho rlvor. tha
main body of It, out of which English literature
drew both poetry and proso, wan furnished by
tho Anglo-Saxon and Coltlo admixture which
began to bo formed In tho sixth contury, and
which has never ceased to swell In volume,
nnd more and moro closely to mingle Its
waters up to the present day,
The Grred iif Christian Solenoe."
To thk EniTon of The Sun .Sir.- Will rou
nllow mo n llttlo space In which I miy add nir
mite ngalnst this furelcal deceiving mode of
"treatment" enoneously called "Chrlst'an
science"? Very recently I lost a dtsvoted
mother, n victim of theso canting sycoilnni"
What science Is there. I should Hko to know. In
tlio " treatment" which consisted In my mother
repenting, nt 11 A. M, dally, the followln
words, " I urn well, I am strong, I am happy " '
Euch sontoneo was n direct He. and to an ab
sent woman citing tlio "troitmeuf'ia ieek.iT
fee was paid for It), tlio woman promts! ig t"
pray nt the same hour! Douth closed tho s -on''
Mrs Eddy nnd her followers me reaping a
hart out of cold mid tholr victims n harve-t of
sorrow It Is funatleiil, iluiigeiuiis. ii"d
imposition nu thu weak and h"!pl lpi
Bii'liin Ih not allowed by law to priotlee with "'',
u illplniiiii from .1 licensed iiioiIIimi college m, I
why aio thffcu charlatan allowed to intn bi'
their lying cant, extoiting fees while H'"r
vii'timsHiuk und dlo I
.Mrs. Eddy challenge thn world to disprove
her Btateniijiilh, but when honextly ehalien y I
and asked for data, she talis toniiswoi hrl'.
whom thoy pretend toismiilate, did notoxfrt
fees for prayer. If you havo no money the nc't
havo notluiHto pray for you, no time for ih
imor: their victim must pay. Whore Is tha
selenro? Where Is tho Christ ? . . 1
Tothocant.thedecolt and the snare of tha w
misdirected snot my mother was lost, and I ma y
disgusted with so-eulled "Christian Seiance
PmsBUKO, Pa.. Jan. 25, Cecil Out

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