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The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, May 24, 1877, Image 3

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EMPIRES AND KINGDOMS OF EUROPE AND ASIA.
Map of the Continents from Gibraltar to Yeddo, Showing the Relations of British India, and Russian Tartary to the
Seat of "War and to Each Other.
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IN WAR.
England's Interests in
the Conflict.
CAN SUE INTERFERE?
India as a Military Base
Against Russia.
ITER FINANCIAL RESOURCES.
Is the Anglo-Indian Army
Available ?
A RUSSIAN ATTACK ON INDIA.
England Can Fight Russia With
Her Treasury,
II tbe only object of tbo war now in progress lo the
Katt was the bringing of Turkey to u senso ol ber true
position in tbo European family ol nation)!, ami too
consequent securing lor ber Christian subjects ibe
rights enjoyed by all civilized peoples, llieo It would
not bo difficult to localize tbe conflict. Indeed, there
would be little trouble in persuading tbo great Towers
to uoilo their forces for tbo accomplishment ol sucb a
very desirable purpo.-e. But behind all this mask 01
religious and humanitarian zeal lias the deep design of
conquest and tbe establishment of now political rela
tions in tbe rations adjoining tbe flospborus. Judging
Irotn the peculiar policy of KDglaod with regard to tha
etlorts at adjusting tbe status 01 the Christian subjects
ol tbo Sultan, and the suggestive remonstrances with
which tbo Torto was pliod by the diplomat to represent"
litres of Urcat Britain during tbe recent session ol tha
Dontcrence. England baa movod ber Turkish pawujust
sne squire too tar to opening thu game that must de
aido whether she ar Russia shall dominate lo the (ar
|}a st,
itaoueH im'krssts i* Tua vast
Doglaed tnay eudoavor to avoid a collision with
Russia regarding this Kasiern question, but ber most
vital Interests tre involved in it and she isnoot look
oj as a nouir.il while her groat rival lor the t.mplie of
Asia is settling it without any respect for what she
considers ber rights so au Asiatic Power. Tbe acat or
war lor the present eiubracca the Turkish territory In
Kurupc and .Una; tbereiore it is reasonable to suppose
that II Itugiand lotorleres bar force will bs appl.od to
limit, II not to prevent, great Russian successes In
both regions. - What this torco consists ol and tbo
manner ol Ita employment -becomes, then, tha main
question to be coosldsrod.
niuce tbo opening ol tbe tines Canal through French
enterprise tbe Mediterranean bas assumed un iniorcst
tor KnglmJ wbiob it did not belorc poeseee, even
thougb Gibraltar and Malta represented tne way sia
lioua ol bor commerce In tnet aea. Tbe currente of
Inde with tbe far Sank bave beau diverted from their ,
oid lines around Africa and Capo Horn into tho more
direct ono via Suez and tUe Red sea, It has been oue
of tbe favorite dreams of English stales men to control
beyond question every route leading to India '-first,
because England's suprouiuoy in that country demands
such a security, and secoud, because bar exclusive
trade roquired that every precaution should on taken
to guard against tbe rivalry and enterprise ol other
nations in that direction. It wasproposod to construct
a railroad from the coast of Syria through the valley of
the Euphrates to tho Persian Gulf, and al..o directly
oustwsrd to India, liy which England would establish
the most rapid means of communication with ber
Eastern possessions; but, owing to the difficulties of
tho country, the enormous cost of tho work and,
above all, to the decided opposition of Russia, the
scheme was abandonc<L It was chiefly in furtherance
of ibis Idea that England entered into the Crimean
war. The Russians wore threatening Turkey, aud
tbe independence and inviolability ol that .state were
necessary to tbe success ot tho croat railroad project.
Therefore England threw her whole force into tho war
for tbe protection of her interests, which sbo dceruod
were seriously menaced by any Russian success. The
truth is that, although Russia suffered severe y In that
contest, her grow in eastward aud southward toward
British India was not seriously checked. Ir.dccd, its
duecilon was simply chaugcd for the lime. A Iter the
war of lSOA-'iS the march of the Russian armies began
10 take the direction of Khiva aud the Central Asian
territories which lie botwecn India ana tbe Caeplun i
Sea. There she absorbed into her vast empire im- 1
niense ureas of desert and mountain, which, Iroin being '
a barrier to ber own progress, buvo become oue to any
nation striving to atlac* ber irum mat side. Rug
tana's direct railroad lino from the Levant to India is
now an impossibility il Buss a desires to ui.ike it such,
and there is not the slightest probability that llie Czars
will ever afford 'heir enemy any facilities tor Strength
ening Iter position iu the has These conditions ren
der tho .Sues Canal ul cxiraordinary impuriaiico to
England. It is her only highway uow open from tho
Mediterranean, and she is resolved to guard it w
she ceo from being closed upmost ber. Any ouu
glancing at tho accompanying map will readily
perceive tho enormous saving of distance al
loc ted by ibo canal ovor all the other avail
able routes. II it were possible, therefore,
th..t England could he cut oil" from this lino, the dis
advantages at which stio would he placed with regard
to other a.-piring Powers would be Incalculable. In
stead ol st'iiuihg her troops ad a bei trade through the
short und sap" route via Gibraltar, Malta, Sue' and
Aden, she woul I ho compelled to send both urouud the
great continents ol Alncu or South America, exposed
to me numerous dangers ol ibe ocean and to tho possi
bio risks ol war. Mu.ta would cease to have He pre
eui eaiuc 10 bur, ami Gibraltar would atauhie again its
true character as a monaco to all Southern Europe.
The interests ol England In the settlement ol me
Eastern question are tiierelore of extraordinary mag
nitude, iilid invsu eiio will eudeavor to dvieud with tier
last tuan nud I ini muling
MOW 1.VIH ASII (.AN IMTHIiri KK.
Even II Turacy tails l" maintain hersoil against the
Russians England innst, as a measure ol seli-prescr
vatioti, take ui lb ? quarrel aod light it out. Although
tuere Is u co.mu.eraidi- ami-war party in Knilamj to
day under iliv leadership ol Mr. Gladstone, us strength
win not sustain the pressure ut national interval, und
tho liral groat successes ot me Russians in
Asia Minor will louao the whole British peo
ple to a hcu.-n ot tlio uccessily ul w.tr.
England has two centres whence ah- tau Ulroct her
military jaiwer agatu-t Huasiit. flies* are ibe Rritish
IsiMO'.a ami Imliit rue lormer represents, oi course,
tho grcal source ol aulliuriiy. oi liuanuial strength,
the naval forci- and the hrst uvunahle nniiiury power
Tbe hitler represents "my a limitary strengiti which is
available in * rccond.iry degree, out Is greater in mug- j
niluoe 111tin the European under cerium highly im
probable conUit ous. As the ally ol Turkey Kngluuil
cuu lurnisb from her European centre tho war ex
penses, the inosi formidable Heel in Ihi worm nud
p.-rbapa Irom hb.noo to iO.is.aj good soldiers. An
English subsidy in iho Turkish treasury mount the
creation ol a lurge nrmy ol irroguhtr troops ilravn
troru tbe Asiatic dominions ul the .Sudan, abunuant
supplies ol arms and amurjiuiiuu lor the.-c lore s aud
heavy artillery lor the doiei.es ol the Turkish strong
holds along tbe ?<tuubo aud in Asia Minor, supplies
of coal lor I lie Turkish fleet md other necessaries for
flu active nit 'leictisive warfare against iho armies
an<l nnvy of tun C/.nr The English lloet will immensely
increase iho naval strength or ihe Turk* snd perhaps
control In a large degree tho inter oreuco ot other
maritime I'owors, snob as France. Italy and Germany,
in the quarrel. Tho English army drawn Iroin the
British Inlands would not alter the enuditioiis
of tho war very much, became it wdl
represent only the addition at iu own numhur
to that of iho Turkish forces, and will only welsh so
much and no more iu tho acalo againnt Russia. Iho
old and patriotic idea in England that one Englishman
Is no good as ton Frenchmen or twenty Russians is
now pretty web exploded. ri?<! brecchioador has re
ducod all European troops to a common level, ho tnnt
II, instead ol 30,000 English soldiers, the sumo number
ot lurks wore brought into tho Hold ihc condition ?>l
things would remain the saino I or Turkey, sud In
oitflnr case the balance would no pro.-erved as it is at
presonl, by tho addition ol an equal number to the
Riim an armies from the ltnmcmc reserve lurccs of
thaL Power.
As to the manner id which England can direct her
European loroos, naval and miitiary, against Kus-ia,
mere can be but litile room for speculation. A balhc
licet to watch the Russian ports during the open rea
son would probably limit tuo operation* of the nsvel
forces ol the Oiuir to the d.doncu ol th>' harbors, out no
impression can now bo made on Russia in that direc
tion by a hostile fleet. I he warn 01 1-54 and 1 ->70 have
proved how little can be accomplished t>v the best iron
clads against a torpedo guarded ooast. \ cry much the
same rouditious prevail en the tb ires ol tho Ruck
8ea, tho important Russian ports being well
si-cured sguluHl lortngn flouts by torpedoes,
botu fixed and locomotive. Indeed, it is a
question with such an experienced naval con
sirucor its Mr. Kued, U. P., o England,
whether the marine torpedo has not rendered tho
bunding of grout irou-clsds a useicss expense. There
i s no doubt that England's licet ol last cruisers called
"commeroo ocii.riJVi.rii'' arc highly efUcioui lor the
purpose lor winch they <rc intended. Their great
speed is the heel promotion against ilie heavier but
Mow. r lron-clud ships ami thur monster guns, while
it virus tiicui absolute control of the sou so far as the
merchant iqarii!" of an onouiy is concerned. Hut
Russia has no commerce to be destroyed by such res
se.u. Looking, therelore, at England's naval strength
as an elemciit or iorc<- in cum in- interleres in Turkey'?
quarrel il must bo regurdud as oior? Innnidable in up
pcaruoeo than in law, and ? ill prove if used against
Russia as inefficient u* it wmM be expenaivo to Kng
i ind. Russia has buioru now oencd the utmost cfloru-<
ol tho columned doe is ol England and I runcr. The
opera it on 1 n tho Baltic during is.it were little hotter
th m ridiculou . The vast armaments ot the utiles cur
tainl) tiurned a lew ?. i/lu.u.- .long the coes: and bat
lured clowu out irhud forts such as th ?c u Botburaunil
and bveahorg. but in tbu main effort they wcr-- kepi at
bav when iboy attempted to strike a biow at Russia's
sirougiiold ut Crousludt where tfts ships of that Powor
were lying securely hebtad tuo lortliicaiiont ami tnc
linee ol torpedo-- It is possluic that tuwni like
Ode.-sa ana Repast opol might culler again Iron) a bom
bardment, but such ? drsliuottoB ol uvuu ihu cities of
an enemy would boa- Itarharou d as it would prove u ??
less. It would hot st -y ilie lide of Rcrsiun victuiy in
Bulgaria add Armenia. Its effects would beentiiuiy
local, air) would inevitably result u sucb i demon
siruiiun again-t Inula us to make lor England the
eundlc minutely more costly ih?r> tnc game.
Tilt: v m i k or ax km.hum coin's ?'akmi.K.
Whin wur is Waged on a granu pcalu sucU as that
now ia progress th" luturieruiico ol a physically week
illy for one or ether ol the belligerents do- s not dis
turb the coodttlons of the coulust 10 any appreciable
degree. England's navv being of little service to I or
koj. bur army, as stated before. would not weigh
much iu inn scale. Lui it bo suppo-ed, however, toil
on Khglisn army corp* i- aindcd on tho coast ?> Ku
ropcau lurkuy, say at Tins, it would prohabiv he
employed so My lor tho doleiico ol >chuumla uud \ irua
ugaius. a Rit-ua advance from trie Uebr u-iacbu.
Willi English guns on tUu ortiucHtlous an l Eugli-h
gunucrs in work luom a doiome ol such a position us
rtchuuuiia might he pioluu,ud, hut it would bo abbnrd
to su\ that th-- ultimate result ol tho con
test would oe other than a Russian vn lory. Mum
hurs would teil igainsl valor, especially when
the number* would exhibit au equal courage nun
mi ability io suaiaiu ibc Intuitu* ol war Eog
laud has ineu ciiiipaigiiing iu European Turkey belnre
now and the i ospiiala oi V arua and el?twuer<' tuld tho
tale ol her lor mm -a. An arniy corps druitod irom
the heme army, whtch !H usually cemlorlably sheltered
and well ltd uud clothed, placed in active service in a
country where Hit extremes ol leuipuruture combined
with other dlsoiso-producing condition- arc daiiv ex
perienced wou'rtsu'nn decimate such a loree even II it
was lilted physically to auatulu all the fatigues uud
privuiiohb ol ordinary active service. The British
coraiuiksuriai d- p irtin-nt was never a success; sir etly
spanking there is no such uepai tiuunt organized iu ac
oordauoe with the true inilitury idee oi maintaining an
army well slid evculy supplied, it U always a case of
roast bee! uud uliuu pudding or oiouldv nerk end arsnic.
era. The infantry soldier who rcvols in ? Iittc tire id,
cheese und ..undon porter io-day cannot calculuto that
by to-morrow ho will oven got enough ot "bard tack '
and water to may his hunger. Requisitions on tlio
commissary genera frequently hove resulted in tlis
most uuioiiKcil lor supplm-. While in the Crimea the
Kngliith troops wauled snoes and stockings, largo con
signments of Woollen cctuloricrs und lion net belts
wero sent out by the good ladles at homo,
and wneu during the cholera sen.on the
11 nncl belts were needed the troops bad
1 a glorious supply ol pickles *U'i gooseberry jnu. It is,
lierbaps. useless to discuss why tins coudittou ol
affairs will recur every lime a largo body ot British
troops are in scUTO lorelgu service. dome say it Is
due 10 too much re I tape, others to a want ol harmoni
ous action between the ultl'ercni departments, while
many do not hesitate to attribute it all to that prculiar
inexperience that grow- out 01 running too long hi one .
groove. Anyhow, it is only necessary to turn to tun
history ol recent campaigns 10 be convinced Hint m I
the mi'Hnry art ot'organisation the British stall :k not
generally succss-iul
r?iK xnolo-.ndi.s ccntsis cv runti
In British Indlu there is a vast Mohammedan pop
t.luiion roputcd '.o bo devoid! to the Sultan and h s
cause. Many of th.s form of belt* I are In ttic ranks el
the native army jeloaging to the Km press ol India, at' j
well us in those of the forces uudci 'be control of the !
oeinl-indoj'siideui u.uivo princes, mere a a popular
idea that, in the event ol I upland taking sides With I
Turkey in this war, a vs?t and irreslrtinle army could !
he collected In lei is and inarched westward i" the aid 1
of the Commander ol the Kauhlul. Perhaps it w.njid
he wd! to consider tlr-t the relations between those j
nalivo princes and tl.e British government Hi India ,
beioro making a loo hurried estimate id the military
fore s thai could he assembled for the assistance of the i
Turks.
Ihe ruled the tfnzllsb in Ind^s is that of the con- |
qtioror, no mailer bow ibe governmeut may seek to j
conceal it under the gin-o oi hnarul institutions. In I
di* is a pirt of thu British Em jure that is specialty |
destined l?y its masters as a producer ol rovenue in the i
llr-t instance, and second, .is a market lor ihc rr an. |
uIaclures of Manchester. Snefileid and Birmingham.
Til. revenue is wrong Ifoiu tho vu-t population of
India by a pruces- of taxation winch, founded
oil tho principle that if a man doe- not rat
he will die?that it, Ir >m sheer B*c< ity i e tnu-t pay
wliit Is demanded of Imp, d lie wishes in preserve hi*
i:ie. Pood aud lbs Other necessaries of iiie, ich ?s ,
Mit, are therefore taxed In ludia, aud ti e ppu,*ilou
pay* in uin lux the price of >t.s existence, md tu the
ui.-er.ibie poverty of .? crowded millions can he *eii '
the po Icy o! in: ruler fbe country is mans ed an i j
governed with an ey? to Knglith interests sotelv, und
stands iu that respect jiroc.- iy the same rotation to '
Ktiglaud SB I'uba docs mi rvpsili. Tncro is 'he ? if- 3 ,
steady drain ol wealth to rep 1*0 Uic coders 01 he
borne govnrnmcui. 1110 swno exclusion 4f these 1 .irr
ih the land from ill (be higher an 1 bettor paid off :es
and Ilieir relegation In su inordinate posts und StSrvs
tiou salaries aid the f .itac .tetn ol using the c. ui.try |
as 1 pro v -1 - hi lor tb? needy younger sou--, broken down ,
spendthrifts aud groedy conn favorites, every onu ol
whom can he won dc crioen ?? ?? biii Ot uxca.ihgo
draw u ov Rbgland 01. 11.0 Indian n-vuiiuc* u. tun
to'si revenue :t '--known 'li e ihc inn I tax forms
forty-two per cent, the ilt tax thirteen per cerii md
the opium lax 1 liielei-u per cenl. binkiug
Irnu ilio?o tbrcu iictns n vou y-lour per cent o:
the wbolo. But ul regard.- the lad tax,
it bid reached Us iinm. Tho country can
bi.ir uo bhi'c th in i- now imposed ipou u, fir it av
erage* aanually about $0 pei aero, mid oxceids the
total ctiftuniH revenue ui -in I miad Kingdom Tho
sail tax average* |l 11 pof lical pi thu outiri popula
tion, und ir -in import on in ah.oiuto necessary o|
lip- \s to lb# opium tax, which produces noarly one
111tli ol thu UritlbU isvettUO, 11 will ceusu to he liuiuoii
some on the Iiidlun population when British peek 1
are sauiOced to Brii.sn coneeicacc. Tbure ft, there
loie, mile prospect that this tax uud trade will ooabai.?
| donud. Out 01 ihe falsi i vvoai.i , the cxpendliarss are
at I allows, arid 11 I - Well I o murk Ih : Ileitis
Ctvu establishment ???. Mb it 1
Arm; 16,1 IH,000
Publnl works,,., Il.TnO ot?<>
i,o ss on exchange 'J.-.d tnsi
All others 4,764,000
Total i. 61,7vp.imo
--Keaving a uellcit of I M - oou
The actual rovuuuo being ?4*1,174,000
^1'or ihc lust throe years the deficit has been ?
lk74-76 ?4,091,000
1476 IH 4, *96,(100
1S7B-77 1,816, olio
Add to this the oxpvnditur* rendered necessary cv
the prevailing lamiue und the umouuts cXpeo -ed ot
accosalty undor thu etreumsMBees on puul.c relief
works, which will oortataly loot up ifon, ?-<,000.990
to ?8,000,11(10, aud 11 is c.tsy h see Hod Hiir.iil ilio bur
den luu.t be on a country tuat hut to pay aU ibe pen
alnes ol tnugovcrumeni. ?M
U is wail to exuaxii.e a little lurlhcr Into thu aura
Hon or tlx' (innnclal burdens and rnsourcei of India
beloro consider.iig the possibility ol drawing mi the
country lor military strength. Par niKiutasnlDg the
army that now bonis Inuia too lollowtug expeudiluri'8
wore and are necessary :
tfiiH by A'imi'miI Fd<l in/ Mia.
1874-7 5 ?ll,Mri,00? JCKiW.WO
1875-7 0 .i.44',1,000 10,80.5.000
1S70 77 1.1*1.000 10,080,000
?showing an incnmie tn 1070-77 over the 'previous
year ui the amount payatle by India ol ?Mo,ikiu.
India all ".nil ptytf one-third nl the total cost ol main
taining the Ilntish army at home and abroad. Tho
Ai rvico la lu u most unsatisfactory and uniato "on
ill ion, and mo Incraase ol ooat m almost wholly epont
In Kuglaad?that h while tho Increase or ihe cost of
maintaining tho army in India i-: only 1.05 ("r "tit.
that of the expenditures ol India in Ruglund
Iiki incicasad nter nineteen por cent iu one year.
Kvcrv thing, tbcro.'ure, is a-me lor tho benoOt ol Eng
land to sol her military poorer and urenglhen her ten
nre ol the Indian Umpire, end little or Lothing tor the
h 'lioSt ol the country that furnishes tho moriev. Tim
railroad system of'the Indian peninsula is .almost
wholly subordinated to military purposes. During tho
pa-a ien ye ?rs India baa paid over ?120,h00,0o0 lor
ranroads which Have been constructed so uly with an
eye to reudei the troops more readily elTectivo against
lno population that supports and pays them. 1 he be, t.
pODiiig rood in India, the Hast Indian, does not earn
its ana ran toed per centago on its capital. an I each of
tnc linea ha-, e debt which il is unablo to sustain under
the very conditions ot which l he money was originally
borrowed. trade does not 5ov? along these railroad
cbunneh because they aro not aligned as commerii.il
but a# miliiarv roads The i tat question ol irrigation
has I'" ei. nOfiee'el until periodical, and, Il
i* Icaruvi, annual Isnuoca will become regu
lar Indian institutions. 7 bo (ireta.nl leor
lul uondntoo of certain portions oi Central
India can be ttacldl d.felly to tho neglect nl useful
works lor those which tend to incrcme the military
control ot the countly Dm, aithouirh an eloit is
being made tn stay the spread of this horrible misery,
the (put remains that the ch -apeat dMpnsition that can
be made oi a. ?upe> IIuuuk population is to lei it be
thinned by death. Fhe Hindoo Is by niturc a lutein
hiii resign' hiinacll to ihe grove with philosophic
tranquillity?indeed, treqoently i-ocking refuge m it
iron, the horrors ol lit". But, like all laiuiisle, ho
.s rat-limes yie ?l- to desperate remove*, wuich. uuloss
. controlled, lead to serious consequence* lor ihose who
rule h m The army, thoroiore. must b* maintained
ai any cost, and Ihuiiiics have heeu heluro now organ
i.-.ed l>y I ? /I:sh sia'csmcit *? tho safety vulvas ol pollt
tea I primna.
i!< it i v nii.Aiii.r.
N. w, the smil nipt on that the Hindoo does not
clearly utidcrsui u h a position With regard U> his
Kb.' ' h in.iaier >'?iiuUl Iu iu orroiieoiuone lidccd. ! lie
pe. pin oi Hindu" in are thoroughly cognizant ol the
n,.hi and wr<n?f nluo ol their case, and
. it. .? hut bccnneit the) aubmlt to the latter
. iron, nccc'iity th..t they .?ece[it u us the
i he ' cor.'it'ioi. attainable ihe>> sec clearly that in
long us the llriilsfc tla.'iloni-over Calcutta and Delhi
i s ? ion* wilt ludia bo the firtna ol ? rapacity which is
I not the I ' fatal because n ,? ewrciseJ under the
r disert name of law I'erl.apn lodta may pro?p??r, but
| sim WIU never represent a iei..? > n buee whose- Kngixb
power dan be dirocie l .igau. >t such hu enemy as
hllSSlM.
There nre at prr ibl in India about sixty two
thousand Hri'i-I. ht luiera Slid |>erbs;t lest tIn.i. two
. hundred ihuu.-und a. .ihiiilw nai.ie iro?|s. includtug
I native poltru, u-.-mr Hritn-'i ? olors Oi there latter
t Ihe r.tnki ire it'ku with M"i: of tn iky tribes, S'icIi
: having us own t '-cuiini tiabils aui le-liel, casto miio
?Ustum. mi. i. ? lure s tho re io re not houion|!ueoi.'<
] enough lor tr.'in por nioo to distant seit i I war ma
, Would Iiirin b ' . ? poore-t i roof,? iu Iho World 'or audi
a purpoa'. Diikrotiecx u> caste tooou uiRcrunet.* >i
I lood in lodia. Kvcu military association can only bo
pri-.orved inder the pr#H?.uro ol discipline. I'hn
j (tboofkns and o'nor bit. tribci derpoe tho more
L-llooiiDsic pyoplo of tb. it?w con n try, who
; are tlicm ? Ivn, undivided into seciiuus or tribes
i whoso religious teuots twacii thctn to abhor everythn.it
. thiit com cl wiili their owu Idu.i. It would, there
lore, tn imp"- ihiu io trun-port either overl imi or U>
] m a ii suihcieut nainiier oi in to troops to ms's F. ig
: land is inln venllou from bcr iudiuu baas ol <n.y pr?c
I Ileal acc ent. Her lomtar is now being appro*' ued
by tInst ot the Hussimu Knipiro, hut ihe tieotrsi ground
is ,in.i i. iiupawablu loi an Auulo-lnalan artny. I.vun
il the disuuca bsiwceu the prenoui seat ol war and tbo
Indian Irontier was not no great, and that tho Inter
veDing area was not (intruded as il is by innumerable
diittculiles. the mere tuci ulono mat io order M kupniy
an ."lOglo-itidian ariuy with the subiisience which it
would require as a llrst neeess.lv, it would involyo a
Commissariat almost as v iried m could bo imatiuicd.
If iht-reioie, the Kuropuafi cuutinguat is hiblo to
Niilb-r Irom a vmi.t oi organi/aMuu iu vari rac, bow
much more would a toron urio>|uatu lor ihe purposes lor
wuicn it was iiiieiitled oiillur lroiu dolectivu arrange
ments and physical till uultlea t The transfiortaiioa
?i a British army Irom luiu oyulaail tu Ail* Minor
may therefore be eel down a* a physical impossibility.
Invading armies have crossed the desert* to IuUia,
bir no uatitre army baa enr kit India to luvado other
territories?at least sucli an event is not recorded is
history.
Til IN-roaTATIoN nv xr.A.
Willi Hiiql.md V puw i-rlul Heel of transports Indian
troops could He sent by sea to the I'erslan Hull or toe
ltud sea. Could be?but xuch a moveinout on an udo
quale real would not ba accompliabed as regards tinio
nod numbers lor a long period anil without an enor
mous expenditure. Not only should the men bo tr dis
ported. but every pound and variety of food necessary
to lii.iiutaiu lturn, i-or the occupation of fepjrpt a
smstl fori e of bepojr truopi. could bo employed, the
chango "I climate being sh^bt and thu general Labile
nt the men being little dissimilar to those of tho Nile
Valley. Hut to send such troops to the snow coyerod
plateaus of Asia Minor tvohld be lo sand tin m to Inev
itable destruction. Katioy a party of shivorlug native)
of the lower bangos Valley kecpiug guard at Kara or
Frxeroam during ih? early npriu,' or late nu
i it in ii, to say nothing ol ihu winter lime. It
would be about a- wise 10 send a Laplander
0 dwell on Ihu aliorea ol tlio Victoria Nlyanau Md
expect Mill to -urvno the change of cliinite. Hut
there .ire bill trib-r in Inula that are accustomed to the
mow) ol the Himalaya ranges nod are as hardy
u?. Coitatoks it. mountain district.x> Certainty, buttne?r
are the very men Whom Kugland will not dare to draft
trom iheir unt.ve tsrritortos, ail particularly to serve
agaiust a I'owor Hi it is us much familiar '? ith these
raiue tribes, their loaniugs and dooires as the Kriltsh
themselves. Viewing it in any aruy there docs not
seeiu to ho the remotest possibility of Holland be ng
able to send 10,bier men westward from India under
tho mo t lavorable o.rcun.stances. unless, indeed,
tboy are Ruropean troops. Hut id >he face of the now
well -uowu ia t I bat Itu-sia has an army ready to raas*
a counter rnovo In the direction ?l India can Kusi.iad
SpiitiOno at her white soldiers from his pott' It u
not likely ih.it "tie < an.
DOt'STfUI. I Ait AI TV OK Tin S.tTIVS nUICM.
Hut thoro ik number grave reason lor non-iniorlsr
enc'i wuh her Indi/iu army, wlucn must govern hn;
lindto-duv. It Is tbe presence in India 91 a largo number
ol native chiefs mid pnuci * whose loyally is mote than
douitlul. 'laeae sortii'indupeodeiit yoven-igus hate
coustduiable foi ;cs attached to ILoir tandarda, and in
il.o segregate their armies number man lor in*n with
tbe British army, ( rue, many of them aro Mutism
mod >ns aud sympathize with the cause ol tLu .Sudan,
tint distant ? d unpens enthusiasm, and home oppor
tunities ire loinj liny when ili*-y prasant themselves
In -uch a (uvorable shape *a they would It Kugland
were mvoivnd in wsr with her powuriul neighbor in
Asia. W ho knows hdt tin active ngoms of the Czar
j have already been among these doubiful subjects
oi :ijo Kmpro.is of India and n> promises succeoded in
] enlisting their -y nips' hies. I.ugliod Is, tnercforv,
[ practically powerh ? with tier lujmt army acaiost
| Ku tl.i, until i ne troops ol that Hewer oither appro.u ft
1 very near lo or cro.-s the frontier. As this is not
I likely to occur yut awhile, at least until the I urlti.-h
question is settled, there If scarcely .i probability thai
Kogland will disturb her army in India.
whkri a\ iko;a> i "U's shocuo ia>i?.
rboul.l nc however, make an i ifort in that direc
tion, nil the troops must be transported by re* io b'ue r,
t.ielice through the can il to the suorsa of tho ho v tun,
where thov would be landed nid added lo the I urkiin
toicoa CWVeflni Syria mid the road- leading to Kgy pt
and the Hoipuoru II u highly improbable thai an
Anglo-ludliin irmy would bo 1 uided at the mouth of
the hupUraies, at tho to ad ol the I'erslan <>ul,
b* cause the <J? t.ito B between such a imdinj
pi*cm and the actual seat of war is more than
twice tnc disiainsof th i h-iiweou ibo Syrian ooast
and any eoi.iuion point in Central A-;a Minor- Uos.uca,
lharr are no ro i l ov rwiucii army material could bs
1 r. US twirled in wigoi.s. rnd nil supplies should go on
CainulhMk, by which uu mm. use ainouulultimo would
b-1 lost. I'oAlllg a cuullhgeul Ol, a?y, uO.Oull M [WY
troops or traim i n n iron. tba lull tribes of Indu, it
would occupy fully six month* heiore auuh a lorco
could lie put in the held id Aala Minor under tho nio. t
lavoruhie circumstance*. in w ouid bring lc o aruiy
ol (ii ? nials i-i ' a territory wheie the climate la ex
ception I'ly yes. re at ills beginning ol wiuter when
they could be ??; to .ill the miseries incidental to
war and ? i bauge Of ciuuate and loud. hen the
lire sh <rmy Iron lidia would b - wholly unfitted
lor in fvice ogaiBst the Hn-siaua. Whoso equip
ru nt would enable lb - in to maintain iht
field even amid the snows and freezing blast*
that sweep over the plateaus of tho headwaters of thr
lluphraies. I ba whole thing is. then, practically tn<
poss bio lor Ktigland. She cannot reach the seat of
war by an ovurlwud march through Afghanistan and
Persia, and to scud her forces by -oa is almost
equally dlflh iili, * veil i) all the other condit oos era
favorable, lu any esse nothing osn be Uoue toward
Using the Angl i I udiaii army in 18? 7.
A K' ASIAN AtracK IIS 'M'tA.
vfbile England cast, ou.y with the utmost difficulty
aud rink u.-e oven a small part ol her ludiau army
against Husaia the uriuiva ol tut Ctar ?rt slowly bug
?u.civ uusB.ug t way souuuaalwuil vo khdla, TMMf

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