




WAKING UP TO REALITIES AFTER JOSEPHUS DANIELS'S DREAM



The battleship New Hampshire, idle now for lack of a crew.



U. S. battleship Arizona.




The Kansas, another useful fighting ship sent to the "graveyard"

Grave Doubts Cast Upon Secretary's Statement That the Efficiency of Navy Has Been Increased

IT FLEAD guilty to having been a dreamer about the navy. I dreamed of a navy with a full enlistment, having found it short about 5,000 men on entering upon the duties of Secretary. This dream has been fulfilled, and in three years 6,531 men have been enlisted.

Moreover, in order to get the reserve ships there at all they had to deplete the complements of the active ships of the North Atlantic fleet, in order partly to man the reserve ships, and neither the active nor the reserve ships could have gone out to fight at all effectively.



The battleship Vermont, which was sent to the "graveyard" that her crew might help man the superdreadnought Arizona, pictured above.

But has the public, which ultimately is most concerned in the matter of naval preparedness, the same reason for satisfaction? Do the facts which Mr. Daniels deals with bear him out? Are our seagoing defenses able to draw upon a full enlistment? Is the available personnel really quite equal to the demands of the available material? Are there enough men to man every gun and to work efficiently every ship?

"The reserve ships had a sort of speed trial outside the harbor. I was not in any of the reserve ships at that time and have not been since, and, praise God, never will be. As a result of this speed trial the vessels were scattered all over the ocean; they broke down in all directions.

for deterioration due to being placed in reserve. Why is this? The layman will ask. The matter is thus explained by Capt. Sims: "If you do not steam the ships you cannot keep them in condition. There are 4,000 or 5,000 valves and one thing and another that will leak, including numerous joints and packings. The only way to keep ships in condition is to send them to sea to do the actual work of steaming. The same applies to guns and torpedoes."

But these men must have the incentive of intership and intergun crew competition to keep them up to the mark. In a fashion the work of the fleet in preparation for battle has become one great game. This is exemplified in the following fashion by Capt. Sims: "We say to our men, 'We are going to fire that gun at a certain time under certain conditions, and they get busy. They take off their shirts, and possibly get in their pants, and they go about the handling of the gun the same as they would play baseball or football.'"

Mr. Daniels has assured the public that the navy is all right, and that we have plenty of men in the service and a reserve large enough out of it, which we could draw in time of need—so that to influence Congress against providing the increase repeatedly urged by prominent officers, Lieutenant-Commander J. K. Taussig, in an article in the United States Naval Institute, entitled "The Enlisted Personnel of the Navy," has flatly contradicted the Secretary of the Navy. According to Lieutenant-Commander Taussig: "In case of hostilities with a first class Power we would require men as follows: For serviceable ships now on navy list, 72,000; For ships building, soon to be completed, 5,000; For auxiliaries now manned by merchant crews and additional auxiliaries that must be purchased, 7,000; For purposes other than on board ship, 11,000; For reserves (to allow for casualties), 5,000; 100,000.

"This is approximately 47,000 more men than allowed for the peace quota. These 47,000 men would be required immediately. There is no doubt that we could enlist them within six months, but the larger portion of them would be raw recruits. It would take at least two years to recruit and train them for efficient service on board ship. Until this were accomplished we would not be prepared to properly employ for war purposes the material at hand."

Another Side to the Story of Trading the Superdreadnought Arizona for Three Old Battleships

commonly recognized that our military position is a defensive one and therefore there must be the closest bond between the battle fleet and the reserve fleet. In other words, the reserve fleet should be counted upon for instant and effective cooperation in time of war. It is not designed to figure in the guise of a mak-shift rushed into service upon a mission akin to a forlorn hope.

"That being the case the sooner it does so the better. Hence the vital questions with us are, first, not shall we put our old battleships into the war battle fleet but how shall we get them in, paying due consideration to the tactical factors of speed and power; and, second, how shall the war reserve fleet get in its blow quickest and hardest? The navy will not long exist as a fighting force if it attempts battle piecemeal."

War reserve fleets abroad are handled in a very different manner. It is not only the practice there to send the vessels as ready for a special response to a call into the battle fleet, but structural defects or shortcomings are remedied so that the reserve fleet actually become better fighting ships than they were originally. It was the difference of procedure between our Navy Department and the naval Ministries of foreign Governments that prompted Capt. Pratt to say: "The price of a battleship to put one of our ships to correct defects would increase the efficiency of our battle fleet more than the addition of a new battleship."

Now it just happens that Mr. Daniels in the course of six months has found it necessary to retire from the active fleet or battle fleet a total of nine battleships, and he has considered them to the limbo of the so-called reserve fleet, which is in no wise comparable to the war reserve fleets of first class maritime Powers. Every one of these ships is well worth keeping, should be modernized in some particulars, and with ample complement aboard ought to be kept busy enough to have them prepared for cooperation with the first line of defense.

ANCIENT GREEKS INVENTED "LATEST" WAR HORROR

Old Gen. Thucydides Tells All About Liquid Fire Guns in His Famous Series About War

This item came by cable as part of the daily war news: LONDON, Oct. 16.—Aided by liquid fire and heavy cannonading the Germans launched an unusually heavy attack at the Schwaben redoubt position, north of Thiepval, last night, but were repulsed with heavy losses, Gen. Haig reported today.



Below will be found an earlier instance of the same sort. GEN. THUCYDIDES, Christian name not given, who might also properly be alluded to as Admiral, being one of the cleverest Greek skippers that ever bossed a squadron of triremes in the Aegean and the best ship news reporter of his day, makes some remarks in his celebrated series of logs about Greek engines of war that may be interesting to the war lords hunting for novelties. The Greeks were ingenious, as the General himself admits, and among their inventions are some, as everybody knows who has read about the wars of antiquity, which experts of the warring people of Europe have adopted. Thucydides saw service in the long and intermittent conflict between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies as a sea fighter and soldier, and no Athenian saw and depicted events so accurately or handed out better historical dope.

After the Hellenes had driven out the Persian invader and had rested a bit the numerous Kaiser Wilhelm's of the little States began to think of acquiring new places in the sun by the simple process of taking them from weaker neighbors. When a very little State was licked by the Athenians, preparatory to absorption, it was picked on and if something wasn't done Hellas would go plumb to hell. So, to prevent little States from being gobbled up by big ones and for the promotion of culture and the defence of civilization, Sparta took a fall out of Athens. The unpleasant way in which this was done was called the Peloponnesian war.

Some of the conflicts were less than skirmishes; some might be called by the police of the East Side mere gang fights; but others were battles of the first order. Frequently after a hundred or more had been killed and wounded on both sides the side that thought it had won would "erect a trophy" telling how it had gloriously knocked out the other side. They were the original war bulletins.

That was the beginning and almost the end of the battle of Delium. Before retreating the Athenians left a garrison in the strong fortress hoping to come back with a larger and better force, relieve the besieged and lick the Boeotians. That fortress was considered impregnable, and it might have been against ordinary assaults. Under the title "Putting One Over on the Athenians" Gen. Thucydides describes the liquid fire gun and the discomfiture of the Athenian garrison. The account is very freely translated from the original Greek.

Putting one over on the Athenians. The cauldron, driving a column of lachrymose smoke and gas and flame 100 feet or more into the air. The Athenians saw the trial test of the great engine with dismay. The troopers in charge of the machine loaded it on six carts and hauled it in front of the weakest wall of the fortress, built of timber, and set it up. An Athenian peering over the wall observed that a Boeotian lieutenant, "What in Hellas is that?" A Boeotian officer shouted back through a megaphone, also invented by the military board, "It's a hint for future generations and it's going to get you, believe me!" It certainly did look fierce, I Thucydides, tell you, and I am some war correspondent.

The Boeotians moved so close to the fortress that they could talk to each other without using megaphones. But the Athenians were not anxious for a gabfest. They saw the bellows squadron turn on the West India cyclone. There was something doing in the fortress when that blast of fire and smoke and gas hit it. When the Boeotians rushed through the gap that had been burned swiftly through the wooden wall they found only a few gallant defenders, somewhat scorched. I guess the rest are running yet."

he armed who hath his quarrel just, but better armed is he who gets his blow in first," again illustrating the antiquity of new things. Thereupon, the Boeotians went to it with, as Gen. Thucydides says, "7,000 heavy armed, more than 10,000 light armed, 1,000 horse and 500 targeteers." The Athenians depended on prestige rather than preparedness. They had many more men but fewer real soldiers than the Boeotians. The Athenians' commander, Gen. Hippocrates, made a speech to them reminding them that they were the greatest in Greece." While the General was orating the Boeotians struck, and the General threw away the manuscript of his speech and lit out with a large part of his forces.