The sun. [volume], August 18, 1918, Section 5 Magazine Section, Page 7, Image 43

About The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920

Image provided by: The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundation

                
8i xsnonv
'AVONHS 'NHS 3HX
THE SUN. SI'NDAY. AUGUST IS. 191?.
What It Means to Win the War in the Air
Air Department Needed to Coordinate
Effort and Stupendous Task
Could Be Done
8161
i&f kBfBYBYBf
JOHN D RYAN
' By ACNES C. LAUT.
WITHIN a very short time the
Hughes report on the airplane
situation and the Senate comuiitee's find
ings on the delayed production of planes
will both be iu the hands of the President.
Their conclusions will doubtless receive
the consideration they, deserve from the
proper authorities, but they do not very
much concern the public. It is all of a
page that has been passed and turned
over. The three questions that concern
the publie are :
"What is the actual production of war
planes now J
What is the actual need of planes to wjn
the war!
And of tlic actual need, what is it prac
tical and possible for us to produce ?
Answer these questions satisfactorily
now and the publie will readily forgive
and forget the mistakes of the past.
A hundred thousand airplanes would
win the war if not at the drop of the
hat, then at the drop of a bomb. They
would drive the Germans out of their rat
hole trenches. Thej would drive them
behind the Hhine. They would start a
run on Berlin.
More than that : even at a GO per cent,
sacrifice of airmen they would save th
millions of land fighters, whose courage
is as powerless against the long range gun
as a child's hand under a sledgehammer.
ATI these arc truisms of the war acknowl
edged to ourselves daily and many times
a day for the last year.
What, then, is the actual production of
airplanes in this country now?
What We Are Doing Just Now.
At the time of writing the end of July
as far as the figures can be gathered
from manufacturers and confirmed by
members of the Aeronautic Club, we are
producing 500 Liberty motors a month,
or 6,000 a year. We are producing froia
25 to 50 H'avilands a week, or a maximum
of 2,500 a year. We are turning out 400
training planes a week, or 20,000 a year.
We are sending out 500 Ilispano-Suiza
engines a month, or 0,000 a year. You
can add the figures for yourself, not
counting the training planes, and see how
near we are coming to the 100,000 air
planes to win the' war.
But when you say we need 100,000 air
planes to win the war it means something
very much bigger than 100,000 airplanes
and" 100,01)0 airmen. By actual experi
ence in the present war, it has been found
that to send and keep 5,000 aviators con
stantly above the firing line it is necessary
to replace 40 per cent, of the men each
month; that is, there must be a replace
ment of 24,000 men a year, on a basis of
5,000 fighters. Figure it out on a basis of
100,000 fighters, and the air programme
to win the war looms as big as a nmvy pro
gramme. For every flier there must be two train
ing machines. Bigger yet! If for 5,000
fighters you need 24,000 replacement men
a year, you need 48,000 training machines
for those 21,000 replacement men. But
the lighting machines must themselves be
replaced 100 per cent, a month; so on a
basis of 5,000 fighting machines you n,eed
60,000 fighting machines a year all this,
note, on the basis of only 5,000 fighters
constantly afield.
'I should say,' declared Henry Wood
house, author of "Military Aeronautics,"
"that to keep 5,00ft fighters daily and
hourly above the fifing line, we should
produce 118,000 air machines a year and
300,000 or 400,000 motor engines."
If that total is needed for 5,000 fighters
figure twenty times tliat for 100,000 fight
ers, and you realize What the phrase "100,
000 airplanes to win jthc war' means.
Many Think 5,000 Planet Enough.
And yet there are those authorities who
think that only 5,000 fighting machines
hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, above the
enemy lines could win the war. This, of
eoursc, takes full account of days of wind
and fogs, when both men and machines
would have to go off the map. But on the
basis of 5,000 constant fighters represent
ing a total of 118,000 machines required,
figure the costs:
The war is now costing $500,000,000 a
day and not less tlian ten million casual
ties a year to all the nations engaged.
Of the 118,000 machines needed to sus
tain 5,000 constant fighters, 20 per cent,
would be single motored, 30 per cent, be
double motored, 50 per cent, would be
three and four motored. The big machines
would cost $25,000, tlic small machines
.$10,000, with $1,500 extra for instruments
and ordnance. Or average the machines
at $20,000 each. What is a total of
$2,000,000,000 plus to win the war against
a waste of $150,000,000,000 and ten mill
ion men a year to keep the war dragging
on an endless stalemate?
Go back and read over these figures
carefully again. And if you want a few
more, contemplate the additional facts.
There ,are in a fighting airplane 4,000
different parts, each of which needs as
fine and delicate adjustment as a camera
lens or compass needle; and you can't
produce this kind of thing by shaking a
stick at it and roaring like Mr. Bumble.
It takes the finest and best material and
the finest and best finger tips working
the material and the finest and best brains
and eyes behind the finger tips.
Why Rigid Tests Are Necessary.
Early in the year, when the tally of
deaths in the training planes began to
total alarmingly large, a bureau of skilled
metallurgists and chemists was established
to test every metal going into the engines
or airplanes. Why? Because only a 2
per cent, variation in one amalgam of
steel for the high powered engines meant
a dead ainnan as soon as he got into high
speed at altitudes above 10,000 feet.
The same thing was done for airplane
fuels to insure a gorolene evaporation at
a low point. And please recall that the
airplane as a war arm is less than two years
old. It was only toward the end of 1916
that the world awakened to the fact that
the only way to win the war without
turning half of humanity into a shambles
was by supremacyin the air.
It now becomes apparent why the de
mand for an air ministry or aerial sec
retary and bureau distinct from army and
navy has split the official world into two
great camps. Those demanding an air
ministry or aerial secretary, as in Eng
land, men like Senator Heed and Harry
New, who are backing the bill introduced
on August 1, see in the airplane not a
branch of the army nor a branch of the
navy but a great air army in itself, a
great air fleet, which shall not only sup
plant but may supersede both army and
navy. They sec the airplane as one of
the great triumvirate army, navy, air.
Those opposed to an air ministry see
in the airplane only the eyes and scouts
and sharpshooters of the fighter on the
land and the fighters on the sea. If the
war goes well as things are, the stand
pats win ; but if when No Man s Land has
bqen crossed progress stalls again, the de
mand for an air army and an air ministry
will gather impetus.
The story of how the failure of last
year's programme occurred will not make
as spectacular reading as graft hunters
would lika to find. The whole airplane
development is in a stage of swift transi
tion, when the inventions of yesterday be
come the antique junk of to-day. WitTiout
anticipating Mr. Hughes's report, here
practically is what Iiappened:
The manufacturers were going ahead
full steam up, according to blueprints
and specifications. It may be said right
here that there are about 2,000 blueprints
and specifications to an airplane. Presto !
A big German machine is brought down
behind the allied lines. It is seized before
it can be destroyed by the pilot. Some
new wrinkle is found in the mounting of a
gun, in cam or shaft or engine.
Is the new poin superior to our
specifications? Wouldn't, in fact, this
new wrinkle as to fuel or wings or engine
or gun practically send our machine to
the scrap heap if we went out against the
enemy without protection against these
new inventions?
News of the new wrinkle is flashed to
the Airplane Board. Two thousand draw
ings and specifications for American ma
chines are junked. A wire goes out to the
manufacturers changing specifications,
and perhaps sending to the scrap heap
100,000 crank shafts, 10,000 cam shafts,
cylinder heads, bearings and small parts
uncounted.
One Machine Needs 2,000 Items.
The manufacturers stop with a yell of
rage, swear and hurry to Washington.
New specifications T A new start; and the
process repeated all over again !
In 1917 wc really went through with
airplanes what the munition and ord
nance manufacturers experienced in 1915
pretty nearly daily changes and heart
sickening delays. But the ordnance manu
facturers finally got their gauges and
standards and got into their war stride,
and the airplane manufacturers are
doing so now. It may be added that the
airplane manufacturers themselves think
there would have been less changing and
junking and scrapping and wasteful
spending if airplane men had been on the
Aircraft Production Board.
As to the Liberty motor, the Hughes re
port will deal with that. It was badly
press ngentcd. It was played up in the
press for a part for which it was unsuited,
and then it took bitter experience to bring
the Government round"to the point of ac
knowledging its pet's deficiencies. It is a
good machine for its own specialty, but it
is not a machine for universal use
Again, big airmen think the blunders
would not have been made if practical air
men had had the handling of air produc
tion, men like Cartiss or Houston or
Wright or Martin, even though some of
these great specialists are at daggers
drawn technically. They know their job,
and they know what can and cannot be
done with a plane, and they could at least
have avoided the errors of beginners.
On the Aircraft Production Board as
first constituted was not one single practi
cal airman. The Aircraft Production
Board members were enthusiasts, but en
thusiasm, like Bryan's oratorical army,
doesn't win this war, or the Germans
would have won out long ago. But this,
too, is past history, and rounds back to
the plane manufacturers' demand for an
air ministry.
Pooling of Patents a Good Step.
The cross-licensing pool of all patents,
which threatened confusion to airplane
production at the beginning of the war, is
not likely to play a very large part in
either official report. When the war be
gan one of the big airplane companies had
possession of about 60 per cent, of all
patents. The other big company had 30
per cent., and the little independents had
about 10 per cent, of the patents.
When it became obvious that airplane
production on a huge scale must be stimu
lated it also became obvious that it was
going to be hard on the beginners to pay
heavy royalties on patents to rival com
panies, and the Government suggested
that all patents be pooled in one hat, with
royalties going out to each patent owner
pro rata for the patents so controlled. If
I remember correctly, this wise settlement
came out of a suggestion from Director
Stratton of the bureau of standards. Any
way, the pool of patents avoided all liti
gation and gave all manufacturers a
chance to go ahead without injunction or
hindrance.
I J"niiiii iibbb bbbbbbbbbbH
CHARLES E HUGHES
Another of the amazing developments
in airplanes to win the war is the quiet
certainty among the biggest airmen that
the air army will ultimately cross the At
lantic to the field of battle on its own
wings. It takes 220 tons of ship space
to convey across the Atlantic a big ma
chine. Also it takes a ship's erew, ten
days of time.
By airplane the trip could be made in
thirty hours with a crew of from two to
eighteen. Aviators now fly from London
to Cairo with only three stops. Always
these air men, with their heads literally
in the clouds and their eyes with a vision
as from a great mountain, are seeing and
foreseeing things to make mortals with
their feet -on the ground gasp. And yet
airplane development is at a pace to make
aviators themselves gasp.
Now go back to the question the publie
wants to have answered:
What is the actual production of war
planes now?
You have the latest figures. Total them
for yourself.
What is the actual need of planes to
win the war?
Not less than 5,000 constant fighters,
which means J18.000 machines a year.
Are we producing them?
We are not.
Can we do it?
Assuredly we can, as easily as we pro
duce 100,000 motor cars.
Why, then, don't we do it?
Because no coordinating head has called
a conference to do it.
Adrice From Henry Woodhouse.
In his testimony before the Senate com
mittee Henry, Woodhouse gave this ad
vice: "Call a conference of all the big air
plane specialists and manufacturers. We
want 118,000 fighting planes in one year.
We will have 114,000 army and navy
fighting aviators ready. Will you have
the machines ready? Let us take a round
robin of how many each of yon can pro
duce. This is short so many thousand
machines a factory. We must assign to
you so many more machines to produce
or find so many more factories to produce
them.
"Here is our programme. To live up
to it what must you have? More steel,
more spruce, more skilled hands! Good!
Call in the. steel men, the spruce men, the
labor leaders! We want and shall com
mandeer so much more steel, so much
more spruce, so many more skilled work
men! "Now, all wants supplied ! Go back and
speed up! The mark is 1,18,000 machines!
For lack of material France and England
are producing only 40 per cent, of the
airplanes they need. Germany is produc
ing 100 per cent, of what she is capable.
If you count piano factories, motor boat
factories, idle garages, Ac, we are pro
ducing less than 1 per cent, of what we '
could do."
Do von want to win the war by su
premacy in the air? There is only one
way to do it, and that is do it and stop
talking about it; and whatever the
Hughes renort savs and whatever the
Senate committee report says, the public
is behind that demand with its pocket
book; but it wants airplanes, not hot air
explains.
4 h