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[No. XLIII.] T H~E TABLE T.—No. XLIII. " The pafions and prejudices of men often ?najk ihtntfelves under the names of virtuous qualities." MY lail number exhibited to the view of the reader two characters, who, with ut any bad intentions, were instrumental in keeping alive a spirit of jealousy and uneasiness among the people,relative to the affairs of govern ment 0 I ftiall now introduce some more of my acquaintance, whose motives perhaps are not quite so unexceptionable. The roify Fumosus is more troublesome, if not more dangerous, than either of the cha racters just mentioned. His paflions are so tumultuous that he can never examine any cir cumstance with candor, and deliberation. He carries every thing to extremes. Whether he is ; n or out of office, he creates many enemies atrainft the government,by his rashness andindif cretion. If he or some of his particular friends should happen to have a leading influence, he funs into a vehemence of applaufeon public men and measures. Should the reverse be the cafe, the whole fury of his paflions takes a different course. He joins the discontented and seditious, and reprobates public proceedings with acrimo ny and revenge. Though he enters into no sys tems to overthrow the government, and though bis paflions will vary or subside, yet he is a peat fomenter of jealousy and uneasiness among the people. His petulance does not, like that of Infelix, waste itfelf in indefinite clamor, but he points his arrows at particular ob jects, and hunts after them with eagerness and sage. Different passions and feelings at times are uppermost. By turns he lhews jealousy, envy, rei'entment, antipathy, and attachment ; and which ever of them prevails,it does not flop short of the highefl degree of excess. When disap pointed, he raves at the administration ; when fuccefsful, he idolizes it, and threatens perdition to its enemies. Upon the w hole, Fumosus, though he is not a man of knavery and intrigue, is still a dangerous character. The impetuosity of his conduct is calculated to excite undue pre judices against the government, and frighten ma ny well-meaning people with falfe alarms. My acquaintance Profundus puzzles many people exceedingly. 'No person can penetrate more readily into the view of another.—He is cool, designing and mysterious. His favorite theories must not be called in question ; and he approves or disapproves of any public tranfavtion, according as it will promote or fruftrate his pe culiar fy'ftem of politics. Such characters as Phofundus are not common. It requires re feirches so elaborate, and an attention to objects so minute and persevering to form abflract sys tems, that afinall proportion of mankind will e wrnake the attempt. Few men have patience aid application,and fewer still have the abilities andaddrefsto proceed systematically Suchfpe culative men often lead others astray ; because their plans, when compared with practice and experiment, are fallacious. I entertain a good opinion of the talents of Pro fun dus, and I have noreafonto scruple his integrity. But he is so dark and incomprehensible, that when he hap pens to take a wrong way of thinking, he draws others into the fame error, by starting difficul ties, with which common minds are perplexed and alarmed. I would recommend it to the ho "tfl: part of my readers, who love tranquility, to have little to do with men, whom they cannot understand. Plain,practical politicians, who are more noted for good actions than for loud or fair »ords, are the lafeft guide and counsel. The vanity and ostentation of Opinus is ve -7 disgusting. His dislike to public measures pro ceeds lrom an affected Angularity of opinion. It ishishigheft aim to recommend himfelf to the world as a person of more than ordinary discern- n 'ent. This easily accounts for the spirit of op position which is so predominating a part of his character. If he should acquiesce in any mea 'ue,which he did not originally propofe,it would prevent the pride and triumph of oppofmg the current opinion of mankind, and making his own •J-gacity more conspicuous. The only conclusion that can be drawn from his disapprobation of '"yroeafure, is, that he did not introduce it it it is no argument that the thing is wrong. have I delineated foine of the motives J. Salifications of a few individuals, for whose I have a great value. Their conver sion, however, sometimes makes unfavorable '"'P'ellions ; and I find that some of their aflo j la!es ca tch their foibles. The peevishness of , I^ tL,x 'ours the temper of some people agninft npV' CVe - rnnient: . T' le incapacity of Bene volus, Kiin" un 4 ua lifi c d to give Inch advice, as the 11 -"els of his disposition tempts his acquaint- WEDNESDAY, September 9, 1789. ance to aflc of him. The turbulence of Fumo • sus, frightens his companions into a dread oi imaginary evils. The mystery of Profundus entangles many an honelVman t in doubts The va nity andpompof Opinus allures theHi allow and fickle-minded into error and instability. It would be well for people to obtain a fatis factory iolution to this question ; whether there are not more causes that induce public men to seek the public prosperity, than probably influ ence either of the chara<slers marked out in this speculation. NEW-YORK, September 9, 1789. SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS. In the HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES, MONDAY, AUGUST 31. In committee of the whole oil the Judicial Bill. THIRD SECTION UNDER CONSIDERATION. MR. LivermorE : I think this law will en tirely change the form of government of the United States. Several obfcrvations have heen made on the clause : It is said to be the hinge on which the whole turns : Some of the objections which I have thrown out, have been attempted to be answered —among others the great ex pence—by expence I do not mean the salaries of Judges—this will how ever be greater than the whole expence of the Judiciary throughout the United States ; but I refer to thr general expenccs, which mull be borne by the people at large, for jails, court houses, &c.—the expences of jurors and witnesses, and other incidental charges,will be another great burthen : This is atprefent borne without repin ing, as the people receive compensation in person al security and public justice ; but if all tliefe are to be doubled throughout, it will be justly consi dered as intolerable. Another burthen is the ra pidity of thecourfe of prolecution in tliefe courts, by which debtors will be obliged very suddenly to pay their debts at a great disadvantage : Some thing like this, occasioned the insurrection in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts : In other States similar modes of rapidity in the collection of debts have produced conventions : This has been the cafe to the Northward, and as I have been in formed, has also to the Southward. This new fangled system will eventually swal low up the State Courts, as those who are in fa vor of this rapid mode of getting debts will have recourse to them. He then adverted to the claffi ingcircumftances which must arifein the admini stration of justice, by these independent courts having fitnilar powers. . Gentlemen, said he, may be facetious refpecfiing dividing the liorfe—but these are serious difficulties—the inltances men tioned by the gentleman from South Carolina, do not apply—the officer here is the fame—the fame Sheriff has the precepts committed to him—and the execution does not claffi—the fame goal ans wers for both, &c. I do not think that the difficulties have been answered by any of the examples brought for the purpose : As to the instance of the trial for piracy in the State of South Carolina, that was a particular cafc, which could not otherwise be provided for ; but these so rarely happen, that no precedent can be drawn from them, to render it neceflary to estab lish these perpetual courts. He then refered to the observation which had been made refpedting those who are opposed to theclaufe,offeringafubftitute,andfaid,he thought upon the whole that the motion made by an Hon. Gentleman from South-Carolina, (Mr. Burke,) that there ffiould be no diftridt courts, is better than any substitute. It may be proper here to refer to the Constitu tion : He then read the clause upon this fubjedt— The Supreme Federal Court is to have original jurifdidtion only in certain fpecified cases—in all other,it is to have only appellate jurifdidtion : It is argued from this, that there are to be Inferior Federal Courts, from which these appeals are to be made : If the fconftitution had taken from the State Courts all cognizance of federal causes, something might be said ; but this is not the cafe. The State Courts are allowed jurifdidtion in these cases. It has been objedted that bonds taken by the Judges of the Supreme Court, cannot be sued in the State Courts : I do not fee why this cannot be done : Similar procelles have been usual among us in times past, and there has been no difficulty. Admiralty Courts ffiould have cognizance of all maritime matters, and cases of seizures ffiould al so be committed to their decision. I hope there fore that the clause will be disagreed to, orftruck out, and that the bill may be rejedted, that a ffiort concise system may be adopted. r Published on h Mr. Vining : I conceive that the inftitutiou of general and independent tribunals, are eilential to the fair and impartial administration of the laws of the United States—That the power of making laws, of executing laws, and a judicial administration of such laws, is in its nature, inse parable andindivifible,if not " JuJlice might be said to b: lame as visll as blind among us." The only plausible argument which has been urged againlt this clause, is the expence : It is true, that ex pence mull in some degree be neceflarily incurred, but it will chiefly consist and end with the organ ization of your courts, and the erecftion of such buildings as may be eflential—filch as Court- Houses, Jails, and Offices, as the gentleman has mentioned—and what, at all events, do such ex pences amount to—they are the price which is paid for the fair and equal administration of your laws : From your amazingly encreafing sys tem of government, causes must neceflarily multi ply in a proportionately extensive ratio : These causes must be tried some where, and whether it is in a State Court, or a Federal Judicature, can, in the article of expence, make but little differ ence to the parties : It is only (for the fake of more impartial justice) transfering the bufinel';s from one tribunal to another. The gentleman has told us, that the people do not like courts—that they have been opposed and prevented by violence—nay, by an in Maflachufetts : Surely'this operates as a pow erful reason to prove that there should be a gener al, independent, and energetic judicature—other wise, if either the State Judges should be so incli ned, or a few lons of facftion choose to aflcmble, they could ever fruftrate the objects of Juftice — and besides, from the different periods fixed by the Constitution of the United States, and the different Constitutions of the several States, with refpeclto the continuance of the Judges in office, it is equally impolfible and inconliftent, to make a general uniform establishment, so as to accom modate them to your government. I wi(h to fee Justice so equally distributed as that every citizen of the United States should be fairly dealt by, and so impartially administered, that every fubjetft or citizen of tlie World, whe ther foreigner or alien, friend or foe, ftiotild be alike fatisfied: By this means you would expand the doors of justice, encourage emigration from all countries into your own, and in Ihort, would make the United States of America, not only an Asylum of Liberty, but a Sanctuary of Justice : The faith of treaties would be preserved in-vio lately—your extensive funding system would have its intended operation—and your revenue, your navigation, and your impost laws would be exe cuted foas to receive their many advantages—and in effetft establish the public and private credit of the Union. Mr. Stone : I have given the arguments all the attention which their weight demands, consi dering the refpediability of the characters which have spoken upon the fubjeifl. It has been said that the clause in the Constitu tion is imperative—if this is the cafe, let us fee where it will carry us : It is conceded on all hands that the establishment of these Courts is immuta ble ; but the Constitution fays, that Congress shall constitute such inferior Courts from time to time. The Constitution gives you a right to extend the judiciary power to all tliofe cases fpecified ; bur it does not fay that these powers shall be exercised over all these cases. He then extended this idea to theLegiflative Pow er,which it cannot be pretended(faid he)isincom plete, because it is not extended to all possible cases : Do yoti divest yourfelf of the power by noC exercising it ? Certainly not. This idea involves the principle mentioned by the gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Benfon,) that the establishment of these inferior tribunals or diftridt courts, will draw the whole judiciary power along with them ; fothat the clause which rellricfts their cognizance to a certain sum, is a nullity. State Judges may be considered in two refpedls, as men, and as Judges : As men, they are to sub mit to the modification of the Constitution, as it respects them as citizens : As Judges, they are to consider their relation as such to the Constitution, and are to administer justice agreeable to that Constitution, or they may resign. I can hardly bring myfelf to consider the fubjedt in a reverse point of view : If it is admitted that the Judges of the several States cannot take cognizance of a law of the United States, because they are laws de novo, you annihilate their judicial capacity at a blow. It appears tome that there is nothing that the State Courts are not competent to, but certain ca ses which are specially designated. He then went on to fhewthat there was no spe cies of treason which could be committed against ir.e/Jay ami Saturd