PUBLISHED EVERY FRIDAY AT SALEM, COLUMBIANA CO,, OHIO. JAMES BARXAnV, Jr., General .Igcnl. BENJAMIN S. JONES, ) J. ELIZA 13 ETH JONES, h HIToRS. Pi'BMsiilNo Committee: Samuel Brooke, James Barnaby, Jr., David L. Galbreath. Lot Holmes. From the National .A. S. Standard. Lysander Spooner on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery. "DoMRSTIC Sl.AVERV IS THE MOST PROMI NENT FEATL'RE IN THE AlllSTlirKATIC rill NTK NANL'K Or THE PROPOSED Co.XSTITl'TION." Gourcrnenr Morris in the Convention if 1787. Mjdison Papers, litM. We have read with attention the many co lumns which Mr. Goodell has showered up on us from various quarters, mid ran say, with perfect sincerity, without meaning to be satirical, that they contain nothing which needs any noiice from us, or which can mis lead a thoughtful reader of our previous cri ticism. Next in order of time conies the Essay of Lysander Spooncr on the Unconstitutionali ty of Slavery. We shall hut fullil an old promise in reviewing die argument it con tains. Events beyond our control have de layed us till now, which we regret only as it seems to have led some of Mr. Spooner's ad mirers to imagine that the delay proceeded from nn unwillingness, on our part, to mea sure lances with so skilful an adversary. We exhort them, on the contrary, to believe that we have no innate antipathy to the idea of an Anti-Slavery Constitution that so far from being obstinately wedded to our own opinion, Mr. Spooncr, or any one cUe, shall find in us a most ready, willing, and easy convert to a doctrine, which will restore to us the power of voting a right we much co vet and a direct share in the Government of the country a privilego we appreciate as highly as any ono can. Only convince us fairly and we will outdo Alvan Stewart him self in glowing eulogy of this new found vir tue of the American Constitution. Indeed if merely believing the Constitution to bn Anti-Slavery would really make it so, we would be the last to stir tlio question. If the beautiful theories of some of our friends could oust from its place the ugly reality of a pro-slavery administration, we would sit quiet, and lut Spooner and Gnodell convert the nation at their leisure. But alas, the ostrich does not get rid of his enemy by hiding his head in the sand. Slavery is not abolished, although we have persuaded our selves that it does not exist. The pro-slavery clauses of the Northern Compact still btand there in full operation, notwithstand ing our logic. The Constitution will never be amended by persuading men that it docs not need amendment. National evils are on ly cured hy holding men's eyes open, and forcing them to gaze on the hideous reality. To be able to meet a crisis men must under stand and appreciate it. All that we have to do, as .Ibolilionisls, with Mr. Spooner's argument is to consider its influences on the Anti-Slavery cause. He maintains that the Judges if the I'niled Slates Courts have the right to declare Slavery illegal, and he pioposes that they should bo made to do so. We believe that in part he mistakes fancy for argument; in part he bases his con clusions on a forced interpretation of legal maxims, and that the rest of bis reasoning, where not logically absurd and self-contradictory, is subversive of all sound principles of Government and of public faith. Anv movement or party, therefore, founded on his plan, would, so soon as it grew considerable enough to attract public attention, be met by the contempt and disapprobation of every en lightened and honest man. To trust ourcause with such a leader is to insure its shipwreck. To keep, therefore, so far as our inlluenee ex tends, the Anti-Slavery movement in its le gitimate channel, to base it on such princi ples as shall deserve and command the as sent of every candid man, to hold up con stantly beforn tlio nation the mirror of ils own deformity, we undertake tbo distasteful task of proving tlio Constitution hostile to us and the slave. It is but justice to Mr. Spooner to acknow ledge that his performance dill'ers from most of those which have preceded it, not only in the ingenuity of the argument, hut in the honest aim of the writer. With him " t'lo wish " does not appear to have been " father to the thought." Ho did not first found a party and then stretch out both hands to clutch something that would sustain him in the right of voting at all. Ho did not violate his own convictions, and then, obstinately shutting his eyes cry out, " I don't see where I am inconsistent." His logic does not grow out of a lingering love of the ballot, or a se cret desire lo put "non-resistance horn du combat." He did not voie in order to save a corrupt and trembling Church and shield it from the storm of deserved rebuke, endeavor to build an ark of political refuge out of legal scraps and disjointed and misunderstood quo tations. He seems to have persuaded him self of the truth of his own theory, and then to have thrown it out fearlessly to the world, trusting in its truth to make it useful, mid with no ulterior object or private end to serve. Before we touch on the argument of Mr. Spooner's Essay, we wish to call attention to two points : 1st. Allowing, for the moment, as he claims, that the Constitution contains no guarantee or recognition of Slavery and granting him, also, in his own words: " That the instrument was plain, and the people had common-sense ; and thoso two j'acts cannot stand together consistently with the idea that there was any general or even considerable misunderstanding of its mean ing." (p. 126 ad Edition.) We go on to ask, (of Abolitionists, not of Mr. Spooner,) how comes it that, as be all along confesses. Courts, Congress, and the people have uniformly warped and twisted the whole instrument aside and awry to serve and sustain Slavery ! that the whole .Id min istration of the Government, from its very commencement, has been pro-slavery 1 If the Constitution be guiltless of any blame in this matter, then surely there must be seme pnwerlul element at work in the Union llsell, wliieli rend ef s it impossible for ibis to bo an AMTM.AWROT W l 5 11 k H V 12 r3 El H . H U H N VOL. 2. NO. 33. xo rsw.v injvr ai.:tn:iiou)i:ns." SALEM, OHIO, FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 1,S 17. WHOLE XO. ,S7. Anti-Slavery milinn, even when blessed wilb an .Inli-Surcry Constitution ; and the expe rience of fifty years proves i'niim itself, un der any form, to be impossible without guilt. In such circumstances, no mailer what the Constitution is. whether good or bad, it is the duty of every honest man to join in the war-cry of the American Anti-Slavery Socie ty, "no I'nion n-i.'i Saee'io'deis." I'or if we could not rscipe the infamy and the sin of such a pro-slavery administration, as ours always has been, under a ConstitutiiPii pore as Mr. Spuoner describes ibis to be. then, as wo never can have a better, we oujht lo ;jivo up the experiment. 2il. As far as we can understand lii:n, Mr. Spooner does nut deny the universal North ern doctrine, that the Executive ollicers of the Government are bound, while they retain llu ir situations, to obey and execute the laws in that manner and sense w hich the Supreme Court deciJe and enjoin, fllis views of the duty of the Supreme ('curt itself we have slated and shall soon discuss. But from the importance he attaches to lliem we have a right to infer bis concurrence in the opinion that the decisions of that Court are binding on llie other departments of Government. I'or if they are not so, of what consequence is it what those decisions are! Of course no ono has ever denied that the Supreme Court now construes the Constitution in a pro-slavery sense. 'I'll is, then, is the law of ihe land unlit altered. Here again the posi tion of tho American Anti-Slavery Society is untouched. Kor whatever be the real cha racter of the Constitution, if those who now swear to support that instrument are huund to support it in the sense which the Courts give it. tlicti, surely, no Abolitionist can consist entiy take such an oath or ask another person to do so. With neil'ier of these points lias Mr. Spooner himself anything to do. He, we believe, does not profess to bo an Abolition ist; at least, in this Essay he considers the question simply as a lawyer, without enter ing into its further bearings. We suggest them for the benefit of those Abolitionists who try to bide themselves behind him, and make a use of his argument which be never intended, and probably would not sanction. Mr. Spooner's first chapter is employed in answering the question, " what is law I " " That law, I mean, which, and which on ly, judicial tribunals are morally bound, un der all circumstances, to declare and sustain. "In answering this question, I shall at tempt to show that law is an intelligible principle of right, necessarily resulting from the nature of man; and not an arbitrary rule, that can be established by mere will, num bers, or power." (p. 5, 'id Edition.) His conclusion is, "that law is simply the rule, principle, obligation, or requiieineut of natural justice." (p. l.) And finally be maintains: " If, then, law really be nothing otlierthnn tin! rule, principle, obligation, or require ment of natural justice, It follows that go vernment can have no powers except such as individuals may rightful,' delegate to it; that no law, inconsistent with men's natural rights, can arise out of any contract or compact of government : that constitutional Ion; under any form of got eminent, cumins on,'; of thine principle of Ihe written ( 'ons'ilutiou, that are consistent leili natural lau; and man's natural rights; and that any other principles, that may bo expressed by the letter of any Con stitution, are void and not law, and all judi cial tribunals are bound to declare them so." (p. 1 1, 2.1 Elition.) Wo might pass Ibis chapter by without n.itice as not concerning our inquiry, sineo Mr. Spooner not only conducts his argument afterward without reference to it, hut distinct ly allows that a definition exactly the oppo site of his is the t ne usually adopted by the people, by Courts of Justice, and by Govern ments. So that, "The very name of law has come to sig nify little moro than an arbitrary command of power without reference to its justice or its injustice; ils innocence or ils criminality."-, a.) Our only object is to abolish Slavery, and not to correct the fundamental ideas which men hold as to law cr Government; and hence, all we have to do wilh law is lo find out what it practical! is, ami then amend it if we can. We might, therefore, we repeat, pass this chapter hy, taking line to mean what I ;Ur. tNpooner allows thai our Judicial tribu nals, our Government, and Ihe general sense I of the people have defined it to be, in the words ho ipiotes from Noah Webster, "a rule of civil cr.nduct prescribed by the Su preme powt r of a Slate, commanding what us sunjecis are 10 uo and prohibiting what nicy are lo lorliear. Or as Heiueccius describes it: " Civil laws are the commands of ihe Su premo power of a Stale." Or as Chancellor Kent defines it: " Municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the Supreme power in a Slate." Or with Nathan Dane, the author of the Ordinance of 1787 : " Municipal or civil law is the rule of mu nicipal or civil conduct prescribed tiv the su perior power in the State coinmandin'r what the Legislature deems right, and prohibitino what it deems wrong." Or with C. Justice Wilmot : Statute law is the will of the Legislature in writing common law is nothintr but stat utes worn out by time." Or with the Koman law, from which Mr. Spooner takes some of his definitions : "What the people command, lot that be law." XII tables of Home. "The will of the Prince, that is law." Justinian's Inst. "The rulo which each Slate chooses for itself, that is the law of such State." Ibid. We might extend these, but tbev am nnlu ! the varied expression of what Mr. Spooncr i iWs is the generally accepted definition; : further quotation is useless. We shall, however, dwell awhile on this chapter. Mr. Spooner himself draws ihe line very clearly and fairly between his own speculations and what he allows to be the genera lly received definition, and never con tuses tbo two. But ibat portion ol the Abo litionists who are misled by his book, often find their greatest difficulty in the points dis cussed in this chapter. We shall endeavor therefore to unravel it a little, since the views it contains are not new, but have been lloat ing a long time in tho Anli-Siavery horizon and only spared because no one has cared lo notice them. Mr. Spooner's doctritto i, that "only what is just and right is law." This propo sition is both true and false, simply because the word la,v has many meanings, like its Latin synonym jus, which Dr. Taylor enys (Eleni. Civil Law,) has forty significations. The most usual source of mistake in argu ment is the use of ambiguous terms. Now, Mr. Spooner's proposition is true of ihe law of Nature, w hich Cicero calls "right reason, the same thing at .'Ithens as at Home ; " hut it is false when applied to municipal, national, civil law, which is olten a very dill'crent thing at Louisville from wbal it is at Lon don. It is with this civil law only that we have to do in an argument like the present. Mr. Spooner's quotations at the close of this chapter, relato mostly to the law of Nature, to law in its most comprehensive sense, or the Ecier.ce of Justice ; such as Hooker's sub limo poetry, assuring us ef law " that her seat is in the bosom of GoJ, and her voice the harmony of tho world." This discussion, however, is a matter of no consequence to tho argument. Leaving it, therefore, let us consider Mr. Spooner's main proposition. "Only that which is just, is law, and all judicial tribunals arc bound so to declare : " taking law to mean the rule of civil affairs in a nation, the only sense of the term with which this argument has any thing to do. In the first place a proposition may justly bo suspected not to be sound, when the au thor confesses in regard to it, as Mr. Spoon cr does here, that, I "It may make sad havoc wilh constitu tions and statute books," and "il is possible. perhaps, that this doctrine would spare enough ol our existing Constitution to save our Government') from llie necessity of a new organization ! 1 " Surely mankind cannot be presumed to have so uniformly mistaken what lliey were about, as to have uniformly set up Govern ments, that were not legal in their own sense of Ihe term! And as surely words must bo interpreted according to the sense mankind chose to put upon them, and not according to Ihe caprice of an individual. Mr. Spooner is at liberty to say that much of what the world calls law, is not obligatory because it is not just in the eye of God ; and there all good men will agree with him. B it to as sert that because a thing is not right it is net law, as that term is commonly and rightfully used, is entering into the question of what constitutes the basis of government among men; and according to a man's theory of Government, will be his denial or assent to the proposition. Does Mr. Spooner mean to say merely, that a nation in making its laws has no right, in the eye of God, to perpetrate injustice! We agree wilh him. It is a doc trine certainly as old as Cicero, and may be traced through Grolius and Locke, and all writers on the subject, down to Jefferson and Channing. Nations are bound by ihe same rule of right and wrong, as individuals: agreed. Or does he mean to say that in set tling what shall be the rule of civil conduct the voice of the majority is not final and con clusive, or its own ollicers in all the diiurl ments of Government 1 Then we differ from him, entirely, and assert that on his plan, Government is impossible. An individual may, and ought to resign his office, rather than assist in a law he deems unjust. But while he retains, under the majority, one of their olfices, he retains it on their conditions, which are, to obey and enforce their decrees. There can be l.o more self-evident proposi tion than that in every Government, the ma jority must rule, and their will be uniform! obeyed. Now, if the majority enact a wick ed law, and the Judge refuses to enforce it, which is to yield, the Judge or the majori ty t Of course the first. According to Mr. Spooncr, no provision would be law until it bad secured the assent, not only of tho Legislature the power ap pointed to make laws but of the Judiciary also the power appointed only to construe and apply them. Apply this principle lo our I'nion and it brings upon tlio present Con stitution a similar disease to that which kill ed the old Confederation, under which laws were of no practical value unless Ihe several States chose, to execute them. According to Mr. Spooner, however, il is an evil insepara ble from all forms of Government, since eve ry decision of tbo National Legislature must bo perpetually subject to the discretionary power of every Court in Iho twenty-eight Slates ! . " Only that which is just, is law, and all judicial tribunals are bound so to declare." This is Mr. Spooner's proposition. Grant, for the purpose of this argument, that only what is just is law. We allow that no laws in support of slavery are morally binding. I'ossibly Mr. Spooner means the same thing, only expresses it more forcibly. The only important point at issue is whin Govern ments enact such laws, what is the proper remedy ? This question has been answered in three ways. 1st. Old-fashioned patriotism replies with Algernon Sydney, " Kesistance to tyrants is obedience to God." Mr. Spooner states that "the only duties any one owes to a wicked Constitution, are disobedience, resistance, destruction." 2d. Next comes the Christian rule, that too sanctioned by Locke, and by Plato the ... ,UUfcers uie motto of the Ame Tin-Art Ann VI ,., . " "-iP!pjr oocieiy " fSi'BMiT to rv. oi man" but suffer any pen lty rather than join in doing a wrontr act ; hieamvhile, let your loud protest prepare a ppmly and quid revolution. J 3d. Thirdly conies Mr. Spooner's plan: ' "If the majority, however large, of the people of a country, enter into a contract of .Government, called a Constitution, by which they agree lo aid, abet, or accomplish any Jiiiid ol injustice, this contract or government is unlawliil and void and lor the samn rea son that a contract of the same nature between two individuals, is unlawful and void. Such n contract of irovernuieiit nni.ft ra nn ;..i,i. fiil authority upon those appointed to admin ister it." ' "Judicial tribunals, sitting under the au thority of this unlawful contract or Conslitu ti.pii, are hound, equally wilh other mi n, to dec I ire it, and all unjust enactments passed by the Government in pursuance of it, unlaw lul and void. These judicial tribunals can not, by accepting oliice under a Government, rid themselves of that paramount obligation, that all men arc under, to declare, if they de clare anything, that justice is law; that Go vernment can have no lawful powers, except those with which it has been invested by law ; lul contract ; and that an unlawful contract for the establishment of Government, is as unlawful and void as any other contract lo do injustice." " No oaths, which judicial or other officers may take, to carry out anil support, an unlaw lul contract or Constitution of Government, are of any moral obligation." (p. 9.) ' Ami here begins Iho real and only impor tant dispute between us. The reader may torget, if he pleases, all wo have said. Mr. Spooner's differences and our own, up to this point, are mere questions of theory, h mat ters little which side be adopted. His posi tion now is; That laws and Constitutions which vio late justice, are void. They are as little binding in the eye of tho law, as in the eve fit i ... i ... . . .! oi iiju. i ney are legally as well as morally void : So far we agree with him, brdifferso slight ly, that hero we care not to dispute the mai ler. He goes on : A Judge holding office under such Constitu tions is authorized and bound to treat them as rwV, and to decide cases, not according to iIiimii, but as li i 3 sense " of natural justice" dictates. Here we differ from him, maintaining that the posilion oj the offeers of such a Government differs from thai if private individuals, their dull is to resign their post whenever unwilling faftl the conditions on which they receive them, and then, as MEN, treat the laws as void. This question is not to be confounded with one somewhat similar to it, and which has been sometimes discussed, especially in Eng land, whether a Judge there may disregard an unjust statute 1 Our present tpiestion is different, for it should be remembered that in England thero is no written Constitution. Even if a Judge had such powers there, wiiii n he has not, it would by no means follow, that ho had the same under our form of Go vernment. I hero the Judge swears, simply to hear Irue allegiance lo the King. It might, therefore, with some plausibility, be argued that having no test to which lo bring acts of Parliament, except the rules of natural jus tice, Judges were authorized to declare them void when inconsistent wilh those rules. Such a doctrine, however, is repudiated by the almost unanimous voice of the English law. However the case may be in England, here the case is different. Our Governi ient is founded on contract. So agrees Mr. Spi on er : "The Constitution is a contract; a written contract, consisting of a certain number of precise words, to which, and to which only. all the parties to it have, in theory, agreed. i'tauiiesiiy neiiuer mis contract, nor tue mean ing of its words, can be changed, without the consent of all the parties to it." (p. 153.) "A contract for the establishment of Go vernment, being nothing but a voluntary con tract between individuals for their mutual benefit, differs in nothing that is essential to its validity from any other contract between man anil man, or butwecn nation and nation." CP- 8.) "Our Constitutions aro but contracts." Note p. 8. Under our Constitution then, thn neonlo and the office-holder make a contract to"eih- er. 1 hey grant him certain specified pow ers, and demand of him certain specified du ties, lie deliberately looks over the cata logue (that is, the Constitution) assents lo sweais mat lie agrees to it, and will per form his pan and so takes ofiicoand acquires power. That power, Mr. Spooner thinks, be may retain while he refuses to perform iho conditions on which ho received it; ami that power, granted bun expressly, and only lor the support of the Constitution, be is bound to use for the destruction of that instrument. Mr. Spooner's ground is that, " immoral con tracts are void." Granted; but if they are absolute nullities, then the Governments sup posed to spring Irom them, du not exist, since they have nothing to soring from. Accord ingly, the supposed Judge is no Judge, and has no authority to declare or decide avullnng. As Mr. Spooner Rays, (p. !).) "Such a con tract of Government confers no rightful au thority upon those appointed to administer ll. Ol course he would not have a Judge uso a wrongful authority for any purpose. Again. " immoral contracts uro not bind ing." True. But if I reeeivo a sum of mo ney, on my promise to commit murder, ami afterward, my moral sense awakens, and 1 re fuso to do the deed, docs that authorize me to retain the money! Such a moral sense would be a must accommodating one! nnd such godliness might well bo " accounted gain"! Tho ruto plainly is that if power is put in to our hands on certain conditions, and wo hecoine.yWort any cause, unable or unwilling lo fullil those conditions, wc ought lo surren der back the power to those who granted it. i, men-iitre, urn t onslitulion is pro-slavery, (as Mr. Spooner and ourselves nui now suii- fliiti- posing it to be,) the Judges have agreed to .... j'toiin pro-siaery acts, and they must perlorm their whole contract, or yield up t, power they received on that condition. Judges are the people's servants, employed to no certain nets. If ihey cannot do those V'1 "l,B no lon!-"'' stewards." I his argument seems lo us corn-It.' ive rs it stantls. Jlul ftlr. Snooner's nrincinles eiv,. it uuuiiinn :i lorce. Ilu savsdi .10 ... i. ; . . --- - v - r' 'i lion, that Here ot.ieo is not rrjven tt anv one be- cause he has a right lo it, nor because it may lim. It is eoiifi-rnvt nn. on biiii, or ralhcr confided lo him, us a trust, inn solely as n trust. Icir the sole benefit nl the people (," the 1 nited Slates. The Presi- cm, as i r' s ni, is not sui.iiosei lo leave any rights in tho olliee. on bis own account; or any riglils except what the people, lor their own benefit, and not for his, have voluntarily chosen lo grant to him." If this be so if the President, or Judge, uas no rigni 0111 wnal tin: people have grant ed him, w ill Mr. Spooner affirm that Ihe peo ple ever granted to anv Judje the riohl lo disregard the pro-slavery clauses of their LOnstiiiiiioi. ! 11 oliice lie "trust, and sole ly a trust," is the trust-holder lo execute his duty according to bis own views or i.ceordiier to Ihe trust dctd ! Again, Mr. Goodc',1 bad maintained Governments have certain inherent powers, that, for instance, of abolishing Slavery, and executing justice, &c. that these enter! into Iho very idea of a Government and eve- ry Government possesses them, whether spc- cillcally granted to il or not ; but Mr. Spoon- er (p. H.) scouts as " an imposture, ihe idea ot any necessary or inherent authority or sove-! reignty in our Government, as sucli" and maintains that they aro limbing but "con- If, then, they are only contracts, ho explain where Judges get a power which the other party to the contract never meant to give them! When, therefore, Mr. Spooner or any one else has shown 113 an English Judge, for in- stance, pulling aside an act of Parliament be- cause ol us injustice, lie has not then reached our ease. Let him show an English Judge holding himself authorized to disregard I the erms of the union between Scotland and Log- land, and between Ireland and England, and ",0 ."'if 'ro n 11..111 Slo it ot the nosilion of an American Mains. 1 ...Ml 1 .i 1 , . . Irate under our Constitution. Even thos however, are not equally strong cases, for such a Judge has never triirosh sworn to maintain those compacts. The royal oalh lo maintain "the church established comes nearest lo our case, and it is well known with what scrupulous anxie- ty even the profligate Geo. IV. clung to w hat lie lancleu Ills iluiy under mat. " These Judicial tribunals, says Mr. Sponn- er, cannot, by accepting office under a Gov- eminent, nil themselves ol the paramount oh-: ligation that all men are under to declare, if they declare anything, thai juslieo is law." " If tluu dirare anything ," that is a very significant "if." Was lhc.ro a lurkin.r doubt in the writer's mind whether our view was not tho correct c:;e ? w hether Judges bad a ngbt to "dtclaie anything" in such circuin- stances ! If there was let him cherish it. True, such Judges cannot rid themselves, as ifi, "of the paramount obligation lo declare, if they declare any thing, that juslieo is law.' lint ll is as men, as simple individuals, mills in the sight of God, that this " paramount ob ligation" tests upon lliem. God knows them nota': Judges. Their only " paramount oh- ligation" as Judges, is lo do what they agreed to do when Ihey were made Judges, or quit llie Delicti. 1.0U Uoes not require ol any ol his creatures to juggle their fellows out of the gift of power, and ihen use ibat power con-: trary to their promises, in order to serve bu- inanity. That weiu to ask " robbery for burnt offering." But pulling out of view this point of con- tract, between the people and their servants, we maintain that such a line tf judicial duty is inconsistent wilh the existence of uniform and regular Government. It is the first step toward anarchy. "Only what is just and right is law." Granted, hut who is to decide what is just and right! We say that for the purpose of the cieil government if any nation, the major- ity of that nation is to decide, and their de- cision is final, and constitutes for that nation law. JUr. spooncr Hunks not; he Hunks that each Judge is to decide for liimso'f and act accordingly. We bay that a uniform Go- vernmeut is impossible on Ibis plan. "Sta- tnles, says Webster, are but recommenda tions, if each man is to construe them as he pleases." (Juol homines, tot sentenliu; (many men many minds.) Law would be one thing in Maine and another thing in Maryland one thing to-day, another thing to-morrow. And each day and each Court would think itself infallibly right. "Orthodoxy is my doxy," said the English Bishop. " fly right rr.ison. savs Atterliurv. everv ono won III Iih willing lo mean Lis uwn. " Discourses about Natural Law," says another eminent writer, "are the fullest of mistakes and most liable to error." Let us look at it. In theso United States somu think that neither men nor nations have the right to make war lo takn life hy iho gallows lo authorize the holding of the soil as individual property to debar women from tho right of voting. One not inconsiderable sect holds that Ihe magistrate should enforce theological ortho- doxy. Will Mr. Spooner inform us on bis principle what is law on each of these points ; and also what a Judge in such case is to pro nounce i lie win not, 01 course, maintain that a principle is right merely because iho majority entertain it. A vote-receiver is sit ting at the ballot-box ; a woman appears nnd oners him a vote. Ills own opinion is that natural law, "tue rule 01 natural justice," ... ... ... . J. . ' obliges him to reeeivo it. Urn majority have .1.1 t.;. i.... ,....'.i: . .1... told bin,, by sprcmc statute, to reec.ve the void of men .only. l.icl,w,yi;,l;ctoact! QtjT.'JH rcmiltanceti tn be made, anil all lefttrl relating tn the pecuniary njfairii of the paptrt In be addressed (post paid) Mr General .Qgcnt. Communications intended for inset' lion to be addressed to Ihe l '.ditors. 07" Terms: 1,50 per annum, or $1,75 (invariably reiuired) if not paid i ill i n six months of tho lime of snbscr bing. AnvKiiTiKKMKftTS making less than a square inserted three limes for 75 cents: one Bquare fl. Printed Ihe Publishing Committee hy G. N. HAPGOOD. jority have ordered him, by specific statute, j Nll(.i, eil!e n,n,! and provided, to doom the culprit lo the gallows. How is be to act Which is "law" lo him 1 We say to him, quit iho bench ralhcr than violate your con "'V"' M.:,.m.,.. Mr. Sj.ooner instructs him that nil laws inconsistent wilh natural justice are ... i 1 1 .1.,. 1.0 ; !... ,1 m , ,. i., ..a '. ; ' I i I that'".''' "" Anti-Slavery provision, " a bounty rn I 1'1,L'r,.v ;in attempt to promote the Anli-Sla-as I Vi rv "'',f." Mr. Spooner thinks just the ri'v,'ts''- Which way shall Ihe poor Judge, I s,'"'cl1 "f natural low, interpret the clause! le.cidit in fcyllani enpieus vitare Charybdin. I f ,c steers clear of Spooner one way. he is sure lo run foul of Smith the oilier. How grateful will he be to the author for Beliin.' j ,im clear of the "old chaos of conflictin'r edicts," and introducing him to such a " na tracts. tnnil, unalterable, universal, simple, inlelli will gihle principle," which supercedes all other , .,w, and " is necessarily the If Mr. Spooner, to ifcape il.is dilemma, shall explain his principle to mean that a J J,,,gB js to decide, not accordin" to bis own I individual idea of ib.hl, bill ihe general sense of the age or nation in which he lives, we j hardly care to dispute such a proposition with j hini-for it is of little practical importance; sinr j ,,e words ifit, statute-t,ook K each I mn.ristratn nlnav. t,A i,.,, ;r. .1 I I I ' j i ' : I ; j i ! 1 t ! 1 ' Which is " law" to him 1 A Judge is sitting on the bench the jury find the prisoner guil- I nf ii.Mn rr llii nwn nnlnlnn l Hint nn Government has n right tn take life ihe rua- oeciare tot'iil s... .-vccoriiiii 1 , as f ptv man a nu n -nii....i.'iirr is. I'.ir tin. 'lime ln pii.r. Iii 1 .1 . .... ... i:..-i .. hi"! esi and bo'ii st eniile. 1:0 must fel tin bis own idea of right ; and as of old, cverv limit's b-nt role was rci.ulated l.v the lenr lb tit' ibn reigning King's foot, so "now Judgi.s are to revi r-c iho ml vice of Lord Coke and ! guided hy the croel ed cord of discretion, anil not l.v the .'oiilen mctwaud (vard-slu k) of Ihe law." " Cicero, t!'e k;.'.', mi, inaii.t ins that for n men haul in lime of laniine to conceal llie fact that a plenty t f niain will come to-morrow. l,,us i.rr";' a high price ;o-day cut of tho fuiivmg pcopic, is contrary 10 natural jus tice." Pali y, the christian, thinks such con duct right. It' such a sale is brought beforn Mr. Spaiener, to be enforced, which w: y will he decide! What is law 1 this eternal, un alterable, unmistakable law, be so much prai ses. Gerrit Smiih thinks the three-fifth slave ha- 1 r - .w u.ji, ,i , ,C ,i,. y evi.lenee nl what 7ns nation thinks just and i.ti. 1 ,, ..... 1 ngnr. 1 no laws," says Aristotle, "are the morals of llie Stato and the character of the whole people taken collectively." If Mr. Spooner should feel disposed to appeal from' Ihe decision of one nation to the general sense of Christendom, be will find thai there never was a sin, for which any Judge, desirous of snppoi ting it, could not find abundance of phi losophers lo uphold him in thinking it right; and surely Slavery at present, finds many such, boih in Church and State. Hence, 011 either plan there could be no uniform and regular I .overiiuient. We shall conclude our discussion of this point by show ing thai llie almost unanimous. ". !1jl ."naiiimous voico of lawyers and judi- c1;" '"ll";'ls repudiates this power. Our lAU'"-la " ' "raw n iroin as many dilUrent s"u.rct,s a8 possib.e, br cause it has been a fa- " i.ioeny party uenaiers anil olllrs 10 maintain that all acts of Parliament or V' .'uly. lp!ruI.Hive body, contrary to reason anu JusllCP ""' void, and that Judges may treal them as such a proposition identical with Mr. Spooner's, and clearly not sound. This doctrine is usually sustained bv dis connected quotations from Blackslone, ninonn- " " ",c generally occupies tlio place: 'This law of nature being coeval with maiikinu, ami nicialed by t.oU liiinsi If, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It 's binding over all 1 tie globe, in all countries, al11' "t all times: no human laws are of any 'validity, if contrary to this; and eurlt of I them as are valid, derive all their force, and " their authority mediately or immediate- ly, from this original." Blackstone, Vol. 1, p. 11. It will be observed that Blackstone only asserts that bad laws are void, without touch ing the question of tlio remedy in such case, or whether Judges may declare and treat them so. Ills able commentator. Prof. Christian. in a note on this passage, discusses this point, and decisively rejects the doctrine. lie siys: lt- an act of parljamen, sll0ulj like , r tt..i .11 .1:1 1 .. . a certain ago to be slain, the Judge ought to resign his office rather ihan be auxiliary to its execution; but il could uny be declared , void ly the same legislative power by which it was oruaincd. I Willi this, the other commentators, Chilly and the rest, agree. Sedgwick unites with them in the same opinion. Woodeson, Black stone's second successor in his professional chair, adds his assent in these words: " We cannot expect that all acts of legis lators will be ethically perfect; but if their proceeuings nre to uo tleciueu upon by their subjects, Government and subordination -,,ase. Intty s iilackslone note, p. 11. V El. Jur. 48. Blackstone himself, in a subsequent page of his work, distinctly denies the doctrino which some might infer from the general terms he had used above. On the Olsl pa.'e of bis volume, he savs: 0 1 1. ; 11.. 1 1 1 ,,,;. " ,.. ., . " . mr'4 reason, are void. But if the Parliament will n-'j. ... u. iiiuiiriii, couuary 10 positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power, in the or dinary forms of the Constitution, that is ves ted with authority to control it; and tho ex amples usually alledged in support of this .i,, ,,.!, mo rute, uo none ot mom prove. re the main vhjeel of a statute is 11 n- r.lu,111.,i,iu ,1... 1., 1 ,.' . , . -. reasouanie, tuo Judges are at liberty to n-iert ; . rr ,1.., .... " ', . , . J 11 ' lor "M Mte to 6ct the ludieial nower ..bovo , . . , - -. " " judicial power : u 5uh,ttivc of a (;0VCII1 ' ; V .