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St*®l 38^#fe«sS — Y J_AN_1S ft BUTjjSR,] RICHMOND. VIRGINIA. Wrmv pebpitapy * *Z'a __[Voi» L So. 4. OJ I lie t oysTiTVTiujrAi. Whig is published Ucice a week, (Tuesdays' and Fridays',) at Jive dol lars per annum, payable within six months, by all who are original Subscribers, or become so in ninety days from this dale—and in advance for all who subscribe thereafter. ' IT/’ for adt:iriising—-fifty tents a square (or less) for thcjirsl insertion,and U7 1-2 cents for each con tinue nr-.—The number of insertions must be noted on tiw Mi S., otherutise they will be continued and charged accordingly. O* Advertisements from the country to he paid for in advance^ or asstuned by some responsible indi vidual in this place or Manchester. IT AH letter* to the Editors must be post-paid(, or they will reteice no attention. KAg\\\ Kj ongv ess. Dcb'ktc on Intern'd Improvement. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Friday, January 10. The bill authorising the President of the U. rates to cause certain surveys and estimates to be made on the subject of Roads and Canals, being under consideration— Mr. Ci.ay, (Speaker) in rising, said, that he •could not enter on the discussion of the subject .“before him, without first asking leave to express 'iii-j thraiks for the kindness of the Committee, in so fur accommodating him as to agree unan imously to adjourn its sittiug to the present -time, in order to afford him the opportunity of exhibiting his views ; which, however, he feared bo should do very unacceptably. As a requital for this kindness, he would endeavor, as far as was practicable, to abbreviate what ho had to present to their consideration. Yet, on a ques tion of this extent and moment, .hero were so launv topics which demand a deliberate exam ination, t“ it, from the nature of the case, it would lie impossible, ho was afraid, t > reduce the argument to any thing that the committee would consider a reasonable compass. u was itiiown 10all wiio heard him, that there had. n-.»w existed for several years a difference of opinion between tho Executive and Legisla tive branches of this government, as t.» the na ture and extent of certain powers conferred up on it by tiie Constitution. Two successive Presidents had returned to Congress hills which had previously passed both Houses of that body, with a communication of the opinion that Con gress, under the constitution, possessed no pow er to enact such laws. High respect, personal and official, must bo felt by all, as it was due to those distinguished officers, and to their opinions thus solemnly announced $ and tho most pro found consideration belonged to our present Chief Magistrate, who had favored that House with a written argument, of great length and hibor, consisting of not loss than sixty or seventy pages, in support of his exposition of the con stitution. From the magnitude of the interests involved in the questiou, all would readily con cur, that, if the power is granted and does really exist, it ought to be vindicated, upheld, maim taineH, that the country might derive the exeat benefits which may flow from its prpd mt exer cise. If it has not been communicate 1 to Con gress, then all claim to it should he, at once, surrendered It was a circumstance or peculiar regret to him, that one more eompetaut than himself had not risen to support the course which tho legislative department had heretofore /elt itself bound to pursue on this great question, -Of all the trusts which are created by human a gcncy, that is the highest, most solemn, and most responsible, which involves the exercise of political power. Exerted when'it has not been intrusted, the public functionary is guilty of usurpation. And his infidelity to the public good is not, perhaps, less culpable when he neglects or refuses to exercise a power which has been fairly conveyed, to promote the public prosperity. If the power which hcthu3 forbears to exercise, can only be exerted by him—if no other public functionary can employ it, and the public good requires its exercise, his treachery is greatly aggravated. It is only in those cases where the object of the investment of power is the personal ease or aggrandizement of the public agent, that his forbearance to use it is praiseworthy, gracious, or magnanimous. He was extremely happy to find, that, on many of the points of the argumont of the hon orable gentleman from Va. (Mr. Barbour) there was entire concurrence between them, widely as they differed in their ultimate conclusion*._ On this occasion (as on all others on which that gentleman obliged the House with an expression of his opinions) ho displayed great ability and ingenuity ; ana, as wen iroin tlic matter as from the respectful manner of his argument, it was deserting of the most thorough consideration_ I fe was compelled to differ from that gentleman at the very threshold. lie had commenced by laying down as a general principle, that, in the deslribution of powers among our Federal and •state governments, those which were of a muni cipal character were to be considered as apper turning to the state governments, and those! which related to external affairs, to the general •government. If he might be allowed to throw the argument of the gentleman iuto the form of n syllogism, (a shape which ho presumed would be quite agreeable to him) it amounted to this : Municipal powers belong exclusively to the state governments ; but the power to make in ternal improvements is municipal; therefore it belongs to the stale governments alone, lie Mr. C. denied both the premises and the con clusion. If the gentleman had affirmed that certain municipal powers, and the great mass'of them, belong to the state governments, his pro position would have boen incontrovertible. But if Ik: bad so qualified it, it would not have assis ted the gentleman at all in his conclusion. But surely the power of taxation—the power to re gulate the value of coin—the power to cxtablish an uniform standard of weights and measures_ to establish post offices and post road;—to regu late commerce among the several states—that hi relation to the judiciary-—besides many other powers indisputably belonging to the federal go vernment, are strictly munici|ial. If, as lie un derstood the gentleman in the course of the sub sequent part of his argument to admit, some mu nicipal powers belong to the one system, and some to the other, we shall derive very little aid from 1 ho gentleman’s principle; in making the discrimination between the two. The question must ever remain open—whetlier any given power, and of course that in question, is or Is not delegated to tiiis government or retained by the states. The conclusion of the gentleman is, that all infernal improvements belong to the state go vernments; that they are of a limited and local character, and arc not comprehended within the *cupe of the federal powers, which relate to the external or general objects. That many, per haps most internal improvements, partake of tho character described by the gentleman, he (Mr. C.) should not deny. But it was mi less true that there were others, emphatically national, which neither tho policy nor the power, nor the intcrc#, of any state would induce it fo aevorn plkli, and which could only be effected by the application of the resources of the nation. The improvement of the navigation of the Mississippi would furnish a striking example. This was undeniably a great and important object. The report of a highly scientific and intelligent offi cer of the Engineer Corps, (which Mr. C. hop ed would be soon taken up aad aqted upon) had shewn that the cost of any practicable improve mentm tlienavigation ofthatriver, inthepresent state of the inhabitants of its banks, was - mere trifle m comparison to the great benefits which would accure from it. He (Mr. Clay) believed that about double the amount of tho loss of a single steam boat and cargo (the Tennessee) would effect the wliole improvement in the navi gation of that river, which ought to be at this time attempted. In this great object twelve states and two territories were in different de grees, interested. The power to effect theiim provemeut of tbat river was surely not munici pal, in the seusi;which the gentleman used the term. If it V/erc, to which of the twelve state* and two territories concerned did it be long? It was a great object, which could only be effected by a confederacy. And here is ex isting t tat confederacy, and no other can lawful ly exist; for the constitution prohibits the states, immediately iuterested, from entering into any treaty or compact with each other. Other ex amples might be given to shew, that, if even the power existed; the inelination'to exert it would not be felt to effectuate certain improvements eminently calculated to promote the prosperity of the Union. Neither of the three states, nor all of them united, through which theCumberland road p isses, would ever have erected that road. —Two of them would have thrown in every im pediment to its completion in ‘their power. Federative in its character, it could only have boon executed so far bv the application of fede rative means. Again*: the contemplated canal through New Jersey ; that to connect the wa ters of tho Chesapeake and Delaware; that to unite the Ohio and the Potomac, were all ob jects of a general and federative nature, in which the states thro’ which they might sever ally pass, could not be ex|>ectcd to feel any such special interest as would lead to their exe cution. Teuding, as undoubtedly they would do, tn promote the gtKxl of the whole, the power and the treasure of the whole must be applied to their execution, if they are ever consummated. 1*1 . . i « , . ■l.... vmj iuu uui ujiiuv, aicn, mat wc should he at all assisted in expounding the constitution otthe United States, by the principle which the gentleman from Virginia had suggested in res pect to municipal powers. The powers of both governments were undoubtedly muncipal, often operating upon the same subject. lie thought a better rule than that which the geutlcroan fur nished for interpreting the constitution might be deduced from an attentive consideration of the-peculiar character of the articles of confed eration, as contrasted with that of the present constitution. By those articles, the powers of the thirteen United States were exerted colla terally. They operated through an intermedi ary. They were addresse-l to the several states, and their execution depended upon the pleasure and t »o co-operation of the states individually. The states seldom fulfilled the expectations of the general government in regard to its requisi tions, and often wholly disappointed them._ Languor and debility, in the movement of the old Confederation, were the inevitable conse quence of that arrangement of power. By the existing Constitution, the powersof the General Government act directly on the persons and things within its scope, without the intervention or impediments incident to any intermediacy. In executing the great trust which the Consti tution of the Unified States creates, wo must, therefore, reject that interpretation of its provi sions which make the General Government de pendant upon those of the states for the execu tion ofanv of its powers; and may safelyconolnde that the only genuine construction would be that which should enable this government to execute the great purposes of its institution, without the co-operation, and, if indispensably necessary, even against the will of any particu lar state. This is the characteristic difference between the two systems of government, of which wo should never lose sight. Interpreted in the one way, we shall relapse into the feeble ness and debility of the old confederacy. In the other, we shall escape from its evils, and fulfil the great purposes which the enlightened fra mers of the existing constitution intended to ef fectuate.—The importance of this essential dif ference in the two forms of government, would be shown in the future progress of the argument. i>eiore ne proceeaeti to comment upon those parts of the constitution which appeared to him to convey the power in question, ho hoped he should be allowed to disclaim, for his part, seve ral sources whence others had deduced the au thority. riie gentleman from Virginia seemed to think it remarkable that the friends of the power should disagree so much among them selves; and to draw a conclusion against its exis tence from the fact of this discrepancy. But he (Mr. C.) could sec nothing extraordinary in this diversity of views. What was more common than for diflerent men to contemplate the same subject under various aspects ? Such was the nature of the human mind, that enlightened men perfectly upright in their intentions, differed in their opinions on almost eveiy topic that could be mentioned. It was rather a presumption, in favor of the cause which he was humbly main taining, that the samfe result.should be attained by so many various modes of reasoning. But, if contrariety of views might be pleaded with any effect against the advocates of the disputed power, it equally availed against their opponents. 'Hicre was, for example, not a very exact coin cidence in opinion between the President of the United States and the gentleman from Virginia. The President says, (page 25 of his book. ’ “The use of the existing road by the staged “ mail carrier, or post boy, in passing over it, as “ others do, is all that would be thought of; the “ jurisdiction and soil remaining to the State, “ with a right in the State, or those authorised “by Us legislature to change the road at plca “ sure.” Again, page 27, the President asks, “ If “ the United States possessed the power con [ “ tended for under this grant, might they not, in I “ adopting the r.»ads of the Individual states, for “ carriage of the mail, as has been done, as “ snme jurisdiction over them, and preclude a “ right to interfere with or alter them >” They both agree that the General Government docs not possess the power. The gentleman from Virginia admits, if he (Mr. C.) understood hi correctly, that the designation of a state road as a poat road, so far withdrew it from the jurisdic tion of the state, that it could not be afterwards put down or closed by tho state; and m this he claims for the General government more power than thd President concedes to it. The Presi dent, on the contrary pronounces that the “ absurdity of such a pretension” (that is preventing by the designation of a post road, the power of the state from alter ing Or Changing it) “ mast be apparent to ■**"**fiiS5saassaissa555S5S5saiHa all who examine it!” The gentleman thinks that the designationofapostroad withdrawsiMn tirely, so far as it is used for that purpose, fr*m the power Of the whole state; whilst the Preii dent thinks it absurd to assert that a mew county court may not defeat the execution of a law of the United States! The President thitiks that under the power of appropriating the a > ncy of the United States, Congress may applyut to any object of internal improvement, providdi it does not assume any territorial jurisdiction; and in this respect, he claims for the genccad gov ernment more power than the gentleman frota Virginia assigns to it. And he (Mr. C4 must own that he bo far coincided with the gentleman from Virginia. If the power can be traced to no more legitimate source than to that of ap propriating the public treasure, he yielded the question. The truth is, that there is no specific grant, in the oonstitution, of the power of appropria tion ; nor was any such requisite. It is. a result ing power. The constitution vests in Congress the power of taxation, with but few limitations, to raise a public revenue. It then enumerates the powers of Congress. And it follows, of ne cessity, that Congress has the right to apply the money so raised to the execution of the powers so granted. The clause which concludes the enumeration of the granted powers, by authoriz ing the passage of all laws “ necessary and pro per” to effectuate them, comprehends the power of appropriation. And the framers of the Con stitution recognize it by the restriction that no money shall be drawn from the Trcrsnry but in virtue of a previous appropriation bv law. It was to him wonderful how the President should have brought bisinind to the conclusion, that un der the power of appropriation, thus incidental ly existing, a right could be set up, in its nature almost without limitation, to employ the public money. He combats with great success and much ability, any deduction of power from the clause relating to the general welfare. He shews that the effect of it wruld be to overturn, or render useless and nugatory, the careful en umeration of our powers; and that it would Con vert a cautiously limited government into on without militation. The same process of reason ing by which his mind was brought to this jus conclusion, one would have thought, should have warned him against his claiming, under the power of appropriation, such a vast latitud of authority. He reasons strongly against the power, as claimed by us, harmless aud bcnpfi cent and limited, as it must be admitted to b and yet ho sets up a power boundless in its ex tent, 'unrestrained to the object of internal im provements, and comprehending the whole, *--.—wt, ii ujc puwer exis as he asserts it, what human restraint is the upon it? He does, indeed, sav, that it cannot be exerted so as to interfere with the territorial jurisdiction of the states. But this is a restric tion altogether gratuitous, flowing from the bounty of the President, aud not /bund in the prescriptions of the Constitution, If we have a right, indefinitely, to apply the money of the Government to internal improvements, or to any other object, what is to prevent the application of it to the purchase of the sovereignty itself, if a state were mean enough' to sell its sovereign ty to the purchase ot kingdoms, empires, the globe itself? With an almost unlimited )»wcr of taxation; and after the revenue is raised with a right to apply it under no other limitations than those which the President’s caution lias suggested, be could not see what other human power was needed. It had been said, by Caesar or Bonaparte, no doubt thought by both, that, with soldiers enough, they could get money e nough; and with money enough, they could command soldiers enough. According to the Presidents’s interprefafion of the Constitution, one of these great levers of public force and power is possessed by this government. The President seems to contemplate, as fraught with much danger,’ the power humbly as it is claimed, to effect the internal improvement of the coun try. And, in his attempt to overthrow it, sets up one of infinitely greater magnitude. The quan tum of power which we claim over the subject of internal improven ent is, it is true, of greater amount and force tli. n that which results from the President’s view of the Constitution ; hut then it is limited to the object of internal improve ments :—whilst the power set up by the Presi dent has no such limitation, and, in effect, as Mr. C. conceived, has no limitation whatever, but that of the anility of the people to bear tax ation. With the most profound respect for the Presi dent, and after the most deliberate consideration of his argument, IVTr. C. could not agree with him. He could not think that any political power accrued to this government, from the mere authority which it possessed to appropriate the public revenue. The power to make inter nal improvements drew after it, most certainly, the right to appropriate money to consuinate the object. But lie could not conceive that this right of appropriation drew after it the power of internal improvements. The appropriation of money was consequence, not cause. It follows: it does not precede. According to the order of nature, wc first determine upon the object to be accomplished, and then appropriate the money necessary to its consummation. According to the order of the Constitution, the power is defin ed, and the application, that is, the appropria tion of the money requisite to its effectuation, follows as a necessary and proper mean.*. The practice of Congressional legislation was con formable to both. Wc first inquire what we may do, and provide by law for its being done ; and we then appropriate, by another act of le gislation, the money necessary to accomplish the specified object.—The error of the argu mrnt lies in its beginning too soon. It suppo ses the money to be in the Treasury, and then seeks to disburso it. But how came it there? Congress cannot impose taxes without an ob ject. Their imposition must be in reference to the whole mass of our powers, to the general purposes of government, or with the view to the fulfilment of some one of those powers, or to the attainment of some one of those purposes.— In either ease, wc consult the Constitution, and ascertain the extent of the authority which is confided to us. We cannot, constitutionally, lay the taxes without regard to the extent of our powers; and then, having acquired the mo ney of the public, appropriate it because we have got it, to any object indefinitely. Nor did he claim the power in question, from the consent or grant of any particular state or states, through which an object of internal im provement might pass. It might, indeed, he prudent to consult a state through which such an improvement might happen to be carried, from considerations of deference and respect to its sovereign power; and from a disposition to main tain those relations of perfect amity wluch are ever desirable, between the general and state governments. Bnt tV. power to establish the improvement, must be found in the Constitution, or it does not e*rdA And vrbat is granted by all. « cannot. uc necessary to obtain the consent of some to perform. The gentleman from Virginia, hi speaking of incidental powers had used a species of argu ment which he in treated him candidly to recon sider. He l)sd said, that the chain of cause and effect was without end; that if we argued from a power expressly granted to all others, whioh Slie convenient or necessary to its exer lere were no bounds to the power of this' naent; that, for example, under the pow providc and maintain a navy,” the right te assumed to the timber necessary to its ketioa, and the soil on which it grew. The gentleman might have added, the acorns from which it spruug. What, upon the gentleman’s own hypothesis, ought to have been his conclu sion ? That Congress possessed no power to provide aud maintain a navy. Such a conclu sion «culd have been quitg as logical, as that Congress has no power over internal improve ments, from the possible lengths to which this power may be pushed. No one ever had, or could, controvert the existence of incidental powers. We may apply different rules for their extraction, but all must concur in the necessity of their actual existence. They result from the imperfections of our nature, and from the ut ter impossibility of foreseeing all the turns and vicisstudes in human affairs. They cannot be defined. Much is attained when the power, the end, is specified and guarded.—Keeping that constantly in view, the means necessary to its attainment must he left to the sound and respon sible discretion of the public functionary. In trench him as you please, employ what language you ran}-, in the constitutional instrument,ne cessary aud proper,” “ indispensably necessa ry,” or any other, and the question is still left, open docs the proposed measure fall within the scope of die incidental power, circumscribed -as it may be?—Your safety against abuse must rest in his interest, his integrity, his responsibili ty to the exercise of the elective franchise; final ly in the ultimate right, when ail other redress fails, of au appeal to the remedy, to be used only in extreme cases, of forcible resistance against intolerable oppression. Doubtless by an extravagant and abusive en largement of incidental powers, the State go vernments may be reduced within too narrow limits. Take any power, however incontestibly granted to the general govejnment, and employ tliat kind of process of reasoning in which the gentlemau from Virginia is so skilful, by trac ing it to its remotest effects, you may make it absorb the powers of tber state governments. Pursue the opposite course ; take any incontcs tible jKiwer belonging to the governments, and follow it out into all its possible ramifications, aud you may make it thwart and defeat the great operations of the government of the whole. This is the consequence of our systems. Their harmony is to be preserved only by forbearance, liberality* practical good sense, and mutual concession, bring these dispositions into the administrations of our various institutions, and all tbs dreaded conflicts of authorities will be found to be perfectly imaginary. He said, that he disclaimed, for himself, sever al sources to which others had ascended to ar rive at the power in question. In rpaking this disclaimer, he ment to cast no imputation od them. He wis glad to meet them by whatever road they travelled, at the point' of a constitu tional conclusion. Nor did their positions wea ken his ; on the contrary, if correctly taken, and his, also, were justified by fair interpreta tion, they added strength to his. But he felt it his duty, frankly and sincerely, to state his own views of the constitution. In coming to the ground on which (said Mr. C.) I make my stand to maintain the power, and where I am ready to meet its antagonists, I am happy, in the outset, to state my hearty concurrence with the gentleman from Virginia, in the old, 1798, re publican principles, (now become federal, also,) by which the constitution is to be interpreted. I agree with him, that this is a limited govern ment ; that it has no powers but the granted powers ; and that the granted powers are those which are expressly enumerated, or such as, being implied are necessary and proper to ef fectuate the enumerated powers. And, if I do not shew the power over federative, national,, internal improvments to be fairly dcducible, af ter the strictest application of these principles, I entreat the Committee unanimously to reject the bill. The gentleman from Virginia has rightly anticipated that, in regard to roads, I claim the power, under the grant, to establish post offices and post roads. The whole ques tion, on this part of the subject, turns upon the true meaning of this clause, and that again up on the genuine signification of the word “ estab lish.7' According to my understanding of it, the meaning of it is, to fix, to make firm, to build. According to that of the gentleman from Virginin, it is to designate,to adopt. Gra ma tjeal criticism was, to me, always unpleasant, and I do not profess to be any proficient in it But I will confidently appeal, in support of any definition, to any vocabulary whatever of res r^vvuw.v w iiii; uuiumou use 01 the word. That it could not mean only adop tion was to me evident; for adoption pre-sup poses establishment, which is precedent in its very nature. That which does not exist, which is not established, cannot be adopted. There was, then, an essential difference between the gentleman from Virginia and me. I consider tho power as original and creative : he as deri vative, adoptive. But I will shew, out of the mouth of tho President himself, who agrees with the gentleman from Virginia, as to the sense of this word, that what I contend for, is its genuine meaning. The President, in almost the first lines of his message to this House, of the 4th of May, 1822, returning the Cumberland bill with his veto says, “ a power to e*tabli*h turnpikes, with gates and tolls, &c. implies a power to a dopt and execute a complete system of internal improvment.” What is tho sense in which the word “ establish” is here used ? Is it not crea tive? Did die President mean to adopt or desig nate some pre-existing turnpikes widi gates, &c. or, for the first time, to set them up, under the authority of Congress ? Again, the President says, “ if it exist as to one road, [that is, the power to lay duties of transit, and to take tbe land on a valuation,] it exists as to any other, and to as many roads as Congress may think proper to esUtbli*h” In what sense does he here employ the word ? The truth is, that the President, could employ no better than the con stitutional word, and he is obliged to use it in the precise sense for which I contend. But I go to a higher authority than that of the Chief Magis trate—to that of th^pnstitution itself.—In ex jxiunding that instrument, we most look at all its parts ; and if wc find a word, the meaning of which it is desirable to obtain, we may safely rest upon the use which has been made of the same word in other parts of the instrument. The word “ establish” is one of frequent recur rence in the constitution ; and I venture to say that it will be found uniformly la express the s».mc idi-t. To *he yfrrrr*c *nr powers, Congress has power “ to establish au uniform rule of naturalization,” Sic. In the preamble, “ We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, Sic. do ordain aud establish this Consti tution,” Sic. What pre-existing code of justice was adopted ? Did not tho people of the United States, in tliis high, sovereign act, contemplate the construction of a code adapted to their fede ral condition ? The sense of Uio word, as con tended for, was self-evident when applied to the constitution. But let us look at the nature, object, and pur poses of the power. The trust confided to Con gress was one of tho most beneficial character. It was the diffusion of information among all the parts of this Republic. It was the transmission aud conclusion of intelligence; it was to com municate knowledge of the laws and acts of go vernment ; and to promote the great business of society in all its relations. This was a great trust, capable of being executed in a highly sa lutary manner. It could be executed only by Congress, and it should be as well performed as it could be, considering the wants and exigen cies of government. And here I beg leave to advert to the principle which I sometime ago laid down, that the powers granted to this gov ernment are to be carried into execution by its own inherent force aud energy, without neces sary dependence upon the state governments. If my construction secures this object; and if that of my opponents places the execution of this trust at the pleasure and mercy of the slate governments, we must reject theirs ami assume mine. But the construction of the President does make it so dependent. He contends that we cau only use as post roads those which the states shall have previously established; that they are at liberty to after, to change, and of coui-se to shut them up at pleasure. It results from this view of the President that any of the great mail routes now existing, that, for exam ple, from South to North, may be closed at ple:isurc or by caprice, by any one of the states or its authorities through which it passes, by that of Delaware or any other. Is it possible that the construction of the constitution can be correct, which allows a law of the United States, enacted for the good of the whole, to be obstructed ordefeatod in its operation by any one oi iweniy-iour sovereignties ? The gentle man from Va- it is true, denies the right of a state to close a road which has been designated as a post road. But suppose the state, no longer having occasion to use it for its own se parate and peculiar purposes, withdraws all care and attention from its preservation. Can the state be compelled to repair it? No! the gen tleman from Virginia must say and I will say.— May not the general government repair this road which is abandoned by the state power ?_ May it not repair it in the most efficacious man ner ? And nyiy it not protect and defend that which it has ihus repaired, and which there is no longer an interest or inclination in the state to protect and defend ? Or does the gentleman mean to contend that a road may exist in the sta tute book, which a state will not, and the gene ral government cannot, repair and improve ?— And what sort of an account should we Tender to the pcoplo of the United States of the execu tion of the high trust confided, for their benefit, to us, if we were to tell them that wc had failed to execute it, because a state would not make a road for us ? The roads, and other internal improvements of states, are made in reference to their indivi dual interests. It is the eye only of the whole, and the power of the whole that can look to the interests of all. In the infancy of the govern ment, and in tho actual state of the public Trea sury, it may be the only alternative left us to use those roads, which are made for state purposes, to promote the national object, ill as they may bo adopted to it. It may never be necessary to make more than a few great national arteries of communication, leaving to the states the lateral and minor ramifications. Even tliese should only be executed, without pressure upon the re sources of the country, and according to the convenience and ability of government. But, surely, in the performance of a great national duty imposed upon this government, which has for its object t’ve distribution of intelligence, ci vil, commercial, literary, and social, we ought to perform the substance of the trust, ami not content ourselves with a mere paper inefficient execution of it. If I am right in these views, the power to establish post roads being in its na ture original and creative, and the government having adopted the roads made bv state means only from its inability to exert the whole extent of its authority, the controverted power is ex pressly granted to Congress, and there is an end of the question It ought to be bomc in mind that this power over roads was not contained in the articles of confederation, which limited Congress to the es tablishment of post offices; and that the general character of the present constitution, as contras ted wish those art icleg, is that of an enlargement of power. But, if the construction of the oppo site side be correct, we are left precisely where the articles of confederation left ns, notwithstand ing the additional words contained in the pre sent constitution. What, too, will the gentle men do with the first member of the clause to establish post offices? Must Congress adopt, designate, some pre-existing office, established by state authority ? But there is none such_ May it not then fix, build, create, cslaUluh offi ces of its own ? J he gentleman from Virginia sought to alarm us by the awful emphasis with which he set be fore us the total extent of post roads in the Union. Eighty thousand miles of post roads ! exclaimed the gentleman; and will you assert for the gene ral government jurisdiction, and erect, turnpikes on such an immense distance ? Not to-day, nor to-morrow; but this government is (o last, I trust, forever ; we may at least hope it will en dure until tho wave of population, cultivation, and intelligence, shall have washed the Rocky mountains and mingled with the Pacific. And may we not also hope that the day will arrive when the improvrnents and the comforts of social life shall spread over the wide surface of this vast continent? All this is not to be suddenly done. So ciety m 11 st not be bu rthened or opp ressed. Things must bo gradual and progressive. The sarrie species of formidable array which the gentleman makes, might be exhibited in reference to the construction of a navy, or any other of the great purposes of government. Wc might be told of the fleets and vessels of great maritime pow ers which whiten the ocean ; and triumphantly asked if we should vainly attempt to cope with or rival that tremendous poweT ? And we should shrink from the effort, if we were to listen to hi* counsels, in hopeless despair. Vjw, sir, U is a subject of peculiar delight tome to loqk forward to the proud and happy period, distant as it rrn^ be, wheu circulation and association between the Atlantic and Pacific ami the Mexican Gulf, shall be as free and perfect as they are at this mo ment in England, or in any other the most highly improved cvmH-v on the glebe. Ill the awn time, without bearing heavily upon any of oat important interests, )et us apply ourselves to tho accomplishment of what is most; practicable and immediately necessary. But what most staggers my honorable friend* is the jurisdiction over the sites of roads and o ther internal improvements which he suppose* Congress might assume; and he considers tl o exercise of such a jurisdiction as furnishing the just occasion for serious alarm. Let us analyte tho subject. Prior to tho erection of a road under tbe authority of the General Government, there existed, in the State through which it pas ses, no actual exercise of jurisdiction over the ground which it traverses as n road. There was only the possibility of the exorcise of such a jurisdiction when the state should, if ever, ©• rect such a road- But the road is made by the authority of Congress, and out of the fad of its erection arises a necessity for its preservation and protection. The road is some thirty or fiftv or sixty feet in width, and with that norrow li mit passes through a part of the territory of the Stale* The capital expended in the making of the road incorporates itself with, and beco a part of the permanent and immovable property of the State. The jurisdiction which is claimed for the General Government, is that only which relates to the necessary defence, protection, and preservation of the road. It is of a charter alto gether conservative. Whatever does not relate to the existence and protection of the road re mains with the State. Murders, trespasses, contracts, all tho occurrences and transactions of society upon the road, not airectiug its actual existence, will fall within the jurisdiction of the civil or criminal tribunals of the State, as if the roap had never been brought into existence.— How much remains to the State ! How little is claimed for the General Government! It is possible that a jurisdiction so limited, so harm less, so Unambitious, can bo regarded, as serious ly alarming to the sovereignty of the States! Congress now asserts and exercises, without contestation, a power to protect the mail in its transit by the sanction of all suitable penalties. The man who violates it is punished with death or otherwise, according to the circumstances of the case. This power is exerted as incident to that of establishing post offices and post roads_ Is the protection of the tiling ir. transitu a power more clearly deducible from the grant, than that of facilitating, by means of a practicable road, its actual transportation ? Mails certainly imply mads, roads imply their own preserv ation, then preservation implies the power to preserve them, and tbe Constitution tells us. in express terms, that we shall establish the one and the other. In respect to cutting canals, I admit the ques tion is not quite so clear as in regard to roads. With respect to these, as I have endeavored to shew, the power is expressly granted. In ru ff™1 to canals, it appeals tonic to be f.irly com prehended in, or dcducihle from, certain grant ed powers. Congress has power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. Precisely the same measure of power which is granted in the one case is con ferred in the other. And the uniform practical exposition of the constitution, as to the regula tion of foreign commerce, is equally applicable to that among the several states. Suppose, in stead of directing the legislation of tliis govern ment constantly, as heretofore, to the object of foreign commerce, to the utter neglect of the interior cominercc among the several states, the fact had been reversed, and now, for the first time, we were about to legislate for our foreign trade. Should wc not, in that case, hear all the constitutional objections made to the erection of buoys, beacons, lighthouses, the surveys of coasts, and the other numerous facilities accord ed It* the foreign trade, which we now hear to the making of roads and canals ? Two years ago, a sea wall, in other words, a marine canal, was authorized by an act of Congress, in New Hamp shire ; and I doubt not that many of those voted for it who have now constitutional scruples on this bill. Yes, any thing, every thing, may be done for foreign commerce; any thing, every thing, on the margin of the ocean. Butnbthnw* for domestic trade ; nothing for tlie great infe rior uf the country! Yet. the equity and tbn beneficence of the constitution equally compre hends both. The gentleman docs, indeed, maintain (bat there is a difference as to the cha racter of the facilities in the two cases. But I put it to his own candor whether the only dif ference is not that which springs from the na ture of the two elements on which the two spe cies of commerce are conducted—tiro differ ence between land abd water. The principle is the same whether you promote commerce by opening for it an artificial channel where now there is none, or by increasing the case or safe ty with which it may be conducted through a natural channel which the bounty of Provi dence has bestowed. In the one case, your ob ject is to facilitate arrival ami departure from the ocean to the land, in tiro other, it i9 to ac complish the same object from the land to the ocean.—Physical obstacles may bo greater in the one case than in theother, but the moral or constitutional power equally iucludcs both_. The gentleman from Virginia had, to be sorts contended that the power to make these com mercial facilities was to he found in another clause of the constitution—that which enables Congress to obtain cessions of territory for ‘spe cific objects, and grants to it an exclusive juris diction. These cessions may be obtained for me urecuon ox ions, magazines, arsenals dockyards, or other nccdtul buildings.” It £ apparent that it relates altogether to m'titary OP naval affairs, and not to the regulation of com merce. How was the marine canal covered bv this clause ? Is it to be considered as a “ need ful building ?” The object of this power is per fectly obvious. The Convention saw that, in military or naval posts, such as are indicated, it was indispensably necessary, for their proper government, to vest in Congress the power of exclusive legislation. If we claimed over ob jects of internal improvement an exclusive ju risdiction, the gentleman might urge, with much force, the clause in question. Ilut the claim of Concurrent jurisdiction onlv is asserted. The gentleman professes himself unable to comprc uend how concurrent jurisdiction can be exer cised by two different governments at the same time over the same parsons and things. Hut, is not this the fact w ith resp^et to the Mate and federal governments? Hoes not every thing within our limits, stnituin a two-fold relation to the state and to the federal authoritv ? The power of taxation as exerted bv both'govern ments, that over the militia, beside, ttnnv other*, is concurrent. No doubt ernlnirra *ing casrr may be conceived and stated by gentlemen of acute and ingenious minds. One was put frj me yesterday. Two canals are desired, one by the federal, and the' other by a Mate govern - ment; and there is not a supply of wnl<*bwf for the feed, r of one canal—which is to take it ' Hie constitnti.m. f Inch ordain* the supremacy of tho lav.* of (fie United states, anywri* tho quesuon. Th* go-*! fh* whole- is psmnnfcox