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WASHINGTON, D. C., SUNDAY MORNING, AUGUST I'M.',.
BY GEN. F. VON BERNHARDT. THE quick taking of Przemys and th victories of the allie man and Austrian forces a Grodeck and Romberg, at Zoi kiev and Rawa-Ruskn, and the ad vane of their armies acro3S the Bug and th Dniester on the one side and agains Dublin on the other side?all thes achievements form undoubtedly an im portant chapter in the present worl var. The occupation of l.omberp, the capi tal of Galicia. is i.t itself not of decisiv strategical importance, although a important railroaod center and com mercial center was thereby taken awa from the enemy. But it is important a a visible proof of the brilliant victo lies which the Teutonic allies hav carried away over the Russian arm in a number of glorious battles. It i furthermore important through tli enormous moral effect which this sue / net; /M-n-i t cil nvM'i-tr'iorn In t ho nT?rl( and that it save proof that the Russia: army was at the time no longer abl to resist the hostile attack, let olon to undertake anew a big strategics offensive movement. But the real raili tarv success is to be found in the vie tory itself and in the violent shod which the Russian main army suffered * :j= If is true that it attempts to defen Itself with astonishing tenacity agains the onward press of the pursuing vie tors, and tries time and again to re sume the offensive at least at certai points. There are visible symptom: however, which show that the cffectiv state of the army has been severel disrupted. During the month of Jun alone the armies of the Gens, vo Linsingen. von Maekensen and vo Yd oyrseh have captured 409 officer: 140.6.">o men. eighty cannons and 26 machine y.uns. The troops under Fiel FIFTEEN THOUSAND RUSSIAN PR] Marshal von Hindenburp captured 3 2 otficers, 2">,T>74 men. seven cannons, si bcfrnb-throwers and fifty-two machin puns, while the troops fiphtinp unde Austrian command ? ptured durinp th same period o'?I < fiietrs, 381.000 mer ninety-three cannons, 264 machin nuns, scveiit v-eiiriit munition trans porta and 1 'j f;eM railroad car;:. It is true that these figures canr.o simply be auccld together, as it ir.a have been possible that some item have been counted twice. Hut the fac that the Russian armies since the bat tlf-s on the Dur.ujez have lost a rour. 3??0.00o men. numerous artillery an other army material in Galicia aloin points to the conclusion that the vari ous troop parts and the whole organi zntion ?> the Russian army must liav been smashed on a large scale. Therein lies the importance of th Galician campaign up to date. If on considers, furthermore, the extent c the immense losses which th" Russian have sustained in th" battles in th Carpathians as well as in Rast Prussi and i:i western Poland in their figh against Hinder burg. it must be real ized that despite tlie immense huma material which is a- Russia's dispose the offensive strength of our easker opponent has been broken. for the tim being at least. ar.d that there mus he a lack not only of trained soldier but also of officers and instructors fc the training unci formation of nei troops. Many of the prisoners wh have been taken recently only had training of two weeks and can hardl be characterized as soldiers. The final decision of the whole cam XKJL.KrUO.VC STATIO.V paigrn has not been determined as yet. The Russians are still preparing? new defenses at every opportunity in Gael lieia. and in South Poland, to the right t of the Vistula, they are still holding their lines alor.gr the Upper Pneister and along the left bank of the Vistula e in front of Warsaw and Ivangorod, and e are still occupying the Robr-Narew ,1 line, and are fighting with tenacity for the possession of Uourland, but the e core of its army is slumbering in eter nal sleep, or is in German captivity. * * Up to .Tune 23 there were in German c concentration camps 5,557 officers and n 533,307 men, exclusive of those who - were captured by the Austrians, and y may be estimated at 200,000. In addis tion to these, there are about 300,000 - prisoners which were captured by tlie 1 e Austro-German forces in Galicia. More * y than 1,000 guns had been captured at , s the close of 1014. This number has ] e been materially increased since then. 1 _ 1 have no official figures at my dis- i . posal. It will hardly be too high to '< ' estimate the number of guns captured i i in 1915 at between 400 and 500. 1 e More than 1,100 machine guns nave s e been sent to Germany from the eastern i , theater of war up to date. An equal i number has, however, been retained by - the victorious armies for their imme- i - diate use. Aside from these trophies, ^ large quantities of ammunition and in- \ . numerable war materials fell into our ; ' hands. Tlie number of the dead and wounded is probably much larger than that of the prisoners, so that the total A losses of the Russians in their fights , against Germans and Austrians, in- ] elusive of the numerous sick and those 1 ' who died of diseases, may be estimated < - at 3,000,000. Such a loss is surely not ] n to be replaced easily by full-fledged 5 soldiers. j ' In addition to this the Russian situa- I e tion is made more diflicult by interior y troubles. The revolutionary movee ment is becoming more and more i n threatening, and has already resulted n in wild excesses, biood shedding, incen- : s, diarism and looting in Moscow and St. \ S Petersburg. i d Summing everything up, the situation ISOXERS HF.LD IX AlGl'STOWO PKKIWI CAMPS IX GERMANY. 1 in the east is such that while we may X have to count upon severe fighting e against the brave and tenacious Kusr sian army and its strong intrenchment e lines, we will soon be able to assume ' * an assured defensive movement, in ore tier to utilize our forces again in the west, or perhaps in the south. i It lies in the nature of the thing that I we maintained in substance a defensive s upon the western theater of war, while .'t the big offensive movement in the east . demanded the participation of large d masses of troops. Our troops were d forced to fight there against tremen;, dously superior forces. Realizing the 1 - situation correctly, the French made all - possible efforts to penetrate our lines e and to relieve the situation for the Russians by a timely victory; at the c same time they attempted to make the e most of the opportunity when the main ,f strength of the German forces was ap s patently needed in the east to' force a 1 e victorious decision, on their front. 5 n Powerful forces were used to attain 1 II this purpose. All parts of the world 1 e had to give their troops to assist the < it Franco-British armies to victory. 1 s Africans, Indians and Canadian^ are i ,r v fighting on the side of the masters. < o Even the remnants of the Belgian i a army participated in this fight. But all ' J efforts have failed thus far. The allied l i- armies may have won small local ad Jl^ OF UEBMA.N OITPOSTS ON THE SHU ? ^ ^ ? Gen. F. von Bern Poland Form an Impo Be of Decisive Strategi Russians Preparing Ne the French?Submarir Decides Battles. vantages, which were in most cases :aken away from them again. The . J Germans have maintained their main | ine of defense. The enemy succeeded I low here in achieving a real sutttss. Insuperable the German line in its inrenchments defies the overwhelming ittacks of the enemy. On several points t has even gained important advan:ages. In general it waits with selfsacrificing patience for the time when t will be able to again assume fresh m l decisive offensive movements. The powerful attempts of the French to break'through the German lines at Arras are apparently?as far as this may be judged at tins time?to be regarded as the height of the French offensive, while the main efforts of the English may be expected at some future time. But even if the so frequently announced great offensive of our adversaries is still impending, there is the cheerful confidence in the German -anks that this, too. will bleed to death. It is not to be overlooked that the offensive strength of the French will exhaust itself in time. In prisoners and trophies which were taken from the allies the German concentration camps received up to June 23, 4,123 French officers and 262,8X0 men, 664 Belgian officers and 23,813 men, and C2S British officers and 23,813 men. These numbers have been materially increased since then. In addi lATOIt\ TO HKIVG SEXT TO PRISON ^ tion to these 28,000 British and Belgian soldiers have been interned in Holland. The bloody losses of these armies are much larger than those of prisoners. The British themselves recentlv estimated their total losses at 250.000. At the close of 1914, 1,800 guns had been captured on the western front. Their number has since been much increased. Three hundred and thirty-three Frenfch, 108 Belgian and 1" British machine guns have thus far been sent to Germany. An equal number has been retained for use by our troops, so that the total number of captured machine guns from both theaters of war amounts to a round 3,000. It is difficult to estimate what the losses in dead and wounded have been. But it is clear that they must be large, owing to the many desperate attacks which were made, especially by the French, and that they must surpass our losses many times. * * * The total losses of the French, which an, of course, only be estimated, may reach about 1,500,000, if not more. Sev;nteen-year-old boys are already called lo the colors in France to fill the gaps in the ranks. As a consequence we ran await the development of the situation upon this theater of war, too, with quiet confidence, and shall find means, when the time of the great offensive comes, to break through the vtlWK iV^fjKH? vfllxa&XSfioJM^inPB^ * RES OP A18NE RIVER. ^ _ j hardi Says Victories of the Allied German an< irtant Chapter in World War?Occupation of cal Importance, as the City is a Commercial iw Defenses?Powerful Forces Used Against le Warfare in the Southeastern Theater of Wmmmm* - - I JB llfel r I N LATE PftOTO OF GERMANY'S FOREMOST MILITARY GENIUS, FIE LI ARSHAL GEN. VON HINDENBURG, COMMANDING TIIE EASTERN ARMIES KXX3tte%XSS*XX5t*XN^*^X%X%N?*X%^%%%XXXXXXV****XXVN\>N^ B2LL TO STEVE j BY RING W. LARDNER. \ PHILA., Aug". 21. Sieve, wen sieve 1 jest gut unew wrucuig i icnei only not to you of course but the letter I jest got threw writeing was to Gussy and it was some letter and I will tell you what was in It only 1st. 1 better tell you how I come to write it. I guess you know that we been a way from home sence the middle of last wk. in St. Louis and Pittsburgh and Brooklyn and when we got here they was a letter waiting at the hotel for me with my name on it so I seen front the hand writeing it was from Gussy and I knowed they must be some thing the matter or she wouldnt waist no time writeing her husband a letter but would send me a postal card like usul. so 1 oppened up the letter and sure enough it started out a bout I would half to help her out of trubble. She says she was so sick of seen this here Babe a round the house that she couldent stand it no longer and she had hinted a round and this in that but Babe dident show no sines of geting ready to go home. And of coarse witli she there vissiting Gussy cant get to go out nowheres with her girl trends in the evening because there all sore on Babe on acct. of how she trys to flirt and make goggly eyes at evry man a round weather its on the st. car or where is it. And she keeps asking Gussy all the wile to call up some man or some other man and have them up to the house and Gussy dont like to do it on acet. she dont want to addmit that this here old flivver is a frend of hern, and bessides the grosery bills has ran up turrible big sence she been there and Gussy been trying ever sence she come to find out some thing she couldent eat but they aint nothing shes against provide it she can bite in to it and I guess if Gussy served the phonegraft records porched on toast this old bird would wash them down some ways. And she aint been in the kichen to help Gussy with the dislis and cooking sence she come and if she droped some of her hare on the floor at night she would go a round part bald the next day if Gussy dident neal down and pick it up for her. And if Gussys got some thing pretty to ware she has to get up befifore Babe gets up and put it on the 1st. thing in the morning with all her work to do or else Babe would handle it a wile and then say my I would love to borry this for today and put it on her self with out giveing Gussy no chanct to say I yes or no. So all to gather Gussy cant stand her a round the house no more but shes to pollite to come right out and can her and if it was me that was doing it I would say look here Babe the A. M. papers out side the front door and would she Dlease go get it because 1 wasent drest and the minut she got out side the door I would lock it ?jn her. But as I say Gussys to pollite to pull the ruff stuff so shes ast me for help and heres the scheme and Gussy got it up in her mind but couldent pull it with out me unlest I helped lier. I wrote Gussy a letter and I says in it that 1 was so lone some for her that I couldent wait till the trip was over to see her and please for she to take the 1st. train and join me ether here or in Boston and sine my name to the letter. So I sent the letter and when Gussy gets a hold of it she will say my I've got to hurry and pack up and join my husband on the trip and Im awful sorry to cut short your vissit but dont dare reffuse him on acct. of how mad he gets. So then Babe will'ask Gussy to leave her see the letter and Gussy will hand it over to her and leave her read it for her self and then Gussy will start and make a bluff a bout packing up and if Babe dont show no sines of leaveing her self Gussy will tell her shes got to make a certun train and Babe will half to pack up her self and beat it and if Babe goes down to the deepo with Gussy Gussy will probily get on to some train and get oft the other side and duck home. Some scheame hey Steve and some letter I wrote and I says in it if Gussy dident take the 1st. train 1 would be threw with her for life and per tended like I thot Babe must of went home all ready a long wile a go. I guess that will do the business hey Steve. Well Steve Bresnahan dont act like he was ever going to stick me In the game and I guess may be its because I aint quarl some and busting some of the boys in the jaw all the wile but I guess if I busted them they would know it hey Steve. Respy. . ? (Copyright, 1915, by Blng W. Lerdner.l _ i.Li Bagim i Austrian Armies in T /?v L\ i * /v 1 r* < 1"\ ^ /-\ -I 4- A I nemuuig v>iauiicu IU and Railway Center. Russians?Losses of ar-?The Spirit Which hostile lines and to carry the attack into the heart of the hostile country, perhaps earlier than the British will be ready with the creation of their new army and the readiness of the necessary ammunition. They may have realized in the meantime that it is not so easy to put an army into the field which is capable of defeating the Merman 1 roops. Even at sea the British have had no successes. In the sea fight in the North sea they were even unable to nail a victory to their flag, despite numerical and artillery superiority. On the.contrary, they suffered heavy losses and terminated the fifjht by retreating. Their dominion at sea has been seriously shattered. Although they succeeded to" prevent overseas imports from reaching Germany they themselves are suffering the hardest from the submarine warfare, which will he Continued more severely from day to day, and against which neither the change of flag nor the arming of merchant vessels will avail. Even the aerial warfare against Eng jariu niis iiui reavneu us uuu our aerial fleet gradually gains the upper hand in France. Thus the prospects at sea and in the air are not unfavorable for us, and German tenacity and capability will succeed, as on land, so in this respect, gradually to win the upper hand. The German submarines have already ; FIFTV CAITIRED RUSSIAN GUNS THE 10TH RUSSIAN ARMY, entered the war upon the southeastern theater in a decisive manner and forced our adversaries to abandon in general the effective co-operation of their fleets during the attack upon the Dardanelles. Voices are already raised which declare the whole undertaking as impractical, if the German submarines succeed in dominating the seas. * This fight for the Dardanelles is of high importance to the whole situation. In the first place, it occupies large fighting forces and keeps them away from Europe, *nd secondly, the stakes over which it is fought are very important. If it should be possible for the quadruple entente to force th.e passage, and to take Constantinople, Turkey would be affected quite seriously. A continuance of her warfare would be made extremely difficult for her. The effect upon Bulgaria and Rumania could not be estimated and the provisioning of Russia with munitions and other necessities would l>e greatly facilitated. But such a success is hardly to be expected for our ally's adversaries. The forcing of the Dardanelles, if possible at all, can only be attained by making the heaviest possible sacrifices, which might seriously threaten the dominion of the Mediterranean by the allies. The attack on land, moreover, in order to l>e successful, demands such large bodies of troops and such' a decisive co-operation of the fleet that it is hardly possible that the allies are equal to this task. Human quantities alone are not sufficient. Improvised militia troops, Australians ami other drummed together folk will always find their masters in the Turks. Tt mnv therefore, be confidently ex pected that the Dardanelles will be held by the Turks. This, however, will not only have a favorable influence upon the Balkan states, whose interests would be menaced by Russia and British dominion of Constantinople, but it will also enable the Turks to reap new laurels upon the other theaters of war. It only remains to speak of the Italians, who saw fit to enter the triple entente at a time when Russia's heaviest defeat was in .process of preparation. In Germany this participation of Italy in the wan created, curiously enough, little impression.- Everybody was convinced from the start that the success of the Italians would not be equal to their own expectations and to those of their allies. As a matter of fact these expectations were quite large. It was hoped that Italy's entrance into the war would at once release the pressure upon the Russians and would be decisive in a general way. In Italy the war party expected easy victories, while the mass of the people was not in favor of the war. How differently everything turned out! Up to the present time the Italian armies have not won a foot of territory, unless it was conceded to them voluntarily. On the other hand, they have been severely defeated along the Isonzo front. Even its fleet cannot maintain control at sea, and in Tripoli they have already lost the largest portion of their colonies through heavy defeats by the tribes of the interior, or else have deserted their possessions. % * * Even If it should be possible for them to gain territory in the Tyrol and along the Isonzo their participation could never become of decisive importance. The space which is available along the Austrian front is too small to permit h of the development of the whole Italian tl forces. A flanking movement around C' the Austrian positions is absolutely out a of the question. It is a matter of frontal attack under the hardest condi- f< tions. which could hardly be productive a of great results. An attack on Austria p upon the Balkan peninsula, on the fi other hand, again offers great dilficul- fi ties and cannot lead to important deei- c? sions within the near future. ti It appears quite impossible to defeat A Austria upon this theater of war. The P decision will undoubtedly be fought out tl upon the French battlefields. However ii this may result. Italy will under all o circumstances be the loser. If the central powers are victorious there tl cannot be any doubt that Italy will o have to pay its share of the bill. Tf the '1 quadruple entente is victorious, on the a other hand. Ttalv will become absolute- r< ly dependent upon France and Fngland w and must relinquish for all time to n come its dominating position in the Mediterranean. a * 8 * * S ? A review of the whole situation will ~ reveal a favorable situation for the v central powers, so much the more as the states of the quadruple entente J have a conception relative to military ^ successes which can be based neither i upon the history of the war nor has a ^ foundation in the nature of this war. ^ It is constantly said on the other side t that the success in a decisive manner 1 depends upon the quantity of muni- 11 tions which is available, and that, aside from the superior masses, the technical means were instrumental to success. ^ It is constantly emphasized that, in t contrast to former wars, these factors t are today determining. How little have men who hold this J! belief penetrated into the real spirit of j the war! t Munitions in sufficient quantities cer- t tainly are essential in warfare, and the p technical means of warfare are cer tainly an important factor to success, and it is surely not of little importance p that just in this respect, in the tech- p nique of war. we are in advance of our f PARKED IX FRONT OF CHURCH IN St WHICH WAS ANNIHILATED IN THE : enemies. The superiority in artillery s and in number is, of course, of prime a importance. i The masses, however, win their de- c cisive importance only when they have t been trained in discipline and capabil- f ity, are full of belligerent spirit and are led by men who are thoroughly ' aware of what brings results in war, and who are masters of their profession or, rather, art. Munitions and '.ethnical war materials achieve their full value only when they are used with a purpose and with valiant, military , spirit. What did it avail the Russians that they pressed on with enormous superiority against East Prussia and the Carpathians? Their desperate attacks crumbled under the superior leadership of the German generals and the well , aimed heroic spirit of the Austro-Ger- ~ man troops, so that they had to surrender their arms by the hundred thou- i sands to the weaker opponent. What did the enormous quantities of ammunition of the Frenchmen and the Hritish superiority upon the battlefield a avail against men who were led in distinguished fashion, who used their t weapons with superiority and who J could not be shaken by anything in h their unalterable confidence in victory? Or does any one believe that the Ger- h man submarines, which are, of course, ii superior to those of the enemy, could n Final for th< MONDAY 110 Fine $2 To Me* jfcjl jlij j^jpll Highest grade medium-weight suitable for fall and winter wear, fashion lines by our famous cutter, ings to measure, Monday, only $12.7 M. Stein & < 1 'WALKI. THE Gl'XS BELONGED TO HASLRIAX LAKES REGION. dan armies are now being annihilated, vliile the French are bleeding to death n useless attacks upon our lines of iefense, and the British cannot co-oprate owing to defective military organization. If they appear at last with strong orces upon" the battlefield the French .. i 1 1 l, ~ flnnll,. dicnnoad of on.) in ud vc i".ca nuaiij uia jjvov u v/i f auu he Italians have, as tilings look now. io chance at all to take a decisive part n the war. They will hardly climb iver the wall of the Alps. Owing to this disconnection of warare, which cannot he remedied, the .llies will reap the final defeat. (Copyright, 1915, by the New York Tribune.) A Happy Ending. 5 IMKON* FORD, in an address last f month to a class of girl graduates a white, said: "The average girl goes through a netamorphosis the chapters whereof re clearly indicated in her name. "She begins as Mary. There comes a ime when she calls herself May. layme follows. Then, at the height of ier coquetry, sue is Known as :uae. "But don't despair. The story has a appy ending. Only a year or so more 3 required, and our heroine is called 1a." e Season! ONLY! !S Suitings isure, fabrics; light and dark colors. All designed on advance 1916 Mr. E. F. Mudd. All $25 Suit5. a Quality Tailors 8th & F Sti. i t. . , . f July ave achieved such brilliant results as hey actually did if they had not been ammanded by men like Woddlngen nd Hersmg? And now the British. They want "<o >rce a victory with masses of men and mmunition against the armies of a eople who have been brought up in Kbting spirit and patriotic sacrifice rom generation to generation during enturies of history, and whose men are rained from youth on to be soldiers. ,11 are drummed together recruits who artly represent the moral scum of all le world and are certainly not changed ito soldiers by overwhelming forces f artillery and a waste of ammunition It is the spirit which decides wars, he spirit of leadership and the spirit f the troops. The moral factors toay, as always, are the deciding ones, nd as long as our adversaries expect esults only from material sources they ill never succeed ui muster uie cretin n spirit and the German people. The intention to starve out Germany nd to deprive it of the things necesary to life will fail. We ran raise a ufficient amount of foodstuffs upon our wn soil. And we are amply provided ."ith the other materials necessary to . arfare. ' Our allies are standing loyally by ur side, determined, as we are. to gilt for victory to the last drop of ilood. One spirit and one will domnate the peoples of the central powers, those powerful, active idealism canlot be understood in the countries of material world vision. One belief in he final victory of their just cause ives in all, a faith which could move nountaitis. ? * * May our enemies do their worst, "hey cannot oppose anything equal to he hero spirit of our troops. Front he beginning they have offended gainst one of the most important and lecisive laws of the art of warfare lecause they did not succeed to use heir forces simultaneously effective. In his manner they have given us the Kissibility to whip them one after the ither. Belgium was conquered and a large lart of France occupied before the French were able to use their main orces at the decisive point. The Kus