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Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, August 22, 1915, Image 41

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THE quick taking of Przemys
and th victories of the allie
man and Austrian forces a
Grodeck and Romberg, at Zoi
kiev and Rawa-Ruskn, and the ad vane
of their armies acro3S the Bug and th
Dniester on the one side and agains
Dublin on the other side?all thes
achievements form undoubtedly an im
portant chapter in the present worl
The occupation of l.omberp, the capi
tal of Galicia. is i.t itself not of decisiv
strategical importance, although a
important railroaod center and com
mercial center was thereby taken awa
from the enemy. But it is important a
a visible proof of the brilliant victo
lies which the Teutonic allies hav
carried away over the Russian arm
in a number of glorious battles. It i
furthermore important through tli
enormous moral effect which this sue
/ net; /M-n-i t cil nvM'i-tr'iorn In t ho nT?rl(
and that it save proof that the Russia:
army was at the time no longer abl
to resist the hostile attack, let olon
to undertake anew a big strategics
offensive movement. But the real raili
tarv success is to be found in the vie
tory itself and in the violent shod
which the Russian main army suffered
* :j=
If is true that it attempts to defen
Itself with astonishing tenacity agains
the onward press of the pursuing vie
tors, and tries time and again to re
sume the offensive at least at certai
points. There are visible symptom:
however, which show that the cffectiv
state of the army has been severel
disrupted. During the month of Jun
alone the armies of the Gens, vo
Linsingen. von Maekensen and vo
Yd oyrseh have captured 409 officer:
140.6.">o men. eighty cannons and 26
machine y.uns. The troops under Fiel
Marshal von Hindenburp captured 3 2
otficers, 2">,T>74 men. seven cannons, si
bcfrnb-throwers and fifty-two machin
puns, while the troops fiphtinp unde
Austrian command ? ptured durinp th
same period o'?I < fiietrs, 381.000 mer
ninety-three cannons, 264 machin
nuns, scveiit v-eiiriit munition trans
porta and 1 'j f;eM railroad car;:.
It is true that these figures canr.o
simply be auccld together, as it ir.a
have been possible that some item
have been counted twice. Hut the fac
that the Russian armies since the bat
tlf-s on the Dur.ujez have lost a rour.
3??0.00o men. numerous artillery an
other army material in Galicia aloin
points to the conclusion that the vari
ous troop parts and the whole organi
zntion ?> the Russian army must liav
been smashed on a large scale.
Therein lies the importance of th
Galician campaign up to date. If on
considers, furthermore, the extent c
the immense losses which th" Russian
have sustained in th" battles in th
Carpathians as well as in Rast Prussi
and i:i western Poland in their figh
against Hinder burg. it must be real
ized that despite tlie immense huma
material which is a- Russia's dispose
the offensive strength of our easker
opponent has been broken. for the tim
being at least. ar.d that there mus
he a lack not only of trained soldier
but also of officers and instructors fc
the training unci formation of nei
troops. Many of the prisoners wh
have been taken recently only had
training of two weeks and can hardl
be characterized as soldiers.
The final decision of the whole cam
paigrn has not been determined as yet.
The Russians are still preparing? new
defenses at every opportunity in Gael
lieia. and in South Poland, to the right
t of the Vistula, they are still holding
their lines alor.gr the Upper Pneister
and along the left bank of the Vistula
e in front of Warsaw and Ivangorod, and
e are still occupying the Robr-Narew
,1 line, and are fighting with tenacity for
the possession of Uourland, but the
e core of its army is slumbering in eter
nal sleep, or is in German captivity.
* *
Up to .Tune 23 there were in German
c concentration camps 5,557 officers and
n 533,307 men, exclusive of those who
- were captured by the Austrians, and
y may be estimated at 200,000. In addis
tion to these, there are about 300,000
- prisoners which were captured by tlie 1
e Austro-German forces in Galicia. More *
y than 1,000 guns had been captured at ,
s the close of 1014. This number has ]
e been materially increased since then. 1
_ 1 have no official figures at my dis- i
. posal. It will hardly be too high to '<
' estimate the number of guns captured i
i in 1915 at between 400 and 500. 1
e More than 1,100 machine guns nave s
e been sent to Germany from the eastern i
, theater of war up to date. An equal i
number has, however, been retained by
- the victorious armies for their imme- i
- diate use. Aside from these trophies,
^ large quantities of ammunition and in- \
. numerable war materials fell into our ;
' hands. Tlie number of the dead and
wounded is probably much larger than
that of the prisoners, so that the total
A losses of the Russians in their fights
, against Germans and Austrians, in- ]
elusive of the numerous sick and those 1
' who died of diseases, may be estimated <
- at 3,000,000. Such a loss is surely not ]
n to be replaced easily by full-fledged
5 soldiers. j
' In addition to this the Russian situa- I
e tion is made more diflicult by interior
y troubles. The revolutionary movee
ment is becoming more and more i
n threatening, and has already resulted
n in wild excesses, biood shedding, incen- :
s, diarism and looting in Moscow and St. \
S Petersburg. i
d Summing everything up, the situation
1 in the east is such that while we may
X have to count upon severe fighting
e against the brave and tenacious Kusr
sian army and its strong intrenchment
e lines, we will soon be able to assume
' * an assured defensive movement, in ore
tier to utilize our forces again in the
west, or perhaps in the south. i
It lies in the nature of the thing that
I we maintained in substance a defensive
s upon the western theater of war, while
.'t the big offensive movement in the east
. demanded the participation of large
d masses of troops. Our troops were
d forced to fight there against tremen;,
dously superior forces. Realizing the 1
- situation correctly, the French made all
- possible efforts to penetrate our lines
e and to relieve the situation for the
Russians by a timely victory; at the
c same time they attempted to make the
e most of the opportunity when the main
,f strength of the German forces was ap
s patently needed in the east to' force a 1
e victorious decision, on their front.
n Powerful forces were used to attain 1
II this purpose. All parts of the world 1
e had to give their troops to assist the <
it Franco-British armies to victory. 1
s Africans, Indians and Canadian^ are i
v fighting on the side of the masters. <
o Even the remnants of the Belgian i
a army participated in this fight. But all '
J efforts have failed thus far. The allied l
i- armies may have won small local ad
? ^ ^ ?
Gen. F. von Bern
Poland Form an Impo
Be of Decisive Strategi
Russians Preparing Ne
the French?Submarir
Decides Battles.
vantages, which were in most cases
:aken away from them again. The . J
Germans have maintained their main |
ine of defense. The enemy succeeded I
low here in achieving a real sutttss.
Insuperable the German line in its inrenchments
defies the overwhelming
ittacks of the enemy. On several points
t has even gained important advan:ages.
In general it waits with selfsacrificing
patience for the time when
t will be able to again assume fresh
m l decisive offensive movements.
The powerful attempts of the French
to break'through the German lines at
Arras are apparently?as far as this
may be judged at tins time?to be regarded
as the height of the French offensive,
while the main efforts of the
English may be expected at some future
But even if the so frequently announced
great offensive of our adversaries
is still impending, there is the
cheerful confidence in the German
-anks that this, too. will bleed to death.
It is not to be overlooked that the offensive
strength of the French will exhaust
itself in time.
In prisoners and trophies which were
taken from the allies the German concentration
camps received up to June
23, 4,123 French officers and 262,8X0
men, 664 Belgian officers and 23,813
men, and C2S British officers and 23,813
men. These numbers have been materially
increased since then. In addi
tion to these 28,000 British and Belgian
soldiers have been interned in
Holland. The bloody losses of these
armies are much larger than those of
prisoners. The British themselves recentlv
estimated their total losses at
250.000. At the close of 1914, 1,800
guns had been captured on the western
front. Their number has since been
much increased. Three hundred and
thirty-three Frenfch, 108 Belgian and
1" British machine guns have thus far
been sent to Germany. An equal number
has been retained for use by our
troops, so that the total number of
captured machine guns from both theaters
of war amounts to a round 3,000.
It is difficult to estimate what the
losses in dead and wounded have been.
But it is clear that they must be large,
owing to the many desperate attacks
which were made, especially by the
French, and that they must surpass our
losses many times.
* *
The total losses of the French, which
an, of course, only be estimated, may
reach about 1,500,000, if not more. Sev;nteen-year-old
boys are already called
lo the colors in France to fill the gaps
in the ranks. As a consequence we
ran await the development of the situation
upon this theater of war, too,
with quiet confidence, and shall find
means, when the time of the great offensive
comes, to break through the
vtlWK iV^fjKH? vfllxa&XSfioJM^inPB^ *
hardi Says Victories of the Allied German an<
irtant Chapter in World War?Occupation of
cal Importance, as the City is a Commercial
iw Defenses?Powerful Forces Used Against
le Warfare in the Southeastern Theater of Wmmmm*
- - I
JB llfel r I N
PHILA., Aug". 21. Sieve, wen sieve 1 jest gut unew wrucuig i icnei
only not to you of course but the letter I jest got threw writeing
was to Gussy and it was some letter and I will tell you what was
in It only 1st. 1 better tell you how I come to write it.
I guess you know that we been a way from home sence the middle
of last wk. in St. Louis and Pittsburgh and Brooklyn and when we got
here they was a letter waiting at the hotel for me with my name on it
so I seen front the hand writeing it was from Gussy and I knowed they
must be some thing the matter or she wouldnt waist no time writeing
her husband a letter but would send me a postal card like usul. so 1
oppened up the letter and sure enough it started out a bout I would
half to help her out of trubble. She says she was so sick of seen this here
Babe a round the house that she couldent stand it no longer and she had
hinted a round and this in that but Babe dident show no sines of geting
ready to go home. And of coarse witli she there vissiting Gussy cant
get to go out nowheres with her girl trends in the evening because there
all sore on Babe on acct. of how she trys to flirt and make goggly eyes
at evry man a round weather its on the st. car or where is it. And she
keeps asking Gussy all the wile to call up some man or some other man
and have them up to the house and Gussy dont like to do it on acet. she
dont want to addmit that this here old flivver is a frend of hern, and
bessides the grosery bills has ran up turrible big sence she been there
and Gussy been trying ever sence she come to find out some thing she
couldent eat but they aint nothing shes against provide it she can bite
in to it and I guess if Gussy served the phonegraft records porched on
toast this old bird would wash them down some ways.
And she aint been in the kichen to help Gussy with the dislis and
cooking sence she come and if she droped some of her hare on the floor
at night she would go a round part bald the next day if Gussy dident neal
down and pick it up for her. And if Gussys got some thing pretty to ware
she has to get up befifore Babe gets up and put it on the 1st. thing in the
morning with all her work to do or else Babe would handle it a wile and
then say my I would love to borry this for today and put it on her self
with out giveing Gussy no chanct to say I yes or no. So all to gather
Gussy cant stand her a round the house no more but shes to pollite to
come right out and can her and if it was me that was doing it I would
say look here Babe the A. M. papers out side the front door and would
she Dlease go get it because 1 wasent drest and the minut she got out
side the door I would lock it ?jn her.
But as I say Gussys to pollite to pull the ruff stuff so shes ast me for
help and heres the scheme and Gussy got it up in her mind but couldent
pull it with out me unlest I helped lier. I wrote Gussy a letter and I
says in it that 1 was so lone some for her that I couldent wait till the
trip was over to see her and please for she to take the 1st. train and join
me ether here or in Boston and sine my name to the letter. So I sent the
letter and when Gussy gets a hold of it she will say my I've got to hurry
and pack up and join my husband on the trip and Im awful sorry to cut
short your vissit but dont dare reffuse him on acct. of how mad he gets.
So then Babe will'ask Gussy to leave her see the letter and Gussy will
hand it over to her and leave her read it for her self and then Gussy will
start and make a bluff a bout packing up and if Babe dont show no sines
of leaveing her self Gussy will tell her shes got to make a certun train
and Babe will half to pack up her self and beat it and if Babe goes down
to the deepo with Gussy Gussy will probily get on to some train and get
oft the other side and duck home. Some scheame hey Steve and some
letter I wrote and I says in it if Gussy dident take the 1st. train 1 would
be threw with her for life and per tended like I thot Babe must of went
home all ready a long wile a go. I guess that will do the business hey
Well Steve Bresnahan dont act like he was ever going to stick me
In the game and I guess may be its because I aint quarl some and busting
some of the boys in the jaw all the wile but I guess if I busted them
they would know it hey Steve. Respy.
. ? (Copyright, 1915, by Blng W. Lerdner.l _ i.Li
i Austrian Armies in
T /?v L\ i * /v 1 r* < 1"\ ^ /-\ -I 4- A I
nemuuig v>iauiicu IU
and Railway Center.
Russians?Losses of
ar-?The Spirit Which
hostile lines and to carry the attack
into the heart of the hostile country,
perhaps earlier than the British will
be ready with the creation of their
new army and the readiness of the
necessary ammunition. They may
have realized in the meantime that it
is not so easy to put an army into the
field which is capable of defeating the
Merman 1 roops.
Even at sea the British have had no
successes. In the sea fight in the North
sea they were even unable to nail a
victory to their flag, despite numerical
and artillery superiority. On the.contrary,
they suffered heavy losses and
terminated the fifjht by retreating.
Their dominion at sea has been seriously
shattered. Although they succeeded
to" prevent overseas imports
from reaching Germany they themselves
are suffering the hardest from
the submarine warfare, which will he
Continued more severely from day to
day, and against which neither the
change of flag nor the arming of merchant
vessels will avail.
Even the aerial warfare against Eng
jariu niis iiui reavneu us uuu
our aerial fleet gradually gains the
upper hand in France. Thus the prospects
at sea and in the air are not unfavorable
for us, and German tenacity
and capability will succeed, as on land,
so in this respect, gradually to win
the upper hand.
The German submarines have already
entered the war upon the southeastern
theater in a decisive manner and forced
our adversaries to abandon in general
the effective co-operation of their
fleets during the attack upon the Dardanelles.
Voices are already raised
which declare the whole undertaking
as impractical, if the German submarines
succeed in dominating the seas.
This fight for the Dardanelles is of
high importance to the whole situation.
In the first place, it occupies large fighting
forces and keeps them away from
Europe, *nd secondly, the stakes over
which it is fought are very important.
If it should be possible for the quadruple
entente to force th.e passage, and to take
Constantinople, Turkey would be affected
quite seriously. A continuance of her
warfare would be made extremely difficult
for her. The effect upon Bulgaria and
Rumania could not be estimated and the
provisioning of Russia with munitions
and other necessities would l>e greatly
But such a success is hardly to be expected
for our ally's adversaries. The
forcing of the Dardanelles, if possible at
all, can only be attained by making the
heaviest possible sacrifices, which might
seriously threaten the dominion of the
Mediterranean by the allies. The attack
on land, moreover, in order to l>e
successful, demands such large bodies of
troops and such' a decisive co-operation
of the fleet that it is hardly possible
that the allies are equal to this task.
Human quantities alone are not sufficient.
Improvised militia troops, Australians
ami other drummed together
folk will always find their masters in
the Turks.
Tt mnv therefore, be confidently ex
pected that the Dardanelles will be held
by the Turks.
This, however, will not only have a
favorable influence upon the Balkan
states, whose interests would be menaced
by Russia and British dominion
of Constantinople, but it will also enable
the Turks to reap new laurels
upon the other theaters of war.
It only remains to speak of the Italians,
who saw fit to enter the triple
entente at a time when Russia's heaviest
defeat was in .process of preparation.
In Germany this participation of
Italy in the wan created, curiously
enough, little impression.- Everybody
was convinced from the start that the
success of the Italians would not be
equal to their own expectations and to
those of their allies.
As a matter of fact these expectations
were quite large. It was hoped
that Italy's entrance into the war
would at once release the pressure
upon the Russians and would be decisive
in a general way. In Italy the
war party expected easy victories,
while the mass of the people was not
in favor of the war. How differently
everything turned out! Up to the present
time the Italian armies have not
won a foot of territory, unless it was
conceded to them voluntarily. On the
other hand, they have been severely
defeated along the Isonzo front. Even
its fleet cannot maintain control at sea,
and in Tripoli they have already lost
the largest portion of their colonies
through heavy defeats by the tribes of
the interior, or else have deserted their
* *
Even If it should be possible for them
to gain territory in the Tyrol and along
the Isonzo their participation could
never become of decisive importance.
The space which is available along the
Austrian front is too small to permit h
of the development of the whole Italian tl
forces. A flanking movement around C'
the Austrian positions is absolutely out a
of the question. It is a matter of
frontal attack under the hardest condi- f<
tions. which could hardly be productive a
of great results. An attack on Austria p
upon the Balkan peninsula, on the fi
other hand, again offers great dilficul- fi
ties and cannot lead to important deei- c?
sions within the near future. ti
It appears quite impossible to defeat A
Austria upon this theater of war. The P
decision will undoubtedly be fought out tl
upon the French battlefields. However ii
this may result. Italy will under all o
circumstances be the loser. If the
central powers are victorious there tl
cannot be any doubt that Italy will o
have to pay its share of the bill. Tf the '1
quadruple entente is victorious, on the a
other hand. Ttalv will become absolute- r<
ly dependent upon France and Fngland w
and must relinquish for all time to n
come its dominating position in the
Mediterranean. a
* 8
* * S
A review of the whole situation will ~
reveal a favorable situation for the v
central powers, so much the more as
the states of the quadruple entente J
have a conception relative to military ^
successes which can be based neither i
upon the history of the war nor has a ^
foundation in the nature of this war. ^
It is constantly said on the other side t
that the success in a decisive manner 1
depends upon the quantity of muni- 11
tions which is available, and that, aside
from the superior masses, the technical
means were instrumental to success. ^
It is constantly emphasized that, in t
contrast to former wars, these factors t
are today determining.
How little have men who hold this J!
belief penetrated into the real spirit of j
the war! t
Munitions in sufficient quantities cer- t
tainly are essential in warfare, and the p
technical means of warfare are cer
tainly an important factor to success,
and it is surely not of little importance p
that just in this respect, in the tech- p
nique of war. we are in advance of our f
enemies. The superiority in artillery s
and in number is, of course, of prime a
importance. i
The masses, however, win their de- c
cisive importance only when they have t
been trained in discipline and capabil- f
ity, are full of belligerent spirit and
are led by men who are thoroughly '
aware of what brings results in war,
and who are masters of their profession
or, rather, art. Munitions and
'.ethnical war materials achieve their
full value only when they are used with
a purpose and with valiant, military ,
What did it avail the Russians that
they pressed on with enormous superiority
against East Prussia and the
Carpathians? Their desperate attacks
crumbled under the superior leadership
of the German generals and the well ,
aimed heroic spirit of the Austro-Ger- ~
man troops, so that they had to surrender
their arms by the hundred thou- i
sands to the weaker opponent.
What did the enormous quantities of
ammunition of the Frenchmen and the
Hritish superiority upon the battlefield a
avail against men who were led in distinguished
fashion, who used their t
weapons with superiority and who J
could not be shaken by anything in h
their unalterable confidence in victory?
Or does any one believe that the Ger- h
man submarines, which are, of course, ii
superior to those of the enemy, could n
Final for th<
110 Fine $2
To Me*
jfcjl jlij
Highest grade medium-weight
suitable for fall and winter wear,
fashion lines by our famous cutter,
ings to measure, Monday, only $12.7
M. Stein & <
dan armies are now being annihilated,
vliile the French are bleeding to death
n useless attacks upon our lines of
iefense, and the British cannot co-oprate
owing to defective military organization.
If they appear at last with strong
orces upon" the battlefield the French
.. i 1 1 l, ~ flnnll,. dicnnoad of on.)
in ud vc i".ca nuaiij uia jjvov u v/i f auu
he Italians have, as tilings look now.
io chance at all to take a decisive part
n the war. They will hardly climb
iver the wall of the Alps.
Owing to this disconnection of warare,
which cannot he remedied, the
.llies will reap the final defeat.
(Copyright, 1915, by the New York Tribune.)
A Happy Ending.
5 IMKON* FORD, in an address last
f month to a class of girl graduates
a white, said:
"The average girl goes through a
netamorphosis the chapters whereof
re clearly indicated in her name.
"She begins as Mary. There comes a
ime when she calls herself May.
layme follows. Then, at the height of
ier coquetry, sue is Known as :uae.
"But don't despair. The story has a
appy ending. Only a year or so more
3 required, and our heroine is called
e Season!
!S Suitings
fabrics; light and dark colors.
All designed on advance 1916
Mr. E. F. Mudd. All $25 Suit5.
a Quality Tailors
8th & F Sti.
i t. . , .
f July
ave achieved such brilliant results as
hey actually did if they had not been
ammanded by men like Woddlngen
nd Hersmg?
And now the British. They want "<o
>rce a victory with masses of men and
mmunition against the armies of a
eople who have been brought up in
Kbting spirit and patriotic sacrifice
rom generation to generation during
enturies of history, and whose men are
rained from youth on to be soldiers.
,11 are drummed together recruits who
artly represent the moral scum of all
le world and are certainly not changed
ito soldiers by overwhelming forces
f artillery and a waste of ammunition
It is the spirit which decides wars,
he spirit of leadership and the spirit
f the troops. The moral factors toay,
as always, are the deciding ones,
nd as long as our adversaries expect
esults only from material sources they
ill never succeed ui muster uie cretin
n spirit and the German people.
The intention to starve out Germany
nd to deprive it of the things necesary
to life will fail. We ran raise a
ufficient amount of foodstuffs upon our
wn soil. And we are amply provided
."ith the other materials necessary to
. arfare. '
Our allies are standing loyally by
ur side, determined, as we are. to
gilt for victory to the last drop of
ilood. One spirit and one will domnate
the peoples of the central powers,
those powerful, active idealism canlot
be understood in the countries of
material world vision. One belief in
he final victory of their just cause
ives in all, a faith which could move
* *
May our enemies do their worst,
"hey cannot oppose anything equal to
he hero spirit of our troops. Front
he beginning they have offended
gainst one of the most important and
lecisive laws of the art of warfare
lecause they did not succeed to use
heir forces simultaneously effective. In
his manner they have given us the
Kissibility to whip them one after the
Belgium was conquered and a large
lart of France occupied before the
French were able to use their main
orces at the decisive point. The Kus

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