Evening star. [volume], August 02, 1931, Image 25

About Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972

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Editorial Page
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Part 2—B Pages
GERMAN CRISIS UNSOLVED
DESPITE LONDON PARLEY
Disaster Looms Unless Financial Aid Is
Found—French Keep Whip in
Pressing Economic War.
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.
THE close of the London confer
ference has clearly left the
whole German situation pre
cisely where it was when the
statesmen of the world hurried
to the British capital to seek some
method of ending a German financial
crisis which constituted a world men
ace. No settlement was possible, for
the simple reason that no political so
lution was discoverable for the issues
which separate France and Germany
and are the root cause of the whole
situation.
As far back as last March, when the
Germans suddenly proclaimed their
purpose to form a tariff union with
Austria, the battle was joined between
Faris and Berlin, and it has continued
with the same fundamental spirit ever
since. Confronted by what they re
garded as a violation of the treaty of
Versailles and a threat to their own
securitv and the independence of their
polish and Czech allies, the French
went to war again.
They did not this time, as in 1914 ;
and in 1923—that is, at the time of the
World War and of the Ruhr occupa
tion—mobilize their troops. Instead,
they employed their money. With great
rapidity they drained, not only out of
Cermanv, but out of Britain and other
countries in which there were large {
French short-terms loans, funds in such
great volume that on the one hand the j
Germans were crippled by direct French ;
withdrawals and on the other hand by ;
indirect French pressure, for the other j
states owing France had to recall money j
from Berlin.
French Strategy Clear.
The purpose of the French strategy |
was clear and totally hostile. The
French were resolved, once for all. to
force Germany to accept the terms of
the treaty of Versailles as final or
break her. It was for them war, and
it was war which they did not launch
until they had made all the necessary
preparations, which were financial.
They calculated that Germany, in her
precarious financial situation, could not
stand the strain of the French attack. I
They also calculated that Great Britain j
and the United States, with their vast ;
investments in Germany, would be ;
forced sooner or later to intervene and j
to press Germany to meet French terms
as the sole means of saving herself and i
their investments.
The first part of the campaign went j
according to- plan. By the third week
in June the Germans were on the point |
of a financial collapse. At that point ;
Hindenburg appealed to Hoover. But J
the next step of the American Presi- !
dent had not been anticipated by the
French. They had relied on our tradi
tional poHcy of isolation and Mr. j
Hoover's statements at the time of the
recent meeting of the International
Chamber of Commerce to keep us out
of the conflict. They had expected
Washington to do nothing and New J
York to bring pressure upon the Ger- j
mans.
When Mr. Hoover intervened directly |
end made his debt moratorium, his [
move was just about as welcome to i
the French as the arrival of the Prus- J
sians at Waterloo. Laval, however, had
no choice but to follow the Napoleonic :
example. In military parlance he had I
* to contain" the attack from an un
pected direction, while he finished with j
Germany. Thus as Napoleon under- j
took to hold off Bluecher at Waterloo, i
while Ney smashed Wellington. Laval 1
sought to engage Mr. Hoover in diplo
matic conversations, while the German
collapse was made inevitable. Laval j
was more successful than Napoleon, i
and by the time the moratorium con- '
versations were completed German ruin j
was also inescapable.
Crash Soon Follows.
Thus the American press had hardly ’
ceased its congratulations of the French ;
for their tardy but welcome assent to
the Hoover plan when the collapse in j
Berlin actually took place. France had j
then accomplished precisely the thing j
she set out to accomplish. Moreover, in
the process of accomplishing it she had'
Rot all but a small amount of her money ;
out of Germany. Simultaneously she
had mobilized her vast financial re- [
sources everywhere.
When the German crash came the
situation was this: Germany was in j
the posture of a besieged city at the j
point of surrender. Only* the arrival
of provisions would permit her to go
on. In this case provisions were money.
Her need was not merely for immedi
ate funds to meet a pending crisis, but
long-term loans to enable her to re
establish her situation. But France
was the only country in the world j
which could provide the latter, and
unless France would join in lending
the former, none of the nations which
had already sunk huge sums In Ger
many would dare to go further. And
the steady fall of German securities
was in itself a fatal obstacle to floating
any new loans on any money market.
The French had therefore won their
fight, but they had not been able to
exploit victory by compelling Germany
to surrender unconditionally, as had
happened in 1918 and again in 1923 in
the Ruhr. On the contrary, they were
face by the danger that the concern of
the nations with large investments in
Germany to save might result in some
international agreement which w'ould
permit German recovery without meet
ing French political terms.
French strategy, therefore, was at
once revealed. When Luther, head of
the German Reichsbank, rushed to
Paris in search of help, he was politely
informed that Laval was sympathetic,
but could only talk with a German au
thorized to discuss political terms.
When the debate was resumed at the
Bank of International Settlements at
Easel, France made the same response.
Scene Shifts to Paris.
The scene then shifted to Paris, and
on the suggestion of the British and
American statesmen. Bruening and Cur
ttus. the German chancellor and for
eign secretary, rushed to Paris. But
while this expedition was an enormous
rrrumph for French prestige—since it
was but three months since the Ger
mans had launched their Austrian proj
ect and now they were in Paris as sup
pliants asking for financial aid—the
French were not interested in prestige
alone. They were out to make Germany
agree to accept the treaty of Versailles.
Paris therefore led to nothing.
Bruening said, in effect, "I can’t live at
home if I make political concessions.”
*'l understand perfectly," Laval replied,
“but I can’t survive if I don’t get po
litical concessions for any francs I may
put up.’’ So everybody trooped over to
London to try again. But before going
to London the French insured failure
there by making their participation,
which was against their will, contingent
upon the avoidance of all political
questions.
The French position was predicated
upon the fact that, having beaten the
Germans to their knees, the French had
not the smallest intention of letting any
one else interfere in the making of the
P'ace terms. It was for precisely the
same reason they had insisted that
in Paris the first conversations should
be between themselves and the Ger
mans with no one else present. But since
nothing could be done of serious mo
ment to help Germany without French
participation, and since France had an
nounced that her political conditions
came first, London was foredoomed to
failure.
The only question at London was
whether the French had changed their
mind and were ready to "play ball"
cr not. But the French had not
changed their mind. They irad won
a war and they were in no mood to
lose another peace conference. The
really .decisive point was when Snow
den proposed that France should take
her share in the outstanding German
obligations, which in Immediate short
term loans ran up to $1,200,000,000
and of which 90 per cent were in
American and British hands, the
United States holding 60 per cent and
the British 30. while the French com
mitment was but 5 per cent. The
object of this strategy, of course, was
to give France a money stake in Ger
man recovery. When Laval bowed
himself out cf that ambush the whole
game was up.
Kept Victory Intact.
Thus the French preserved their vic
tory intact, both at Paris and at Lon
don. All the recommendations of the
representatives of the seven powers
did not and could not do more than
cutline away Germany might be
saved, if the problem were limited to
1 purely financial matters. But If France
| and Germany were at war and France*
was not only victorious in the field, but
resolved to impose terms in accord with
i the extent of her victory and the
amount of her power, all attempts to
j save Germany on the financial side
would in the end fail, because France
was resolved Germany should ribt rc
| cover until she met the French con
ditions.
London, like Paris, like the Hoover
moratorium move, could only interpose
a certain delay between Germany and
the operation of the farces in play.
As long as the American and British
publics thought of the question as one
of finance, as long as American and
British statesmen attempted t» deal
with it on the basis of peace, the
: result was the confusion of the publics
and the confounding of the statesmen.
For France went to war again in
March, when the Austro-German tariff
union was proposed, and in June she
j was victorious for the third time in
13 years.
There never were but three ways
j that Germany could be saved: First.
by her surrender to French political
> terms; second, by the abandonment by
| France of her political purposes, or
1 finally, bv the decision of Great Britain
and the United States either by force
I or finance to save Germany in spite
jcf France. Germany was bound never
I to surrender until she had to and
American and British intervention en
couraged her. Moreover, surrender by
the present government would almost
beyond question mean suicide, political
and perhaps personal. The similar
> retreat of Laval would have led to
nothing but the fall of his cabinet and
j the return of Tardieu and a ministry i
lof national safety. As for the final
possibility, neither the United States
i nor Great Britain was willing or in a j
1 position to coerce France at the risk
; of wav and neither had the money to j
! save Germany while France stood by. |
i able and ready to destroy that con- 1
i ftdence without which loans would be
I no more than good money sent after
I bad.
Situation Unchanged.
London leaves the situation just i
| where it was five weeks before, when
I Mr. Hoover launched his moratorium
| proposal. Germany's financial ruin, to :
be sure, has been completed since then.
I but otherwise all remains unchanged.
! The French purpose is unshaken, the j
! French power has been demonstrated at
' Basel, at Paris, at London. All the in- ;
i genious devices for "freezing credits.” j
i which means in simple language, lepv
-1 ing American money in Germany, won’t
! help much, fer on the one hand Ger
! many needs mors money and on the
other, if the Franco-German war is go
* ing to continue, America will be oorre
! spcndingly anxious to get its money cut
! while there is any to bring back.
The scene now r shifts to Berlin.
1 Bruening and Curtius nave been com
| pelled to go home with empty hands.
! They have some promises, but the ques-
I ticn is whether these will suffice to
satisfy a desperate people and a power
ful epposition. They can hang on for
the moment if the public remains quiet,
for the Reichstag will not meet until
Autumn, and they control the police
and, perhaps, the army. While they
last the situation is not hopeless, be
| cause some settlement with France is
at least conceivable. But it will not be
easv to satisfy France and it will be less
easy now than in June. For the French
are both fortified by success and an
gered by what they regard as a hostile
attitude on the part of Washington and
L-ndcn.
The French were wrong when they
reckoned that American concern for
saving its money would lead the United
States to bring pressure on the Ger
mans to accept French terms. It was
a big miscalculation and it has given
the later stages of their campaign a
different form frem that which Paris
expected. But so far it has not changed
the result. And, if one can judge the
situation from the distance, they still
have a lingering hepe that when the
British and the Americans see that they
cannot be persuaded or driven, both will
turn their attention to persuading Ger
many to agree to a political moratorium
as the single means or economic and
financial salvation.
The strength of the’ French position
lies in the fact that, while Washington
and London were preparing for a disar
mament conference next year, the
French were getting ready fer a finan
cial war this year. Thus they mobilized,
concentrated, struck and overwhelmed
their enemy. And when London and
Washington woke up to the situation,
the French victory was complete and
the difficult task that was left consisted
in trying to persuade the French to re
sign the fruits of victory in the inter
ests of a world prosperity they had de
liberately disregarded when they set
out for war. >
(Copyright. 1931.)
1
Canada Allows Servants
To Accompany Tourists
OTTAWA. —Reports that Canada is
forbidding domestics to accompany
American travelers into the Dominion
are scouted by W. A. Gordon, Canadian
minister of immigration and coloniza
tion.
"Statements circulated in the United
States that servants of American tour
ists and visitors are not being allowed
to enter Canada this year are abso
lutely untrue,” says Mr. Gordon.
“Americans have always been allowed
to bring their servants and they may
continue to do so.
“The only persons likely to find dif
ficulty in crossing the international
boundary are aliens residing in the
United States illegally or under tem
porary status, as the question of their
readmission into the United States
would arise should they try to return.
EDITORIAL SECTION
pie Suitdau stat
Queen of Air Is Ready
Launching of Akron Saturday to Give United States Largest Dirigible.
jtom a a mi
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a . iirtliiMPrilii Hull
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UPPER • \ MERIC \’S MR lE\ I \THVY THE \KRON.
iHBk mHm : LOWER: COMPARATIVE SIZE.S OF GREAT UNITED STATES DIRIGIBLES.
————— i ■ ■ r
(c.Bachrach.
MRS. HERBERT HOOVER.
BY FRANCIS D, WALTON.
THE United States moves Into first
place this week among the na
tions competing in the develop
ment of lighter-thin-alr craft.
The ship bv w hlch this advance
! is to be achieved, a dirigible 783 feet long,
and cf 7,400,000 cubic foot gas capacity,
the largest rigid airship in the world,
will be launched at Akron. Ohio, and
will be christened by Mrs. Hoover, wife
New Era Reigns in Spain
-■■■ ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■ ' 1— - ■■ ♦
Republic Sets in Motion Its Plans for Generally Reconstructive Processes.
BY DR. JULIUS KLEIN,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce.
THE country of contrasts: There
you have in four words the
background of this latest chap
ter which Spain hits Just written
in her long and eventful annals.
One frequently hears that country de
scribed as the "ancient stronghold of
conservatism,” coupled with expres
sions of amazement at this latest sud
den turn in its affairs. This concept,
however, ignores the fact that hers
has been indeed a vivid story, whose
pages have for centuries flashed peri-
I odically with strikingly democratic high
lights against the time-honored shadows
of age-old monarchlal traditions.
This has been by no means the first
drastic upheaval in her political mech
anism. It is not even her first appear- j
ance as a republic. Indeed. Spanish
history is replete with instances of
thorough-going democracy, which in
many respects are quite up to what we
have been taught to regard as the su
periorities of Anglo-Saxon respect fori
papular will. For instance, there have ;
been few monarchies, even of the pres
ent-day so-called constitutional vari-1
ety, in which the sovereign has been |
inducted into office with the blunt ad-!
monition to the general effect that “We.
the people, who are as good as you. 1
the King, salute vou. who are no better |
than we." Yet this was the form used
at the coronation of the rulers of one
of the ancient Spanish kingdoms. The
status of the Spanish Cortes, or Parlia
ment, and the extraordinary develop
ment of municipal institutions through
out Spain have for centuries demon
strated the self-governing capacity of
the Spanish people. Democracy is no
novelty in Spain, she has survived its
trials before, and she will again.
And so the chronicles of her past
have recorded again and again these
singular contrasts and sharp variations
between democratic and autocratic in
stitutions. Thus have “sol y sombre" —
to quote the vernacular of the bull
ring—sunshine and shadow —stresr.d
the singularly emphasized contrasts in
the colorful pageantry of Spanish his
tory.
It Is no mere accident that the two
greatest masters of Spanish painting—
indeed, they are among the immortals
of all time—have been the very embodi
ment of this same contrasting spirit:
Zuloaga, the somber Basque, master of
the powerful technique of shadow—the
swarthy faces of his North Coast com
patriots and the rich deep browns and
purples of their costumes, and Sorolla.
the radiant Valencian, gifted captor of
sparkling Mediterranean sunshine. In
the incomparable genius of those two
diametrically opposite craftsmen of our
own time you have the pictorial re
flection, so to speak, of this truly dra
matic quality of Spanish civilization—
its never-ending contrasts and varia
bility.
Replete With Contrasts.
Indeed, that thought lived for cen
turies in the title of the Spanish sov
ereign, who was a King, not of Spain
but of "the Spains"—las Kspanos. For :
like its history, the land and Its people* l
WASHINGTON, D. 0., SUNDAY MORNING, AUGUST 2, 1933.
,of the President. The new airship, the
. 1 Akron, will supplant the Los Angeles as
the queen of the Navy's lighter-than-air
j fleet.
I For several years the performance of
the Graf Zeppelin has represented the
; supremacy of Germany in this particu
■ iar field of air traffic, of which Ger
many is the parent nation. Then Eng
land undertook the building cf the ill
fated R-100 and the R-101. and leader
-1 ship for building and experimentation,
, in the construction of this type of
. I craft at least, passed to Great Britain.
. In {November, 1929. a throng of 30.-
I COO persons assembled at the airship
: dock at Akron to witness the ceremony
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PRESIDENT ALCALA ZAMORA.
are indeed replete with unexpected con
trasts and variations.
Tfie’ mention of Spain usually brings
to the mind of the stranger at once a
composite of the colorful scenes of
Bizets “Carmen,” as "typically Span
ish.” But a dozen or more corners of
the peninsula nation scorn the repre
sentation of that gifted Frenchman as
being applicable only to one portion of
their country—the sun-baked Anda
lusia—and not at all representative of
the sparkling subtropical Mediterranean
littoral, the bleak plateaus of old Cas-
I tile, the vigorously thriving Industrial
1 Catalonia, the substantial Ara
of laying the master ring of a new
dirigible which, in size, would eclipse
i every airliner ever designed. It is this
craft, completed in less than two years
under contract from the United States
Navy, which will be named at Akron
next Saturday.
The Akron will r.ot be flown on the
day of the naming ceremonies. When
; she names the ship, Mrs. Hoover will
release a covey of pigeons, which will
fly out of the dirigible. Then anchor
blocks will be knocked from under the
I new airship and she will be permitted
| "to fly" in the hangar, or float by the
means of her own buoyancy for the
first time. i
gon: the rugged, mountainous North
west, or the thoroughly progressive, pic
turesque Biscayan coast land. There
are great sections of the country where
bagpipes are far more typical than
castinets or guitars, where tawny sherry
wine is displaced by applejack, where
black hair and dark complexions give
way to blonde and even tltian tones, the
vestiges of early Visigothic and Celtic
invasions.
This extreme diversity among the dif
ferent parts of the ccuntry has, of
course, been one of the fundamental
difficulties confronting every central
government in Spain, from the earliest
V.'oild Wide Photo
COMDR. CHARLES E. ROSENDAHL.
About a w?ek will be required after
this "hangar launching” to put the
final touches on the new dirigible be
j tore she can be "walked” from the
hangar and weighed cff for her first
trial flight. The first of these trials will
begin about August 16. '
During the trials there will be at
least five separate flights, with a mini
mum total tinle of 75 hours. Speed t
trials will be conducted, including a
I (Continued on Fourth Page.)
i
times down to the present. It has been
a diversity based not simply upon geo
graphic and ccrnomic factors, but even
upon such elements as fundamental dif
ferences in language—Castilian, Cata
lonian. Basque—as well as extreme va
riations in dialects. The problem of
unity has, therefore, been peculiarly
difficult and should make the outside
world all the more patient and consid
erate in appraising the progress made
by the new government. ,
The cbstacle of this "separatism.” or
•regionalism.” as the Spaniards call it.
itself at the very beginning
of the colonial settlements in the New
’ Woild. The Basque sailors of Columbus'
fleet, on landing at Santo Domingo, in
i sisted upon the reccgnition of their
ancient "fueros” or local charters of
liberty, and similar declarations were
evident among other settlers as they set
up local governments in various parts
of the Americas.
Unification Important.
Efforts toward unification are. there
fore, among the first items on the pro
| gram of th? new Spanish government.
|To the development of public werks,
which is bound to have a large part in
: such a program, American enterprise
! may well make substantial contribu
; tions, through aid in the improvement
of road systems, through the extension
of the already well established telephone
j service and through the further ampli
| fication of airways throughout the pe
i ninsula.
But Spain will be by no means de
| pendent exclusively upon outside help in
; these impertant matters. In the fteld
of aeronautics, forvexample, we have
; only to recall that Juan de la Cierva
by his invention of the autogiro made
what is recognized as the most impor
tant contribution in that whole field
since the first experiments by the
Wrights. Langley and Curtiss.
Diversity, indeed, permeates all parts
of Spanish civilization—its history, cul
ture, political institutions and economic
background. And that is precisely what
makes the land and Its people so in
tensely Interesting. I know of no Old
World country which gives quite such,
an Impression of genuineness, is so
nearly devoid of the artificialities of
"tourist bait,” so authentic —which U
more than can be said of many other
better known haunts of travelers in the
Old World. Everywhere throughout the
country one encounters this same ele
ment of contrast, which recent political
events have stressed so vividly; the
close proximity of the old to the new,
the latest evidences of the mactyne age
opposite customs -end structures that
existed before the caravels of Columbus
sailed west from Palos.
Most emphatically Is there nothing to
verify the casual impressions of the un
informed that Spain has “deteriorated.”
Very much to the contrary! The intel
ligent traveler, and especially the one
who gets away from better known tcur
ist sights, gets unmistakably the im
presslon of progress, energy, positive
(Continued on Fourth Page.)
Special Articles
BAND WAGON RUSH LOOMS
AS ROOSEVELT BOOM GAINS
Support of Leading Smith Men Taken as
an Indication That A1 Will Back
Governor’s Nomination.
I BY MARK SULLIVAN.
BY all the sign* that politician*
rely on, Qov. Franklin D.
Roosevelt of New York is very
close to the Democratic presi
dential nomination. The prin
cipal sign, in this case, is the mental
attitude of former Gov. Smith. If
Smith is for Roosevelt, either wants
him hr have the nomination or is mere
ly willing to let him have it —In that i
case, Roosevelt pretty surely gets the
prize. But If Smith does not want
Roosevelt nominated, if Smith active
ly prefers seme other course—in that
case Roor.evelt has not, to use a poli
tician's phrase for the ultimate of im
possibility, “a Chinaman's chance.”
This condition, Smith's power In the
situation, has existed since Roosevelt
first entered the picture. To poli
ticians, Smith's attitude weighs more
than all the other factors combined.
What has happened now is that cer
i tain events seem to have revealed
Smith's mind. They seem to suggest |
that Smith Is willing to let Roosevelt i
go ahead and get the nomination. !
The events that seem to throw light
on Smith's state of mind are of the
sort that politicians Interpret as a
sailor interprets the weather. One of
these weather signs showed itself in
Massachusetts, liiere. a Democratic
politician. Mayor Curley of Boston,
made a public statement saying:
"Smith is a delightful man and
dearly beloved, but he has hod his t
chance. He (Smith) has made a fine !
record for himself, but he could not !
be elected and I think Smith knows
that he could not be. He should. I 1
think, announce his support of Frank- 1
lin D. Roosevelt.”
Importance Seen.
Now, as politicians interpret that,
they begin with the fact that Massa
chusetts. Democratically speaking, is a
strong Smith State. It Is the strongest ;
Smith State of all. stronger for Smith
than even New York. In Massachusetts
no Democratic politician hoping to con- :
tlnue to exist as sucth would take a
step likely to be regarded as offensive
by Smith. No such politician would j
make a gesture likely to turn out, in the
future, to bi harmful to Smith's wishes
or purposes. Certainly no politician j
who had been for Smith in the past. ;
no politician in Mayor Curley's position.
I would have made the statement that
Mayor Curley mads unless he assumed
| quite confidently, first, that Smith
would not himself be a candidate for j
the Democratic presidential nomination,
and, second, that Smith would not have
any candidate of his own, any candi
date whom he prefers over Gov. Roose
velt.
Curleys action, in short, is inter
preted by every' politician to mean that
Curley, before acting, assured himself,
either directly or by inferences, that
Smith does not want these Massachu
setts delegates for himself or for any
favorite of his other than Gov. Roose
velt.
Rather more convincing, to politi
cians experienced in reading such signs,
is what happened in Pennsylvania. In
that State is a Democratic leider. Jo
seph F. Guffey. Guffey is a more pow
erful leader in Pennsylcania than Cur-;
ley is in Massachusetts, for Pennsyl
vania has no such division into sac- I
, tions as the Bay State has. While
Guffey is not at this time the official
leader of the Pennsylvania Democracy,
no one doubts his capacity to speak for
the organization. Guffey has been a
strong, loyal Smith man. was one of
Smith's mbst important backers in
1928 and 1924 as well.
Pennsylvania Favorable.
Under this state of facts, Guffev now
formally declares that in the coming
national Democratic convention, at
least 66 out of Pennsylvania's 72 dele
gates will be for Gov. Roosevelt. The
significance of this assertion, and its
effect in furthering Roosevelt's for
i tunes, is not limited to the fact, very
weighty In itself, that 66 Pennsylvania
delegates will be, next to New York's
94. the largest bloc in the convention.
The significance of it is not qualified by
any question about Guffev's ability to
deliver the 66—actually he has deliv
ered some such number in every na
tional convention during the past 12
years. (The whole Pennsylvania De
mocracy, excepting a minority of dry
ones in rural counties, usually reflects
what Guffey wants.)
The real significance of Mr. Guffey's
action lies in the assumption, as everv
politician will assume, that Mr. Guffey
; would never have made such a .state -
; ment without first satisfying himself
| that it. would not be objectionable to
Gov. Smith. Tills assumption Is sup
ported both by Guffey's known loyalty
to Smith and by Guffey's own sense of
personal self-preservation. If Smith
should resent this statement bv Guffev.
if Smith should go after those Penn
sylvania delegates for himself, or in
behalf of some other candidate—Owen
D. Young, for example—in anv uli
event. Guffey would be a ruined' leader
and Smith would get the delegates, for
Smith is even more powerful with the
rank and file of the Democracy of
Pennsylvania than the local Guffey.
In short, what every politician In
the country will Infer from Guffey's
action is that Guffey either consulted
Smith in advance and was told that
Smith had no objection, or else knew
enough to feel sure that Smith doesn't
care.
As things stand now. every Demo
cratic leader in the country. State and
local, will assume that Smith has no
personal program for the coming na
tional convention which would exclude
the nomination of Roosevelt.
There is always the possibility that
Smith may develop, some time later
on. a program of his own, other than i
nominating Roosevelt. He may come I
to such a program through reasons
arising In the future. But from now
on he would need to have convincing
reasons. It would be sensational In
deed IX after what has happened.
Smith and Smith's jfriends should un
dertake to enlist Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts for a program other
than the nomination of Roosevelt.
Strength Indicated.
Roosevelt, with Smith not opposed
to him. should have substantially every
delegate from the entire New York
group of States: New York with 94.
Pennsylvania with 72 (though a few
of the Pennsylvania delegates will be
and. anti-Roosevelt); Massachusetts
with 34. Connecticut with 16. Rhode
Island with * and New Jersey with 32.
This New York group of States. In all
Democratic conventions. commonly
acts together. In all these States the
Democratic organization Is wet: In all
they have roughly the same point of
view about national affairs as New
York State, Here, In this one group,
jre 184 delegates out of the roughlv
1.100 that the national convention will
contain.
The ‘‘New York group” of States
alone cannot nominate Roosevelt—they
have been a loser oftener than a winner
In past national conventions. But
Roosevelt has much scattered strength
throughout the rest of the country.
Further than that, Roosevelt has really
no strong opposition In any part of the
country. The South, though dry, will
not oppose Roosevelt implacably: In
deed, Roosevelt will have the delega
tions from some Southern States. The
South is no less dry than ever, but they
do not think of Roosevelt as wet in any
sense strongly offensive to them. The
South also has rather reconciled Itself
to the expectation that the next Demo
cratic nominee will be a wet, and It
feels a little relieved to have the wet
so comparatively mild a one as they
consider Roosevelt to be. The South
will fight to the last ditch to keep the
platform declaration dry. or at least
keep it from being wet Provided they
win the platform point, they will not
seriously oppose Roosevelt for th? nomi
nation. Quite possibly Roosevelt, with
the weight he is certain to have In the
convention, may tacitly accommodate
and help the South in keeping the plat
form from being wet..
Band Wagon Rush Looms.
What has come about constitutes defi
nitely a new phase in the Democratic
I situation. It was the Intention of the
I Democratic leaders, including some
friendly to Roosevelt, to keep the nomi
nation In suspense, not to permit It to
be foreclosed, until the convention meets
or shortly before. It was their convic
tion that as a matter of prudence. If
nothing else, there should be no fore
closure before May or June of next year.
In that expectation, however, the key
stone was former Gov. Smith. Smith
I Is bv far the most powerful individual
|in the party. If Smith is now permit
-1 ting his friends to indorse Roosevelt at
so early'a time as the present, and if
| politicians generally observe this,
| Roosevelt is apt to become the bene
ficiary of a "band wagon rush” on the
part of local leaders and local potential
! delegates all over the country.
The leaders who expected to preserve
the Democratic situation in suspense
until the eve of the convention did
j not count on Roosevelt being so aggres
: sive a candidate as he has been <or his
! friends in his behalf). And they
, counted on other aspirants being more
! aggressive. As it has turned out, Roose
| velt is the only candidate who is acting
’ as a candidate In States other than his
] own. Activities in behalf of Newton
D. Baker do not extend outside Ohio,
j On behalf of Gov. Albert Ritchie of
i Maryland they do not extend outside
j Maryland. On behalf of Senator Rob
! inson they do not extend outside
| Arkansas. (A few other Southern
| States will instruct their delegates for
j Robinson.)
j If this condition continues it would
| seem as if Roosevelt's might be the
I cnly name entered in the presidential
j primaries of many of the States in
j which the presidential primary is the
method of selecting delegates.
The drvs have not been as energetic
as was anticipated, either In opposing
Roosevelt or in putting forward a can
; didate of their own. There was talk
' of the dry's holding a conference either
at Atlanta cf at Chicago to choose a
| candidate about whom they could rally,
| but that has come to nothing. There
was talk of the drvs in California for
example, entering William G. McAdoo
in the race, but that has come to noth
; tng.
Baker Is Reluctant.
! The one possibility of really formida
: bie opposition to Gov. Roosevelt centers
about Newton D. Baker of Ohio. The
handicap to that lies in Baker's appar
ent reluctance to be as aggressive a
candidate as Roosevelt is. If some
new and younger Col. House, ambitious
to make a President, should take up
Mr. Baker: if the Warwick were will
ing to exert the necessary energy and
■ expend the necessary time, and if he
would organize into actual delegates the
potential strength that Baker has —in
i that succession of ''ifs” lies a major
, political opportunity for some one. But
it would take time, hard work and no
j inconsiderable amount of money for
i indispensable and perfectly legitimate
uses.
Baker. If a Nation-wide energetic
fight were made in his behalf, could
get fully as many delegates as Roose-
I velt. He could even take from Roose
i velt many of the delegates in the New
! York group of States that Roosevelt
now seems destined to get.
Other than energetic promotion of
Newton D. Baker, another handicap to
Roosevelt lies in precisely what the
Democratic leaders foresaw and feared
when they hoped to keep the nomina
tion in suspense until the eve of the
convention. If it should become ap
parent at so early a time as the present
that Roosevelt is likely to get the
nomination largely by default, he be
comes in effect a presidential candi
‘date—a presidential candidate in the
campaign sense—more than 15 months
ahead of the election. The risks that
normally a candidate runs for only the
3 months of the campaign become, in
Roosevelt’s case, extended over 15
months. • During every day of that
time Roosevelt will run the risk of
j accident. If the accident happens, and
if it is so damaging as to be fatal, and
if the Democratic leaders are obliged to
deny the nomination to Roosevelt after
I he has been so far in front, that would
i constitute a serious party misfortune.
China Plans First •
Good Roads Exhibit
SHANGHAI. June 25-China will
hold its first annual exhibition and na
tional good roads conference, opening
j September 12, at Shanghai, with 150
delegates from various parts of China
and 50 representatives from foreign
countries. A total attendance of 100.-
000 is expected, with visitors from all
parts of the world. The exhibition is
sponsored by the national, provincial
and municipal authorities and leading
banking, financial, industrial and edu
cational institutions.
Since the founding of the National
Good Roads Association of China 4»
years ago China's total road mileage ha»
increased from 1.500 to 35.000 miles. In
1921 China had only 1.500 miles of
roads and most of those were situated
in the treaty ports under foreign juris
diction. By the end of 1926 this mile
age had been Increased to 15.000, the
Good Roads Association having done
much to encourage road building. The
association since 1922 has published a
monthly magazine and from time to
time has compiled many volumes on
good roads building and maintenance.
The government at Nanking three
years ago adopted a comprehensive plan
for the development of national, provin
cial and .municipal highways, but due
to th* Intermittent disorder that has
prevailed in various parts of the oountry
the scheme in it* entirety has not been
realized. Two years ago Kwangsi Prov
ince built a network of provincial roads
linking th? principal cities, and bus
lines were established. But during the
last year and a half the province ha*
been in a constant state of disorder and
roads have be:n allowed to fall into dis
repair.
The good roads exhibition will award
medals for first, second and third prizes
and certificates of exhibition to all ex
hibitors.
The exhibition will include road
building machinery, highway material
aad testing and laboratory eoripment.
, ... J