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SHALL THE UNDERWORLD
OF U. S. RULE NATION? Rising Power of Gangdom May Lead to Undermining of Cher ished Ideals. (Continued From First Page.)_ knocking at the gates of hell by assassins. Since Merlo died the national toll of ■lain gangsters. Including Mafia chiefs In Chicago, New York and elsewhere, exceeds 5,000. This Is the accepted estimate. Some place it far higher, but none below 5,000. The endless dis pute on crime statistics In this country Is due to a lack of complete informa tion In any centralized agency. The best data is in the Bureau of Investi gation of the Department of Justice. To this clearing house heads of police departments and sheriffs, representing onlv 51,000,000 of the country’s popu lation of 123.000.000, make monthly re ports. But it neither receives adequate financial support from Congress nor proper co-operation from the police of the Nation. Doubled in Generation. The most comprehensive statistics on homicides are gathered by the Pruden tial Insurance Co., and Dr. Frederick L. Hoffman, famed scientist and sta tistician. compiles the gory record. His compilation for 1931 shows that the homicide death rate has more than doubled in a generation. In 1900 the rate was 5.01 per 100.000 population. In 1931 it had jumped to 10.08. The rate in 164 cities was a point higher, 10.09, nearly three times higher than the average of 53 European cities, where the ratio was 3.5 per 100,000 popula tion. In 14 of the largest cities of Canada the homicide rate wTas only 1.6. In London this was halved, the rate there being 0.8. The three Italian cities reporting showed the following; Turin. 2.0; Milan, 3 5. and Rome, 4.4. Now7 let us return to Merlo and the Unione Siciliana section of the under world: and listen to George E. Q. Johnson, United States attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. To hear him we must go back to the morning of Tuesday, March 29. 1932, when Senator William E. Borah, as chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, called him to the stand. The scene is laid in the room of the Committee on Foreign Re lations on the Senate side of the Capi tol where the Senators are inquiring into protests of leaders of the American Federation of Labor against the ap pointment of Judge James H. Wilker son of the United States District Court to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Wilkerson had sen tenced Alphonse Capone, alias "Scar face Al." to 11 years’ imprisonment. Some of these protests were honestly in spired because of injunctions issued aeainst labor unions by Judge Wilker son: others represented the subtle ways of the underworld, especially that part where the racketeering labor unions of Chicago, dominated by the Capone gang, hold sway. Johnson aonnnonea a lucrative law practice in February. 1927. to accept the appointment of United States attorney. He has only his meager ealarv now. When he took office—let us quote his testimony—"The gang sit uation in Chicago » * * was about at Its height. * * * Organized crime was a business, and the gangsters worked with a great deal of arrogance. Some of them posed as political leaders and they had the temerity to go to public banquets where public men were, and it seemed as though they had a rec ognized business. With it all there were a great many murders. Just at this period there was a gang headed by * * * Hymie Weiss. * * * He was the leader in one part, of the city and A1 Capone j at that time had established himself in a suburb known as Cicero, adjoining Chicago on the west. There were many feuds. A number of men were asso ciated with Capone in the early days, men like Dion O'Bannion. Merlo, Lo lardo and Lombardo, all of whom had wide notoriety—they were all murdered in these feuds. They were leaders. Hymie Weiss would not make peace with the Capone organization. He was a man peculiar in some ways. He would have nothing to do with prosti tution and scorned the Capone crowd for that reason. * * *” Small Part to Al. Hymie Weiss was just a dealer in beer, whisky and other intoxicating liquors. He was not a pander. And the same was true of O'Bannion. A few minutes later Johnson told Borah and his colleague how the Gov ernment traced nearly $2,000,000 to Ralph Capone, a brother of Scarface Al; more than $1.000.000 to another of Al s associates and $700,000 to still an other. The amount traced to Scarface Al in a three-year period was com paratively small—$671,017. Here it should be explained that Al Capone seldom dealt in traceable funds, so that this sum does not represent his income for the years 1925-27. At the time of his arrest Government agents estimated Capone's wealth at $20,000, 000. The Lombardo named by Johnson was Antonio Lombardo, who succeeded Merlo as head of the local Mafia. After Merlo died—the reader will note that Johnson had temporarily forgotten that Merlo had not been assassinated—the oath-bound criminals of his race di vided into two factions. One wanted Samuel Amutana, surnamed Smoots; another supported Lombardo. The fol lowers of Lombardo said, and quite properly, that Smoots had little else to recommend beyond his betrothal to the sister of Merlo. And when Smoots de clined to listen to reason he was slain by the squadristi of Lombardo, where upon Lombardo was elected head of the local Mafia. And Capone became a lieutenant of Lombardo, as he had been to Merlo. Capone was always somebody's lieutenant. Many in Chi cago, both in the service of our Govern ment and that of Italy, never regarded him as the dominant leader of the racketeering aristocracy he has been pictured. He was, until his arrest, in the opinion of some, the front man and fixer—nothing more—of John Torrio. Let us leave Torrio and Capone for a brief moment. Knew He Was Marked. Lombardo was still king of the local Italian underworld when Johnson be came United States attorney. When a superstitious Italian saw Lombardo a prayer was silently said, or the Neapoli tan horn, which guards the wearer against the evil eye, was fervently clutched. Many knew in February, 1927, and even earlier, that Lombardo was destined to be shot down in the street. Four days before Johnson testified, Senator Borah read a letter to his col leagues which had prepared them for this declaration. The letter was from Frank J. Lorsch. president of the Chi cago Crime Commission, a civic body expressive of an aroused public trying to free a great city from the ma’igii rule of organized crime and -jorrupt politics. The letter res.d. In part: "Two personal adherents of A1 Capone *re members of the Illinois State Senate. One of them. Senator Leonardi. was convicted of conspiracy to murder, to kidnap and other crimes .in 1928, was sentenced to pay a fine, according to the verdict of the jury, and paid that fine. He was subse quently tried on two kidnaping charges and escaped conviction, but the pre siding judge sent several men to jail for from six months to a year for con tempt of ccurt in seeking to br.be the juries trying these cases. The other. Senator Serratella. is under indictment for frauds charged to have been com mitted by him while City of Chicago sealer, prior to Mayor Cermak’s term. One of his attorneys is in the Lower House. Mr. Granata, a member of Con gress, a Capone henchman, was elected on the lace of the returns tap fraud so gross that the county judge sent a number of the Judges and clerks of election committing the frauds to Jail. "In 1928 I traced the violences In the twentieth ward back to a conspiracy between Capone, the leading politicians and the police, the result of which was exposure and convictions of some 15 of the conspirators, all minor politi cians and hoodlums.” Granata Was Ousted. Two weeks after this letter became part of the record of the United States Senate the lower branch of Congress unseated Peter C. Granata, the "Capone henchman,” for the frauds cited by Loesch. State Senator “Leonardi” Is James B. Leonardo. State Senator Daniel A. Seritella, whose surname also was misspelled in the record, was sen tenced to a year in prison and fined $2,000 a month later for conspiring to defraud Chicago housewives of $54,000, 000 through short weights. A co-de fcndant, Harry Hockstein, was chief deputy when Seritella was city sealer. He received a like sentence. The prose cution charged that Seritella and Hock stein were on the pay roll of dishonest grocers and other food dealers. The politics of gangsters is determined by circumstances. In Chicago, which is Republican, they are Republicans. In New York City, which is Democratic, they are Democrats. And no matter what their racial origin, all maintain the age-old law of the underworld, "Never reveal anything to the police,” which in its own argot is rendered “Never squeal.” In New York City the heads of the savage milk racket made fortunes for themselves and several politicians, espe cially Health Department officials, who connived at their sale of adulterated milk, some of it thinned to a poisonous degree, with water from a dirtv stable hose. When Dr. Louis I. Harris, an aiert. as well as honest man. became health commissioner, he started to send the "poisoners of babies,” as he de scribed them, to jail. Harris, also a product of the old Jewish quarter of New York, met with obstacles nearly everywhere, save in the Borough of the Bronx, where an incorruptible district attorney and his staff brought about the indictment and conviction of Thomas J. Clougher, former "czar" of the Health Department. The opposition to Harris’ efforts to smash the milk ring came from Christians. Two Given Clemency. It had previously been testified before a grand jury in the Borough of Queens that one milk racketeer had paid Clougher $250,000 in graft. Through Clougher it was hoped to reach the real political protectors of the baby poison ers. But while awaiting sentence his counsel informed the district attorney and the press that Clougher would not confess "and throw himself upon the mercy of the court.” After Clougher served part of his term in jail a Demo cratic Governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, showed him mercy by commuting his sentence. In Chicago a convicted pan der. who also refused to squeal, was pardoned by a Republican Governor, Len Small. Which suggests the query: Which is more degraded, a man who lives on the traffic in women, or a man who takes the bribes of baby poisoners? John H. Lyle of the Municipal Court of Chicago, in his campaign against William Hale Thompson for the Republican nomination for mayor in 1931, turned the light on the under world of politics and crime. Speaking before an audience in the Hamilton Club on February 11. he said the Ca pone gang contributed $50,000 to Thompson's successful campaign for mayor in 1927. and in return Thomp son appointed "one of Capone's closest friends as a member of his cabinet.” Said the Chicago Tribune: "He was referring to City Sealer Daniel A. Seritella, Capone's lieutenant.” Capone Real Issue. “The real Issue,” said Judge Lyle in this speech, “is not whether I shall be elected or whether Thompson shall be elected, but whether A1 Capone is to be authorized to rule Chicago again through the medium of a dummy in the mayor's chair.” Lyle knew he had no chance of de feating Thompson for the nomination. Thompson and Small — the Governor who pardoned the pander—controlled th“ Republican party in the city and State. But Lyle also knew that his at tacks on Thompson would make it im possible for the Thompson-Small ma chine to overcome the combination of decent Republicans and Democrats in the general election. Lyle’s charges did not astonish Chi cago. In an earlier campaign, accord ing to Loesch, Capone contributed $260,000 to aid the election of Thomp son, who told an admiring audience that he would poke King George in the snout. Thompson is a droll dema gogue. He is of old American stock, a university graduate, learned and so cially prominent—and personally hon est. But he loves power. The rise of Capone was sudden in politics only. His rise in crime was slow. Penniless and ragged, he arrived in Chicago early in 1920. He sought out John Torrio, another New York product, then bodyguard for Big Jim Colosimo. owner of a chain of brothels. In one of these, the Roma Inn, Capone was employed as laundry boy. He soon rose in favor with Chicago's vice lord. He was present when Vincenzo Cos mano and Mossy Enright were shot down when they came to collect $25, 000 in tribute from Colosimo, who later met the same fate. Also at this double murder was Frank Uale, alias Frank Yale, mowed down in a Brooklyn street by a machine gun traced to the Capone gang. Uale, a pioneer in the Brooklyn laundry racket, was 1 of 45 slain in the constant rivalry for control of the Mafia of Chicago which began with Merlo's death. Became Chief Front. In Capone’s first year In Chicago. Joe Howard hijacked a load of alcohol. Howard was in a speakeasy when a "young fellow” entered. "Hello, Al,” said Howard. Al fired. When Capone was arrested for this murder, he gave his name as Al Brown. He was freed and became a pupil of Mike Merlo; and Brown became Capon! Later he changed the “i” to “e.” A few months after Merlo died Torrio fell on his doorstep, apparently dead from a crossfire of shotguns and auto matics. When he recovered he left for Italv to continue his convalescence. With the departure of Torrio, Ca non? became the chief front for the local Mafia, which was now dealing in beer as well as stronger drink and women. And many believed that Torrio continued to give orders to the loud spoken, lavish-spending. blustering, L-verdressed Capone, who threatened, whined and cried in turn. When Tor rio returned to this country he settled in a quiet part of Brooklyn, where he still lives. He visits Chicago every six months or so. Torrio is the opposite of Capone. He is a quiet dresser, reticent, soft-spoken. After serving a term in Leavenworth for violating the Volstead act, he moved in the world of sport and masqueraded as a prize fight promoter. Henry Barrett Chamberlin, chief op erative of the Chi'-'’go Crime Commis sion. end his aide. R. W. Dvorak, under whose supervision the list of public enemies was prenared. regard Canone as a front, a highly publicized thug, whose name was used as a trade mark of terrorism for the business. They are inclined to look upon Toitio as his im mediate master, and, being men who deal in facts, they stressed that this was only a belief. “I think Torrio is the Isadsr; bvt X do not knon" aMd-Cbatitartfo icrica’s Role in New Era Nation Must Decide Future Courses as Result of Protests Against Japan’s Aggression. BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Professor of History, Columbia University. IT Is probable that history will re gard the recent withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Shanghai as a much more important event than the drama of their struggle over the rice fields in the city's suburbs. Few nations have ever turned back from an objective won by the sacrifice of the lives of their citizens in response to the “public opinion of mankind. What ever other practical reasons Japan may have had for withdrawing its troops, the declaration which it has issued is as high a tribute as has ever been paid to that community of nations which is just beginning to measure its strength with the old, historic entities embodied in the national states. All through the weeks and months while its army was overrunning Man churia Japan seemed sincerely surprised that there should be any objection raised to its action by nations which, throughout all modem history, have been doing just the same sort of thing. Why should Japan be singled out for reproof when England, in Egypt, and the United States, in Mexico, had been similarly carrying on what we had called "the white man's burden?” The Japanese felt that in bringing law and order into Manchuria they were laying the basis of progress and civili zation. It was a burden and a respon sibility as well as an opportunity for Japan's own interests. Viewed from this angle, it seemed like hypocrisy for the Western nations to attempt to hold Ja pan back on the plea that It was block ing the path of progress, when progress lay in the furtherance of those things which Japan was bringing. Old Standards Not Valid. The very fact, however, that the United States showed such keen inter est in the Oriental crisis at a time when its own crisis was so all-ahsorbing was an indication in Itself that the old standards were no longer wholly valid in the United States. We have turned a corner in our national history and are no longer judging present policies in the light of the past. During the nine teenth century we shared with other great nations the task of that era, which was the upbuilding of the national state. It was a period in which each nation worked out its own destiny, using war as the instrument of policy, and the result was an international anarchy that culminated in the World War. Out of that tragedy came a new pro gram for the world which the mobilized forces of industry are busily making good—a program of international co operation as the only alternative to re C“in 'short.^lie era of the World War and the succeeding decide lias been a great revolutionary period, laying the basis of the structure of international peace The symbol of this revolution is the covenant to the members of the League, and the Kellogg-Briand pact to those outside it. The United States, in objecting to the action of Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai, has regis tered its adherence to the new era over against a nation which applies the time-old method for the redress of its grievances and the fulfillment of its responsibilities. Defense of World Peace. It would, of course, be absurd to state that the American people have fully and clearly seen that their objection to Japanese policy is in defense of the new order of world affairs. Indeed, to state the problem in these terms would sur prise many of those who hold to the opinion that Japan was in the wrong. The fact that it apparently had violated treaties with the United States in pur suing its own aims in the Orient is as far as many people go. They do not fullv realize that these particular treaties are charters of the international community and that our interest in them is more the maintenance of the rights of that community than it is the material interests of the United States in the Far East. The nine-power treaty was a product of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, and Secretary Stlmson. in his letter of Feb ruary 25 to Senator Borah, rightly pointed out that the work of that con ference hangs together as a whole and that the measure of disarmament at tained would not have been possible but for the political agreement that the great powers would come together in conference over disputes in the Far East and not proceed rough-shod in the old nineteenth century way by the independent action of any nation with out regard to the rights of the com munity of nations in that part of the world. The nine-power treaty guaranteed China against aggression and the four power pact, relating to the island pos sessions in the Pacific, attempted to substitute conference for war. The Kel logg pact made this method universal by the far-reaching obligations of ar ticle 2, in which it was agTeed that all future disputes, of whatever kind they might be, should never be settled by other than pacific means. Find Substitute for War. Strangely enough, the United States, by these three treaties, due chiefly to its initiative, established in the area of the Pacific the one most fundamental principle of the League of Nations—that of substituting pacific settlement for war. There was no blanket agreement that bound them together Into a single cove nant, nor was there, at first sight, any method of enforcement for any of them other than the usual consequences of the violation of treaties, which deprives the violator of any of their privileges. But when the action of Japan tested their validity and our interest in their maintenance it was seen that they ex pressed and applied locally in the Far East that very principle of the avoid ance of war which all parties in the United States, opponents of the League as well as its adherents, believe to be the vital principle in the League of Nations. And taken together In this way, there was even a substitute for article 16 of the covenant—that article enforcing peace, which kept us from its ratifica tion. For the disarmament provisions of the Washington Conference were also involved, and if it were found that Japan had violated the nine-power pact by refusing conference on its claims against China, then Secretary Stimson’s warning that If Japan re fused pacific means of settlement we might regard ourselves as no longer bound by the agreement to disarm in the Pacific was in order. It goes without saying that this in terest in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific is by no means the only reason why American public opinion sided against Japan. There has been a traditional sympathy with China, which found expression in the doctrine of the open door and the strong pro test over the 21 demands which Japan imposed upon the weak government of Peking in wartime, and Its effort to hold Shantung through the peace treaty; while the critical attitude toward Japan had its antecedents in our naval rivalry and the irritation on both sides over the exclusion bill. But in the present incident this underlying drift of American sentiment had only one way of expressing itself—which was that Japan should keep its treaty engagements with the United States, engagements which were expressed in terms of the new era of pacific settle ment and international co-cperaticn. Has Cause for Grievance. Unless this line of argument is sound —namely, that our protest against Japan is a measure of our real interest in the maintenance of the regime of international peace and the substitu tion of conference for conflict—Japan has a definite caiue tig grievance •galnb m to*. Mmtm » hold ft back In Us course. For unless we have turned the corner of tne nineteenth century. It is wholly within the rights of Japan to decide for itself what it shall do with its neighbor. For there can be no doubt but what Japan's grievances in Manchuria and the rest of China were of the kind that would have been recognized as a just cause of war down to tnese last years. It is not necessary to enumerate; the grievances; they are sufficiently known, and in the eyes of the conservative ele ment of Japan, especially its military leaders, acts of war were the only kind of pressure that would bring redress. Judged on the basis of the past history of Western nations, Japan's action was not only legitimate but to be expected. It was so much in line with what the Western powers had repeatedly done that unless we have really crossed the Rubicon into the new era. our protests on the basis of a higher morality are only another example of what has often been termed Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy. This is the heart of the question of our relations with Japan—whether we really mean, for ourselves and for all the world, the permanent establishment of the principles of the Kellogg-B^land pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. If we only mean to use the pact to head off other nations from enterprises which we have other reasons to oppose, and are not ready to strengthen in every way the edifice of peace and international co-operation for which we make such high claims in this incident, then our maladjustment with the world is worse than if we never had made such a gesture of international morals. The Japanese issue, then, raises in the United States a challenge to make good In the incomplete alignment with the forces of peace throughout the world—a challenge to find the adequate substitute for war as an instrument of national policy when denying nations that instrument which has been theirs from the beginning of time. The real issue raised in Manchuria is whether there is any better way than that which Japan has used. It ts not enough to stop Japan and hold it back from its objectives, for the objectives are those by which civilisa tion has progressed in the past. Japan proposes to take on itself ‘‘the white man's burden" in the Far East. It is trying bravely, but. as we think, mistak enly, to be the policeman in a sphere of anarchy; to safeguard life and prop erty where both are insecure; to undo corruption in one of the mast corrupt governments in the world, that of the war lords of Manchuria; to end ban ditry in the countryside and make it possible for the hard-working, peace loving Chinese farmers to escape the exactions of unscrupulous tax-gatherers and money lenders. The aim of all this endeavor is lauda ble and high, and in the setting of nine teenth century’ history there would be only one basis for opposing it, and that would be when these measures run counter to the material interest of another state. The unanimity of opinion in Japan in support of its policy would seem to argue that it at least has not taken seriously, or not taken seriously enough, the revolution in international affairs which ts symbolized by the Kel logg pact and the covenant of the League. But it would be justified in this if we. for our part, do not make our DRIVE AGAINST “EXPERTS” DEVELOPS AT GENEVA Prospect of Some Measure of Success in Limiting Armaments of Nations Accordingly Is Remarked. BY ALBIN E. JOHNSON. GENEVA—A determined drive against the so-called “military, naval and air experts,” into whose hands the Geneva Dis armament Conference has fallen, is developing, and. as a result oi this and a new loreign policy being encouraged by liberal Left elements in France, the prospects of some measure of success in the world's initial effort to limit and reduce instruments of war are again encouraging. After the first two months of political maneuvering, the conference went into "commissions,” largely because of the uncertainty of the French elections, the departure of Secretary Stimson, the domestic troubles of Chancellor Bruen ing and Premier Ramsay MacDonalS's illness. Eight weeks have elapsed and the commissions have made practically no progress. A fortnight ago there was an actual danger of the conference col lapsing. Manv delegations reduced their numbers by half in the interests of economy—and because it no longer took a formidable group of admirals, generals and such to hold their posi tions intact. Three Principles Accepted. The conference had gotten off to a fairly good start, largely as a result of the American proposal for qualitative disarmament. Three principles were accepted, namely: That the present conference was to be only the first and a series of disarmament conferences were to follow; that a serious reduction in existing armaments was to be made immediately; that offensive weapons were to be the first to be abolished, either through scrapping them or inter nationalizing them. Urged forward by a formidable public opinion (thousands of petitions, tele grams, resolutions representing the voices of tens of millions of persons, poured in on Geneva), the political delegates reacted definitely. British, Germans, Americans, Italians—and even the French pledged themselves to obtaining both limitation and reduc tion of the world's $5,000,000,000 annual armaments burden. Then came the German elections, with a swing toward Hitlerism. The French elections followed, with an un expected drift back to Socialism. Stimson's departure, MacDonald's in disposition. Tardieu's fall from power and the Japanese ramp in Manchuria and Shanghai—and disarmament was almost forgotten. That is, except by the “experts.” As stated before, the “experts” of Geneva are army, navy and air force officers largely. They were called in to give advice as to how the political de cisions taken by the conference could be put into effect. But it has proved tantamount to calling a group of meat packers and butchers together to en courage the spread of vegetarianism. They steadfastly refuse to legislate themselves and their colleagues out of jobs by reduction of armies and navies. “Offensive Armament." Having decided that “offensive arma ments” should be abolished, the con ference asked the “experts” to define offensive weapons. So the experts set about to first define "defensive forti fications.” Having decided that em battlenients built out of seven solid feet of concrete and steel composed a fort ress they argued that only a gun ca pable of hurling 800 pounds of chilled steel a distance of about 15 or 25 miles could be considered offensive. Then, having decided that invasion of a country only threatened the "civilian sive, but defensive. Presumably only ' a boat which could enter a river was offensive. Again an aircraft carrier wasn't considered offensive, but the airplanes which it could launch against an enemy might be. And so on, ad infinitum. Commenting upon the situation. Lord Cecil. Europe's most able and sincere advocate of disarmament, who refused, after six years' service on the League's preparatory disarmament commission, to represent Britain at the present con ference. declares that the time has come for public opinion again to be marshaled—this time against the "ex perts.” "The present tendency was natural, almost inevitable." said Lord Ctcil in an interview. "It was clear from the very outset of the disarmament discus sions that if the matter was to be left to tlie experts nothing would be done. That is no charge against them. They are. I am sure, most able, conscientious and highly instructed gentlemen. But just look at their training! Thev are charged with the duty of advising'their governments as to the preparations necessary to insure, as far as possible, victory in any war in which their coun try may be engaged. Much of their time is spent in thinking out new Im provements in armaments and extorting from their ministries of finance the sums necessary for carrying them out. They think necessarily, and properly, all the time in terms of war and of victory. What officer, at any rate of the larger countries, would ever be sat isfied in planning to stave off defeat?” Objective of Conference. The objective of the Disarmament Conference, according to Lord Cecil, is not to secure victory for any country, but to make the outbreak of war less probable. Since the experts can think only in terms of theoretical superiority, it is absolutely necessary to remove the conference from the realm of material to political factors. ■‘Positive limitation of armaments will put an end to competition, which cer tainly is a fruitful cause of war," con tinued Lord Cecil. “Secondly, a gen eral reduction in armaments burdens will lessen the financial strain upon nations and diminish the economic un rest which we see all around us; third ly, by abolishing those types of arma ments which make sudden and over whelming aggression possible we di minish international fears and suspicion, which are the chief dangers to peace at the present time.” It does not necessitate “experts” to determine what are aggressive arma ments, according to Lord Cecil. For six years in the League’s Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and for six weeks during the present conference, the “experts” have tried futilely to de cide which armaments were really “ag gressive” when applied to their own military organisations. At the Versail les Peace Treaty Conference it took the allied military experts just 24 hours to decide, unanimously, what were ag gressive armaments so far as Germany —a defeated nation—was concerned. Acording to Lord Cecil and others, the victorious powers should now apply to themselves the same formula which they enforced upon Germany—namely, those five classes of armaments which at Paris were forbidden to the van quished powers, i.e., warships over 10. 000 tons; submarines, tanks, mobile guns over 105 mm. caliber, and all naval and military aircraft—these should now be scrapped by every coun try which has pledged Itself never to own the still unfinished problem of com bining progress with International jus tice. If we hold back Japan from Its objectives and still refuse to take our owm responsibility In strengthening the alternatives for war, then the tribunal of history will decide this case for Japan. Must Harmonize Pacts. This means. In plain English, that we must harmonize the pact of Paris with the covenant of the League of Nations —harmonize them so that the United States may work freely under one or the other, for both would then be parts of a common program. They are the two documents which the world has accepted as the basis of the new order of things. The pact states the general principles, but does not apply them; the covenant furnishes a program for ap plying them, but In a way which Is not acceptable to all the world. The pressing need for this harmoniza tion was shown In the aw'kward situa tions which arose last November, when the United States and the League tried to work together, the one under the pact and the other under the cove nant—a procedure against which Japan very properly protested. It was a pro cedure which stultified the League and lessened the credit of the pact. It is going much too far to say that the League failed in its dealings with Japan and China: but It did not apply the expected remedy; it did not by an act of power interpose with either economic or military sanctions to stop the con flict. mere has been and probably always will be a division of opinion as to whether peace can be enforced. The European continental nations general ly. and Prance in particular, call for a police force strong enough to pre serve the peace against any willful violator. But the security which this might conceivably bring them brings insecurity to nations that might other wise escape by reason of their distance from the scene of disturbance. Canada is not willing to send its boys abroad to fight in Balkan wars, and even England would be doubly reluctant to enter another continental war. The Scandinavian countries, on the out skirts of Europe, share the same feel ing. For these reasons there have been two parties In the League itself, one for strong enforcement and the other for lessening the obligation to join the international posse. Must Be Strengthened. Now1, the outstanding fact in the Japanese Incident w'as that Prance was no more willing to join in an in ternational police force in Manchuria than ^ie British dominions would be willing to take part in the quarrels of Eastern Europe. Therefore, it would seem as though the time had come when the League should be ready to reconsider the program of peace en forcement in Article XVI. For. how ever strong the obligation may read in the present document, unless it can be relied upon in time of crisis it is in herently weak. A study of Article XVI shows that it needs revision in any case. Fortu nately, no revision is needed of the military sanctions, for all that the Council of the League can do is to advise the member states of the need and suggest that they take action. But the economic sanction is en tirely different. It is obligatory, auto matic, immediate and universal. At least that is the way the text of the opening paragraph runs: “Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its cov enants under Articles XII. XIII or XV. it shall ipso facto be denned to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which herebv undertake immediatelv to sub ject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all finan cial, commercial or personal inter course between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the na tionals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.” Further Sanctions Needed. It is true that In the history of the League this has been interpreted as a program to be applied according to the circumstances, but this agreement of the Assembly has not been incorporated in the covenant itself. New, this open ing paragraph might very well b? di vided into a number of successive steps, limiting the automatic obligation to the shipment of arms and supplies of war and the granting of money loans, and leaving all other economic measures for a conference at the time of the crisis, or at least putting them on the same level as the military sanctions, which they somewhat resemble. The League has already been busy at this revision of the covenant to har monize it with the pact of Paris. The work is practically done, except for Article XVI, and, as we have just seen, there are no inherent difficulties in re vising it. But while the technical difficulties are not unsurmountable, there are practical obstacles for which the United States is chiefly to blame. After the way we have sought and gained special terms for our adherence to the World Court and then have held back from mem bership there is little patience left for any plan which depends for its success upon American co-operation. What, therefore, can we do to help solve this problem? The statement of our minimum pro gram is to be found in the resolution which Senator Capper introduced into the Senate on April 6, 1932, five years after M. Brland's offer and 15 years after our entry into the World War. In this resolution. Congress is called upon to declare it to be the general policy of the United States to refuse recognition to any settlement made by force of arms in violation of the Kellogg pact, if that settlement is of a kind that “would impair the obligations of that pact.” Urges Embargo on Arms. But this recognition of the "Stim son doctrine" is not enough. The Pres ident should be empowered to put an embargo on the shipment of arms and supplies of war and money to any vio lator of the pact, having due regard to similar action “by other nations • * * in open conference." This last phrase means, of course, the League of Nations, for that is where the conference must be held. If we take similar action of this kind, whether by ourselves or in consultation with the League, then we have adjusted our selves to the proposed revised text of Article XVI. The Capper resolution, therefore, offers the United States a program by which it may adjust itself to meet the responsibility which it has assumed in denying to Japan the right to continue the age-long way of asserting a nation’s claims by force. The task that confronts the United States today is not to emasculate the existing framework of the international community, but to take up once more the uncompleted task of insuring peace by the strengthening of those institu tions which at the same time make for justice. It would be a misfortune for public opinion to be led to imagine that the task was done when it is only just begun, and that anything short of this full measure of constructive planning will avert other crises in years to come. — — --• Shrewd Suspicion. From the Nashville Banner. Police arrested a fellow on West Madison street in Chicago because he was carrying his pants on his arm and had a red lantern in his hand. Of ficers told the judge they suspected the npnofdrtajdpft w W PANAMA IS HOLDING FIRST ENTIRELY FREE ELECTION Votes for President, Free From Both U. S. Supervision and Local Government Domination. BY GASTON NERVAL. FOR THE first time In their short history as an Independent na tion, the Panamans will decide today by themselves who is to rule them for the next four years. The statement may seem too radical, but it is true. In all the previous presi dential elections, since Panama was established as a republic some 30 years ago, the Influence of the United States was a deciding factor. The electoral machinery was com pletely controlled by the men In the government. Thus, government candi dates, or those who had official support, were virtually elected when nominated. The opposition candidates were help less against the pressure and political maneuvering of the class in power, t The only chance for candidates op posed to the government rested, there fore, on the supervision of the elections by the United States. Only when the country which had helped Panama to gain independence, and which was bound by treaty to preserve it, inter vened and controlled the elections, were the Panamans certain that government influences could be overcome. Was Important Factor. But in this case the followers of government candidates charged the United States with discrimination against them. Under such circum stances, the attitude of the United States was, truly, a most important factor in all previous presidential con tests In Panama. If this country refused to supervise the elections, the success of the govern ment forces was assured. If it agreed to supervise them, it lent Its moral prestige to the opposition and deprived the official clique of an otherwise cer- | tain victory. Thus the weight of the United States inclined the scales one way or another. Some one even said that, due to this peculiar circumstance, presidential elections in Panama were decided at the State Department. This time, however, the situation is a j different one. A revolution which was successfully carried out a year and a half ago has ended the traditional gov ernment control of popular elections and generally of internal politics in Panama. The revolution of January, 1931, which overthrew an inefficient admin istration, inaugurated a period of legitimacy and freedom in political ac tivities theretofore unknown to the great bulk of the Panaman population. First Impartial Government. Furthermore, it gave Panama its first impartial, non-partisan and nationalistic government; a government which was only interested in the reorganization of the country and not in the perpetua tion in power of any particular group of men. As a result, the last few months have witnessed an open, fair electoral cam paign, during which neither party has even mentioned the desirability of for eign supervision. Instead of a government candidate and an opposition candidate there are this time two popular candidates nomi nated by two equally large and influen tial sectors of Panaman public opin ion. Instead of an administration in terested in preventing the intervention of the United States to assure the vic tory of its friends, there is an im partial one which is not interested in the triumph of any one man. Presi dent Alfaro deserves special credit for the fair and strictly neutral attitude of the government in this connection. And thus today, when the Panamans go to the polls, they may feel con fident that whoever is elected it will be the exclusive choice of the Panaman people. This Is, really, something new in the annals of Panaman politics. Alike in Many Respects. In more than one respect, the two : men who will contend today for the presidency of Panama are alike. To start with, their names are similar. One of them is Dr. Harmodio Arias, whom Washingtonians knew last year as the diplomatic representative of his country. The other is Dr. Francisco Arias Paredes, former secretary of the interior, who also was in Washington some time last year in an unofficial capacity. Both of them were in sympathy with the revolutionary movement of Janu ary. 1931. and became closely connected with it when it succeeded in other throwing the unpopular administration of President Arosemena. A man of stainless public record and great energy was needed when Pan ama, as a consequence of that move ment, was left without a chief execu tive. Dr. Harmodio Arias was that man. The resigning President him self, obeying the command of public opinion, asked Dr. Arias to join his cabinet, so that, in accordance with the Panama constitution, he might be chosen by the other members of the cabinet to head the provisional govern ment. preserve order and lead in the task of reconstruction until the elected Vice President ("primer designado”), absent at the time, could return and take charge of the administration. Served as Minister to U. S. When Dr. Alfaro returned to Panama and was inaugurated president by the Supreme Court. Dr. Arias handed to him the reins of government and was subsequently appointed Minister to Washington. The activity and states manship he displayed during the short but trying period in which he was at the helm of the Panaman ship of state gained many admirers for Dr. Arias. He became a national figure. Ever since the day he left the governmental palace his name was mentioned for the presidential elections which the consti tution scheduled for the following year. While he was representing his country before the White House the popularity of his candidacy grew to such an extent that he was forced to resign his diplo matic post and respond to the insistent calls of his followers. Back in Panama, he was given an un usually enthusiastic welcome and in the convention of the Doctrinal Liberal party last November was overwhelming ly nominated for the presidency. HLs opponent in today’s elections, Dr. Paredes, has also been prominently con nected with the revolutionary move ment which started with the ousting of the Arosemena regime. He was given a cabinet portfolio in the government of President Alfaro and took a leading role in the task of reorganization made necessary by the breakdown of the old system and its long-standing privileges. A few months ago, when his fol lowers failed to reach an agreement with those of Harmodio Arias, they cut loose from the regular Liberal lines and established a new organization, the Liberal Reform party, which nominated Senor Francisco Arias Paredes for the presidential post. Later on his candi dacy received the support of the Chiarista party, the one overthrown by the 1931 revolution, which was left without a candidate a few weeks ago by the resignation of Senor Boyd. Both Hare Clean Records. Thus the Panaman people have been placed In the position of choosing between two men of the same political background, of similar principles and ideals, of equally clean political records, and both of them have had an out standing part in the establishment of the new order of things, under which Panama is enjoying greater freedom and administrative honesty than it had known before. Although the support of the Liberal Reform candidate by the Chiarista group has made this one of the closest presidential races ever run, the figures concerning registration of voters, given out a few days ago by the secretary of government, seem to prognosticate the victory of Dr. Harmodio Arias. Up to this writing, his followers had a majority of over 6.000 “cedulas,” or voting certificates, over the combined Panchista (Liberal Reform! and Chi arista parties. Though this is only a preliminary and uncertain index, Pan aman residents of Washington insist that the registration figures should be taken as a pretty fair indication of how public opinion will express itself at the polls today. According to press dispatches, the cardinal point in Dr. Arias' platform is to take away from the chief executive the autocratic power that has resulted in the country being ruled by a small clique of politicians. He wants the people to have a larger participation in the administration of public affairs, and to this effect advocates the reform of the present electoral laws, and the curtailment of the appointive authority of the president. Seeks to Preserve Credit. As for econmic matters, Dr. Arias’ chief endeavors will be devoted, if elected, to the preservatiop of the national credit. No matter how diffi cult financial conditions become in Panama, there will be no moratorium and the government will keep on serv icing its external debt. "If I should become President, and it became necessary,” Dr. Arias declared in a recent interview, “I would go out on the street with my hat in my hand begging for the money to keep up the interest and service on the public debt, rather than permit a default.” But he added thoughtfully: "However, under stand, Panama must not borrow any more money; not now at least, and the country must stop living on the future, as it has been, with borrowed money.” Dr. Arias plans severe budget econ omies. He has already told his followers that he will not reward them with government positions in case he is elected, for in his administration there would be less jobs than in the present one. The relations with the United States occupy an important place in Dr. Arias’ presidential platform. In' advocating an improvement based on “equity and justice and a more sympathetic under standing.” he declares: “I opposed the treaty of 1926 openly and frankly because I believed, and still believe, that if it had been ap proved it would have caused more trouble and misunderstanding than it was intended to correct.” This treaty, designed to take the place of the original canal treaty of 1903. and to cure the friction caused by the latter, was denied approval by tire Panaman Congress. The platform of Francisco Arias Paredes is not different from that of Dr. Arias' in its fundamental principles. Distinctive features of it are the pro posed six-year term for the President of the republic, the restriction of com mercial activities in the Canal Zone, the halting of immigration, the pro- * posed government assistance to the na tive Indian, and the stem denunciation of intervention by any foreign power, especially at the polls. It only remains now to be hoped that violence will not cast a blot upon to day's elections, which have so far set a new precedent of fair play and open mindedness in Panaman politics. (Copyright, 1932.) Hope in Arms Conference Is Seen Through Sincerity of All Nations (Continued From First Page.)_ service by stating at least two of them quite frankly, forbearing to criticize and confining himself for the moment to a simple exposition of them. Let us, like him, refuse to despair. It is the universal experience of those who have taken part in interna tional conferences that no such con ference will succeed unless the ground has been carefully prepared. In this case that preparation was long, detailed and laborious; but it is equally their experience that, even after such prepa ration, the road to agreement is apt to be long and weary, the travelers beset with perils and often threatened with disaster. Indeed, in most cases, it is not until danger is pressing and disaster Immi nent that the way of salvation is found. It is only at that moment and in face of common perils that the travelers forget their differences and unite to climb together to safety. It may well be that in this case, as in many others, dawn will break only when the dark ness seems most profound. Limitation of Two Kinds. For the moment the conference would appear to have given provisional ac ceptance to the principle that limita tion of armaments must be of two kinds; it must not be solely quantita tive, by fixation of the numbers of men or weapons of any type each nation may possess. It must also be qualita tive; it should proscribe certain weapons (poison gas is an example, and. if the United States and Great Britain could have tneir way, submarines would be another) by any nation engaged in war. This is in essence a double effort. It is sought on one hand to distinguish between weapons of offense and weap ons of defense, and an the other be effects. Involving combatants and non combatants in one blind fury of de struction, and those the action of which is in the main concentrated on the armed forces of the enemy, and spares, as far as may be, the civilian population. Obviously the difficulty of making such distinctions is Immense. Each weapon is the answer to some other, as the tank to the machine gun. When we abolish one, what scope may we not be giving the other? For what new weapon may we not be opening the wray? Distinction Is Difficult. Or take the attempt to distinguish between the combatant and the non combatant. Does it not remind you of the trumpeter in Aesop’s Fable who pleaded to be spared on the ground that he had killed no one but had blown his trumpet only to encourage the others? What decides in these days of na tions in arms whether a man is to be a soldier in the trenches, an artisan in the factory or a peasant in the fields? Not his own will, but the needs of his country. He will go where he is sent, and he will be sent where he will be most useful in waging the war to a successful conclusion. Again, an arsenal or arms factory is surely a legitimate object of attack. Yet there was probably not an arsenal among the combatant nations in Eu rope which long before the war ended did not contain nearly as many women and girls as men, and often more. I do not state these difficulties with any wish to disparage the value of dis cussion on the lines on which it is now taking place, still less with any desire to render the discussion fruitless or to damn in advance whatever agreement ^nay be reaqheg.