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opccidl- WED. ONLY KRYPTOK INVISIBLE BL- FOCALS For both near and tar vision (lenses only) of genuine ground in untinted glass. Every C. pair made to individual J needs. A REAL VALUE! COMPLETE with any style frame, examination included. No Cl Eft ADDITIONAL CHARGE *llUW Special—Regularly $12.50 ( • COMPLETE GLASSES ) , • CHOICE OF 10 \ PIFKFBKNT STYLES abb Ab • SINGLE VISION Nit fin ) FRAME OR RIMLESS v%J«i#U • EXAMINATION ( • CASE & CLEANER ^ OCILISTS* PRESCRIPTIONS FILLED Ht7MJUwty at TRIBBY'S Jeweler s-Optlcfans €17 7th St. N.W. Call NAtional S0T7 t \ from the cool green quiet of Central Park make for nights of relaxation ct the Barbizon-Plaza. Guests en/oy our famous Continental Breakfast, served piping hot in each room...our 30th floor Yacht Lounge, nightly concerts with refreshments, erf exhibits, lecturer 'end library. Cocktail lounge end restaurants are air-cooled. Delicious French cuisine at moderate prices. Sing/e rooms with private bath as low as W daily'*18 weekly • *70 monthly Double rooms with twin beds as low at t *J daily'*30 weekly'*110 monthly All rater include a delicious Continental Breakfast. Write directly to the Hotel for latest brochure WDS inquire. Ask Mr. Foster Woodward & Lothrop—District 5300 BARBIZON-PLAZA 5Bt> ST. AT itf <VL, CEWTRAL PAX SOUTH, H T. Indo-China Move Seen Failing To Improve Japan's Position Problem of Communications Not Easy For Tokio to Solve, Maj. Eliot Says Bv MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING F.I.IOT. ! It is quite possible to exaggerate the military importance of a Japa nese occupation of Southern Indo Chinese bases. Like most military questions, this has to be considered in relation to other factors involved; j in the particular case in point, these are numerous and complicating. First, it should not be supposed that the Japanese are in position to bring the whole weight of their naval and military power to bear | from Indo-Chinese bases. They do not have a continuous block of oc cupied territory stretching from their main centers of operation in the Yangtze Valley straight on down to Saigon; very far from it. And if they did. there are no roads or rail roads which would enable them to concentrate men and supplies in Indo-China for a great campaign against Thailand and British Malaya. The first point to be made is, I therefore, that the communications of the Japanese forces in Indo t China are not land communications, but maritime. These forces are i wholly dependent, therefore, on the ability of the Japanese Navy to maintain command of the route from the nearest point in Japan let us say the naval base at Sasebo —to Saigon. This is a distance of 2.000 nautical miles, or eight days’ steaming for average supply ships and transports. Two Points of Support. Along this route, Japan holds two principal points of support—the Island of Formosa and the Island ot Hainan. These are. respectively, 1.300 and 800 nautical miles from Saigon Without other complica tions, this would be a well-protected route along which the Japanese fleet could insure the movement of supplies. But the other complica tions exist in the form of the British and American naval bases at Hong Kong and Manila, both 900 miles from Saigon, lying on opposite sides of the 600-mile northern entrance to the South China Sea. Through this channel or through far nar- , row waterways actually in Ameri- ! can or Dutch territorial waters, must pass all shipping moving between Japan and Indo-China. Submarines and patrol aircraft, operating from these fortified bases, could make such movement exceed ingly precarious, if not impossible; I and the submarine strength of the American Navy, as well as both British and American air power, has 1 been substantially increased in the Far East during the last few months. Hong Kong is heavily fortified and contains a strong garrison; its ap proaches from the land side are of great natural strength and a Japa nese army attacking it would be exposed to the assault of Chinese j guerrillas on its communications. Because of the great number—per haps as many as 2.000.000—refugees it contains. Hong Kong eventually might have to yield to famine; but that would take time. As for Manila, its reduction would be a question of landing an expedi tionary force on the island of Luzon against strong resistance and with out the support of any other than carrier-based aircraft fsave for a few- long-distance operations from Formosa i; having landed, It would be necessary to defeat the mobile forces of American and Philippine troops in extremely difficult terri tory. surround and take the city and the naval base at Cavite—and even then the island fortress of Corregi dor would present a problem, though the mere retention of Corregidor would not enable the American sub marines and patrol aircraft to go ; on operating. However, by that time ; no doubt other refueling bases would have trf be established at other points in the vast Phillippine Archi pelago. Line of Communications. The real point is that in order to develop any powerful offensive ac tion from their bases in Indo-China, the Japanese must first of all secure the line of communications from the industrial centers and supply depots of Japan itself to those bases. This line is insecure while Hong Kong and Manila are in hostile hands and while there are forces based on those two points which can attack Japanese shipping. The only way the Japanese can overcome these difficulties is to attack and reduce both Hong Kong and Manila. No doubt this could be done in time, but it probably could not be done before the United States Pacific Fleet could arrive f;om Hawaii. However that might turn out— and there are many problems to be considered in moving the fleet west ward—the offensive operations of the Japanese forces in Indo-China would meanwhile be confined to those made possible by the supplies and ammunitions assembled at the Indo-Chinese bases, and the size of the forces themselves, together with their equipment in the matter of airplanes and shipping. An index to the actual intentions of the Japanese therefore can be obtained by taking note of the character of the military and naval base establishments and garrisons, which they proceed to set up in Indo-China. If all this disturbance has been merely a Japanese trial balloon, to try out the international wind cur rents and perhaps serve as a distrac tion while making the real move elsewhere, then we may expect to see more nominal forces of occupation, with supplies enough for normal times, established at Samranh Bay and at Cap St. Jacques. I nail:inn May He large!. If large forces of troops, with re serves of ammunition, motor trans port, gasoline and strong air sup port are sent, it may be that the Japanese contemplate operations against Thailand, for which, from Saigon, fairly good road communi cations exist. If great extensions of dockage facilities also are under taken and supplies of marine fuel oil collected, then a maritime expe dition with the Indo-Chinese ports as a base may be in the Japanese mind. This might be directed against Thailand, but more probably would be either against British Malaya, British Borneo, or some point in the Netherlands Indies. In case of an attack on Thailand, the Japanese might hope that Britain and the United States would not interfere; j but such hopes can hardly be main tained in view of what has happened at the first hint of a Japanese move | into Southern Indo-China. In the other cases Japan could hardly doubt that she would face a major, war. Therefore, everything would de pend. as far as her expeditionary j forces are concerned, on the amount of supplies previously collected in Indo-China. and the speed with j which Hong Kong and Manila could : be reduced, while the Japanese fleet i operated to the eastward to delay the movements of the United States Pacific fleet. Serious Problem. Considering that Japan could not hope to station in Indo-China air forces capable of dealing with the combined air strength in the South China Sea of Britain, the Nether lands and the United States; con sidering further that the sub marines and torpedo craft of these powers, supported by land based aircraft and by a few cruisers, would be actively assailing the Japanese transports and supply ships which did succeed in getting ( past the guardian fortresses in the north, and considering that the ne cessities of the expeditionary forces might very well require the Japanese Fleet to give battle to a superior force under unfavorable conditions (a fact which the American com mander in chief would have every means of exploiting", the Japanese high command has a serious pro blem to deal with in attempting any further offensive from Indo China. Should these difficulties be come further complicated by the need for dealing with Soviet air craft and submarines in the Sea of Japan itself, they would become in soluble; if they were not so already. The safest of the possible offen sives seems to be a land attack on Thailand; here much would depend on the character of the Thai re sistance, if any, and the vigor of the steps taken by the associated western powers to cut off the Japanese communications. That is, after all, the crucial point. Indo-China itself cannot support a great offensive of any kind; if the j three western powers "with or with out Soviet aid) stick firmly together j and determine to resist with armed ! force any further Japanese aggres- j sion, they still have every means of doing so, and the Japanese move | into Indo-China does not greatly improve Japan's position. It can be dangerous to our interests in the Far East only if we permit it to be come so. (Copyright. 1941. by New York Tribune. Inc.) Singapore Talks Held To Meet Tin Crisis Bj tie Associated Press LONDON. July 26.—A Reuters. British news agency, dispatch from Singapore yesterday reported that British officials, bankers and smelter operators in that British stronghold already were conferring on plans to enable the tin industry to meet a possible Japanese blockade of Malaya. Such a blockade, the dispatch said, was considered likely in the event of British and United States economic measures against Japan in connec tion with the expected Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. Malaya is one of the world's great sources of tin. on which the United States draws heavily. , American Radiator Co. HEAT Hot-Water Heat - COMPLETELY INSTALLED ! IN 6 ‘ROOMS Written Guarantee “ No Money Down CP TO 8 TEARS TO PAY F. H. A. Rale.—lit Payment October Coal, Oil or Cat Estimate Free. Day or Nicfct ROYAL HEATING CO. 907 15th St. N.W. NAtl. 3803 Nirht and Son.. Rand. 8830 MOSCOW.—REAPPOINTED— L. Z. Mekhlis, former chief of the political department of the Red Army, was reap pointed to that post yesterday and also appointed vice com missar for defense. Mekhlis stepped down as army politi cal chief when the political commissar system was abol ished after the Finnish war. It recently has been rein stated. —A. P. Wirephoto. Japanese Freighter Overdue at Canal By the Associated Press. BALBOA. Canal Zone, July 26.— The Japanese freighter Akagi Maru, carrying 1,500 tons of cement, was more than 24 hours overdue today at the Panama Canal from Corinto. Nicaragua, and agents said they did j not expect her to arrive. It was assumed the ship is stay- j ing clear of United States harbors. I Rug's—Carpets Remnants Lowest Prices-Open Evenings WOODRIDGE RUG Cr CARPET CO., INC. 1715 Rhode Island Ave. N.E. Telephone—Hobart 8200 Henderson Summons Automobile Makers . j By the Associated Press. Leon Henderson, administrator of | price control and civilian supply, j yesterday summoned automobile ! manufacturers to a meeting here j Tuesday morning to discuss his tentative program for a reduction in J passenger car output. At the same time, the <5ffice of | Production Management arranged a meeting with automobile industry representatives for Tuesday after noon. The O. P. M. meeting will be con ducted by a raw materials sub committee of the industry advisory group. Mr. Henderson announced recent ly a tentative program for a reduc tion in automobile output approxi mating 50 per cent. He said then that the final details of the program would be worked out after consulta tion with the industry. William 5. Knudsen. O. P M. di rector, said a sudden, drastic cut in automobile manufacturing “would re- i suit in unemployment, but he in cheated that it would be necessarM to reduce the output far more th&ft the 20 per cent already agreed to. 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