Evening star. [volume], September 18, 1946, Page A-6, Image 6

About Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972

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Idea of Third Party
Opposed by Pepper
As 'Political Folly'
By Associated Pres*
MIAMI BEACH, Fla., Sept. 18.—
Senator Pepper, Democrat, of Flor
ida, a figure In speculation about
presidential possibilities, was firmly
on record today against a third
party, which he said would consti
tute political folly.
Senator Pepper declared in an in
terview' here that neither he nor
Secretary of Commerce Wallace,
who likewise has been mentioned as
a presidential possibility, favored a
party split to set up a new organ
ization.
“A third party would be doomed
to failure," the Florida Senator said,
after he addressed the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen Convention
yesterday.
"No one Would get anywhere with
a third party,” he added. "In many!
States they couldn’t even get the
names on the ballots.”
Reactionaries Assailed.
Senator Pepper spoke out against
reaction in his speech to the train
men. declaring he did not '.‘like re
action in the Democratic patty any
more than I like it in the Repub
lican party.”
Discussing President Truman's
radio address to the Nation last
May on the trainmens strike, the
Senator said:
"Somebody so poisoned the mind
of the Chief Magistrate that he
submitted to the people the terms
that had been reserved for our
enemies—unconditional surrender.”j
In the interview Senator Pepper
said that "the kind of liberalism w'e 1
need in the Democratic party is
the kind of democracy Franklin D
Roosevelt, Andrew' Jackson and
Woodrow Wilson believed in.”
He said there was "to much con
servationism in the Democratic
party and we must see to it there
fore that the people who choose us
are given a truly Democratic ad
ministration.”
Calls Wallace Good Democrat.
Asked if he considered himself
or Secretary Wallace "left wingers,”
Senator Pepper said “I don’t know
exactly what a left winger is, but
I regard ’Wallace as just a good
Democrat who believes in democ
racy and wants to see it become ef
fective."
Commenting on Secretary Wal
lace's recent speech on Russia.
Senator Pepper said ‘T regard a
frank and full discussion of our
foreign policy as in the interest of
peace. In a democracy it is the
duty of people themselves to dis
cuss and to determine the policy of
the country when it means peace
or war for the country.”
Senator Pepper was incorrectly
quoted yesterday as describing
President Truman as "reactionary.”;
A recording of his speech showed
that he did not make this reference
to the President, but termed some
of Mr. Truman's advisers as re
actionaries.
The misquotation was carried
by the Associated Press, but was'
removed from the story in an hour:
and a corrected version substituted.
Hopes Fade for Last 13
Aboard Split Tanker
By the Associoted Pr®is
ELIZABETH CITY. N. C Sept.
18—One lone Martin Mariner plane
of the Coast Guard continued today
to scour the North Carolina coast
line for 13 persons missing in the
sinking of the Norwegian tanker'
Marit II, but Coast Guard sources
said almost all hope had been aban
doned for their safety.
Among those missing are Capt.
Leif Williamson, master of the
Marit, and his wife, who were on
the bridge when the vessel split
during a violent storm 90 miles off
Cape Hatteras on Friday.
Army and Navy planes after
making a search which covered
. 120.000 square miles, were released
to their bases at the end of yes
terday's unsuccessful hunt.
Twenty-four members of the
Marits crew\ who took to life rafts,
were rescued Sunday and have been
brought to port.
One Army plane yesterday re
ported that it had spotted a small
jife raft with two men aboard, but
"a closer inspection by a tanker in
the vicinity showed the report to
be in error.
Planes yesterday did spot the
^ deckhouse of tile tanker, but no
• signs of life were visible.
36,000 Butcher Shops
Are Reported Closed
By th® Asiocioted Press
CHICAGO, Sept. 18.—Lack of
fresh meat since retail price con
trols were re-established on Sep
tember 9 has resulted in the closing
of at least 36,000 of the Nations
butcher shops, the National Asso
ciation of Retail Meat Dealers says.
The situation, according to an as
sociation spokesman, will become
' progressively worse.” He said a sur
vey of the organization's 60,000
members disclosed that between 60
and 75 per cent have closed their
shops because of the sharp decrease
in meat production.
The American Hospital Associa
tion said it has asked the Agricul
ture Department and Office of Price
Administration to find a way to sup
ply hospitals with meat.
The National Association of Hotel
and Restaurant Meat Purveyors, a
group of 300 dealers who sell only to 1
hotels and restaurants, reported
that their members were virtually
out of business.
Policeman Acquitted
Of Aiding Holdup Gang
By Associated Press
NEW YORK, Sept. 18 An all-male
Queens County Jury last night ac
quitted George L. Rabldoux, 40, for
mer Brooklyn patrolman, of charges
of supplying a Brooklyn holdup gang
with arms and ammunition used in
the $6,179 robbery of a paymaster
June 28.
But as he stepped from the court
room, ftabldoux was arrested by
Federal investigators on charges of
violation of the Federal firearms
law prohibiting the possession of an
unregistered submachine gun.
Judge Thomas Downs told the
Jurors after they returned the ver
dict :
“You have rendered one of the
most disgraceful verdicts in the his
tory of this court. After the dis
graceful exhibition of this defendant
esn the stand, I don't see how you
•ould reacljQpuch a verdict."
Text of Wallace Letter to Truman Urging Revised Foreign Policy
The text of Secretary of Com
merce Wallace's letter of July 23,
1946, to President Truman on
foreign policy follows:
My dear Mr. President:
I hope you will excuse this long
letter. Personally I hate to write
long letters, and I hate to receive
them.
My only excuse is that this sub
ject is a very important one—prob
ably the mast important in the world
today. I checked with you about
this last Thursday and you sug
gested after Cabinet meeting on
Friday that you would like to have
my views.
I have been increasingly disturbed
about the trend of international af
fairs since the end of the war, and
I am even more troubled by the
apparently growing feeling among
the American people that another
war is coming and the only way that
we can head it off is to arm our
selves to the teeth. Yet all of past
history indicates that an armaments
race does not lead to peace but to
war. The months just ahead may
well be the crucial period which will
decide whether the civilized world
will go down in destruction after the
five or 10 years needed for several
nations to arm themselves with
atomic bombs. Therefore I want to
give you my views on how the pres
ent trend toward conflict might be
averted.
You may think it strange, in
reading further, that I should ex
press so much concern at this par
ticular time, just after the Foreign
Ministers' Conference at which real
progress was made on peace treaties1
for several eastern European coun
tries and for Italy. Others have
expressed a feeling of increased op
timism that still further progress
could be made through continued
negotiations on the same basis, even
though the remaining European
issues are much more difficult than
those on which a measure of agree
ment has already been reached.
I am fully appreciative of the I
efforts that have been made and
the patience that has been exercised
by our various representatives who
have carried on negotiations with
the Russians during the past few
years. Iam conscious of the aggra
vations they have put up with and
of the apparent inconsistencies on
the part of Russian representatives.
On the other hand, I feel these very
difficulties make it necessary for
some of us who, from the outside,
are watching the course of events to
voice our opinions.
Most Spending for Defense.
Incidentally, as Secretary of Com
merce I talk to a good many busi
nessmen, and I find them very much
concerned over the size of the Fed
eral budget and the burden of the
national debt. For the next fiscal
year and for the year immediately
ahead, by far the largest category
nf Federal spending is the national
defense. For example, the total
recommended Federal appropria
tions for the fiscal year 1947 sub
mitted to the Congress in the official
budget amounted to about $36,000,
000,000. Of the total budget some
$13,000,000,000 was for the War and
Navy Departments alone. An ad
ditional $5,000,000,000 was for war
liquidation activities. Ten billion
dollars represented interest on the
public debt and veterans’ benefits,
which are primarily the continuing
costs of past wars. These items total
$28,000,000,000, or about 80 per cent
of the total recommended expendi
tures.
Clearly, a large reduction in the
Federal budget would require a cut
in military appropriations. These
appropriations are now more than
10 times as great as they were dur
ing the thirties.
In the 1938 budget appropriations
for national defense were less than
a billon dollars, compared with $13 -
000.000.000 for the present fiscal
year. Thus, even from a purely dol
lars-and-cents standpoint, American
business and the American people
have an interest in organizing a
peaceful world in which the com
pletely unproductive expenditures on
national defense could be reduced.
Of course, dollars and cents are
not the most important reason why
we all want a peaceful world. The
fundamental reason is that w»e do
not wish to go through another war
—and especially an atomic war
which will undoubtedly be directed 1
primarily against civilian popula
tions and may well mean the end
of modern civilization.
Yet are we really concentrating
all our efforts on a program to build 1
a lasting peace? There caA be no
doubt that the Americar^ peoplej
want and expect that their leaders
w'ill work for an enduring peace.
But the people must necessarily
leave to their leaders the specific
ways and means to this objective.
I think that at the moment the peo
ple feel that the outlook for the
elimination of war is dark, that
other nations are wilfully obstruct
ing American efforts to achieve a
permanent peace.
I . S. Power Is feared.
How do American actions since
V-J day appear to other nations?
I mean by actions the concrete
things like $13,000,000,000 for the
War and Navy Departments, the
Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and
continued production of bombs, the
plan to arm Latin America with our
weapons, production of B-29s and
planned production of B-36s and the
effort to secure airbases spread
over half the globe from which the
other half of the globe can be
bombed. I cannot but feel that
these actions must make it look to
the rest of the world as if we were
only paying lip service to peace at
the confer^ice table.
These facts rather make it appear
either 'It that we are preparing
ourselves to win the war which we
regard as inevitable or <2» that we
are trying to build tip a predomi
nance of force to intimidate the
rest of mankind. How would it look
to us if Russia had the atomic bomb
and we did not, if Russia had 10,000
mile bombers and airbases within
1.000 miles of our coast line and we
did not?
NO LASTING SECURITY IN
ARMAMENTS.
Some of the military men and
self-styled “realists” are saying:
“What's wrong with trying to
build up a predominance of force.
The only way to preserve peace is
for this country to be so well armed
that no one will dare attack us. We
know that America will never start
a war.”
The flaw in this policy is simply
that it will not work. In a world of
atomic bombs and other revolution
ary weapons, such as radio-active
poison gases and biological warfare,
a peace maintained by a predomi
nance of force is no longer possible.
Why is this so? The reasons are
clear.
First, atomic warfare is cheap and
easy compared with old-fashioned
war. Within a very few years several
countries can have actomic bombs
and other atomic weapons. Com
pared with the cost of large armies
and the manufacture of old-fash
ioned weapons, atomic bombs cost
very little and require only a rela
tively small part of a nation's pro
duction plant and labor force.
More Bombs Are Not Advantage.
Second, so far as winning a war
is concerned, having more bombs—
even many more bombs—than the
other fellow is no longer a decisive
advantage. If another nation had
enough bombs to eliminate all of
our principal cities and our heavy
industry, it wouldn't help us very
much if we had 10 times as many
bombs as we needed to do the same
to them.
Third, and most important, the
very fact that several nations have
atomic bombs will inevitably result
in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching
trigger psychology in all the peoples
of the world, and because of our
wealth and vulnerability we would
be among the most seriously affected
Atomic war will not require vast
and time-consuming preparations,
the mobilization of large armies, the
conversion of a large proportion of
a country's industrial plants to the
manufacture of weapons. In a
world armed with atomic weapons,
some incident will lead to the use
of those weapons.
Thdre is a school of military,
thinking which recognizes these
facts, recognizes that when several
nations have atomic bombs, a war
which will destroy modern civiliza
tion will result and that no nation
or combination of nations can win
such a war. This school of thought
therefore advocates a "preventive
war,” an attack on Russia now be
fore Russia has atomic bombs.
This scheme is not only Immoral
but stupid. If we should attempt to
destroy all the principal Russian j
cities and her heavy industry, we
might W’ell succeed. But the imme
diate countermeasure which such
an attack would call forth is the
prompt occupation of all continental
Europe by the Red Army. Would we
be prepared to destroy the cities of
all Eurpoe in trying to finish what
we had started? This idea is so con
trary to all the basic instincts and
principles of the American people
that any such action would be pos
sible only under a dictatorship at
home. Thus the "predominance of
force” idea, and the notion of a
"defensive attack" are both unwork
able. The only solution is the one
which you have so wisely advanced
and which forms the basis of the
Moscow statement on atomic energy.
That solution consists of mutual
trust and confidence among nations,
atomic disarmament, and an effec
tive system of enforcing that dis
armament.
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
ATOMIC ENERGY.
There is, however, a fatal defect
in the Moscow statement, in the
Acheson report, and in the Amer
ican plan recently presented to
the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission. That defect is the
scheme, as it is generally under
stood, of arriving at international
agreements by “many stages,” of
requiring other nations to enter into
binding commitments not to con
duct research into the military uses
of atomic energy and to disclose
their uranium and thorium resources
while the United States retains the
right to withhold its technical
knowledge of atomic energy until
the international control and in
spection system is working to our
satisfaction.
In other words, we are telling the
Russians that if they are "good boys”
we may eventually tprn over our
knowledge of atomic energy to them
and to the other nations. But there
is no objective standard of what
will qualify them as being "good”!
nor any specified time for sharing
our knowledge.
Is it any wonder that the Russians
did not show any great enthusiasm
for our plan? Would we have been
enthusiastic if the Russians had a
monopoly of atomic energy, and
offered to share the information
with us at some indefinite time in
the future at. their discretion if we
agveed now' not to try to make a bomb |
and give them information on our
secret resources of uranium and
thorium? I think we would react’
as the Russians appear to have
done. We would have put up coun
terproposals for the record, but our
real effort would go into trying to
make a bomb so that our bargaining
position would be equalized. That is
the essence of the Russian position,
which is very clearly stated in the
Pravda article of June 24, 1946.
It is perfectly clear that the “step
by-step plan” in any such one-sided
form is not workable. The entire
agreement will have to be worked
out and wrapped up in a single
package. This may involve certain
steps or stages, but the timing of
such steps must be agreed to in the
initial master treaty.
Russia Has Two Advantages.
Realistically, Russia has two cards
which she can use in negotiating
with us: <1) Our lack of information
on the state of her scientific and
technical progress on atomic energy
and < 2» our ignorance of her
uranium and thorium resources.
These cards are nothing like as
powerful as our cards—a stockpile
of bombs, manufacturing plants in
actuaT production, B-29s and B-36s
and our bases covering half the
globe. Yet we are in effect asking
her to reveal her only two cards
Immediately—telling her that after
we have seen her cards we will de
cide whether we want to continue
to play the game.
Insistence on our part that the
game must be played our way will
only lead to a deadlock. The Rus
sians will redouble their efforts to
manufacture bombs, and they mav
also decide to expand their “security
zone" in a serious way. Up to now,)
despite all our outcries against it, j
their efforts to develop a security
zone in Eastern Europe and in the
Middle East are small change from j
the point of view of military power
as compared with our airbases in;
Greenland, Okinawa and many i
other places thousands of miles from
our shores.
We may feel very self-righteous if,
w'e refuse to budge on our plan and
the Russians refuse to accept it, but;
that means only one thing—the j
atomic armament race is on in dead
ly earnest.
I am convinced, therefore, that if
we are to achieve our hopes of ne-1
gotiating a treaty which will result
in effective international atomic dis
armaments we must abandon the
impractical form of the “step-by- j
step" idea which W'as presented to
the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission, We must be prepared
to reach an agreement which will
commit us to disclosing information
and destroying our bombs at a speci
fied time or in terms of specified ac
tions by ofcer countries, rather than
at our wittered discretion. 11 we
AFTER BUSY DAY—Hat in
hand, Secretary of Commerce
Wallace walks down a corridor
after leaving his office early
last night, just before White
House Press Secretary Charles
G. Ross said President Tru
man had disapproved release
of Mr. Wallace’s letter on for
eign policy to him.—AP Photo.
are willing to negotiate on this basis,
1 believe the Russians will also ne
gotiate seriously with a view to
reaching an agreement.
There can be, of course, no abso
lute assurance the Russians will
finally agree to a workable plan if
we adopt this view. They may pre
rer to stall until they also have
jombs and can negotiate on a more
?qual basis, not realizing the danger
o themselves as well as the rest of
:he world in a situation in which
several nations have atomic bombs.
But we must make the effort to
lead off the atomic bomb race.
We have everything to gain by
loing so, and do not give up any
:hing by adopting this policy as the
fundamental basis for our negotia
tion. During the transition period
toward full-scale international con
trol, we retain our technical know
how, and the only existing produc
tion plants for fissionable materials
and bombs remain within our bor
ders.
Veto Issue Irrelevant.
The Russian counterproposal It
self Is an indication that they may
be willing to negotiate seriously if
we are. In some respects their
counterproposal goes even further
than our plan and is in agreement
with the basic principles of our
plan, which is to make violations of
the proposed treaty a national and
international crime for which indi
viduals can be punished.
It wall have been noted that In
the preceding discussion I have not
mentioned the question of the so
called "veto.” I have not done so
because the veto Issue is completely
irrelevant, because the proposal to
"abolish the veto,” which means
something in the general activities
of the Security Council, has no
meaning with respect to a treaty
on atomic energy. If we sign a
treaty with other nations we will
all have agreed to do certain things.
Until we arrive at such a treaty,
we as well as the other major
powers will have the power to veto.
Once the treaty is ratified, however,
the question of veto becomes mean
ingless. If any nation violates the
treaty provision, say of permitting
inspection of suspected illegal
bomb-making activities, what ac
tion is there that can be vetoed?
As in the case of any other treaty
violations the remaining signatory
nations are free to take what ac
tion they feel is necessary, includ
ing the ultimate step of declaring
(var.
OTHER PROBLEMS OF AMER
ICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIPS.
I believe that for the United States
and Russia to live together in peace
is the most important single prob
lem facing the world today. Many
people, in view of the relatively
satisfactory outcome of the recent
Paris Conference, feel that good;
progress is being made on the prob- ?
lem of working out relations between '
the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia.'
This feeling seems to me to be
resting on superficial appearances
more productive of a temporary
truce than of final peace. On the
whole, as we look beneath the sur
face in late July of 1946, our actions
and those of the western powers in
general carry with them the ultimate
danger of a third world war—this
time an atomic world war. As the
strongest single nation, and the
nation whose leadership is followed
by the entire world with the excep
tion of Russia and a few weak neigh
boring countries in Eastern Europe,
I believe that we have the oppor
tunity to lead the world to peace.
In general there are two over-all
points of view which can be taken
in approaching the problem of the
United States - Russian relations.
The first is that it. is not possible to
get along with the Russians and
therefore war is inevitable. The
second is that war with Russia would
bring catastrophe to all mankind,
and therefore we must find a way
if living in peace. It is clear that
our own welfare as well as that of
the entire world requires that we
maintain the latter point of view.
[ am sure that this is also your
opinion, and the radio address of
the Secretary of State on July 15
clearly indicates that he is pre
pared to negotiate as long as may be
necessary to work out a solution on
this basis.
We should try to get an honest
answer to the question of what the
factors are which caused Russia to
distrust us, in addition to the ques
tion of what factors lead u$ to dis
trust Russia. I am not sure that we
nave as a Nation or an administration
found an adequate answer to either
question. Although we have recog- ;
nized that both questions are of
critical importance.
FACTORS IN AMERICAN DIS
TRUST OF RUSSIA.
Our basic distrust of the Russians,
which has been greatly intensified
in recent months bv the plying up
of conflict in the press, stems
from, differences in political and
economic organization. For the
first time in our history defeat
ists among us have raised the fear
of another system as a successful
rival to democracy and free enter
prize in other countries and per
haps even our own. I am convinced
that we can meet that challenge
as we have in the past by demon
strating that economic abundance
can be achieved without sacrificing
personal, political and religious
liberties. We » cannot meet it as
Hitler tried to, by an anti-Comin
tern alliance.
It is perhaps too easy to forget
that despite the deep-seated differ
ences in our cultures and intensive
anti-Russian propaganda of some
25 years standing, the American
people reversed their attitudes dur
ing the crisis of war. Today, under
the pressure of seemingly insoluble
international problems and con
tinuing deadlocks, the tide of Amer
ican public opinion is again turning
against Russia. In this reaction lies
one of the dangers to which this
letter is addressed.
FACTORS IN RUSSIAN DISTRCST
OF THE WESTERN WORLD.
I should list the factors which
make for Russian distrust of the
United States and of the western
world as follows:
The first is Russian history, which
we must take into account because
it is the setting in which Russians
see all actions and policies of the
rest of the world. Russian history
for over a thousand years has been
a succession of attempts, often un
successful. to resist invasion and
conquests by the Mongols, the Turks,
the Swedes, the Germans and the
Poles.
The scant 30 years of the exist
ence of the Soviet government has
in Russian eyes been a continuation
of their historical struggle for na
tional existence.
The first four years of the new
regime, from 1917 through 1921, were
spent in resisting attempts at de
struction by the Japanese, the Brit
ish and French, with some Ameri
can assistance, and by the several
White Russian armies encouraged
and financed by the western pow
ers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet state
was almost conquered by the Ger
mans after a period during which
the Western European powers had
apparently acquiesced in the re
arming of Germany in the belief
that the Nazis would seek to ex
pand eastward rather than west
ward. The Russians, therefore, ob
viously see themselves as fighting
for their existence in a hostile
world.
Soviet Fears Aggressive Intent.
Second, it follows that to the
Russians all of the defense and
security measures of the western
powers seem to have an aggressive
intent. Our actions to expand our
military security system—such steps
as extending the Monroe Doctrine
to include the arming of the West
ern Hemisphere nations, our present
monopoly of the atomic bomb, our
interest in outlying bases and our
general support of the British Em
pire—appear to them as going far
beyond the requirements of defense.
I think we might feel the same
if the United States were the only
capitalistic country in the world,
and the principal socialistic coun
tries were creating a level of armed
strength far exceeding anything in
; their previous history. From the
Russian point of view, also, the
! granting of a loan to Britain and
j the lack of tangible results on their
request to borrow for rehabilitation
j purposes may be regarded as an
| other evidence of strengthening of
an anti-Soviet bloc.
Finally, our resistance to her at
tempts to obtain warm-water ports
and her own security system in the
form of ‘'friendly” neighboring
states seems, from the Russian point
of view, to clinch the case. After 25
| years of isolation and after having
; achieved the status of a major
power, Russia believes that she is
entitled to recognition of her new
status. Our Interest in establishing
democracy in eastern Europe, where
democracy by and large has never
existed, seems to her an attempt to
re-establish the encirclement of un
friendly neighbors which was cre
ated after the last war and which
might serve as a springboard of still
another effort to destroy her.
WHAT SHOULD WE DO.
If this analysis is correct, and
there is ample evidence to support
it, the action to improve the situa
tion is clearly indicated. The funda
mental objective of such action
should be to allay any reasonable
Russian grounds for fear, suspicion
and distrust. We must recognize that
the world has changed and that to
day there can be no "One World"
unless the United States and Rus
sia can find some way of living to
gether.
For example, most of us are
firmly convinced of the soundness
of our position when we suggest the
internationalization and defortifl
cation of the Danube or of the
Dardanelles, but we would be hor
rified and angered by any Russian
counterproposal that would in
volve also the internationalizing and
disarming of Suez or Panama. We
must recognize that to the Russians
these seem to be identical situations.
We should ascertain from a fresh
point of view what Russia believes
to be essential to her own security
as a prerequisite to the writing of
the peace and to co-operation in
the construction of a W’orld order.
We should be prepared to judge
her requirements against the back
ground of what we ourselves and
the British have insisted upon as
essential to our respective security.
We should be prepared, even at the
expense of risking epithets of ap
peasement, to agree to reasonable
Russian guarantees of security. The
progress made during June and
July on the Italian and other
treaties indicates that we can hope
to arrive at understanding and
agreement on this aspect of the
problem.
We should not pursue further the
question of the veto in connection
with atomic energy, a question
which is irrelevant and should
never have been raised. We should
be prepared to negotiate a treaty
which will establish a definite se
quence of events for the establish
ment of international control and
development of atomic energy. This.
I believe, is the most important
single question, and the one on
which the present trend is definitely
toward deadlock rather than ulti
mate agreement.
U. S. Must Allay Fears.
We should make an effort to coun
teract the irrational fear of Russia
which is being systematically built
up in the American people by cer
tain individuals and publications
The slogan that communism anc
capitalism, regimentation and de
mocracy, cannot continue to exist in
the same world is, from a historical
point of view, pure propaganda
Several religious doctrines, all claim
ing to be the only true gospel and
salvation, have existed side by side
with a reasonable degree of tolerance
for centuries. This country was foi
the first half of its national life a
democratic island in a world dom
inated by absolutist governments.
We should not act as if we, too,
felt that we were threatened in to
day's world. We are by far the
most powerful nation in the world,
the only Allied nation which came
out of the war without devastation
and much stronger than before the
war. Any talk on our part about
the need for strengthening our de
fenses further is bound to appear
hypocritical to other nations.
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS.
We should also be prepared to
enter into economic discussion with
out demanding that the Russians
agree in advance to discussion of a
series of what are to them difficult
and somewhat unrelated political
and economic concessions. Although
this is the field in which my de
partment is most directly concerned.
I must say that, tn mr opinion, this
aspect of the problem is not as
critical as some of the others, and
certainly is far less important than
the question of atomic energy con
trol. But successful negotiation in
this field might help considerably
to bridge the chasm that sep
arates us.
The question of a loan should be
approached on economic and com
mercial grounds and should be dis
associated as much as possible from
th» current misunderstandings
which flow from the basic differences
between their system and ours. You
have already clearly disassociated
yourself and the American people
from the expressions of anti-Soviet
suppoit for the British loan. If we
could have followed up your state
ment on signing the British loan bill
with a loan to the U. S. S. R. on a
commercial basis and on similar
financial terms, I believe that it
would have clearly demonstrated
that, this country is not attempting
to use its economic resources in the
game of power politics. In the light
of the present export-import bank
situation, it is now of the greatest
importance that we undertake gen
eral economic discussions at an early
date.
It is of the greatest importance
that we should discuss with the Rus
sians in a friendly way their long
range economic problems and the
future of our co-operation in mat
ters of trade. The reconstruction
program of the U. S. S. R. and the
plans for the full development of
the Soviet Union offers tremendous
opportunities lor American goods
and American technicians.
Russia T ses U. S. Equipment.
American products, especially ma
chines of all kinds, are well estab
lished in the Soviet Union. For ex
ample. American equipment, prac
tices and methods are standard in
coal mining, iron and steel, oil and
nonferrous metals.
Nor would this trade be one
sided. Although the Soviet Union
lias been an excellent credit risk
in the past, eventually the goods
and services exported from this
country must be paid for by the
Russians by exports to us and to
other countries. Russian products
which are either definitely needed
or which are noncompetitive in this
country are various nonferrous metal
ores, furs, linen products, lumber
j products, vegetable drugs, paper and
pulp, and native handicrafts.
I feel that negotiations on thej
establishment of active trade might
well help to clear away the fog of
political misunderstanding. Such
discussions might well be initiated
while we are endeavoring to reach
a common ground on security is
sues, and if conducted in an under
standing manner, could only serve
to make that problem easier.
I In the memorandum which I sent
! to you in March, and which I sug
gested should be given to Gen.
Smith to take to Moscow, I made
! certain suggestions for trade dis
i cussions and a trade mission. In
preference to proposed discussions
in this country I want to renew my
original proposal and urge the ap
pointment of a mission to Moscow.
Such a mission might have as its
; objective the drafting of a proposal
involving Russian reconstruction
!and collaboration with Russia in
the industrial and economic devel
i opment of areas in which we have
| joint interests, such as the Middle
East.
As I stated at that time I am
prepared to make suggestions for
i the composition of the mission and
i some of the specific economic ques
tions to be discussed. The Depart
ment of Commerce has already ar
ranged, with the co-operation of
the State Department, to send two
i representatives to Moscow for the
i months of July and August for
preliminary discussions of a much
more limited scope.
I think it is very significant that
most of the more optimistic reports
about the possibilities of getting
along with the Russians have come
from American observers who were
businessmen. I have in mind such
men as Wendell Willkie, Eric John
ston and former Ambassador Joe
Davies. The Russians seem to be
j friendly to, and seem to have re
spect for, capitalist businessmen.
A number of observers have re
ported that the Soviet leader? are
"Isolationists" and appear to be
lacking: a true insight, into the
principles, motives and ways of
thinking in other nations. We must
admit, however, that they pointed
out the symptoms and the way to
prevent World War II in their pro
motion of the concept of collective
security. And aside from that, it
seems to me we should try to do
something constructive about their
isolationism and Ignorance, and I
believe the aforementioned trade
mission could accomplish much in
that direction. I gather, too, that
Is part of what you have had in
mind in Inviting Premier Stalin to
visit America.
Many of the problems relating
to the countries bordering on Rus
sia could more readily be solved
once an atmosphere of mutual trust
and confidence is established and
some form of economic arrange
ments are worked out with Russia.
These problems also might be help
ed by discussions of an economic
nature. Russian economic penetra
tion of the Danube area, for ex
ample, might be countered by con
crete proposals for economic col
laboration in the development of
the resources of this aeea. rather
than by insisting that the Russians
should cease their unilateral pene
tration and offering no solution to
the present economic chaos there.
SUMMARY.
This proposal admittedly rails
for a shift In some of our think
ing about International matters. It
is Imperative that we make this
shift. We have little time to lose.
Our postwar actions have not, yet
been adjusted to the lessons to be
gained from experience of Allied
co-operation during the war and
the facts of the atomic age.
It is certainly desirable that, as
far as passible, we achieve unity on
the home front with respect to our
international relations; but unity
on the basis of building up conflict
abroad would prove to be not only
unsound, but disastrous. I think
there is some reason to fear that in
our earnest efforts to achieve bi
partisan unity in this country we
may have given way too much to
isolationism masquerading as tough
realism in international affairs.
The real test lies in the achieve
ment of international unity. It will
jbe fruitless to continue to seek solu
| tions for the many specific problems
that face us in the making of the
peace and in the establishment of
an enduring international order
without first achieving an atmos
phere of mutual trust and confi
dence. The task admittedly is not
an easy one. There is no question,
as the Secretary of State has indi
cated. that negotiations with the
Russians are difficult because of cul
tural differences, their traditional
isolationism and their insistence on
a visible quid pro quo in all agree
ments. But the task is not an in
superable one if we take into account
that to other nations our foreign
policy consists not only of the prin
ciples that we advocate, but of the
actions we take.
Fundamentally, this comes down
to the point discussed earlier in
this letter, that even our own se
curity, in the sense that we have
known it in the past, cannot be pre
served by military means in & world
armed with atomic weapons. The
only type of security which can be
maintained by our own military
! force is the type described by a
military man before the Senate
Atomic Energy Committee—a secur
! ity against invasion after all our
cities and perhaps 40 million of our
city population have been de
stroyed by atomic weapons. That
is the best that “security” on the
basis of armaments has to offer us.
It is not the kind of security that
our people and the people of the
other United Nations are striving
for.
I think that progressive leader
ship along the lines suggested above
would represent and best serve the
interests of the large majority of
our people, would reassert the for
ward looking position of the Dem
ocratic party in international af
fairs. and, finally, would arrest the
new trend toward isolationism and
a disastrous atomic world war.
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