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'THE EVENING STAR, Washington, D. C. 1 THURSDAY. MARCH 17. ISSS Textual Highlights From State Department File on Yalta By tha Auociatad Prm Following are textual ex cerpts from the State De partment’s compilation of documents bearing on the Yalta Big Three conference: Introduction In February, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt conferred with Prime Minister Churchill at Malta in the Mediterranean, with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea, and again with Churchill at Alexandria in Egypt .. No unpublished docu mentation could be found . . . for the Alexandria conference, which consisted merely of a pri vate conversation on February 15 between Roosevelt and Churchill . » . Pre-Conference Papers PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN (Washington) 17 July, 1944 Top Secret. Priority. Sent to the United States Naval Attache, Moscow, via Navy channels. Number 27. Top secret and personal. From the President for Marshal Stalin. Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty ac cord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the Far East and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It I would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the j 10th and 15th of September. The most central point for you and me would be ttie north of Scot land. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your army is doing so magnificently that the hop would ! be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can! let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore. Roosevelt. THE AMBASSADOR IN THE SOVIET UNION (HARRI MAN) TO THE PRESIDENT. Top Secret MOSCOW, 18 July, 1944. Sent by the United States Na val Attache, Moscow, via Navyj channels. Personal and top secret for the President from Haryijsjfth, I recommend that you eon-' aider omitting from your mes sage to Marshal Stalin your . . , (No. 27) the following sentence “Your army is doing so ipag niflcently that the hop would be much shorter td Scotland than the one taken By Molotov two years ago.” The implica tion of this sentence is that Marshal Stalin should fly over enemy occupied territory. Be cause of the dangers Inherent in such a flight I feel there may be resentment on the part of Stalin’s principal advisors which might Jeopardize the prospects of the meeting itself. Because of the real fear that I have of such a reaction by the Soviets I I have taken the liberty of hold-! lng delivery of your message 1 awaiting your reply. STALIN TO ROOSEVELT Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington. Secret and personal from Pre mier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt. I share your throught about j the desirability of a meeting be tween you, Mr. Churchill and; myself. However. I must say. that now, when the Soviet armies are in volved in battles on such a wide front, it would be Impossible for me to leave the country and de part for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues con sider it absolutely impossible. July 22. 1944. ROOSEVELT TO STALIN Top secret. (Washington) 27 July 1944. 1 Number 32. Top secret and personal. For Marshal Stalin from the President. I can fully understand the dif ficulty of your coming to a con ference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meet ing would help me domestically and we are approaching the time for further stratetical decisions. ROOSEVELT HARRIMAN TO PRESIDENT Top secret. Moscow, 24 Sep tember 1944. (Personnel and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman. This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked Oen. Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him person ally a message regarding a fu ture meeting. Stalin Interrupted to say that he had been ill with the grippe when Hurley was in Moscow, that in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but that this time he had been ill for several weeks. He: looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I explained; that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November end that as it was too late for ■ Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said i that a meeting was very deslr- 1 able but that he was afraid his doctors would not allow him to travel. . . .1 am satisfied that ißt||n is anxious to meet you w' Ei^j| * . A L Hr JUnTn ■ \HwB ASSt J-OeS wMv MU IB*' i ■ IK 11 Ssjjflfl 1 9h ■ /■- m ? —Sifnal Corps Photo THE FINAL DINNER AT YALTA—A dinner as the historic 1945 Big Three conference ended in Yalta. The late Edward R. Stet tinius, jr., then Secretary of State, is at left, lifting his glass. The late President Franklin Roosevelt is flanked by Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churqhill. At far right is V. M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister. The man seated beyond Stalin is not identified but next to him, face partly hidden, is Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. but he is definitely worried about his health. ... PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN Top secret. 4 October 1944. ... Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once: “While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and my self, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you. You. nat urally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly con vinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minis ter’s desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcom ing talks with Churchill as pre liminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here. In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr Churchill approve, that our Am bassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr Hartiman would not be in a po sition to commit this Govern ment relative to the important matters which yoft and the Prime Minister will, very nat urally, discuss .. The above message will indi cate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer. I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any cir cumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bilateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full dress meeting be tween the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested.” —ROOSEVELT ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL Sent to the Unitaed Statese Naval Attache, Lopdon, via Navy channels. Top Secret Priority Washington. 4, Otober, 1944. Number 626. 4 October 1944, top secret and personal from tne President for the Prime Mip ister. I can well understand the rea sons why you feel that an im mediate meeting between your self and Uncle Joe is necessary ,before the three of us can get together. The questions which you will discuss there are ones which are, of course, of real in terest to the United States, as I know you will agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to stand by and to participate as my observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed Stalin. While natural ly Averell will not be in a posi tion to commit the United States —I could not permit anyone to commit me in advance—he will be able to keep me fully in formed and I have told him to return and report to me as soon as the conference is over. I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself, but I am pre pared for'a meeting of the three of us any time after the elec tions here, for which your meet ing with Uncle Joe should be a useful prelude, and I have so informed Uncle Joe. Like you, I attach the great importance to the continued unity of our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you, however, that the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which the three of us can, I am sure, work out together and I hope you will postpone discussion of it until our meeting. There is. after all, no Immediate urgency : about this question which is so directly related to public' opinion ! in the United States and Great Britain and in all the United Nations.... ROOSEVELT. STALIN TO ROOSEVELT Secret and personal from Pre -1 mier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin Roosevelt. During the stay of Mr. Church ill and Mr. Eden in Moscow, wa exchanged views on a num ber of questions of mutual inter est. Ambassador Harriman has. certainly. Informed you about all important Moscow conversations. I also know that the Prime Min ister had to send you his esti mate of the Moscow conversa tions. On my part, I can say that our conversations were ex tremely useful for the mutual ascertaining of views on such questions as the attitude toward the future of Germany, the Polish question, policy in regard to the Balkan states, and important questions of further military pol icy. During the conversations, it has been clarified that we can, without great difficulties, adjust our policy on all questions stand ing before us, and if we are not' in a position so far to provide an immediate necessary decision of this or that task, as for exam ple, on the Polish question, but nevertheless, more favourable perspectives are opened. I hope that these Moscow conversations will be of some benefit from the point of view that at the future meeting of three of us, we shall be able to adopt definite deci sions on all urgent questions of our mutual interest. . . . CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT (Seven paragraphs deleted by State Department.) Paragraph 8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. (Churchill’s usual reference to “Uncle Joe” Stalin) that you had suggested a triple meeting toward the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire. ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL Top Secret. 18 November 1944. ... It does not seem to me that the French provisional gov ernment should take part in our next conference as such a debat ing society would confuse our es sential issues. . . . ROOSEVELT. STETTINIUS TO HARRIMAN ... In addition to myself and Bohlen, whom you know about, I shall bring with me to Argonaut H. Freeman Matthews: Alger Hiss, for Dumbarton Oaks mat ters, and four men who will act as secretaries. ... CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT Top Secret London, 22, October, 1944. (Five paragraphs deleted by State Department.) Para. 6. We (Churchill and Stalin) also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland, Czecho and Hungary to form a realm of in dependent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna, the capital of a federation of South-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg. and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the cap ital of a large Danubian federa tion has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed. Para. 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached |and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the international ization of the Kiel Canal. lam not opposed to this line of thought. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FILES The commanding general, Manhattan, District project (Groves), to the Chief of Staff. United States Army (Marshall): Top Secret War Department. Washington. December 30. 1944. Subject: Atomic Fission Bombs To: The Chief of Staff It is now reasonably, certain that our operation plans should be based on the gun type bomb, which,,it is estimated, will pro duce the equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explosion. The first bomb, without previous full scale test which we’do not believe will be necessary, should be ready about 1 August 1945. The second one should be ready by the end of the year and suc ceeding ones at . . . (State De partment deletion) Intervals thereafter. Our previous hopes that an implosion (compression) type of bomb might be developed in the late spring have now been dis sipated by scientific difficulties which we have not as yet been able to solve. The present effects of these-difficulties are that more material will be required and thaUthe material will be less 0 efficiently used. We should have sufficient material for the first implosion type bomb sometime in the latter part of July. The plan of operations while based on the more certain, more powerful gun-type bomb also provides for the use of the im plosion-type bombs when they beocme available. ... (State De partment deletion) the time schedule must not be adversely affected by anything other than the difficulties of solving our scientific problems. The 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force, has been organized and it is now undergoing training as well as assisting in essential tests.... L. R. GROVES, Major General, U. S. A. (Indorsements): To S/W I think the fore going proposal should be ap proved with your concurrence G. C. M(arshall). The Sec. of War and the President both read this paper and approved it. 12/30/44 L. R. G(roves). CHURCHILL TO' ROOSEVELT (State Department deleted four paragraphs.) Para. 5. Major war criminals, U. J. took an unexpectedly ul tra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial, otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I Feb. 4 Yalta Meeting— Roosevelt-Stalin LIVADIA PALACE Present United States Soviet Union President Marshal Stalin Roosevelt Foreign Mr. Bohlen Commissar Molotov Mr. Pavlov Bohlen Minutes Top Secret Subject: General discussion. The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruc tion of the Crimea and there fore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German army. Marshal Stalin . . . said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings. The President agreed with this. Marshal Stalin then inquired about the military situation'on the Western front. The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped Gen. Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet staff. Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with Gen. De Gaulle. Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found De Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and De Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting. The President then described his conversation with De Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when De Gaulle compared him self with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of Prance and with Clemenceau as the political leader. Marshal Stalin replied that De Gaulle does not seem to under stand the situation in France.... The President said he had re cently heard that the French government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international con trol. Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story De Gaulle had told In Moscow—there he said the Rhine whs the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency. The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the Eastern border of France to bold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British Army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat It, too. The President then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The Presi dent said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of (have) preferred to have the north west zone which would be in dependent’ of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British. Marshal Stalin inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason. The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only «ut of kindness. Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only rea son to give France a zone. Feb. 4 Dinner- Tripartite Livadia Palace PRESENT United States: President Roosevelt. Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Har riman and Mr. Bohlen. United Kingdom: Prime Min ister Churchill, Foreign Secre tary Eden, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Maj. Birse. Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Vyshinskl, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Pavlov. Bohlen minutes: Top Secret Subject: Voice of smaller powers in postwar peace organization. : : : Marshal Stalin made it quite plain on a number of oc casions that he felt that the great powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domina tion the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the j Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three great powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. Marshal Stalin said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the great powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers. The President said he agreed that the great powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the three powers represented at this table. The Prime Minister said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great na tions of the world should dis charge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exer cise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vyshinskl said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the great powers, and in reply to an ob servation by Mr. Bohlen con cerning the opinion of American people he replied that the Ameri can people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vyshinski would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake Jo tell that to the American people. Mr. Vyshinski replied that he would be glad to do so.) The Prime Minister, referring to the rights of the small na tions, gave a quotation which said: “The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang . . Feb. 5 Meeting— Plenary Livadia Palace Bohlen Minutes Top Secret Bubject: Treatment of Ger | many. I ... Marshal Stalin stated that Ihe thought K would bring up ; many complications If we should jppve four nations instead of three participating In the deter mination of German matters The .Prime Minister replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the fu ture role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very im portant role. He . . . went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was prob lematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe. The President replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. Marshal Stalin . . . repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed lit tle to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control com mission for Germany should be run .by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest'sacrifices in bringing victory. The Presideht remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over $lO billion to Germany and that this time we would not re peat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German prop erty that had been sequestered during the war had been turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. . . . The President concluded. . . ... That despite his desire to see the dev astated area in all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in France, and else where, restored, he felt that reparations could not possibly cover the needs. He concluded that he was in favor of extract ing the maximum in reparations from Germany but not to the extent that the people would starve. . . . Feb. 6 Meeting— Plenary Livadia Palace. Matthews minutes. President: I should like to bring up Poland As I said in Teheran, in general I am in favor or the Curzon Line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face. . . The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Ger many. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet government could give something to Poland. . . Stalin: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. . . It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basic of our policy and we favor a strong independent Po land. ... I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the West at the expense of Germany. . . . Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indif ferent as to what kind of gov ernment there is in Poland but they do want one that will main tain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government ful fills this role not badly. There are agents of the London gov ernment connected with the so called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. . . When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the con trary. . . Prime Minister: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps y/e are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. . . . Feb. 8 Meeting— Roosevelt-Stalin Livadia Palace Present United States: President Roosevelt, Mr. Harriman and Mr Bohlen. Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin. Foreign Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov. Bohlen Minutes Top Secret ▲ It* Do mat: in fha Vat* IToef Air Bases in the Far East The President said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bon lns and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for addi tional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be nec essary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4 million men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be ablb to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives. Marshal Stalin said he did not object to the United States hav ing bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. Far East: Russian Desires. Following the discussion of certain military questions in volved in the Far East, Marshal Stalin said that he would like to discuss the political condi tions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. ... The President said he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Teheran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the South Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port; (1) Outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) Making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method. The President said he hoped the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong ob jections to this suggestion. Marshall Stalin said there was another question and that in volved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Har bin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting there with the Kabarovsk to Vladivostok line. The President said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: Jl) To lease under dirassi soviet operation; (2) Under a commis sion composed of one Chinese and one Russian. Marshal Stalin said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Rus sia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would under stand the national interest in volved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet. The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in 24 hours. Marshal Stalin agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guar antee the security of the Su preme Soviet. Marshal Stalin went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the West and move 25 divisions to the Far East he thought it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these matters. Marshal Stalin said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians BROMWELL'S Season-End SALE li![CyHz9l aJUBKHp ENTIRE STOCK FIREPLACE FIXTURES Famous Curtain Screens Solid Brass Andirons Flretool Sets—Fenders, etc. Our Entire Stock Brass, Copper, Silver, Pewter Other Gifts and Home Accessories, 10% %ff. Buy for Gifts, Your Own Needs ... for Months Ahead! No C.O.D.’s, No Layaways, No Gift Wrapping I. L BROMHELL IK. 710 12th St. N.W. FREE f ■ would not be difficult and he would not object to an interna tionalized free port. TRUSTEESHIPS The President then said he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chi nese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was In the Philip pines where it had taken about 50 years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that In the case of Korea the period might be from 20 to 30 years. Marshal Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. The President replied In the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval. The President then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this. Marshal Stalin replied that they would most, certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us.” In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited. The President then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indo-China. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma. Marshal Stalin remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indo-China, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indo-China was a very important area. The President said France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN CHINA The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive. Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would re main alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek. The President said Gen. Wede meyer and the new Ambassador, Gen. Hurley, were having much more success than their prede cessors and had made more prog ress in bringing the Communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuamintang and the Chungking government than with the so called Communists. Feb. 8 Dinner— Tripartite Yusupovsky Palace Marshal Stalin acted as host. Present: United States, President Roose velt. Secretary Stettenius, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Flynn. Mrs. Boet tiger, Miss Harriman, Mr. Bohlen. United Kingdom: Prime Min ister Churchill, Foreign Secre tary Eden. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Field Marshal Brooke. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunning ham, Gen. Ismay. Field Marshal Alexander, Mrs. Oliver. Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov. Gen eral of the Army Antonov, Mr. Vyshinsky. Mr. Beriya, Mr. Mai sky, Marshal of Aviation Khu dyakov. Mr. Gusev, Mr. Gromy ko, Mr Pavlov. Bohlen Minutes Top Secret Subject: General Conversa tion. The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and 45 toasts in all were drunk. In a toast to the alliance be (Continued on Page A-5, Col. 3) DRESS UP FOR EASTER MEN'S HATS—S4.9S $7.50 value In all desired colon and shades. 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