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VOLUME XXIII.
KNOXVI L I ili. TENN., , SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1861
1 1 ' 1 : rr-n- - ! i 11
NU3IDER C.
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( tm n .11 1 m.1 ran un, b4 eftrf4
rVt tk. Hh w krr tgUr cctunla.
;lar4r Mr!X ptWr T,
Sabswibtrs Coaplainkj. "
CompMnU continue to reach ci frota all
uartfrf f tht non-ArrirjU of ar ppcr to
fgbK-ribers. T caa onlj tuy la reply, tlat
11 tbe packages are done tip in gooion
!itkD, aad in food time, aaddepositrtTanr
citr Poft-offict, 3dreudt every ao wboie
nxiat It C5ir list The Tost Muur la thlf
citj, stai ot that be sc&da tbeta oatrefu
larlr, and bit 4airt Mr. LewU, taja the
same. Thej meet with fool Iaafter Uaring
here, at the Uar.da o( vopriocipled mea
handliog tleu "as route jta,' aad Poifc
ilaftiri. AVe don't expect XhU sute of tbin
to lift alwaj-f. These eorrnpt hangers-oa, lit
lit Tost OlSct De partment ia the ConfederaV
Uovernnietit, 111 te detected, and turned out,
in tbe course of time, as thejr will natur&ilj
take to niiH-roLbicjr, htp.g cow with t a oae
atep of that higher degree. Stewart, who
has refuted to hand out oar papers at
ilarphy, X. C. and who ha been opening
other uca's lettej, has f eceotly btea turft'td
out.
There is another elate of oar subscribers
who cotnplaia of not getting the paper, and
the are persons whose subscription have
pired. We stop all whose time hare expired,
a&d onJj send to thea whea thej reaew their
subscriptions, supposing that all wild do tot
recew dt tire a discontinuance.
A Corn Bread Lecture.
The E'gUttr of last week, coauioei a lec
ture to the troops now in the field, of very
great importance, relative to the use and
jirt piratioa of Cora Bread, which it regards
n bert adapted to the use of the rmj. -Large
quotations' are made from Ramsey's
History of Tennessee, showing bow corn meal
ia manufactured into bread. Oae fact is dis
closed that most persons are ignorant of it
ii ibis : corn r.ieal to be mide ready for the
cook, mast le mixed with cold water. It oc
xirs to us that evt rj mes in the army should
be furniibed with a copy of Ramsey's His
tory of Tenneswel
Oar Cora Cropt.
We Lave kept an eye oa the season and the
trops, all this tutnuuT. and we are pleased to
a that never, in all oar lire, have we seen
o Cte a crop of corn, throughout East Ten
nefcite. We have had warm weather, during
tie iuuiuft, and one rain after another, as it
seeded to be wanted, until our wboleconntry
abounds taok, with green, and overfiowiog
field; of corn. Corn it now made, and growing
rd, bat fodder is in its prime forpreferviog.
There will be more corn raited in East Ten
nfee, tba will supply the country for two
yf. 4 .
Oen. ZIcDcwelTi Heport
We ablUb from the Louisrille Courier a
Secession ptpr, the official report of Gen.
atcDowtll, who commanded the United States
forces at !ull Huo, oa the plains of Uanassas.
This report, as it sets forth the Federal losses
in men, materials and provisions, will be read
with more iotertit than any thing we could
occopy oar cola m us with. Up to this time,
the other side of the question bas not been
fcivn, acd it i spoken of as a matter of sor
Kite that the (ienerais commandiag the
outkern army Law cot made a report, or
rather that it has not beet published I
" S apreiae Court v
Tie members of the bar ara notified that the
nular term of tba Soprttne Court, for tils
IXvuion of the State, will be held the second
moo day of r-ptwmbr. A -special Judge will
be appointed, to bold the Court, la pUQo. of
Woo. It. A. Curothcrs retrgaed.
W. R. CASWELL, Clerk.
Ceaeril ITcDo-artU'f Cncial Heport of
-.- the Eaffafftatat. . ; .. 5:;,
IIisDcatTKaa DtraanitxT KoaTawiertftx)
ViMista, AausoTo, Va Aog. 4,' 13I.
LkvUnant Cktt . I). 7Vwamm, An'tant
. Adjutant Qenenlt lliQijrltrt tf ikt Amy,
' )rtkirfton, D. Cf . ; '. ' ' ;v
Covoxii.:! bare the honor to submit the
following report of the battle of the 21st f
July, near klanassas, Virginia. It baa been
delayed till this time from the inability of the
subordinate commanders to get earlier tree
ceantof tk- state of their couraa&da.
In my commoulcation to yon of he 20th
ulu, I stated it as my la'entioa to move that
afternooa, and drive the enemy from the east
tide of Bull's Run, so as to enable the engi
neers to tnake sufficiently accurate recoa
noisseace to justify our future movemenu.
Later fn the day they bad obtained enoogh
iufbrtaation of the passage across the stream
to dispense with the recoanoissance, and it
was decided to more without delay., It bad
been ray intention to toove the several col
mas oat on the road a few miles on the even
ing of the 20th, to that they would nave a
shorter march in the morning; but I deferred
to those who bad the greatest distance to go,
and whs preferred starting early it the taorn
lsgr and make bat oae move .
- Oa the eveolag of the 20U alt, ray command
was mostly at or near Cent revllle. The eaemy
was at or near Manassas, distant fromCentre
riiie ebaat seven miles te the so a lb west. Cen
treville is a Tillage of a few booses, mostly
oa the west side of a ridge running nearly
north and south. The road from Ceutreville
to ManASsaa Junction war along this ridge,
and crosses Hull's Run about three miles from
the former place. . Tbt Werrealoa Turapike,
which rnns nearly cast and west, roes over
mis ridge, torouga toe village, ana crosses
L Ball's Hia about four miles from it, Ball's
Run having a eourse between the crossing
from northwest to southwest. The first di
vision (Tyler's) was stationed oa the north
side of the War rent on Turnpike, and an the
eastern slope of the . Ccntreviile ridge, two
brigades, an the sane toad, aad a mile aad a
half in advance to the west of the ridge, and
est brigade on the ro4 frost Ccntreviile to
ilaaas, where, it croeset Ball Baa at
Blackburn's Ford, wfcsre Gen. Tyler bad the
engagement of the 16th tilt. The second di
vision (Hauler's) was oa the Warrenton Tare
pike, cue mile east of Ccntreviile. The third
division (lleintselroaa's) was on a road known
as the Ola Braddock road, which comes into
Ceutreville from the eotthwest about a mile
and a half from the village. The afth divis
ion (Miles') was on i the same road with the
t&ira diviaioa, and between it aad Centrevme
A snap-, wWck U kerewila, . mark4 A, will
show these positions better than I caa del
cribe them.
On FrMay night a train "f subsistence ar
rived, and on Saturday its contents were or
dered to be lT.ued to the command, and the
men required to have three days rations in
incur uaversacas. un saiuraay, orders were
issued for tie available force to march. As
reported to you itrtny letter of the 10th ult,
my personal recoaaoissance of the rotds to
the south bad showed that it was not practi
cable to carry oat the original plan of turn
ing the enemy's position on their right. The
afulr of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed
be was loo strong at that point for us to force
a passage there without great loss, and if we
did, that it would bring us in front of bis
strong position at Maaassas, which was not
desired. Our information was that the stone
bridge, over which the Warrentoo road cros
sed Bull's Run, to the west of Ccntreviile,
was defended by a battery in position, and the
road on bis side of the stream impeded by a
heavy abattls. The alternative, therefore,
was to turn the extreme left of bis position.
Reliable information was obtained of an on
deiended ford about three miles above the
bridge, there being another ford between it
and the bridge, which was defended. It was
therefore determined to take the road to the
upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind
the farces guarding the lower ford and the
bridge, and after occupying the Warrington
road east of the bridge, to send oat a forte tp
destroy the railroad at or sear Ceatreviill,
and thus break up the communication between
the enemj's force at Uanassas and those in
the valley of Virginia, before Winchester,
which bad been held in check by Major Gen
eral Patterson. .
Brig. Gen. Tyler was directed to move with
three of bis brigades oa the Warrenton road,
and commence cannonading the enemy's bat
teries, while Hunter's division, moving after
biin, should, after passing a little stream call
ed Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and
move aronndjtoTbe nipper ford, and there
tura son tin an3 gef tenia d the enemy." 'Vol.
lieintselm&n's division was to follow Hun
ter's as far as the turning off place to thelow
er ford, where be was to cross after the enemy
had been driven out by Hunter's division, the
the Fifth divisionMites' to beta reserve on
the Ccntreviile ridge
I bad felt anxious about the road from Ha
rasses by Blackburn's Ford to Centrevills
along the ridge, fearing that whilst we should
be ia force to the front, and endeavoring to
tJrn the enemy's position, we ourselves should
be turned by bins by this road for if be
should once obtain possession of this ridg,
which overlooks all the country to the west
to the foot of the spurs of the filne Ridge, we
sbontd bave been irretrievably cut eff and
destroyed. 1 had, therefore, ; directed this
point to be bek force, and lent an engi
neer to fWtforUe some field wofks to
strengthen the' position. ,
The Fourth division (Unnyaa's)bad not been
brought to the front further than to gaard
ewr( eommBlcfttione by way of Vienna and
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His
advance regiment wni About seven taile I ia
the tear of Centwflle. - '' -
The divisions were ordeted to inarch at
bslf-pait two c'clotk A. U to as to arrive oa
the groan d early in th day, and thai avoid
the beat which ii to be expected at tbU sea-
soa. Thera was delay h the first division
gtttieg but of its camp oa the road, and the
! other divisions were ia consequence two and
three hours behind the. time .appointed a
great misfortune as events turned out. The
wood road leading from the Warrenton turn
pike to the upper ford wis much longer then
w counted epos, the general direction of the
stream being oblique t the road, and we
having the obtuse agl on Our aide.
Gen. Tyler commenced With bit artillery at
balf-past six A. but tb enemy did not re
ply, aad after some tint! fib: cam a question
whether be was in any forte la our front, and
If be did not Intend hieJetf to make aa at
tack, aad make it by Blackburn's Ford. After
firing several times, and obtaining no response,
I held one cf Heintxlran'a brigades in re
serve in case we should have to - send any
troops back to reinforce Miles' division. The
other brigades moved forward as directed ia
the general orders. Oa reaching the ford at
Dudley's Spring, 1 found part of the leading
brigade of Huoter's division (Burnside's) bad
crossed, nut the men were slow in getting
over, flopping to drink. As at this tints the
clouds of dust from the direction of Manas
sas indicated the immediate approach of a
large force, and fearing it might come down
on the head of the column before the division
could gri over and sustain It, orders were
seat back to the head if regiments to break
ftoia the column, aui come forward sepa
rately as fast as possible Orders were sent by
an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzrl
man's divsion t come by a wearer road across
the field, and an ald-de-camp was sent to
Brigadier-General Tyler, to direct biui to
presss forward his atutk, as large bodies of
the enemy were pafstn'ir in front cf him to
attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road
leading from Sudley'l Spring south, and
over hich Burnside'l brigade inarched, was
for about a mile thickly wooded, whilst on
the right of the road tor the eame distance,
the country was divided between fields and
woods. About a mile from the road the coun
try on both sides of the road is open, and fit
nearly a mile farther Urge rolling fields ex
tend down tojtbe Warrenton turnpike, which
crosses what became the field of battle
through the valley of a small water coarse, a
tributary of Bull's Run. -v
Shortly after the loading regiment of the
Rrst brigade reached - the open space, and
whilst others and the second brigade were
crossing the front and right, the enemy open
ed fire, beginning with the artillery and fol
lowing it up with infantry. The leading
brigade (Barnside's) bad to sustain this shock
for some time without support, and did it
well. The ba'talio of regular infantry was
sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards, the
other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regi
ment 4eUcbcd from JJnn'telman's division to
the left, forced the Vbttny back far enough to
allow Sherman's aad Key's brigades, of Ty
ler's division, to cross from their position on
the Warrenton road. These drove the right
of the enemy, understood to bave been com-
mnuded by Beauregard, from the front of the
field, and out of the detached woods, and
down to the road, and across it up the slopes
on the side. Whilst this was going on, Heint
zeltnan'a division was moving down the field
to the stream, and up the road beyond. Be-
vond the Warrenton road, and to the left of
the road, down which our troops bad march
ed from Hudlrj's Springs, is a bill with a
farm house on it. Behind this bill the enemy
had, early in the day, some of his most annoy
ing batteries planted. Across the road from
this bill was another bill, or rather elevated
ridge, or table land. The hottest party of the
contest was for the possession of this hill,
with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintielroan's
division, Wilcox's andjlo ward's brigade oa
the right, supported by part of farter's brig
ade and the cavalry onder Palmer ; and
Franklin's brigade of Heintselman'a 'division,
Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the
center and np the road, whilst Krj's brigade
ot Tyler's division waa on the left, attacking
the batteries near the stone bridge. Thn
Rhode Island battery of Bueoside'e brigade
also participated in this attack by its fire from
the north of the turnpike. The enemy waa
understood to be commanded by J. K. John
ston. Rickctt s battery, which did such ef
fective service, and played so brilliant a part
l the contest, was, together with Griffin's
battery, oa the side of the hill, and became
the object of the special attention of the en
emy, wno succeeded our otneevt mistaking
one of bis regiments for one of our own, and
allowing it to approach without firing upon
it in disabling the battery, and then attempt
ed to take it. Three times was be repulsed
by different corps in succession, and driven
back, and the guns taken by band, the hors
es being killed, and palled away. The third
time it was apposed that the repulse was
final, for be was driven entirely from the bill,
and so far beyond it as not to be ia sight, and
all were certain the day was ours He bad
before this been driven nearly a mile and a
half, and was beyond the Warrenton road,
which was entirely la our possession from
the Stone Bridge westward, and our engin
eers were just completing the removal of the
abattil across the road, to allow our rein
forcement (Shenck's brigade and Ayres' bat
tery) to Join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and
broken. Hut we bad been fighting since half
past tea o'clock ia the; morning, aad it was
after three o'clock la the afternoon. The
men bad been up slice two o'clock In the
morning, and had what to those anused to
such things seemed a long march before com
ing into action though . the long distance
gone over was not more thaa nine and a balf
miles; and though, they bad three days' pro
visions served out to ihn a "T before,
.1.1 L JI I A. ..-
many ba aoaoi. euner cm net eat tuem, or
tare tbera away oa th fiwcB or during the
battle, - and I weft i therefore 4 Hhom food.
They bad done moeb severe fighting. Some
of the regiments which bad been driven from
the bill la tue first two attempts of the ene
my to kef possession had becom shaken,
were unsiaijf , ana a pea i oi me rants.
It was at this time that the enemy's rein
forcements tame to his aid trots the. railroad
train, understood to have juft arrived from
the valley with theifiidoe of Johasoa'a army.
They threw themselves id the woods oa oar
right, aad towards the rear of enr right, aad
opened a, fire of musketry oa or men, which
caused them to break and retire down the
hillside. This sooa drgeaerated Into disor
der, for which there was bo remedy P. very
effort was made to rally them, .area beyond
the reach of the enemy's fire, bat la vale.
The battalllon of regular Infantry alone feovei
up the bill opposite to tbe one with the house
oa it, and there maintained itsself until car
men could get down to and across Warrenton
turnpike, oa the way back to the po title a we
occupied in the morning. .Tbe plain was
covered with the retreating troops, end they
seemed to infect those with whom tbey came
in contact. Tbe retreat soon bfam aeVi
and this sooa degenerated still farther into a
panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the
efforts of all those who had assisted so faith
fully daring the long and hard day's work to
gaining almost tbe object of ear wishes, aad
that nothing remained on tbe Geld but to recog
nize what we could no longer prevent, I gave
the necensry orders to protect their with
drawal, begging tbe men to- form lato line,
and offvr the appearance, at least of organi
zation. Tbey returned by the fords to the
Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by
Col. Porter's force of regulars. Once on the
road, and the different corps comiog together
in small parties, many without officers, tbey
became intermingled, and all organization
was lost.
Orders bad been sent back to Milei divi
sion for a brigade to move forward and protect
this retreat, and Col. Blenket's brigade was
detached for this purpose, and was ordered to
go so far fotward as tbe point where the road
to tbe right, left tbe main road.
By referring to the general order, it will be
seen that, while the operations were to go oo
in front, an attack was made at Blackburn's
Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed
there. A reference to bis report, and to that
of Major Hunt, commanding -the artillery,
will show that this part of the plan was well
and effectively carried oat. It succeeded ia
deceiving tbe enemy for a considerable time,
and In keeping ia check a part of bis fore.
The fire of the artillery at this point is repre
sented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great ac
tivity its this direction, much firing, and col
umns of dust, I became anxious for this place,
fearing if it were turned or forced the whole
stream of our retreating mass would be cap
tured or destroyed. Alter providing for the
protection of the retreat by Porter's and
Hlcuker's brigadee, I repaired to Richard
son's and found the whole force ordered to
h stationed for tbe holding of tbe road from
Manassas by Blackburn's Ford lo Ontreville,
on tbe march, under the orders from the Di
vision Commander, at Centrerille. 1 imme
diately halted it, and ordered it to take np
the best line of defense across tbe ridlre that
their position admitted of, and subsequently
taking in person the command of this part of
the army, I caused such disposition of the
forces which had been added to by the First
and Second New Jersey and the DeKalb Re
giments, ordered np from Banyan's reserve
before going forwardas would best serve to
check the enemv. Tbe ridge being held ia
this way, the retreating current passed slow
Iy tbroegh Ccntreviile to the rear. The' en
emy followed us from the Ford as far as Cub
Run, and owing to the road becoming blocked
up at tbe crossing, caused us much damage
there, for the artillery could not pass, and sev
eral pieces and caissons bad to bcabaadoned.
In tbe panic tbe horses hsnling the caissons
and ammunition were cut from their places
by persons to escape with, and in this way
much confusion was caused, the panic aggra
vated, and the road encumbered. Not only
were piece of artillery lost, bnt also many of
the ambulances carrying the wounded.
Br sundown roost of our men bad gotten
behind Ccntreviile ridge, and it became a
question whether we shod or not endeavor
to make a stand there. The condition of our
artillery and its ammunition, and tbe want of
food for the men, who had generally aban
doned or thrown away all that bad been Is
sued tbe day before, and the utter demorali
aatlon of the army, seemed to sJT who were
near enough to be consulted division aad
brigade commands and staff to'admit of no
alternative but to fall back; the more so as
the position at Blackburn's Ford was then ia
tbe possession of tbe enemy, and fie. was al
ready turning our left. On sending the offi
cers of the staff to the different camps, they
found, as the reported tome, that our decision
had been anticipated by tbe troops, most of
those who had come ia from tbe front being
alreadv oa the road to the rear; tbe panic
with which they came ia still continuing and
hurrying theui along.
At o'clock tbe rear guard ( Bleaker' s bri
gade) moved, covering the retreat, which was
effected during the night and next morning.
The troops at Fairfax station leaving by the
cars took with them the balk of tb sapplles
which had been sept t'tere. Ify aid-de-ramp,
MsJ. Weds wort b, stayed at Fairfax Court
House till late in the morning, to see that the
strsggfvrs and weary and wora oaf soldiers
were not left behind. A ' '
I transmit herewith the reports of the sev
eral divsion and brigade commanders, to
which I refer fer tbe conduct of particular
regiments and corps, and a consolidated re
turn of the killed wounded and misting.
Fraa the latter, it will be sesn that our killed
amoutted to nineteen fleers aad foal hun
dred and sixty-two aon-e.oaalsila.ncd. offi
cers and privates, aad our woaaded. to sixty
four officers and nine hundred aad forty-seven
Bon-commissioae J officers and privates.'
Many of the wounded will loon be able tajoit
tbe ranks, and will leave cor total tt killed
and disabled from further service ait oat
thousand. The return of tbt mlsslag it very
Inaccurate, the rata snppoisl to bo missing
having fallen lato other regiment! an I rone
to Washington many of tbt Zohivsi toTKew
York, la oae br gad the nanber originally
reported at sit basdred and sixteen, was
yesterday feduced to one hundred and sev-eotv-fju,
. These reduction are being made
daily. In a few dayi a more correct retura
can be made. 1 '
Of cours nolbleg secant isknoea of the
loss of the entmy. Aa officer from their
forces, com! tg from them with a Sag of trace,
admitted eighteen bandred kilted and wound
ed, and other information shows this to be
touch under tbe true number.
Tbe officer commanding tbe tTIeventh New
Tork Zouaves acd Col. Heintxleman, say that
tbt returns of that regiment cannot be relied
' oa, as many of those reported among the ras.
tallies, bare absented thrmselveasisce their
rttturn and bave gone to New York. Among
the missing reported ar msny of our in geons,
who remained in attendance on our mnded,
na4 were, against the rules of modern war.
fare, toad prisoners.
The issue of this bard fought battle, in
which certainly our troops lost no credit in
their conflict on tbe field with an enemy ably
commanded, superior ia numbers, who ba'i
but a short distance to march ; an 1 who act
ed tin bis owa ground, oa tbe defensive, and
always under cover, whilst our men were of
necessity ont on the open field, and should
not" prevent full credit being given to those
officers aad corps whose serviees merited sac
cess if tbey did cot attain iu
To avoid repetition, I will only mention
here the names of those not embraced in re
ports of division and brigade commanders.
1 beg to refer to their reports for the names
of tbose serving uader their immediate or
ders, desiring that oo this subject they be
considered as part of my own. 1 claim credit
for tbe officers of my staff, and for tbose act
ing as such during the day. ' Tbey did every
thing ia their power, exposing themselves
freely wbeo required, aad doing all that men
could do, communicating orders, guiding tbe
columns, exhorting tbe troops, rallying them
when broken, and providing for them tbe best
the circumstances admitted.
, . Tbe following officers commanded divisions
and brigades, and in the several places, their
duty called them did tbe most effective service
and behaved la the most gallant manner.
Brigadier General Tyler, Connecticut Vol
unteers. Colonel David nunter, Third cavalry, se
verely wounded at tbe bead of bis division.
Coloael S. P. Heintxleman, Seventeenth in
fantry, wounded ia tbe arm while leading his
division into action on tbe bilL
Brigadier General Scbenck, Ohio Volan
teers, commanding Second brigade, First di
vislea.i '
Colonel E. D. Keyes, Eleventh infantry,
commanding First brigade, First division.
Colonel W. P. Franklin, Twtlth infantrr,
First brigade, Third division.
Colonel W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth iafac
try, coalman ding Third brigade, First divis
ion. Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth infan
try, commanding First brigade, Second divu
ioa. Colonel A. . Barnside, Rhode Island Vol
unteers, commandiag Second brigade, Sec
ond division.
Colonel O. B Wilcox, llichigrin Volunteers,
commanding second brigade, Third division ;
who was wounded and taken prisoner while
oa the hill, ia the hottest of the. fight.
Colonel O. 0. noward, Maine Volunteer,
commanding Third brigade, Third divisioa.
Colonel J. B. Richardson, Michigan Volun
teers, commanding Fourth brigade, First di
visioa. Coloael Bleaker, Xew York Volaateers,
commanding Fourth brigade, First divis
ion. ' . - -
Colonel Davie, New York Valuateers,
commanding Second brigade, KifVu division.
As my position may warrfnt, even if it
does not .call, for iome'exrtanation cf the
causes, as far as they can bo seen, which led
to tbe results herein stated, I trujt it may not
be ont of place if I refer ia a few words u
the immediate antecedents of tbe battle.
When I submitted to the Gene ral-in-Chief, ia
compliance with Ms verbal instructions, the
plan of operation and estimate of force re
quired, the time I was to proceed to carry it
iato effect was fixed for the ft a of July, Mon
day. Every facility possible was given ma
by the General-in-Chief and heads of the a l
minlstrativa departments in maklar th
necessary preparation. Bat the regiments,
owing 1 was told to want of traaiporUlion,
came over slowly. Many of them did not
come across till eight or nine days after the
time fixed upon, and went forward without
my even seeing them, and without bavin
been together before in a brigaded Tbe send
ing of reinforcements to Gen. Patterson, by
drawing off the wagons-wna a furtarrafil tnf"
favorabie eause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of
the Quartermaster-Qcneral, and bis Ctvoring
me in every way, the warons tor ammunition.
subsistence, Ac, add the horses for the train
aad the artillery, did not arrive for more thaa
a week after the time appelated to move. I
was not even prepared a late as tbe 15th nit.,
aad th desire I should move became great,
and it was wished I should not, if possible,
delay longer tMa a Tuesday, the 16th ult
Whea 1 did se out, oa th 16th, I was still
deficient in wagoas for subsistence. But I
Went forward, trastlog to tbeir being procur
ed la time to follow me. Tbe trains thus
harrledly gathered together, with horse,
wagon, driver, and wagon managers, all
new atd'naused to each other, nsoted with
diScoltyand disorder, and was .the cause of
a daj'a delay la getting the provisions for
ward, making It necessary to make oa Sunday
th attack w should bave made oa Saturday.
i coaia not, witu every exertion, get for
ward with the Uopi nlier than w did. I '
wUh J to go to Ccntreviile the second (lav,
Which would hav taken u thereon th ITlb,
and enabled as, so far as they were eencem
Ma (9 lto actio on the 19th, iastsad of
th tUin but when ( went forward from Fait
hx Co art Hone, beyond Gema&tows, to
trge theca forward, I was told It vu impel
- (posnbd en f sertk .
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