Weekly national intelligencer. [volume], January 08, 1848, Image 4

About Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869

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"" SPEECH of Mk. CALIIOUN,
UK fOl'TH CAROLINA,
In the Sc/iale of the United January 4, 1848.
The following resolution* subm tted some days ago by
Mr. Calboi'W, coming up for cons duraliou?
lienulved l ictt to conquer Mexico and to hold it, either as
m ?,-.,vincL- '< ? to incopiMJinte it in the I'irion, would be in.
' ? . ... w ii the avow oil object tor which the war has been
szu2d?v H"=y or u.c t.ov.
eminent in conflict with its character ami genius, anil, in the
end subversive of oilr live and popular institutions.
Hcsoh t'j I bat no line nt policy in the further prosecution
of tbt' war fciiould be adopted which may lead to consequences
so disastrous.
Mr. CALHtH'N said: In offering, Senators, these resolu
tions for your consideration, 1 am governed by the rsn*on?
which induced me to oppoae the war, and by whicli 1 have
been governed since it was sanctioned bv Congress. In allu
ding 'o my opposition to the war, 1 do not intend t? touch on
the reasons wfuch governed me on that occasion further thin
is necessary to explain n>v motives upon the present.
I then opposed the war, not only because it might have
l>een t a^ilv avoided ; not only becauaa the President had no
authority ti order a part of the disputed territory in possession
of the .Mexicans to be occupied by our troops ; not only be
cause I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanc
tioned the war untiue, but from high considerations of policy;
because I believed it would l< ad to many and serious evils to
the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. Dut
after the war wa? declared, by authority of the Government,
I acquiesced in what 1 could not prevent, and which it was
impossible for me to arrest; ami I then felt it to be my 3uty
to limit my efforts to giving such direction to the waras would,
as far a* possible, prevent the evils and danger with which it
threatened the country and its instituti ons. For this purpose,
at the last session, 1 suggested to the Senate the policy of
adopting a defensive line, and for the same purpose I now
offer these resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive
which governs me on this occasion. I am moved by no per
sonal or party considerations. My object is neither to sustain
the Executive nor to strengthen the opposition, buA simply to
discharge an important duty to the country. In doing so I
sho'd express my opinion on all po'nts with the freedom and
boldness which becomes an independent Senator, who has
nothing to ask from the Government or from the people.
But when 1 come to notice those points on which I differ from
the President, I shall do it with all the decorum which is due
to the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
I BUg^stsd a defensive line because, in the first p'acc, I
believed that the only certain uiode of terminating the war
successfully was to take- indemnity in our own hail Is, by
occupying defensively, wi<h our miJi'arv force, a portion of
the Mexican territory, which we miu-ht deem ample for in
demnity ; and, in liienext, because I believed it would prevent
a great sacrifice of life and property ; but, above all, because I
believed that i: was ilie only way we could avoid the groat
dancer to our institutions a'jainst which these resolutions are
intended to guard. The President tcok a different view.
He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war?not for
conquest?that was emphatically disavowed?but for the pur
pose of conquering peace?that is, to compel Mexico to sign
a treaty ceding sufficient territory to indemnify the claims of
our citizens and of the country for the expenses of the war.
I could not approve of thifc policy. I opposed it, among other
reasons, because I believed there was uo certainty that the
object intended to le ellected would lie accomplished, let the
war be ever so successful. Congress thought differently,-and
granted ample provisions, in men and money, for carrying
out the policy recommended by the President. It has now
been fully tested under the most favorable circumstances. It
has b*en as successful as the most sanguine hope of the E xecu
tive could have anticipated. Victory after victory has followed
in rapid succession, without a single reverse. Santa Anna
repelled and defeated with all his forces at Buena Vista;
Vera Cruz, with its castle, captured ; the heights of Cerro Gordo
triumphantly carried; J&lapa, Perote, and Puebla occupied;
and, after many triumphant victories under the walls of Mexi
co, its gates opened to us, arid put us in possession of^he
capital. But what has all these* splendid achievements ac
complisbcd ' Has the avowed object at the war lieen attain
ed ? Have we conquered peace 1 Have we compelled Mex
ico lo sign a treaty ' Have we obtained indemnity ? No.
Not a single object contemplated by the campaign has l.een
etiected ; and, what is wowe, our difficulties are greater now
than toey wore at the commencement, and the object* sought
more difficult * > l>e accomplished. To what is this complete
failure to be attributed ' Not to our army. It has done all
that skill ami gallantry could accomplish. It is to be attributed
to the policy pursued. The Executive aimed at indemnity in
a wrong way. Instead of taking at into our own hands, when
we had ierr. ? ry in '.ur posses-ion amp'e to cover the claim*
of our citizei.s and the excuses of the war, he sought it indi
rectly through a treaty with Mexico. He thus put it out of
our own power, and uitJer the control of Mexico, to say
whether we should have indemnity or not, and thereby en
ttl>U l.'T to .Meat tb>r whole object of the campaign by simply
refusing to treat with us. Owi,ng to this mistaken policy,
after a mojt successful and brilliant campaign, involving an
expenditure not lt*ss, probably, than forty millions of dollars,
and the sacrifice, by the sword and by disease, of many valu
able lives, probably not less than six or seven thousand, no
thing is left b&t the glory which our at my has acquired.
But, as an apology for all this, it is insisted that the main
tenance of a defensive lin* would have involved as great a
sacrifice as the campaign itself. The Pn sident and the ."Sec
retary of War have assigned many rea- m* for entertaining
this opinion. I have examined them with care. This is not
the priper occasion to discus* them, hut I must say, with all
due deference, they arc, to my mind, utterly fallacious ; and
to satisfy your minds that such is the ease, I will place the
subject in a single point of view.
The line proposed by me, to which I suppose their reasons
wore intruded to be applied, would be covered in its whole
extent from the Pacific Ocean to the Paso del Norte, on the
Kio Grande, by the Gulf of California, and the wilderness
peopled by hastile tribes of Indians, through which no Mexi
can force could penetrate. For its entire occupancy and
defence, nothing would he required but a lew small
vessels of war stationed in the Gu'f, and a single regrinrfnt
to keep down any resistance from the few inhabitant* within.
From the Paso del Norte to the mouth of the river, a distance
of a few hundred miles, a single fact will show what little
force will be necessary to its defence. It was a frontier be
tween Texas and Mexico when the former had but an incou
siderable population?not more than a hundred and fifty
thousand a; the utmost at any time?with no standing army,
and but very ft w irregular troops ; yet for several years she
maintained.this line, without any, except slight occasional,
intrusion from Mexico, and that too when Mexico was far
moie consolidated in her power, and when revolutions were
not so frequent, and her money resources were far greater
than at presen*. If, then, Texas alone, under such circum
stances, could defend that fiontier for so long a period, can
any man belie ve that now, when she is backed by the whole
of the United Btates?now that Mexico is exhausted, defeated,
and prostrated?I repeat, can any man Is-lievc that it would
involve as great a sacrifice to us of men and money to t'efend
that frontier as did the last campaign ' .No. I hazard nothing
in asserting that, to defend it for an indefinite period, would
have required a less sum than the interest on the money spent
in the campaign, and fewer men than were sacrificed in carry
ing it on.
much for the past. We now come to the commence
ment of ani tier campaign ; and the question recurs, what shall
be done '* The President, in his messa;e, recommends the
same line of jioliry?a vigorous prosecution of the war?not for
conquest, that .? again emphatically disavowed ; not to blot
Mexico out of tue list of nations ; no, he desires to see htr an
independent >.id flourishing community, and assigns strong
reason* for r , but to obtain an honorable peace. We heai
no more of c inquiring peace, but I preiume that he means by
an honorable peace ttie saino thing ; that is,,fi com|>cl Mexico
to agree to a t"-aty ceding a sufficient part of her territory, as
an indemnity for :he expt uses of the war and for the claims
of oar citizcn*.
I have examined with care the grounds on which the Presi
dent renews his recommendation, and am again compelled to
dissent. There a c many and powerful reasons, more so even
than those that existed at the commencement of the bit cam
paign, to justify my dissent. The sacrificc in money will be
vastly greater, i'here is a bill for ten additional regiments
now before the Senate, ami anotlier for twenty regiments of
volunteers has t?een reported, authorizing in all the raising of
an additional force of something upwards of thirty thousand
This, in addition to that already authorized by l*iw, will bo
sufficient to keep an effective army in Mexico of not much, if
any, less than seventy thousand men, and will raise the ex
pense- of the campaign to prolmbly not lose thin sixty millions
of dollars.
To meet so large an expenditure would involve, in the pre
sent and prospective condition of the money market, it is to
, lie apprenended, not a little embarrass nent. I.ast year money
ahutidant and easily'obtained. An unfortunate famine
in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural products.
That turned the b liana* of trade greatly in our favor, and specie
poured ii.io the country with a strong and steady current. No'
inconsiderable portion of it |>assod into the Trea?urv, through
the duties, which kept it fall in spile of the Ursums remit
tod to n rct the expense* of the war. The case is different
now. Instead of having a tide flowing in equal to the drain
flowing out, the drain is now both way*. The exchanges
now are against u* instead of being in our favor, and instead
of specieming into the country from abroad it i* fl.wing
out. In the iwan time the price of stocks and Treasury notes,
inetead of being at or above par, hare both fallen Mow to a
email extent. The effecta of the depreciation of Trcasory
notes will cause them to pass into the Treasury in payment of
the customs and other due* to the Government a* the cheaper
corrency, instead of gol I and silver; while the expenses 0f the
war, whother paid for by the transmission of gold and silver
direct to Mexico, or by drafts drawn in favor of British mer
chant* or other capitalist* there, will cause whatever specie
may ix> in uie vaults 01 me 1 reaaury to now irom 11, eitoer ior
remittance direct on account of the ordinary transaction* oi
the country, or to pay the draft* which may be drawu upon
it, ami which, when paid in the preaeut state of exchange*,
will lie remitted abroad. But thia process of paying in Trea
sury notea instead of gold and silver, and gold and silver flow
ing out in both directions, cannot continue long without ex
hausting its specie, and leaving nothing to nuct the public ex
pend! turM? including those of the war, but Treasury notes.
Can they under such circumstances preserve even their present
value ? Is there not great danger that they will fall lower and
lower, and filially involve the finances of ihe Government and
the circulation of the couutry in tho greatest embarrassment
and ditiiculty ?
Is thcie not great dangor, with this prospect before u?, and
with the necessity of raising by loaus near forty millions, of a
commercial and financial crisis?even podsibly a suspension
l?y the banka ? I wish uot to create panic ; but there is
danger, which makes a great difference, in a financial and
morjeye^) point of view, between the state of things now and
at the commencement oT the last session. Looking to the
future, it is to l>e apprehended that not a little ditiiculty will
have to be encountered in raising money to meet the oxidises
of ihe next campaign, if conducted on the large >cale which
is proposed. Meu you may raise, but money will be found
difficult to obtain. It is even to be apprehended that loans
will have to be negotiated on veiy disadvantageous terms for
the i u! lie. In the present state of things, if they grow no
worse, there can be no retort to Treasury notes. -They can
not bj materially increased without a ruinous depreciation
and a resort must be had exclusively, or almost entirely so,
to l oir ming. But, at Ihe present priccs of stocks, to borrow
so large a sum a* will be uecessary can only be dona at a
greatly increased rate of interest on the nominal amount of
stock. la n recent conversation wiih a gentleman well in
formed on this subject, he said that, in his opinion, if forty
millions are required, a loan could not be had for more than
ninety lor one hundred, which would bo about at the rate of
seven per cent.
These are formidable objections, but they are not the only
om s that are more?o than they were at the commencement
of the last campaign. I hold that the avowed object for tbe
vigorous prosecution of the war is less certain cf being real
ized now ihan.it was then ; and, if it should tail to bo real
ized, it will leave our affairs in a far worse condition than they
are at present. That object, as lias been stated, is to obtain
an honorable treaty: one which, to use the language of the
President, will give indemnity for the pas', and security for the
future?that is, a treaty which will give us a cession of terri
t>iy not only equal to our present demand for indemnity, but
equal to the additional demand : equal to the entire expenses
t) be incurred in conducting the campaign, and a guaranty
from the Government of Mexico for its faithful execution.
Now, Senatois, I hold that, whether the war is successful or
unsuccessful, theic is not only nocertain'.y that this object will
be accomplished, but almost a certainty that it will not be. If
the war be unsuccessful; if our aims should be balHed, as 1
trtttt and believe they will not be ; but if, from any unfortu
nate accident, such should bj the case, it is clear that we shall
not be able to negotiate a treaty that will accomplish (he ob
ject intended. On the contrary, if the war should he suc
cessful, it is almost equally certain that, in that case, theavow
e 1 o'lject for prosecuting the war vigorously will not be accom
plished. I might take higher ground, and maintain that the
more successfully the war is prosecuted the more certainly the
object avowed to be accomplished will be defeated, while the
objects disavowed would as certainly be accomplished.
What is the object of a vigorous prosecution of the war ?
How can it be successful ? I can see but one way of making
it so, and that is by suppressing all resistance on the port ol
Mexico; overpoweting and dispersing her army, and utterly
ov.rihrowing her Government. But if that should Le done;
if a vigorous prosecution of the wtr should lend to that re
sult, how ore we to obtain an honorable peace ? Wiih whom
sjiall we treat for indemnity fair the past and security for the
future 5 War may be made by one party, but it requires two
to make peace If all authoriy is overthrown in Mexico,
where will be the power to enter into negotiation and make
peace ? Our very success would defeat the po-sibilily of ma
king peace. In that case, the war would not end in peace,
but in conquest; rot in negotiation, but in subjugation ; and
defeat, I repeat, the very object you aim to accomplish, and
accomplish that wiiich you disavow to lie your intent on, by
destroying the m pirate existence of Mexico, overthrowing her
nationality, and ! lotting out her name from the lint of nation*,
instead of leaving her a free republic, which the President
has so earnc-t'y expressed his desne to' do.
If I understand hi* message correctly, I have his own au
thority for thu conclusion to which I come. Ho lakes very
much the view that I do as to how a war ought to be
prosecuted vigorously, and what would be its results, with .the
difference a* to the latter resting on a single contingency, and
that a remote one. He says that the great difficulty of ob
taining peace results from this, that the people of Mexico ate
divided under factious chieftains, and that the chief in jwiwer
dare not make peace, because for doing so he would be dis
placed by a rival. He also says, that tlis only wuy to reme
dy this evil ai.d to obtain a treaty is to put down the whole of
them, including the one in power, as well as the others.
Well, what then ' Are wo to stop thete ? No. Our lien
erals are, it * en.*,'authorized to encourage and to protect the
welI-dispo*d inhabitants in establishing a republican govern
ment. He says they are numerous, and are prevented from
expressing their opinions and making an attempt to form such
a government only by fear ot those military chieftains. He
promises, when they nave thus formed a government, under
the encouragement and,, protection of our army, to obtain
yeace by a treaty with the government thus formed which
shall give us ample indemnity for the pas' and security for the
future. I must say I am at a lo?s to *ee how a free and'inde
pendent republic can l? e*tabli?hed in Mexico under the pro
tection and authority of a conquerors. I csn readily under
stand ho* an aristocracy or a despotic government might be,
but bow a free republican government can be so established,
un 'er mch circumstances, is to me incomprehensible. I bad
always supposed that such a government tnu't be the sponta
neous wish of the people ; that it must emanate from the hearts
of the people, and be sup[>orted by tlieir devotion to it, with
out support from abroad. Hut it seems that these are anti
quated notions?obsolete ideas?and that free popular gov
ernments may be made under the authority and protection of
a conqueror.
Hut supjKMe these difficulties surmounted, how can we
rnnke a free Government in Mexico ' Where are the ma
terials > It is to be, I presume, a confederated government
like rheir former. Where is the intelligence in Mexico for
the construction and preservation of such a government > It
is what she has been aiming at for more than twenty years,
hut so utterly incoin|>ctciit are her people for the task, that it
has been a complete failure from first to last. The great body
of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is conccntrateJ in the
priesthood, who are naturally disinclined to that form of gov
ernment ; the residue, for the most part, ure llie owners of
the haciendas, the larger planters of the country, but they are
without concert and destitute of the means ol forming such a
government. But if it were possible to establish such a gov
ernment, it could not stand without the protection of our army.
It would fall as soon as it is withdrawn.
If it be determined to have a treaty, it would be a far pre
ferable course, as it appears to me, to abstain from attacking
or destroying the Government now existing in Mexico, and
to tieat with it, if indeed it be capable of forming a treaty
"hir-h it coultj. maintain and execute. Upon that point I do
not profess to have any information beyond that derived from
conversations with those who have been in Mexico; but from
all that I can hear, it may lie doubted whether we have not
already pushed what is cslled a vigorous prosecution of the
war, so far as not to leave sufficient piwer and influence in
the Government to enter into a treaty which would be respect
ed when our forces are withdrawn. Huch I know to be the
opinion of intelligent officers. They concur in thinking that
tiie exiting Government at Cjueretaro, if it should enter into
a treaty in conformity with the views expressed,by the Ex
ecutive, would be overthrown, and that we should be compel
led to defend that portion of Mexico which we require for in
demnity, lief* risively, or be compelled to return and renew the
prosocjjion of the war. If such is its weakness, it may be
apprehended that even now, without pushing the vigorous
prosecution rf the war further, we are greatly exposed to the
dang< r w hich these resolutions are intended to guard against,
and that it requires great discretion and prompt action on our
part to avoid it.
Uu?, More leaving this part of the subject, I must enter
my solemn protest, us .one of the representatives of a Mtnte of
th? Union, against pledging protection to any Government
established in Mexico under our countenance or cncouwge
m -nt. It wnold inevitably be overthrown as soon as our
forces arc wiilidriwn, and we would lie compelled, in fulfil
ment of plighted faith, implied or expressed, to return anil
reinstate su-h government in power, to be again overturned
and again r< instated, until we should be compelled to take ih?
government into our own bands, just as the English have
been compelled agiin and again to do in Hindustan, under
similar circun n ances, until it has led to its entire conquest.
Let ns avoid following the example which we have been con
demning at far back as rfly recollection extends.
I he Presim nt himself entertains doubt whether the plan
of forming a f>overnment?in the manner which I have lieen
considering, and treati: g with it for indemnity, may not fail.
In that caw, he agrees that the very course to which I have
said the vigorou-- prosecution of the war will inevitably lend
must be taken. He says, after li tving attempted to establish
such a government?after having employed the l>est cff,r:s to
iccure |?eaoe?it all fail, " we niiist holJ on to the occupa
tion of tha country ; we must take the full meaeure of in
demnity in'oour own hands, arid enforce such tsrms as the
honor of the country derrianda." Thee are bit wonls. Now,
what is this * I* ji not ?ti aeknowlidgmcnt that, if he fails
in eatabliahing a Ojvernment with which he can treat in
Mexico?after putting down all resistance under the existing
Government, we mu?t make a conqneit of the whole court
t y, ?n'' hold it subject to our control ' Can words be
stronger > "Occupy the whole country"?" take the full
measure of inJemntfy?no defensive linn?no treaty?and
enforce terms." Terms on whom' On the Government >
No, no, no. To enforc; terms on the people individually (
^ I II ?l 11II
that is to My, to establish a government over them in the form
of a province.
The I'naidt'iit is right. If lite vigorous prosecution of the
war should In- successful, and lite contingency on which he
expects to make a treaty tuils, iheie will he no retieat. Every
argument again* t calling back the army und taking a defen
rive line will have double force, alter having spent sixty mil
lions of dollars and acqui od the posaeaaion of I he whole of
Mexico, und tha iot< rests in favor of keeping possession
would t>e much more powerful ther^ than now. The uruiy
itself will be larger. Those who hvo by the war, the nu
ineroui contractors, the merchants, the sutlers, the specula
tor* in land and mine*, and all who arc profiting dirertly or
indirectly by its prosecution, will t>e adverse to retiring,
ami will swell the cry of holding on to our conquest*. They
constitute an immense body of vast influence, who are grow
ing rich by what is impoverishing the re?t of the country.
it is at this stage ih.t the President speaks of tilting tile in
demnity into our own hands. But why delay it until the whole
country is subdued ' Why not take it now ? A part of Mexi
co would be a better indemnity now than the whole of Mexi
co would be ut the end of the next campaign, when sixty mil
lions of dollars will lie added to the present expenditures. We
would indeed acquire a control over a much hrger portion of
her population, but we would never lie able to extort from
them, by all the forms of taxation to which you can resort, a
sum sufficient to pay the force necessary to hold them in sub- ;
jeetion. That force must lie a large one, not less certainly !
than forty thousand men, uccording to the opinion of the ;
Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. Davis,) who must be rcgurded
us a competent judge upon this point. He stated in debate i
the other day that the army now there, exceeding that num
ber, are in danger ; und urged, on that account, the immedi
ate passage of the bill to raise ten regiments. On this sub
ject it is us well to speak out plainly at once. We shall never ;
obtain indemnity for the expenditures of the war. They must i
come out of the pockets of the people of the United States ;
and the longer the wur is continued, and the more numerous
our Qiiny, the greater will be the debt, and the heavier the
burden imposed upon the country.
If thebo views be correct, the end of the policy recommend- !
ed by the President, whether contemplated or not, will be to ?
force the Government to aloptone or the other alternatives al- >
ludcJ to in these resolution*. With this impression I cannot !
support the policy he lecommends, for the reasons assigned in
the tint resolution. The first of these is, that it would be in
consistent with the avowed object for which the war hus been i
prosecuted. That it would be so is apparent from what has
aheady been said. Sincethe commencement of the war until j
this time, the President has continually disavowed ths inten
tion of conquering Mexico and subjecting her to our control.
He has constantly proclaimed that the only object was indem
nity, und that the war is prosecuted to obtain it by treaty ; and
yet, if the results should bo as I have staled, the end will he,
that what was disavowed will br accomplished, and what has
been avowed to lie its object wil be defeated. Such a result
would be a deep and lasting impeachment of the sincerity or
the intelligence of the Governmmt: of its sincerity, because
directly opposed to what it has continually and emphatically
disavowed ; or of its intelligence, for not perceiving what ought
to have been so readily anticipated.
We have heard much of the reputation which our country
lias acquired by this war. I acknowledge it to the full amount,
as far as the military is concerned. The army hus done its
duty nobly, and conferred high hoiors on the country, for
which I sincerely thank tlij-ni; btlt lopprohend that the repu
tation acquired does not go beyond (bis, and that in other re
spects we have lostinsteaJ of acquiring reputation by the war.
I It would seem certain, from all pubications from abroad, that
the Government itself has net gained reputation in the eyes
of the woild for justice, moderation, or wisdom* Whether
this be deserved or not, it is not forme 11 inquire at present;
I am now speaking merely of repitation, and in that view it
appears that we have lost abroad nmuch in civil and political
reputation as we have acquired for our skill and valor in arms,
liu', much as I regard military ghry, as much as I irjoice to
witness the display of that indonitable energy and courage
which surmounts all difficulties, I would be s >rry indeed that
our Government should lose any portion of that high charac
ter for justice, moderation, and discretion which distingui>hcd
it in the early stages of our histoy.
The next reason assigned it that, either holding Mexico 1
as a province or incorporating ter into the Union, would l?e
unprecedented by any exanple in our history. We
buve conquered many of the reighboring tribes) of Indians,
but we bavj never thought of holding them in subjec
tion or of incorporating them into our Union. They have
been left as an independent people in the midst of us, or been
driven back into the forests. IS or have we ever incorporated
into the Union any but the Cuitasian racc. To incorporate
Mexico woul-l be the first dept'ture of the kind ; for more
than half of its population am jure Indians, and by far the
larger portion of the residue mixed blood. 1 protest against
the incorporation of such a pe >ple. Ours is the government
of the white man. The gnat misfortune of what was for
merly Spanish America, in to be traced to the fital error of
placing the colored race on an equality wi h the whi'e.
Thuterror destroyed the social arrangem' nl which formed the
bas'fs of their society. Thia error we have wholly cscnped.
The Brazilians, formetly a province of Portugal, have cs
ea|>ed also to a considerable extent; and they aul we are the
ouly people of this continent who have made r.-volutions
without anarchy. And yet, with thia example before them,
and our uniform practice, there are those among us who talk
about erecting these Mexicana into territorial governments,
and paring them on an equality with the people of theae
States I utterly protest against the project
It ir a remarkable font, in this connexion, that, in thr whole
history of man, as far as my information extends, tber- is no
instant e whatever of any civilr-ed colored race, of arty -hade,
!<ein;; f und equal to the establishment and maiulciuRce of
free go\ernment, although by far the largest proportion of the
hum n family ia composed of them : and even in th lavage
state we rarely find them eny where with Mich governments,
except it be our noble savages ; for noble I will call them for
their many high qualities. They for the most part kaJ free
instititions, but such inatitutiona are much more iasily
su t.i ned among a savage than a civilized people. Are we to
ovcrlxik this gnat fact > Are we to associate with turselvea
as equals, companions, and fe'low-citizena, the Indium and
mixed races of Mexico' 'I would consider auch association
as degrading to ourselves and fatal to our inatitutions
The next remaining reasona'assigned, that it wot Id be in
confliit with the genius and character of ourUoiernnuvit, and,
in tin end, subversive of our free institutions, arc in imately
connected, and I shall conaider them together.
Tint it would be contrary to the genius and chancier of
our Government, and subversive of our free popular mstitu
tions, to bold Mexico as a subject province, ia a pn [tuition
too clear for argument before a body so enlightene! a< the
Scnae. You know the American Constitution too well, you
have leaked into history, and are too well acquainted w th the
fatal effects which large provincial possessions have e'er had
on the institutions of free States, to need any proof tc satisfy
you how hostile it would be to the institutions of this -ountry
to hold Mexico as a subject province. There is not an ex
empli- on record of any free State holding a provinct of the
Mime extent and population without disaatrous con sec | icncea.
The nations conquered and held as provinces have, i;i time,
retaliated by destroying the liberty of their conquerors, (.rough
the corrupting efTect of extended patronage and irrespxuible ,
power. Such certainly would be our caae. The conquest of
Mexiro would add so vastly to the putronage of this (ivern
merit, that it would absorb the whole powers of the States: the
Union would Itecome an imperial powers, and the States re- j
duceil to mere subordinate corporations. Out the evil would
not end thero ; the proceas would go on, and the powirtmns
ferrol from the Statea to the Union would be transferred |'r>m
this Legislative department to the executive. All the imnemc
pa ronagn which holding Mexico aa a province would cre
ate, tne maintenance of a large army to hold it in auhjeetion,
and th? appointment ef a multitude of civil officers neressary
fo govern it, would I* vealed in bim. The great influence
which it would give the President would be the means of
controlling ihe Legislative department, and subjecting it to
his dictation, especially when combined with the principle of I
proscription which liaa now become the establiahed practice of
the Government. The struggle to obtain the IV-nlential
chair would become proportionablv great?so great as to de
"troy the freedom of elections. The end would lis anarchy or
despotism as certain as I am now addrcaaing the Senate.
Let it fiot lie said that Great Britain ia an example to the
contrary * that she holds provinces of vast extent and popula
tion without materially impairing the liberty of the subject,
or exposing the Goverumeht to violence, anarchy, refusion,
or corruption. It is so. But it must be attributed to the pe
culiar character of her Government. Of all (} ernments
that ever existed, of a free character, the British far tranacends
them all in one particular, and that is, its capacity to bear
patronage without the evils usually incident to it. She can
lietr more, in proportion to population and w? alth, than any
Government of that character that ever existed I might
e en go further, and assert than despotism itself, in its inost
iilisolute form. I w II not undertake to explsin nliy it is so.
It will fake me further from the course which I have pre
scribed lor myself than I desire; bull will say, jn a ft-w
word*, that it results from the fact that her Executive and the
House of fjords (the conservstive liranchc< of her Govern
ment) are both hereditary, while the other House of Parlia
ment haa a popular character. The Roman Government cx
< eeded the Bri'ish in ita capacity for conquest. .No Govern
ment ever did eiist, and none piobably ever will, which, in
that |wrticular/ equalled it ? but its capacity to hold conquered
provin es in subjection was as nothing compared to that of
(treat Britain ? and h<nre, when the Roman power passed
l?eyond the limits of Italy, crossed the Adriatic, the Mediter
ranean, and the Alps liberty fell prostrate : the Koman pe p!e
became a rabble j ?on option penetrated every department of
the Government j violence and anarchy ruled the day, and
military despotism closed the sceno. Now, on the contrary,
we see England, with subject-provinces of vastly greater terri
torial extent, and probably of not inferior population, (I have
compared them,) we see her, I repeat, going on without the
personal liberty of the subject being materially impaired, or
the Government subject to violence or anarchy ? Yet England ,
has not wholly escaped the curse which must ever befall'a
Government which holds extensive provinces in ttubjec
tion ; for, although ahe has not lost her liberty or fallen into
anarchy, yet we behold ibe population of England cruslud
to (he earth by the auperiucumlH-nt weight of debt und taxa
tion, which may one day terminate in revolution. The wealth
derived trom her conquests and provincial possessions may
have contributed to swell the overgrown fortunes of the upper
classes, but haa done nothing to alleviate the {treasure on the
laboring il.us.-is below. On tbe contrary, theexpenae incident
to their conquest, and of governing and holding them in sub
jection, have been drawn uiaiuly from their labor, und have
, increased instead of decreasing tbe weight of the pressure, it
has placed a burden upon them, which, with all their skill
, and industry, wi h all the vast accumulation of capital and
power of machinery with which they are aided, they are
i scarce capable of lieuring, without being reduced to the lowest
| depths of poverty. Take, for example, Ireland, her earliest
aiid nearest conquest, and is it not to this (lay a cause of
* heavy expense, and a burden, instead of a source of revenue }
On the contrary, our Government, in this particular, is the
; very reverse of tbe liriti^h. Of all free Governments it has
| the least capacity,-in propoition to the wealth and population
of the country, to bear patronage. The genius of the two,
i in this particular, is precisely opposite, however much alike in
exterior forms aud other particulars. The cause of this dif
ference 1 will not undertake to explain on the present occa
sion. It results from its federal character and elective chief
magistrate ; and, so far from the example of Great Biitain
cinstituting a safe precedent for us to follow, the little she has
gained from her numerous conquests and vast provincial pos
sessions, and the heavy burdens whi h it has imposed upon
her people to meet the consequent expenses, ought to be to us
a warning never to be forgotten ; especially when we reflect
that, from the nature of out Government, we would be so lia
ble to the other and greater evils from whiclMh*, from the na
ture of her Government, is in a great measu^ixempted. Such
and so weighty are the objections to conquering Mexico, and
holding it as a subject-province.
Nor are the reasons less weighty against incorporating her
into the Union. Ai far as law is concerned, that is easily done.
All that is necessary is to establish a T? rritorial Government
for the several States in Mexico, of which there are upwards
of twenty ; appoint governors, judges, and magistrates, and
to give to the population a subordinate ri^hC of making laws,
we defraying the cost of the Government. So far as legisla
tion goes, the woik will be dune ; but there would be a great
difference between the-e Territorial Governments and those
which we have heretofore established within our own limits.
These are only the offsets of our own people, or foreigners
| from the same countries from which our ancestors came, Tbe
! first settlers in the Territories are too few in number to form
I and support a government of their own, and are under obli
( gation to tho Government of the United States for forming one
for them, and defraying the expense of maintaining it?know
ing, as they do, that, when they have sufficient population,
j they will be permitted to form a constitution /or themselves,
and be admitted as a member of the Union. During the
: period of their Territoiial Government, no force is neces
sary to keep them in a state of subjection. The case will
be entirely different with these Mexican Territories. When
| you form them, you must have powerful armies to hold
them in subjection, with all tbe expense? incident to sup
< porting them. You may call them Territories, but they
woultl, in reality, be but provinces under another name, and
would involve the country in all the difficulties and dangers
1 which I have already shown would result from holding the
country in that condition. How long this state of things
would last before they would be fitted to lie incorporated into
1 the Union as Stales, wo may form some idea from simi*
i lar instances wiih which we are familiar. Ireland hus been
held in subjection by England for muny centuries, and yet
remains hostile, although her people am of a kindred race with
the conquerors. The French colony in Canada still entertain
hostile fet lings towards their conquerors, although living in
the midst of them for nearly one hundred years. If we may
judge from these examples, it would not be unsafe ty conclude
that the Mexicans never will be heartily reconciled to our au
thority. The better class have Castiliau blood in their veins,
and are of the old Gothic stock?quite <qual to the Anglo
Saxons in many res|>ects, and lit some superior. Of all the
people upon earth they are the most pertinacious; they hold
out longer, and of cn when there would seem to be no
prospect of ever making effectual resistance. It is admitted,
i oeueve, on nil nanus, that they arc now universally hostile
to u?, and the probability is will continue sj.
But suppose this difficulty removed". Suppose their hostility
should'cease, and they should become desirous of being in
corporated in our Union. Ought we to admit thera ? Are
the Mexicans (it to be politically associ itt d with us > Are they
fit not only to govern themselves, but for governing us also ? Are
any of you, Senators, willing that your Stale should constitute
a member of a Union, of which twenty-odd Mexican States,
more than one-third of the whole, would be a part, the far
I greater part of the inhabitants of which are pure Indians, not
equal in intelligence and elevation of character to the Chero
kee*, Choctaws, or any of our Southern Indian tribes '
We make a great mistake in supposing all people are capa
ble of self government. Acting under that impression, many
are anxious to force free Governments on aU the people of
this continent, and over the world, if they hid the power. It
has been lately urged in tl very respectable quarter, that it is
' the mission ot this country to,spread civil and religions liberty
over all the globe, and esjiecially over thi* continent?even by
force, if necessary. It is a sad delusion. None but a people
advanced to a high state of moral and intellectual excellence
are capable, in a civilized condition, of foimingand maintain
ing free Governments ; and among those who are so far ad
vanced, very few indeed have had the good fortune to form
constitutions capable of endurance. It is a remarkable fact in
the political history of man, that there ia scarcely an instance
of a free constitutional Government which has been the work
exclusively of foiesight and wisdom They have all been the
result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. It is a
very difficult task to make a constitution worthy of being called
so*. This admirable federal constitution of ours is the result
of such a combination. It is superior to the wisdom of any or
< all of the men by whose agency it was made. The force of
circumstances, and not foresight or wisdom, induced them to
adopt many of its wisest provisions.
But of the few nations who have been so fortunate as to
adopt wise constitutions, still fewer have had the wisdom long
to preserve them. It is harder to preserve them than to ob
tain liberty. After years of prosperity, the tenure by which
it ia held ia but too oflen foigottrn ; and I fear, Senators, that
such is the case with us. There is no solicitude now about
liberty. It was not so in the early days of the Republic.
Then it was the first object of our solicitude. The maxim
then was, that " power is always stealing from tho many to
the few;" "the price of liberty is perpetual vigilance."
Then no question of any magnitude came up in which the
first inquiry was not " Is it constitutional >n " is it consistent
with our free popular institutions " how ia it to affect our
liberty It is not so now. Questions of the greatest mag
nitude are now discussed without reference or allusion to these
vital considerations. I have been often struck with the fact
that, in the discussions of the great questions in which we
are now engaged, relating to the origin and the conduct of this
war, their effect on the free institutions and the liberty of the
people have scarcely been alluded to, although their bearing
in that respect is so direct and disastrous. They would, in
former days, have been the great and leading topics of dis
cussion i and would, above all othera, have had the most
powerful effect in arousing the attention of the country. But
now other topics occupy the attention of Congreas and of the
country?military glory, extension of the empire, and the ag
grandisement of the country. To what is this great change
to be attributed * Is it because there has been a decay of the
apirit of liberty among the people ' I think no\ I believe
that it was never more ardent. The true cause is, that we
have ceased to reinemlrcr the tenure by which liberty alone
can be prea?rved. We have had so many years of prospe
rity?passed through no many difficulties and dangers without
the loss of liberty?that we begin to think that we hold it by
right Divine from Heaven it<e!f. Under this impression, with
out thinking or reflecting, we plunge into war, contract heavy
debt*, increase vastly the patronage of the Executive, and
indulge in every species of extravagance, without thinking
that we expose our liberty to haznnl. It is a great and fatal
mistake. The day of retribution will come \ and, when it
does, awful will Ire the reckoning, and heavy the responsi
bility somewhere.
I have now shown, Senators, that the conquest of Mexico,
and holding it as a subject province, or incorporating it into
our Union, is liable to the many and irresisiiti|? objections
assigned in the first resolution. I have also shown that the
policy recommended by the President, if caniid out, would
terminate in all probability in its conquest, and holding it
either in one or the other mode stated ; and that such is tho
opinion of the President himself, unless in the mean time
peace can lie obtained. Believing, then, that this line of
policy might lead to consequences so disastrous, it ought not,
in my opinion, in the language of the second resolution, to
he adopted. Thus thinking I cannot give it my support. The
question ia then prcaentcd, What should be done * It ia a
great and difficult question, and daily becoming more so. I,
who have used every effort in my power to prevent this war,
might excuse myself from answerin^it, and leave it to those
who have incurred greater responsibility in relation to it.
But I will not shrink from any responsibility where the ssfely
of the country or its institutions are at stake.
The first consideration in determining what line of policy,
in the present state of things, ought to be adopted, ia to de
cide what line will most effectually guard against the dangera
which I have shown would result from the conquest of Mexi
co, nnd the disastrous consequences which would follow it.
After the most mature reflection which I have been able to
give to the subject, I am of opinion now, and have lieen from
the first, thot the only one by which it can be certainly guard- J
ed again?t, is to take the question of indemnity in our own
bands?to nccup\|drfenaively, and hold subject to negotia
tor, a portion of the territory of Mexico, which we may deem
ample to cover all proper claime upon her, and which will be
best suited to ns to acquire and least disadvantageous to her
to lose. Such was my impreeeion when the message of tbe
President of the United States recommended to Congreas the
recognition of the existence of tbe war with Mexico. My
I view, at that time, a? to-ike proper course to be pursued, wan
' I) vote the supplies, to rescue Gen. Taylor and hi* army from
the dangers which surrounded them, and take time to deter
mine whether wo should recognise the war or not. Hud it
been adopted, I would have insisted on raising a provisional
army, to he collected at some proper |>oint and to he trained
and disciplined ; but to postpone the declaration of war until
the Congress of Mexico, in which, according to her constitu
tion, the wut making power resided, should be allowed time
to disuvow the intention of making war in us, and to adjust
all differences between the two countries- Hut, if she refused,
even then 1 would have advised to seize, by way of r. pri>ul,
the portion of her territory which we might select, and hold it
defensively, as I have just stated, instead of declaring war for
mally against her; and that mainly for the purpose of avoid
ing the very dangers against which these resolutions are in
tended to guard. But such was the urgency which was sup
l>ose(l ihon to exist that uo time was allowed to present or
press these views upon the Senate. Such a cour e, besides
the saving of an immense sacrilice of men und money, and
avoiding the many other evils to which the course adopted has
already subjected the country, would havj effectually prevent
ed our being entangled in the affairs of Mexico, from which
we find it now so difficult to extricate ourselves. This con
sideration alone gives it decisive advantages over the course
adopted, and makes it vastly supeiior, even if it should in
volve the same sacrilice of men aud money to maintain a de
fensive line, as would, to use the usual phrase, the vigorous
prosecution of the war. Mexico is to us as a dead !>ody, and
this is the only way that we can cut the cord which binds us to
the corpse.
In recommending this line of policy I look not to the in
terests of Mexico, but to those of our own country, and to the
preservation of its free popular institutions.With me the
liberty of the country is all in all. If that be preserved, every
thing will be preserved ; but if lost, all will be lost. To pre
serve it, it is indispensable to adopt a course of moderation
and justice towards all other countries; to avoid war when
ever it can be avoided ; to let those great cuuses now operating
coutinue to work, and which, by the mere operation of time, will
luise our country to an elevation and influence which 110 coun
try has ever heretofore attained, liy pursuing such a course,
we may succeed in combining greatness and liberty?the high
est possible greatrtens with the largest measure of liberty?and
do more to extend liberty by our example, over this continent
and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand
victories. It may be, in expressing these sentiments, that I
find no response in the breakts of those around me. If so, it
must l>e attributed to the fact that I am growing old, and that
my principles and feelings belong to a period of thirty or thirty
five years anterior to the present date. It is not, however, the
first time I have veutured in their maintenance to stand alone
i on this floor. When Gen. Jackson, some years since, during
the latter part of his administration, recommended to Congress
to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, I stood
? alone in my place here and raised my voice against it, on the
| ground that there was no just cause of war with her ; that in
entering into the treaty to indemnify our-citizens for old claims
aguinst her, the King of France and his Ministers declared to
our Minister that it required a vote of the Chambers to makr
the appropriation to carry it into effect ; and that they were
no further responsible than to use their best efforts to induce
them to da so. This was all'communicated to our Executive,
and the treaty accepted and ratified, with tub condition attach
ed. And yet the President, although he admitted that the
King and bis Ministers had fully redeemed their pledge to use
' their best efforts to obtain the necessary appropriation, recoin
1 mended the adoption of the measure to which I have alluded,
and which would have been tantamount to war. Fortunately
the Government of Great Britain, by her interposition, pre
vented it. This example, I fefcr, has contributed much to give
the strong tendency, which we have since witnessed, to re
sort to menace and force in the settlement of our differences
with other powers.
According to my opinion, all parties arc interested in adopt
ing a line of policy which will with certainty disentangle us
from the ufi'airs of Mexico, and uvoid the great sacrifices of
men and money, and the many other evils to which the war
exposes us. Let me say to my friends who sup|>ort the Ad
ministration in their policy, that if you persist, and if |)eace
by some good fortune should not be obtained, the war will go
. on from year to year, and you will be utterly overthrown as a
party. Do you not sec that its effects, in reference to our
iuternul uffairs, is to dmc you into a course of policy directly
I contrary to that which you have .profound to support, and in
favor of that which you have charged your opponent* with
supporting. You have ever profiled to oppose, an a parly,
a national debt, and charged your opponent* with being iU
advocates. But what, I a?k, are thoeflecls of the war in this
respect ? U it not to create an immense national debt, greater
than that which the party to which you are opposed could possi
bly have created by any other policy, had they been in power.
This campaign, on which you look so lightly, will add to it
a sum more than half as great as the entire debt of the Revo
lution. You have been opposed to the extension of the pa
tronage of the Exocutive, at least in profession. But this war
is doing more to enlarge hi* patronage than any other policy
which your opponents could have adopted. You profess to
be iu favor of a metallic currency. Do you not see that, with
the increase of stocks and Treasury notes, you are in danger
of being plunged again into the lowest depths of the pa|>er
system ? You, as a party, have advocated the doctrine of
tree trade. Do you not see that, by the v??t increase of the
expenditures of the country, and the heavy interest which
you will have to pay on the public debt, you are creating a
necessity of increasing the duties on imports to the highest
? point that revenue will admit, and thus depriving the country
of all the practical benefits of free trade, and preventing the Go
vernment from making any material reduction, until the whole
debt is paid, which cannot be expected during this generation '
What could youi opponents have done more, or even as mucb,
; to destroy u system of policy which you claim to distinguish
you from them, and to establish that which you allege to be
the reason why. they should be excluded from power ? Has
not and will not this war policy, il persisted in, effectually and
finally obliterate the line of policy which you have insisted as
distinguishing you from them ? VV by, then, to save your
selves from such a lesult, do you hesitate to adopt the courae
of policy I have suggested, as the only certain mcana of pre
venting tlieae and other evils, and the danger to which our In
stitutions are exposed ' Thepiide of opinion may resist. I
know the difficulty, and respect it, with which we yield mea
aurcs that we have advocated, even when time has shown them
to lie wrong. But true magnanimity and the highest honor
command that we should abandon them when they threaten to
be injurioua inatead of bencficial to the country. It would do
great credit to the party in power to adopt the policy now, in
reference to the war, of taking indemnity into our bands, by
a?suming a defensive position, which, it can hardly be doubted,
they would have done when the war was recogniaed, if they
had foreseen the difficulties and dangers to whi^h it has led.
It would be a noble sacrifice of individual pride to patriotism.
In asserting that the only alternative ia between the policy
recommended by the President and the adopfon of a defensive
? position, I have put out of the question the policy of taking
no territory. I have done so because I believe the voice of
the country has decided irrevocably againat it, and that to
press it as the alternative would render almost certain the final
adoption of the policy recommended by the President, notwith
standing the disasters which it threatens. Let me say to my
friendson the other side ofthecharnlier (forassuch I regard them,
for political differences here do not afTect our |>eraonal relations)
that they have contributed by their course to fix the determina
tion not to terminate the war without some suitable indemnity in
territory. I do not refer to your vote recognising the existence
of war between the Republic of Mexico and the United States. I
well know that you voted with a view to furnish immediate
support to General Taylor and his army, then surrounded by
.imminent danger, and not with the intention of recognising
the war, and that you remonstrated and protested against that
interpretation being put upon your votes. But aince it passed,
and the war was recognised, most of you have continued to
vote for appropriations to prosecute the war, when the object
of prosecuting it was avowed to be to acquire territory aa an
indemnity. Now, I cannot see how the two can be reconciled?
how you can refuse to take indemnity in territory, when you
have voted means for the express purpose of obtaining such in
demnity. The people are not aide to understand why you shoukl
vote money so profusely to gel indemnity, ami refuse to take it
when obtiined ; and hence public opinion has been brought so
decidedly to the conclusion not to terminate the war without
tenitorial indemnity. But if such indemnity is to be had
without involving the hazard of conquering the country, with
all the dangers to which it would expose us, we mutt decide
whether we shall adopt a defensive position or not now?this
vrry session. It will, in all possibility, be too late at the next.
I have now, Senators, delivered my sentiments with free
dom and candor upon all the questions connected with these
resolutions. I propose nothing now ; but, if I find that I will
be supported, I will move to raise a committee to deliberate
upon the subject of the defensive line.
The opportunity is favorable, while there are so many offi
cers from Mexico now in the city, whose opinion would be r.f
grest value in determine on the one to be a lopted. If the
course of policy which I have suggested should be adopted,
we may not get peacc immediately. Tbe war may still con
tinue for some lime; but, be that as it will, it will accomplish
the all important object?will extricate the country from its
entanglermnt with Mexico.
Drath o? Libct. fiiMur.?The painful news of the
denih of Lieut. II. Ridsklt is confirmed by letters from Vera
Crux. A letter dated Vera Crux, December 24, stales that
he waa killed in an action with the Mexicans about the 3Sd
of November, at a small town called Matamoros, about fifty
miles from Puebla. The letter ad3s ?
" He waa aerving as Adjutant General to General La**,
and when he fell was displaying the gallantry of his name and
raoe, in leading a charge againrt the enemy, in which he sus
tained the honor of his ancestors and proved himself worthy
of his comrades."
Lieut. Rtneitr leaves ? wife and three children to mourn
the loee of a most affectionate husband and parent.
[Baltimore Patriot.
omunsuniAii inouiunun.
Report of the Board of Regent* to Congress.
To the Senate and House of Hepresentutives of the U. State* :
In obedience to tbe act of Congrers " to establish the
Smithsonian Institution for the increase and diffusion of know
ledge among men," tbe Board of Regents herewith submit to
Congress a report of-the operations, expenditures, and con
dition of the Institution, with sundry accompanying docu ,
menU.
Th?i>e documents embrace a complete record, as well of
the operations of the Institution since the date of the last an*
nual repoit to Congress, as of its expenditures and of its
present condition. - They are as follows :
No. 1. Report of the Building Committee to the Board ot
Regents, accompanied by a copy of their journal, from the
date of the appointment of the committee to the l?t Decem
ber, 1847.
No. 2. Copy of the Journal of the Building Committee,
referred to in the foregoing.
No. 3. Report of the Executive Committee, containing a
statement of the expenditures of tin Institution from the or
ganization of the Institution to the 1st December, 1847.
No. 4. Proceedings of the Boaid of Regents from the date
of the la?t annual report to the 22d of December, 1847.
No. 5. Report of tbe Executive Committee to the Board
of Regents, dated December 15, 1847, embodying a state
ment of the present condition of the funds of the Institution
and the proposed scale of annual expenditure until the com
pletion of the building.
No. G. Report of the Secretary of the Institution to the
Board of Regents, contuining a programme of organization of
the Smithsonian Institution, presented to the Board Decem
ber 8, 1847.
Document No. 1 will be found to contain a condensed
statement of the proceedings of the Building Committee,
compiled from their journal, by which it will be seen that, in
the discharge of their duty, they had occasion to collect and
have carefully recorded a variety of information of much
practical value, especially on the subject of building mate
rials. The actual result, in their own case, has been that
they have obtained for the Institution building a freestone
| greatly superior, both in durability and appearance, to any
heretofore used in the public buildings of this city, yet cost
ing less than one-half as much as that employed in the erec- w
tion of the Capitol, Executive Mansion, Treasury Building,
and Patent Office. Attention is respectfully invited to these
results, as they can hardly fail to be important to the public
service, if the General Government at any time hereafter
should add to the number of its buildings in this metropolis.
Document No. 2 gives, in minute detail, the results above
referred to. It contains reports from an experienced geolo
gist on the marble and granite quarries of Maryland ; on the
Aquia creek quarries, which have hitherto furnished the
materials for the principal structures in this city ; and on the
freestone quarries of the upper Potomac, in the vicinity of
Seneca creek, whence has been drawn the lilac grey freestone
employed by the committee for the Institution building. It
contains also a report, by a chemist of this city, of the result
of certain experiments which the committee caused to be in
stituted to determine the durability of various building ma
terials when exposed to the action of the weather.
This document contains, further, a copy of the contract
made for the eroction of the Institution building, together
with the specifications of the same. It will be perceived tha1
the contract was taken at a rate less by about thirty-seven
thousand dollars than the amount set apart by Congress for
the erection of the building. ?
In this document will also be found seveul other contracts
made by the committee ; ameng them one with Messrs. Wiley
& Putnam, publishers of New York, for the publication of a
brief treatise on Public Architecture, to bo illustrated wiih
plans and designs of tpe Institution building, and to contain
the result of a series of experiments which have been set on
foot by the Institution to determine the economical value of
the principal building materials throughout the United States.
It also contains an address by the Chancellor of the Insti
tution, delivered on occasion of laying the corner-stone of the
building, and embracing a succinct view of the objecU and
the general proceedings of the Institution, together with some
detail* touching the style and dimensions of the building
then about to be commenced.
Document No. 3 gives a table of the expenditures of the In
. stitution under the various heads ?ince its commencement.
The entire expenditure is $37,670, of which about two-thirds
were spent for the building and incidentals therewith connect
ed, and one-third for other objects, among the latter upwards
of two thousand dollar* for boolu and philosophical apparatus,
about two thousand dollars for salaries of officers, thirteen
hundred for premiums lor designs for the Institution building,
and $3,876 for expenses of the Board and its committees.
This last item has been considerably swelled in consequence
of the provision in the act organising the Inntitution that its
first meeting should be in September, when Congress was not
in seesfon, and when, consequently, the travelling and other
expenses of all its members, fifteen in number, and some re
siding at a great distance, had to be paid , those of tiffc mem
bers only excepted who were residents of this city. * To pre
vent the recurrence of such expense, the Board, as will be seen
by teference to its journal, has arranged its regular meetings
to take place during the sesaions of Congress?restricting them
to one only each year < and as, at that time, all the members
of the Board except four become lesidents of the city, incur
ring no additional expense by attending to their duty as Re
gents, and therefore charging to the Insdfetion no expenses,
the annual expense of the Board will hereafter be very small
compared to what it haa been ; it cannot reasonably be esti
mated beyond $800 or $1,000 annually.
This item of expenditure haa also been increased by the ne
cessary expenses of a committee'appointed to visit and report
upon public structures in the principal cities of the Union, and
to confer with architects with a view to the selection of conve
nient plans, baaed upon the act of Congress and of a suitable
style of architecture. The Board believe that, when the In
stitution building shall ba completed, Congress and the public
will he satiafied with the result of these labors.
Some expense will annually be incurred by the Building
Committee until the completion of their task. But, as two of
the members of the committee are residents of Washington,
that expense will not be large, and will, the Board believe, be
greatly overpaid by the amount of information collected and
recorded by them, and by the volume, of much interest to the
builder and mechanic, now preparing for publication.
Document No. 4 is a record of all the important proceed
ings of the Board of Regents, extracted from their jobraal and
continued from the close of their proceedings, as given in the
list report of the Board to Congress, down to the end of their
last meeting. Thtre will be found, among other reeolutiona
pamed by the Board, one making appropriations for the cur
rent expeoaes of the Institution throughout the coming year <
also the action of the Board upon the series of reeolutiona es
tablishing a scale of expenditure for the next four years.
Document No. 5 la an important one. In it the Executive
Committee propose to the Board a plan of financial operations
and acale of expenditure for four years from and after the Itfth
of March next | that is, during the last four years of the build*
ing contract. According to which plan the sum of Afaan
thousand dollars may annually, throughout that term, ba ap
propriated for the current expenaea of the Institution, and the
building may be completed and furnished, and the grounda
laid out and fenced, without withdrawing from the amount of
so-called accumulated interest, to wit. $343,189, specially made
applicable by Congress to the building more than $103,000,
and thus leaving $140,000 of that sum to be add<? to the ori
ginal principal or bequeat as a permanent inveatment
Document No. 6 ia alao of importune. The programme
of the organisation of the Institution given therein, embraces
ns well the general considerations which have served aa a guide
in adopting that organisation as tb.i details both of the plan to
intrrau and of the plan to diffutt. knowledge. The report of
the Secretary eluctdatea and expliine the programme, and alao
containa a statement of the progress msde in the preparation
of the first volume of the transactions of the Institution.
The Board respectfully expreas the hope that Congress will
cause to ba published, along with this report, theee several
documents.
All which is reepectfully submitted,
G. M. DALLAS, Chancellor.
J08EPH HENRY, Secretory.
Dicr.ieaia 31, 1847.
Tun FtffAacite or Prnnstlvaxia.??The receipts fro
all aoureaa, during the year 1847, amounted to $4,361,704,
which includes a balance in the Treasury, December I, 1846,
of $384,678. The receipts from the public works amounted
to $1,A87,996, and from the tax on real and person*I estate
$1,380,781. The expenditures during the laet year amount
ed to $3,-<l80,813, leaving a balance in the Treaeury on the
1st of December laat of $680,800. Among the items of ex
penditure for the last yaw we find $690,575 for the public im
provements ; $100,1 IS for the expenses of Government; and
$3,003,340 for interest on State debt.