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RECOLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAN

It was easy to believe, that the enemies of freedom would upon this occasion, turn their hateful eyes towards the United States of America, and endeavour to stimulate our government, who, let us hope, however, has too much sense to be so worked on, to wage a war for the destruction of liberty in the western world. But I, who fully expected to see this, am really astounded at the speed and the boldness, with which the project has been brought forward in some of our public prints, especially the Times, which, in plain terms, urges a war against the United States upon the same principles that the close of the war has been carried on against Napoleon; and, indeed, which aims at the subjugation, re-occupation, and recolonization of that country. Before I proceed any further, I shall insert the article, which has called forth these observations.

"It is understood that part of our army in France will be immediately transferred to America, to finish the war there with the same glory as in Europe, and to place the peace on a foundation equally firm and lasting. Now, that the tyrant Bonaparte has been consigned to infamy, there is no public feeling in this country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans. That a republic boasting of its freedom should have stooped to become the tool of the monster's ambition; that it should have attempted to plunge the parhizical weapon into the heart of that country from whence its own origin was derived; that it should have chosen the precise moment when it fancied that Russia was overwhelmed, to attempt to consummate the ruin of Britain—all this is conducted so black, so loathsome, so hateful, that it naturally stirs up the indignation that we have described. Nevertheless, there is in this case the same popular error, that there was, not long since, when France identified in the mind of most men, with the name of Bonaparte. The American Government in the point of fact, is as much a tyranny (though we are far from saying it is so horrible a one) as was that of Bonaparte: and as we firmly uphold the principle of No Peace with Bonaparte, so, to the conqueror

NO PEACE with Bonaparte; so, to be consistent with ourselves, we must in like manner maintain the doctrine of NO PEACE WITH JAMES MADISON. The reasons for this are twofold, as respecting this country, and as respecting America. A very little reflection will render them sufficiently manifest.—In the first place, hatred of England is the fundamental point in the policy of Mr. Madison. He is the ostensible organ of a party, all whose thoughts, feelings, and sentiments are guided by this master key. Some of the statesmen of this school have not blush'd to assert in full Senate, "that the world ought to rejoice, if Britain were sunk in the sea;" if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty: "there were no more than a sandbank for the sea-monsters to fatten on, a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict." Such is the deep-rooted antipathy which these wicked men have to the land of their forefathers! With such men Mr. Madison acts; and he himself before the secession of his party to power, expressly laid it down as a principle (on the discussion of Mr. Jay's negotiation) "that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France."—His love for the latter country, however, was but an adjunct of the hatred which he entertained towards us; and he hated us for the very same reason: that Bonaparte did—because we stand in the way of any state that aspires at universal dominion; for, young as is the transatlantic Republic, it has already indulged in something more than dreams of the most unmeasured ambition. We need not here detail the long history of fraud and falsehood by which he at length succeeded in deluding his countrymen into war. Suffice it to say, he had two objects in that war: first, to sap the foundations of our maritime greatness, by denying the allegiance of our sailors; and secondly, to seize on our colonial possessions on the main land of America, leaving it to a future occasion to lay hands on our insular settlements in the West Indies. Perhaps when he finds himself unexpectedly deprived of the buckler under which he aimed these stab at our vital existence—the mighty Napoleon, the protector in petto of the Columbian Confederacy—he may be willing to draw in his horns, and sneak away from his audacious under taking.—But having wrested the dagger from the bravo's hand, shall we quietly return it to him to put up in its sheath? No. No. Mr. Madison himself, in his very last public speech, has furnished us with a most apposite rule of conduct, which he cannot blame us for adopting, since he avowedly follows it himself—namely, that we should "not only chastise the Savages into present peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears." Hitherto we have considered the Americans as identified with Mr. Madison's government; but is this the fact? So much the reverse, that it has been openly avowed to some of the states to treat for peace with Great Britain separately; and they would act wisely and justifiably in adopting this measure. The eastern states; the most cultivated, the most intelligent, the most respectable, are at this instant reprobating the thralldom by the southern constitution, which is the cause of our present pleasure —

Union ; or else that constitution has been violated and overthrown by the faction of which Mr. Madison is the ostensible head ; and, in either case, the oppressed states would act justly to themselves, to separate their interests from those of the incapable and treacherous individual who has dragged them reluctantly into a war no less inglorious than unjust. When we speak of these and the like crimes as perpetrated by Mr. Madison individually, we only mean to use his name in the common way, in which persons in eminent stations are generally spoken of. He stands at the head of the list, not better than Mr. Gallatin may be more artful, Mr. Clay more furious, Mr. Jefferson more malignant, and so on ; and besides there is a ferocious banditti belonging to his party, of whom, perhaps, he himself stands in awe, and who, as they consist of fish traitors, and fugitive bankrupts and swindlers, from all parts of the United Kingdom, may easily be conceived to exceed even the native Americans in rancour against Great Britain ; but the more shameless and abandoned are the individuals who compose this faction, the greater odium must be cast on Mr. Madison himself, in the eyes of the moral and reflecting part of the American population. It is a great mistake to suppose that the United States are wholly deficient of characters of the latter description. They have many wise and many eloquent men, whose words yet live in the hearts and in the meditations of their countrymen. Mr. Walsh, the accomplished editor of the American Review, has attained a high literary reputation even in this country, and though the late Fisher Ames (the Barker of the western hemisphere,) is not so much known in this country, he deservedly enjoys a much greater popularity in America. These, and many more such writers as these, have kept alive the fire of genuine British liberty in the United States. Whilst, on the other hand, the miserable blunders of the Dearbons and Hopkins's, and Wilkersons and Hamptons, and all the long list of defeated generals, have thrown a ridicule on that invasion of Canada which was one of the great baits of the war. Lastly comes the fall of Mr. Madison's grand patron, attended with the execrations and scorn of all Europe. Can we doubt, that a vigorous effort on our part will annihilate the power of a faction alike hostile to Britain, and fatal to America ? Is not the time propitious for winning at least the sounder and better parts of the Americans to an union of interests with the country from whence they sprang ?

It is impossible to read this article without being convinced that there are men, who seriously entertained the wish to see America recolonized; who wish to see our king restored in America, as the Bourbons have been in France; for Mr. Madison is the chosen President of the union; he does nothing of himself; it is the President, the Congress and the people, all acting in concert. Yet he is to be put down; no peace is to be made with him any more than with Napoleon; the government of the states is a tyranny; the constitution is violated, or inefficient; its existence inimical to lasting peace; the time is propitious for winning the sounder part of the States, at least to an union of interests with the country whence they sprang. These are sentiments and declarations to begin with; but, in fact, they go the whole length of recolonization; and that is the project now on foot amongst the foes of freedom, who seem to be resolved to prove to us, that those friends of liberty in America who did not wish for the extinguishment of Napoleon, despot as he was, were not without sound reasons for their sentiments. They saw, that, though he had betrayed the public cause, if he were put down there would be men ready to urge projects of the description of that of which we are now speaking. This language towards the United States was never made use of: sentiments like these were never hazarded, while Napoleon was in power; but, the moment he is down, these men turn their hostile eyes towards America, the only republic left upon the face of the earth!—Our quarrel with America ceases with the war. There being peace in Europe, the quarrel is at an end without any discussions. But this writer passes over all the subjects of quarrel. The American President and government are bad. That is now, according to him, to be the ground of the war; and, we are to have no peace with them. I will pass over the impudent falsehoods which this writer utters as to the conduct of Mr. Madison and the nature and the effects of the American government; and come at once to what is most interesting to us now—namely, first, whether a war for the recovery of the American States as colonies would be popular in England; and second, whether it would be likely to succeed. As to the first, I have no hesitation in expressing my belief, that it would be, for a while at least, the most popular war in which England was ever engaged; the reasons for which opinion I will now state. In the first place, peace, real and lasting peace, and a vast reduction of our forces, would be total ruin to a great number of persons and families. All these wish for war, no matter with whom, or upon what grounds. They will be for the war for the same reason that undertakers are for deaths, and without being, any more than these, chargeable with any malicious motive. The farmers will be for war, upon much about the same principles—they being of opinion, no matter whether erroneously or not, that war makes corn dear.—Here are two very numerous classes of persons. A third is the land-owners in general, who believe that peace will lower their rents without lowering their taxes. The owners and builders fear America, who would sail much cheaper than they and who if left at quiet, would cover the world with their ships. The great mannerers ever will be for a war, likely, as they think, to tear up, root and branch, those arguments which are not only supplying America herself, but must, in a few years, really with the emigration of artisans to America, become our rival, and supplant us in the world. Besides if America is to be recovered, we should, they think, have a monopoly of supplying her. Even stockholders, though they might, generally wish for peace, might probably be persuaded, that the recolonization of America would afford the means of lessening the

national debt ; that America might be made to bear a share of the debt—that the lands there might be sold for our account—and, in short, that this might be made an immense source of income, and an infallible security to the paper system. Of politicians there will be two descriptions for the war : one will see in America a dangerous maritime rival—a maritime power which grows, like her own Indian corn, almost visibly to the eye. They will mix this apprehension with the feelings of mortification and revenge arising from the naval victories of America, which are not to be washed away by the fall of Napoleon, nor of fifty Napoleons at his heels. These are honorable-minded men, loving their country—not able to endure the idea, of her ever, at any time, ceasing to be mistress of the ocean, and so terrified at this idea as to lose sight, in the pursuit of a preventive remedy, all notions of justice, humanity and freedom. Another description of politicians, animated solely by their hatred of whatever gives liberty to man, will see in America what, indeed, they have always seen, and for which they have always hated her, an asylum for the oppressed—a dwelling for real liberty—an example of a people, enjoying the height of prosperity and the greatest safety of person and property, without any hereditary titles, without any army, and almost without taxes—a country, where the law knows nothing about religion or its ministers—where every man pursues his own notion in religious matters—where there are no sinecures, no pensions, no grants of public money to individuals—where the people at large choose their representatives in the legislature, their presidents, governors, and sheriffs, where bribery and corruption are unknown, and where the putting of a criminal to death is nearly as rare as an eclipse of the Sun or Moon.

This description of politicians look at America as Satan is said to have eyed our first parents in the garden of Eden; not with feelings of envy, but with those of deadly malice. They would exterminate the people and burn up the country. The example of such a people "sears the eyeballs." They will tell us, that, while that example exists, nothing is done; nothing is secured; nothing is safe; they will endeavor to terrify the government and the nation by describing the emigrations which will take place from Europe; the numbers of artisans and of people of enterprize that will crowd to America, adding to her population, extending her knowledge, increasing her means of all sorts, and enabling her, in a short time, to spread far & wide what they call her disorganizing principles. This last description of politicians have the press greatly in their hands; the press is the most powerful instrument; and it will in this case have prejudice, supposed private interest, passion, and all in favor of its efforts. These are the reasons on which I found my opinion as to the popularity of such a war; but yet I hope and trust that the Ministers and the Prince Regent will not be carried away by such notions. It is for them to consider what is best for the country, and permanently best; and not to suffer their judgment to be warped by an outcry, proceeding from the selfishness of some and the rage of others. With regard to the second question; whether a war for the recolonization of America would be likely to succeed? I think it would not. I must, however, confess, that I agree with the author of the above article, that "the time is propitious" in the highest degree.

Not only have we an army ready organized, composed of the best stuff; best commanded; best appointed and provided; best disciplined in the world; but we do not know what to do with it in the way of employment, and it would be for a year at least as expensive in peace as in war.—We have more than a sufficiency of ships of war to carry this army across the Atlantic, without crowding and without the aid of a single transport. In Europe we have nothing to fear. France will, for some years, have enough to do at home. It is the same in Spain and Holland; and, besides, what are any of them to do without fleets, and where, in the world is there a fleet but in England? now, then, what are the Americans to do against this army and this fleet? I have no doubt that our army would lay waste the sea coast; that it would at first beat the Americans wherever they meet them; that it would if it chose, demolish some towns and occupy others; that it would make the Congress change its place of sitting; but unless the States divided, I have no idea that such a war would finally succeed, and it appears to me that the fall of Napoleon, especially coupled with what will be deemed the rigorous language of the Times Newspaper, will infallibly silence the voice of faction in America, and will make the whole of the people of one mind as to the necessity of providing for resistance.—The Times seems to suppose that the people of America, or, at least a part of them, and especially in the Eastern States, will heartily participate in our joy at the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons. Will they not on the contrary be terribly alarmed? And will not those who have cried out against the government for aiding Napoleon, as they called it, begin to fear the consequences of his fall, when the project of the Times reaches their ears, and when they find that there are writers in England who already openly propose to make war upon them for the express purpose of subverting their government and effecting in America what has been effected in France, namely a restoration? Mr. Ames is complimented by this writer as the Burke of America, and I dare say that Mr. Ames would have liked very well to get a pension of three thousand pounds a year; but in that respect he was not so lucky as his great prototype, Mr. Ames was a poor drivelling hankerer after aristocracy. His party wished to establish a sort of petty noblesse; they wanted to make some honorary distinctions. The people took the alarm; put them out of power, and they have ever since been con-

endeavoring to tear out the vitals of their country. The fall of Napoleon, however, will leave them wholly without support from the people when that people hears that the first consequence of his fall is a proposition in the English public prints, to treat their government as that of Napoleon has been treated, and upon the same principle, namely, that it is a despotism. As I said before, I trust that our government is too wise to be led to the adoption of any such projects, but if they were, what could our friends in America say? They have been asserting for years past, that ours was a cause of freedom against a despot—What will they say if we make war upon them upon the same principle, and for the same end that we have been making war against Napoleon? By Mr. Jefferson and his party it was always concluded that there was no danger to be apprehended from France under any circumstances; and that if France, if the new order of things was subdued in France, America would be in great danger. Therefore they always wished, and they acted as if they wished, that France should not be defeated in the result of the war.

It is in our power, by making peace with them at once, and waving all disputes about differences that cannot arise during peace, to show them that their fears were groundless; but will they not when they see the object of the Times Newspaper, hold it up to the teeth of their political adversaries, and say—look here!! Here is the first fruits of the fall of the man whose destruction you told us we ought to assist in producing, and to do any thing in the upholding of whom you represented as impolitic and base.—

his will be the language to those advisers, who will hang their heads with shame, unless the author of the *Times* can make a shift some how or other to convey to them a small portion of his impudence.—I think it is clear, then, that the people of America would, in case such a war were to be made upon them be united in a spirit of resistance; and if, they were, I have no idea that ten such armies as all that we could send, well disciplined and brave as our army is, would finally succeed in subduing and re-colonizing the country: We might make inroads from Canada; we might destroy manufactories; we might lay waste the cornfields and burn many of the mills; we might tear the country a good deal to pieces; but I do not believe that we should, even by adding another eight hundred millions to our debt, secure one single colony in the country now called the United States of America. Yet it is really true that the enemies of freedom, while America remains what she now is, have gained nothing. Napoleon has been put down, but then he was an enemy of freedom. He was not owned by any friend of freedom, France was not a republic, nor had she a representative government under her. The war against him was in the name of the people. The example, so hateful to the enemies of liberty, of a people happy and free, without distinction of ranks, without an established church, without hereditary power or privilege of any sort, with a press now perfectly free, with legislators and chief magistrates periodically elected by the people at large: this example still exists, and this country is yet open to all the world; and to put down this example would, I am of opinion, cost us more blood and more money than it cost us to put down Napoleon. The enemies of freedom promised us peace, durable peace, if we got Napoleon; but scarcely is he down, when they propose to us a new war, more, if possible, expensive in its nature, and longer in its duration. To be sure America holds out an alluring bait; it presents employment for Governors of Provinces, Commanders, Postmasters, Attorneys and Solicitors, Generals, Secretaries, Councillors of State, Taxing people, Paymasters, Judges, and a long and nameless list of hangers on; but again, I say, I hope and trust that the prince Regent and his Ministers will have too much wisdom to listen to any such mad and wicked project.—It is impossible, however, for the people of America not to feel some alarm and to make preparations accordingly. This language of our Newspapers is quite enough to excite apprehensions; and for this, amongst the rest, we have to a curse base and degenerate press.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE

VIENNA, April 7.

The Gazette of this city contains in the French and German language the following

TREATY OF ALLIANCE.

Between his majesty the emperor of Austria, king of Hungary Bohemia, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, his majesty the king of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty the king of Prussia, signed at Chaumont, March 1, 1814.

In the name of the most holy and indivisible Trinity

Their imperial and royal majesties, the emperor of Austria, king of Hungary and Bohemia, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, his majesty the king of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty the king of Prussia, having transmitted to the French government proposals for a general peace, and being at the same time animated with the wish, in case France should reject these proposals, to strengthen the mutual obligation existing between them for the vigorous prosecution of a war which is designed to relieve Europe from its long sufferings, and to secure its future repose, by the re-establishment of a just balance of power; and on the other hand, in case Providence should bless their peaceful views to agree on the best means of securing the happy result of their exertions against every future attack:

Their imperial and royal majesties, above named, have resolved to confirm this double agreement by a solemn treaty, to be signed by each of the four powers, separately, with the three others.

They have named for their plenipotentiaries his imperial apostolic majesty to negotiate the conditions of this treaty with his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, Clemens Winzel Lotharius, Prince of Metternich, Wineberg Ochsenhausen, Knight of the Golden Fleece, &c.

Minister of state, and minister for foreign affairs; and his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, on his side, Charles Robert count Nesselrode, his privy councillor, secretary of state. &c. who having exchanged their full powers have agreed on the following articles:

Art. 1. The high contracting powers engaged by the present treaty, in case France should refuse to accede to the terms of the peace proposed, to exert the whole force of their dominions for a vigorous prosecution of the war against France, and to employ it in the most perfect agreement, in order by this means to procure for themselves, and all Europe, a general peace, under the protection of which all nations may maintain, and securely enjoy their independence and their rights.

It is to be understood, that this new agreement is not to make any change in the obligations already existing between the contracting powers, concerning the number of troops to be employed against the common enemy; on the contrary, each of the four contracting courts again binds itself, by the present treaty, to keep in the field an army of 150,000 men always complete, in activity against the common enemy, and that exclusively of the garrisons of the fortresses.

2. The high contracting powers mutually engage to enter into no separate negotiations with the common enemy, and to conclude neither peace, cessation of hostilities, nor any convention whatever, except by a joint consent of them all.

They further engage never to lay down their arms till the object of the war, as they have agreed upon it among themselves, shall be fully obtained.

3. In order to obtain this great object as soon as possible, his majesty the king of Great Britain engages to furnish a subsidy of 5,000,000l. sterling for the service of the year 1814, which shall be equally divided between the three powers: and their imperial and royal majesties further engage to settle before the first of January of every future year, in case (which God forbid) the war should continue so long, the advance in money that may be necessary in the course of the subsequent year.

The subsidy of 5,000,000l. herein specified, shall be paid at London, in monthly instalments, and in equal proportions, to the ministers of the respective powers duly authorised to receive it.

In case peace should be concluded between the allied powers and France before the end of the year, the subsidies calculated at the rate of 5,000,000*l.* per annum, shall be paid to the end of the month in which the definitive treaty shall be signed, and his Britannic majesty promises, over and above the subsidies here stipulated, to pay to Austria and Prussia the amount of two months, and to Russia of four months, to defray the expenses of the march of their troops back to their own territories.

4. The high contracting powers shall be mutually authorised to have officers duly commissioned with the generals commanding those armies, who may freely correspond with their governments, and acquaint them of the military events, and of every thing relative to the operations of the armies.

5. Though the high contracting powers have reserved it to themselves, in the moment when peace shall be concluded with France, to consult with each other on the means by which they may most certainly secure to Europe—and reasonably teach others the maintenance of this peace—they have nevertheless thought it necessary for the defence of their European possessions, in case of an interference to be apprehended from France, in the order of things resulting from the said peace, to make immediately a defensive convention

6. For this end they mutually agree, that if the dominions of one of the high contracting powers should be threatened with an invasion from France, the rest shall have no means untried to prevent such invasion by amicable mediation.

7. But in case such endeavours should be fruitless, the high contracting powers engage to send to the party attacked an auxiliary army of 60,000.

8. This army shall consist of 30,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, with a proportionate train of artillery and ammunition. Care should be taken that it shal take the field at the very latest in two months after it is called for, and in the manner most effectual for the power so attacked or threatened.

9. As on account of the situation of the theatre of war, or for other reasons, it might be difficult for Great Britain to furnish the stipulated assistance in English troops within the appointed time, and keep them up to the full war complements, his Britannic Majesty reserves to himself the right to furnish his contingent to the power requiring it, either in foreign troops in his pay, or to pay an annual sum at the rate of 20*l*. sterling for every foot soldier, and 30*l*. for every horseman, to the full amount of the stipulated contingent. The manner in which Great Britain will have to afford its assistance in every particular case, shall be arranged by an amicable agreement between the British government and the power attacked or threatened, at the same time that the assistance is required.—The same principle shall be extended to the number of troops which his Britannic Majesty engages to furnish by the first article of the present treaty.

Art. 10. The auxiliary army is under the immediate command of the General in Chief of the requiring power; but it shall be led by its own General, and employed in all military operations according to the rules of war. The pay of the auxiliary army to be at the charge of the power requiring. The rations & portions of provisions, forage, &c., as also quarters, will be furnished as soon as the Auxiliary Army has passed its own frontiers, by the power requiring—and be supplied according to the same standing as it supplies its own troops in the field and in quarters.

Art. 11. The military regulations, and economy in the interior administration of the troops depends wholly on their own general.—The trophies taken from the enemy belong to the troops which have gained them.