

tion should be so constituted, as to utter fully and clearly the voice of the people, and not that of political managers, or office holders and office seekers; and for that purpose, I hold it indispensable, that the Delegates should be appointed directly by the people, or to use the language of Gen. Jackson, should be "fresh from the people." I also hold, that the only possible mode to effect this, is for the people to choose the Delegates by Districts, and that they should vote *per capita*. Every other mode of appointing would be controlled by political machinery, and place the appointments in the hands of the few, who work it.

I object, then, to the proposed Convention, because it will not be constituted in conformity with this fundamental article of the Republican creed. The Delegates to it will be appointed from some of the States, not by the people in Districts, but as has been stated, by State Conventions en masse, composed of Delegates, appointed in all cases, as far as I am informed, by County or District Conventions, and in some cases, if not misinformed, these again composed of Delegates appointed by still smaller divisions, or a few interested individuals. Instead then, of being directly, or fresh from the people, the Delegates to the Baltimore Convention will be the Delegates of Delegates; and of course removed, in all cases, at least three, if not four degrees from the people. At each successive remove, the votes of the people will become less full and distinct, until, at last, it will be so faint and imperfect, as not to be audible. To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form a scheme more perfectly calculated to annihilate the control of the people over the Presidential election, and vest it in those, who make politics a trade, and who live or expect to live on the Government.

In this connection, I object not the less strongly to the mode in which Virginia has resolved the Delegates shall vote. With all due respect, I must say, I can imagine nothing more directly in conflict with the principles of our federal system of government, or to use a broader expression, the principles on which all confederated communities have been united. I hazard nothing in saying, that there is not an instance in our political history, from the meeting of the first Revolutionary Congress to the present day, of the Delegates of any State, voting by majority and counting *per capita*; nor do I believe an instance of the kind can be found in the history of any confederated community. There is indeed something monstrous in the idea of giving the majority the right of impressing the vote of the minority into its service, and counting them as its own. The plain rule—that which has ever prevailed, and which conforms to the dictates of common sense, is, that where a State votes as a State, by a majority of its Delegates, the votes count one, be they few or many, or the State large or small. On the contrary, where the votes of all the Delegates are counted, the vote individually and independently, each for himself counting one. And it is to be noted, that wherever this latter mode of voting exists among confederated States, it is in all cases founded on compact, to which the consent of each State is required. In the absence of compact, the invariable mode of voting in such States, is, in all cases, by the majority, their vote counting one. The course which Virginia has resolved to take, is in violation of this plain and fundamental rule, and if it should become a settled practice, would be destructive of the foundation on which the whole structure of the State Right doctrine is reared.

I hold, in the next place, to be an indispensable principle, that the Convention should be so constituted, as to give to each State, in the nomination of a candidate, the same relative weight, which the Constitution secure to it in the election of the President, making due allowance for its relative party strength. By the election, I mean the whole—the eventual choice when it goes into the House of Representatives, as well as the primary vote in the electoral college. The one is as much a part of the election as the other. The two make the whole. The adoption of the one, in the Convention, which framed the Constitution, depended on the adoption of the other. Neither could possibly be adopted alone. The two were the result of compromise between the larger and smaller States, after a long and doubtful struggle, which threatened the loss of the Constitution itself. The object of giving the eventual choice by the House, was to counterpoise the preponderance of the larger in the electoral college. Without this, the smaller would have voted against the whole provision, and its rejection would have been the consequence. Even as it stands, Delaware voted against it. In confirmation of what I state, I refer to Mr. Madison's report on the proceedings of the Convention.

Having stated what I mean by the election, it will require but a few words to explain my reasons for the principles I have laid down. They are few and simple, and rest on the ground, that the nomination is in reality the election, if concurred in, as far as the party is concerned. It is so intended to be. The leading reason assigned for making it, is to prevent a division of the party, and thereby prevent the election from going into the House, where the smaller States would have the advantage intended to be secured to them by the Constitution, by being placed on an equality with the larger.

Such being the intended object and effect, I now submit to every candid mind, whether the Convention ought not to be so constituted, as to compensate in the nomination for the important advantage in the election, which the smaller States surrender by going into a Convention. Would it not be unfair—a palpable want of good faith and subversive of the compromise of the Constitution to withhold it? Or, if demanded, would it be short of an insult to refuse it? Can it be thought, that the smaller States are so debased and absorbed in the party politics of the day, as to permit themselves to be thus indirectly stripped of a right, which their high minded and patriotic ancestors sold so dear, as even to prefer the loss of the Constitution itself, rather than surrender it?

I object, then, to the proposed Convention, in this connection, because it makes no compensation to the smaller States for the surrender of this unquestionable and

important constitutional right. Instead of that, its advocates "peremptorily and indignantly refuse any, and treat with scorn every attempt to secure it." Some have even gone so far, as to deny, that the eventual choice of the House constitute any portion of the election, and to manifest open hostility against the provision of the Constitution, which contains it.

If there was no other objection, the one under consideration would be insuperable with me. I differ utterly from the advocates of the proposed Convention, in reference to this provision. I regard it as one of the first importance, not because I desire the election to go into the House, but because I believe it to be an indispensable means, in the hands of the smaller States of preserving their just and constitutional weight in the Presidential election, and through that, in the Executive Department and the Government itself, which I believe to be essential to the preservation of our sublime federal system. I regard the adjustment of the relative weight of the States in the Government to be the fundamental compromise of the Constitution, and that on which our whole political system depends. Its adjustment constituted the great difficulty in forming the Constitution. The principle on which it was finally effected was, that a provision should be also made, in some form, to preserve the original equality of the States in every department of the Government. The principle was easily carried out in constituting the legislative department, by preserving the equality of the States in one branch, (the Senate) and conceding to population its full preponderance in the other. But the great and difficult task of reducing it to practice was, in the Executive Department, at the head of which there is but a single officer. So great was it, that it occupied the attention of the Convention, from time to time, during the whole session, and was very near causing a failure at last. It would have been an easy task to constitute that department, either on the principle of the equality of the States in the government, or that of population. To combine the two, in the election of a single officer, was quite a different affair; but however difficult, it had to be performed, at the hazard of losing the Constitution.

It was finally accomplished, by giving to the larger States nearly the same preponderance in the electoral college, as they have in the House, and to the smaller, in the event of a choice by the House, the same equality: they possess in the Senate; thus following closely the analogy of the Legislative Department. To make it as close as possible, it was at first proposed to give the eventual choice, to the Senate, instead of the House, but it was altered, and the present provision adopted, for reasons which did not affect the principle.

It was believed by the framers, the practical operation of the provision would be, that the electoral college, in which the influence of the larger States preponderates, would nominate, and that the House voting by States, where their equality is preserved, would elect who should be President. To give it that operation in practice, the provision, as it originally stood in the Constitution, was that each elector should vote for two individuals, without discriminating which should be President, or Vice President, and if no one had a majority of the whole votes, then out of the five highest, the House voting by States, should elect one, and the person not elected, having the highest number of votes, should be the Vice President. It has been since altered, so that the electors should designate which should be President, and which Vice President, and the selection of the House was limited to the three highest. It is manifest, that if this provision of the Constitution had been left to operate by itself, without the intervention of caucuses, or party conventions between the people and the election, that the practical operation would have been such as I have stated, and such as was clearly intended by the framers of the Constitution.

The object intended is important. The preservation of the relative weight of the States, as established by the Constitution in all the Departments, is necessary to the success and duration of our system of Government; but it may be doubted, whether the provision adopted to effect it in the Executive Department, is not too refined for the strong, and I may add, corrupt passions, which the Presidential election will ever excite. Certain it is, that if the practice of nominating Candidates for the Presidency, by Conventions, constituted, as they proposed, shall become the established usage, it will utterly defeat the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and would be followed by a radical and dangerous change, not only in the Executive Department, but in the Government itself.

This danger was early foreseen, and to avoid it, some of the wisest and most experienced statesmen of former days so strongly objected to Congressional caucuses to nominate candidates for the Presidency, that they never could be induced to attend them, among these it will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and Mr. Lowndes. Others, believing that this proposition of the Constitution was too refined for practice, were solicitous to amend it, but without impairing the influence of the smaller States in the election. Among these, I rank myself. With that object, resolutions were introduced, in 1828, in the Senate by Col. Benton, and in the House by Mr. McDuffie, providing for districting the States, and for referring the election back to the people, in case there should be no choice, to elect one from the two highest candidates. The principle which governed in the amendment proposed, was to give a fair compensation to the smaller States for the surrender of their advantage in the eventual choice of the House and at the same time to make the mode of electing the President more strictly in conformity with the principles of our popular institutions and to be less liable to corruption, than the existing provision. They received the general support of the party, but were objected to by a few, as not being a full equivalent to the smaller States. The principle embraced is identical with that on which you proposed to constitute the Baltimore Convention, but which has been so dictatorially objected to by some, who then took so prominent a part in its favor. If you

have not succeeded, there is at least some consolation in reflecting that if others have since changed, you now stand where you then did, in the purer and better days of the party. I was in favor of then, as I am now, not because I consider the resolutions as perfect, theoretically, as the existing provisions of the Constitution, but because I believe it would in practice more certainly accomplish what the framers of the Constitution intended. But while the provision stands as it does, I would regard myself as little short of a traitor to that sacred instrument, should I give my assent, directly or indirectly, to any practice which would have the effect of divesting the smaller States of the due weight which it secures to them in the Presidential election, whether designed or not. And here let me add, that as objectionable as I think a Congressional caucus for nominating a President, it is in my opinion, far less so, than a Convention constituted as is proposed. The former had indeed many things to recommend it. Its members consisting of Senators and Representatives, were the immediate organs of the State Legislatures, or the people; were responsible to them, respectively, and were for the most part, of high character, standing and talents. They voted per capita, and what is very important, they represented fairly the relative strength of the party in their respective States. In all these important particulars, it was all that could be desired for a nominating body, and formed a striking contrast to the proposed Convention; and yet, it could not be borne by the people in the then purer days of the Republic. I, acting with Gen. Jackson and most of the leaders of the party at the time, contributed to put it down, because we believed it to be liable to be acted on and influenced by the patronage of the Government—an objection far more applicable to a Convention constituted as the one proposed, than a Congressional caucus. Far however was it then from my intention, in aiding to put that down, to substitute in its place what I regard as an hundred times more objectionable in every point of view. Indeed, if there must be an intermediate body between the people and the election, unknown to the Constitution, it may be well questioned whether a better than the old plan of a Congressional caucus can be devised.

In taking the ground I have, in favor of maintaining the right secured the smaller States by the compromise of the Constitution, I am actuated by no partisan feeling or desire to conciliate their good opinion. If the case was reversed, and the rights of the larger instead of the smaller, were invaded, I would with equal readiness and firmness, stand up in their defence. I am the partisan of neither one, nor the other, but simply a supporter of the Constitution, and what I believe to be just and fair. I regard the Constitution, as the only ark of safety for all, and I believe that in defending it, I defend the interest and safety of each and all; the greater as well as the smaller—the States invading the right of the others, as the States whose right are invaded.

I have laid down the principle, on which I rest the objection in question, with the limitation, that the relative weight of the States should be maintained, making due allowance for their relative party strength. The propriety of the limitation is so apparent, that a few words, in illustration, will be required. The Convention is a party Convention, and professedly intended to take the sense of the party, which cannot be done fairly, if States having but little party strength, are put on an equality with those which have much. If that were done, the result might be, that a small portion of the party from States the least sound, politically, and which could give but little support to Congress, might select the candidate, and make the President, against a great majority of the soundest, and on which the President and his administration would have to rely for support. All this is clearly too unfair and improper to be denied. There may be a great difficulty in applying a remedy in a Convention, but I do not feel myself called upon to say how it can be done, or by what standard the relative party strength of the respective States should be determined; perhaps the best would be their relative strength in Congress at the time. In laying down the principle, I added the limitation for the sake of accuracy, and to show how imperfectly the party must be represented when it is overlooked. I see no provision in the proposed Convention to meet it.

But, in order to realize how the Convention will operate, it will be necessary to view the combined effects of the objections which I have. Thus viewed, it will be found, that a Convention so constituted, tends irresistibly to centralization—centralization of the control over the Presidential election in the hands of the few of the central, large States, at first, and finally, in political managers, office holders and office seekers; or to express it differently, in that portion of the community, who live, or expect to live on the Government, in contradistinction to the great mass, who expect to live on their own means, or their honest industry; and who maintain the Government, and politically speaking, emphatically the people.

That such would be the case, may be inferred from the fact, that it would afford the means to some six or seven States lying contiguous and not far from the centre of the Union, to control the nomination, and through that the election, by concentrating their united voice in the Convention. Give them the power of doing so, and it would not long lie dormant. What may be done by combination, where the temptation is so great, will be sure long to be done. To combine and conquer, is not less true as a maxim, where power is concerned, than to "Divide and conquer." Nothing is better established, than that the desire for power can bring together and unite the most discordant materials.

But the tendency to centralization will not stop there. The appointment of delegates en masse by State Convention, would tend, at the same time and even with greater force, to centralize this control in the hands of the few, who make politics a trade. The farther the Convention is removed from the people, the more certainly the control over it will be placed in the hands of the interested few, and when removed three or four degrees, as has been shown it will be, where the appointment is by

State Conventions, the power of the people will cease, and the seekers of Executive favor will become supreme. At that stage, an active, trained and combined corps will be formed in the party, whose whole time and attention will be directed to politics. It will be their sole business. Into their hands the appointments of delegates in all the States will fall, and they will take special care that none but themselves or their humble and obedient dependants shall be appointed. The central and State Conventions will be filled by the most experienced and cunning, and after nominating the President, they will take good care to divide the patronage and offices, both of the General and State Governments, among themselves and their dependants. But why say I? Is it not already the case? Have there not been many instances of State Conventions being filled by office holders and office seekers, who after making the nomination, have divided the offices in the State among themselves and their partisans, and joined in recommending to the candidate whom they had just nominated, to appoint them to the offices to which they have been respectively allotted. If such be the case in the infancy of the system, it must end, if such conventions should become the established usage. When it comes to that, it will not be long before the sword will take place of the Constitution.

Such are my objections to the mode in which the proposed Convention is to be constituted, and my reasons for entertaining them. They are such, that I cannot refuse to obey them without renouncing the principles which I have often avowed in public and private, and which have guided me through the whole course of my public life.

In coming to this conclusion, I have not passed over, without careful examination, the reasons assigned by its advocates for constituting the Convention as they propose. They have not diminished the force of my objections. I propose to notice the most prominent.

That which they have urged with the greatest confidence, is, that each State has a right to appoint Delegates as she pleases. I meet it, by utterly denying that there is any such right. That each State has a right to act as it pleases, in whatever relates to it exclusively, no one will deny; but it is a perfect novel doctrine, that any State has such a right, when she comes to act in concert with others in reference to what concerns the whole. In such cases it is the plainest dictate of common sense, that whatever affects the whole should be regulated by the mutual consent of all, and not by the discretion of each. That by the appointment of Delegates to the proposed Convention is a case of this description, I trust I have conclusively shown. I have, I also trust shown more, that the supposed right is perfectly deceptive, for while it claims for each State the right to appoint Delegates as it pleases, it in reality gives the larger States the right to dictate how the others shall appoint. If, for example, the Empire State, as it is called, adopts the mode of appointing (as she has) which will concentrate her whole strength, what discretion would she leave to others, if they go into Convention, but to appoint as she has appointed, or to be ruled by her. It is then, neither more nor less than a claim to dictate, under the garb of a right, and such its exercise has proved in the present case. It has left no option, but to conform to her course, or be overruled, or refuse to go into the Convention.

I regret this, because I sincerely desire to preserve the harmony of the party. I had strong hope that the rally after the defeat in 1840 would be exclusively on principles. This hope was greatly strengthened by the truly republican and noble stand, taken at the extra session and the earlier portion of the succeeding regular session. During that period of rigid adherence to principle, perfect harmony prevailed between the ranks of the party. I beheld it with joy. I believed the moment highly favorable for the thorough reformation of the Government and the restoration of the Constitution. To the Republican party, I looked for the accomplishment of this great work; and I accordingly felt the deepest solicitude, that the stand taken, and the harmony which existed, should be preserved. In order that it should, I made up my mind to waive the objection, which I have long entertained to any intermediate body, unknown to the Constitution, between the people and the election of the President, in the hope that the proposed Convention would be so constituted that I might consistently with my principles give it my support. In this I have been disappointed, and being so, I am compelled to decide as I have done. The same motives which impelled me to separate from the administration of Gen. Jackson, in the plenitude of its power, and to come to the rescue of Mr. Van Buren's at its greatest depression, compels me now to withhold my name from the proposed Convention.

Having now assigned my reasons for refusing to permit my name to go before the Baltimore Convention, it rests with you who have placed it before the people and assented to abide by a Convention fairly constituted to determine what course you will pursue.

Be your decision what it may I shall be content. But I regard it as due to the occasion, to you any myself, to declare that under no circumstances whatever shall I support any candidate, who is opposed to free trade, and in favor of the protective policy, or whose prominent and influential friends and supporters are. I hold the policy to be another name for a system of monopoly and plunder, and to be thoroughly anti-republican and federal in its character. I also hold that so long as the duties are so laid as to be in fact bonuses to one portion of the community, while they operate as oppressive taxes on the other, there can be no hope that the Government can be reformed, or that its expenditures will be reduced to the proper standard.

Were I, with the evidences before me, to say otherwise of my course, it would be, practically, to declare that I regard the protective policy to be an open question, so far as the party is concerned; which I would consider on my part, a virtual abandonment of the cause of Free Trade. That can never be. I have done and suffered too much for it, when its friends were few and feeble, to abandon it now—now, when the auspices every where, on this and the other side of the Atlantic, proclaim the approaching downfall of protection and the permanent triumph of Free Trade. I, who upheld it against monopoly and plunder, in the worst of times, and braved the menaces of Administration and Opposition, when backed but by a single State, will not—cannot abandon the glorious cause now, when its banner waves in proud triumph over the metropolis of the commercial world. No, I shall maintain immovably the ground I have so long occupied, until I have witnessed its great and final victory, if it shall please the Disposer of Events to spare my life, so long. It will be, indeed, a victory—the harbinger of a new and brighter and higher civilization.

Much less, still, can I give my support to any candidate, who shall give his aid or countenance to the agitation of abolition in Congress or elsewhere; or whose prominent and influential friends and supporters shall. I doubt the sincerity of any man, who declares he is no abolitionist, whilst at the same time, he aids or countenances the agitation of the question, be his pretext what it may. If we have a right to our slaves, we have the right to hold them in peace and quiet. If the Constitution guarantees the one, it guarantees the other; and if it forbids the one from being attacked, it equally forbids the other. Indeed, the one stands to the abolitionists, as an end, and is so avowed by the abolitionists; if the end be prohibited, the means of effecting it also are. Of the two, I regard the deluded fanatic far less guilty and

dangerous than he, who, for political or party purposes, aids or countenances him, in what he knows is intended to do that, which he acknowledges to be forbidden by the Constitution.

It is time that an end should be put to this system of plunder and agitation. They have been borne long enough. They are kindred measures and hostile, as far, at least, as one portion of the Union is concerned. While the tariff takes from us the proceeds of our labor, abolition strikes at the labor itself. The one robs us of our income, while the other aims at destroying the source from which that income is derived. It is impossible for us to stand patiently much longer, under their double operation, without being impoverished and ruined.

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

CONGRESSIONAL.

Correspondence of the Charleston Patriot
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24.

In the Senate, after the presentation of a host of petitions on the subject of postage, the bill for the improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, was debated and again postponed.

The resolution of the Finance Committee, relative to the Tariff bill of Mr. McDuffie, was again taken up.

Mr. Berrien raised a point of order, to wit, that the only question legitimately before the Senate, was whether the bill could originate in the Senate, and that debate on the merits of the bill could not be in order.

This was debated by Messrs. Bagby, Sevier and others. Finally Mr. Berrien moved to lay the whole matter on the table. The motion was subsequently withdrawn to enable Mr. McDuffie to reply to Mr. Evans. The former however, is bound to renew the motion.

The Senate spent the remainder of that day in Executive Session.

In the House a report was made from the minority of the Committee on Elections, in the case of the non-districted members. Its takes opposite ground to the report of the majority, and contends that said members were not lawfully elected. Ten thousand extra copies of both report, have been ordered to be printed. I presume the debate on this knotty subject will occupy at least a month.

After the disposal of several unimportant matters, the House resumed the consideration of the report of the Select Committee on the Rules. The question was still on the motion to re-commit the Report with instructions to re-insert the 21st Rule.

Mr. Winthrop resumed and concluded his remarks against the rule.

Mr. Payne followed, and intimated that all this abolition cry was raised by men who sought to create a storm in the hope that they might ride upon the whirlwind. He incidentally defended the institution of slavery, and argued that it is a necessary concomitant of civilization.

The morning hour having expired, the subject was again laid over.

A bill was reported from the Committee on Claims, providing for the payment of the passage of Lafayette from this country to France, in 1824.

The House then went into Committee, and took up the resolution reported yesterday from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It puts forth that in the opinion of the Committee, it is not expedient, at this time, to interfere with the question of Oregon, inasmuch as the negotiations are about commencing.

Mr. Owen has moved to amend by inserting "it is expedient." On this motion, he again took the floor, and resumed his remarks from yesterday. He argued that it is the duty of this Government to give immediate notice to Great Britain of our intention to annul that portion of the Treaty of 1818, which relates to the joint occupation of Oregon. In his opinion Great Britain has not the shadow of a title to the Territory; also, that it is the height of folly for us to negotiate about that which is clearly our own.

Mr. Thomason followed in support of the resolution of the Committee.

Mr. Wentworth advocated the amendment, and made a real war speech.

The subject was then laid aside, and the Committee took up a bill authorizing the transfer of certain appropriations, so as to enable the Navy Department to continue the works recently suspended at the various Navy Yards.

A debate ensued, after which, without taking the question, the Committee arose, and the House adjourned.

January 25.

In the Senate, the resolution of Mr. Semple, calling on the Secretary of State for information relative to our consular system, was adopted, with an amendment requiring a statement of the number of Consuls in our service who are not citizens. The number is I believe, great. It is the intention of Mr. Semple to insert a clause in his bill, prohibiting the appointment of any Consul who is not a citizen. Should the bill pass in that shape, it will be difficult for the Government to procure Consuls at some of the remote stations, for the reason that the amount of fees is so trifling that no citizen would think it worth while to go from this country. It is on this account that the services of resident Consuls of other nations have been secured.

The resolution of Mr. Semple, requesting the President to notify the British Government of our intention to amend that article of the treaty of 1818, which relates to the joint occupation of Oregon, was next taken up.

Mr. Archer desired it might be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to remain until the result of the approaching negotiations should be known.

Mr. Semple contended that the resolution will in no way interfere with the negotiations.

After some remarks from Messrs. Buchanan and Atchison, the subject was laid over.

A bill was reported from the Military Committee to repeal the act of last Session, dismounting the 2d Regiment of Dragoons.

After some debate on the bill to improve the navigation of Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, the Senate adjourned to Monday next.

In the House, the whole day was taken up on a motion to print a report made this morning on the contested election case of Messrs. Goggin and Gilmer. Finally, the motion to print prevailed. The Report is in favor of Mr. Gilmer.

There are several cases of sickness

among members. Mr. Phoenix, of New York, lies at the point of death, with the bilious fever.

This morning, just before the Speaker took the Chair, a fracas occurred between Mr. Weller and the Reporter of the Baltimore Patriot. In the fight, several squares of glass were broken. Mr. Broadfield desired to separate the parties, but was prevented by Mr. Payne. It appears that the affair grew out of a report in the above paper relative to the proceedings between Messrs. Weller and Stewart last week.

The weather to-day is at least twenty degrees colder. We shall, I presume, have to pay with interest for the recent mild temperature.

At the Assembly Rooms last evening, after the dancing, some of the gentlemen got up a fight, and amused themselves by throwing decanters at each others heads.

Among those mentioned as likely to receive the nomination of Secretary of the Navy, is R. M. Saunders, one of the Democratic members from N. Carolina.

January 27.

In the House this morning, Mr. Cave Johnson desired to introduce his proposed amendment to the rules, so that none but the Reporters of the Washington City papers shall have desks on the floor. It not being in order, however, at present, the matter lies over. Should this amendment prevail, the people will know but very little of the real movements of their Representatives. It is well known that the City papers, depending as they do, on the patronage of Congress, dare not in many cases report the whole truth. Hence it falls to the lot of the reporters for distant newspapers to supply the omission, and to give the political details, etc. behind the scenes. There can be no excuse for wilful misrepresentation, but I am persuaded that far greater order is now observed than there would be were this wholesome but hated restraint removed.

Mr. Black made an unsuccessful motion to suspend the rules, for the purpose of introducing a resolution, providing for the appointment of a Committee to consider the expediency of appointing a corps of sworn reporters for the service of the House; and reporters to report verbatim.

This would never answer, for the reports would be so voluminous that no ten papers could contain them. And if this difficulty were removed, who could be found to read such a mass of uninteresting matter. The people care nothing about the dry details of Congress. They desire to have the principal points of the speeches, with the line of argument. All beyond this is seldom read.

Mr. Wise from the Select Committee on the Rules made a minority report. Among other matters, it provides for the retention of the 21st Rule.

Several executive communications in answer to resolutions, were received. Among them was one from the President giving the latest information relative to the remaining Indians in Florida.

In his despatch of Nov. 1843, General Worth states: "As yet few have manifested a disposition to emigrate, and the time has not yet arrived to effect their removal by coercive measures, as they are somewhat shy and distrustful of the whites. All have visited Tampa except a few of the very aged, but in parties of 10 to 15 only. These apprehensions under the policy pursued will soon wear away, when if considered desirable, advantage may be taken of a favorable occasion to send off the whole. Precipitancy will occasion much and vexatious difficulty. Since the pacification of Aug. 14, 1842, these people have observed perfect good faith, and strictly fulfilled their engagements. Not an instance of unkindness towards the whites has yet occurred."

The remainder of the day was spent in Committee of the Whole on private bills.

It is said that Mr. Shriver of the Baltimore Patriot, who had the fight with Mr. Weller on Thursday, has demanded satisfaction. The bearer of the challenge was a highly distinguished ex-member of Congress from Maryland. It appears however that Mr. Weller has declined to accept it. Mr. Shriver is of one of the first families in Maryland, and was recently a candidate for the Senate of that State.

From the Charleston Mercury, Feb. 3.

We had no letter from Washington yesterday, but the proceedings of the House on Saturday were without interest. The Senate was not in session. The Mail will be due from Washington to-day.

The Madisonian of Saturday defines its position on the Presidency. It is opposed to Van Buren on various grounds—one of which is the uniform hostility of the greater portion of Mr. Van B.'s friends to Mr. Tyler during his term of office—and another is the Caucus system of nomination adhered to in Mr. Van Buren's favor, by which as the Madisonian argues, candidates are forced upon the people, instead of being selected by them. But that paper also declares utter and irreconcilable hostility to Mr. Clay and his measures, and ends by saying its position is one of armed neutrality between the parties.

In the same number we find a correspondence that has interested us, between Mr. Saunders of the House, and Mr. Henshaw, late Secretary of the Navy. The latter reviews the various petty slanders that have been put in circulation against his character as an honest man, and which have even been set up as the pretexts of his rejection by the Senate. Mr. Henshaw shows in a very simple and very conclusive way that these imputations were slanders, and very silly and poorly contrived ones. We trust there is too much dignity in the Senate to keep the veil over their proceedings in this case. Mr. Henshaw has been considered an able, faithful and efficient administrator of the Navy Department—we have ever considered him, and have no doubt that the country has suffered a loss by his rejection. The general belief is that he was rejected because he was neither a Clay man nor a Van Buren man. But whatever the reasons, we presume the Senate will not shrink from avowing them.

Important Law Suits.—A Washington letter says—"Two of the most important law suits ever brought to issue in this country, are now being tried before the Supreme Court. That of Mrs. Gaines is the first on the calendar, and involves the