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" We will cling to the Pillars of the Temple of our Liberties, and ' ust fall -we will Perish amidst the Ruins."
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Communications, post paid, will.bc prompt ly and strictly attended to From the Washington Union. MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH. IN TiHE U. S. sE' ATE. ON THE THREE MILLION BILL. Mr. Calhoun rose, and thus addressed the Senate. Never, Mr. President, since .1 have been on this stage of action. has our country been placed in a more crivicat condition that at present. We are not only in the midst of a war, very diMilcult und very expensive, but we are involved in a domestive question of the most irrita ting and dangerous character. They bath claim an earnest and deliberate con sideration, and I do trust that before this session closses, as late as it is, that they will both receive a full discussion. It is due to our constituents that the actual state of things in reference to both should he fully understood. Fur the presear, I propose to consider the question which is more immediately pressing-how shall the war be best conducted to bring it most advantageously to a successful termina tion ? Or, toexpress it a little mo~re fully -hom. shallit .he..conductedt to e.nabl. us most advantageously to elTect sill the u-h jects .for wihicb it was made? For it is only by cfteling this t hat the war can properly he said to be succesefuh The re are two ways in which le war may be conduetetl. Tle one is to pttlh on uli-at sive o;peratints until llcxico is cotmpellel to yield to otur terms. The othe-r is. to take a defensive position and to maintain und secure the country already in our military occupation; and -the question which I propose to consider is, " hicht of these two plans of operation ought to be selected. It is, Mr. President, a grave question; in my opiion, next in impor tance only to the waritseil. I have given it my deliberate consideration, tnd the result to which I have come is, that we ought to choose a defensive position. I shall now proceed to state the reasons upon which that opinion is founded. I believe, Mr. President, it is the policy best calculated to bring the war advanta geously to a successful t -rmitnation, or, to express it more fully and explicity'-aOd I wish to he fully comprehended on this important question-to bring it to a cer tain and successful terrmination, nwl that w.i'h the least sacrifice of men and money and with thie least haz-ird of disastrous consequences ani loss of standing antd reputation to the country. If I tightly understand the object for which the war was -declaredl feel a deep conviction that by assuniig this defensive attitude all thise.mag 'be elfected. I say if I rightly understand-for strange as it may seem. to me the object for which this war has been declared is even at this late dlay, left to inference. I have examined the President's message-mfessages raither and the act of this body miaking the vwar, and the result of that examination has b en this-that the objects fer this w' ar hnas been declared are threefold;-first, to repel in vasion; next, to establish the Rio nel Norte as the westertn boundary of Texas; and thirdly, to obtain indemnity for the claims of our citizetns against Mexico. The two first appear to me to be the primary ob jects of the war, and the last to be the secondary object of the war. The Presi. dent in his message to Congress on the subject of the war, does tnot -recommendm Congress to declare war. No. H~e as sumnes that war already to exist, because lie aftirmned that the country had been in -vaded, and American blood beetn spik-d 'on American soil. Trhat assumption nme predicated upon the ground that the Rio idel Norte was the wvesterts bounidary of Texas, for he alirme I that Mexico had 'crossed that boundary-had come to the opposite side of the river, which in his npinion constituted the territorial limits of the eduetry. ..But after having beets ens tered into, lhe ~reconimends subseqjuently that the wir be prosecnted with reference to the claims en our citizens. The act of Congress. Mr. President, makirig wvar, or rather recognizinig swar, for war had not yet bieen declared-that act of Congress reiterated the description of the Piesident that war existed lby the act of the republic of Mexico, and that the Rio del Norte was the westertn bounidary of Texas, and that the crossinrg of that river constiiuted invasioni. Hence [ cmits sier both the Executive and the legisla sive braniches of this government are coin miitted to the fac' that the Rio del Norte is the western boundary of Texas. and ,bet the crossitne and snitinreof blood on our side is an invasion. These, then. are the primary objects of the war. But hav ing got into war, the President recoin mends it to be prosecuted for the object I have mentioned-that is to say. indemni ty fot our citizens-a recoinitiudation, in ay opinion, proper of itself; for while we are engaged in war all the differences be tween the i wo countries ought, if possible, to be settled.-These appear to mhe be the objects of the war.-Conquest is expressly disavoned, and constitutes none of the objects of the-war. The President, in ad dition, recommends that we shall also prosecute the war. in order to obtain in demnity for the expense of the war, but that in no sense can be considered as an object of that war. It is neither more nor less than a mere question of policy; for it would be absurd in the extreme to suppose that a nation would enter into a war for the purpose of indemnifying itself for the expenses of that war. I hold that such being the objects of the war, that nall the objects for which it was declared can ba accomplised by taking a defeusive posi tion. Two of them have been already entirely affrcted. 'T'he enemy has been repelled by tawo brillPaut victories. The Rio del Norte is held from the mnuth to its extreme source on the eastern side by ourselves.-Not a Mexican soldier is to be found oti the eastern side of it. As to the remaining indemnity to our citizens such has been the success of our arms that we have not only acquired enough fur that, but vastly more, to con prehead, great as they already have been, the expenses of the war, if it should be judged that it were wise, sound, and just policy on our p.-art so to defray them. i'ere, Mr. President, arises the question shah we hold the line that we now occu py. and which we cover by our military forces, comprehen-lhng two thirds of the whole of Mexico, as is estimated, compri sing the valley of the Del Norte on both sides, quite up on the western side of the Sierra - Madre, and comprising on thte southern side of our line-1 mean Oregon, down to:tho southern extremities of the Californias and Now Mexico ? Shall we hold to that; or, shall we select some other porton more suited to the objects we have in view ? I am out prepared to discuss aud .decide tat ,-Za- r - a therquisite intrnation, ;:aid if I had, it would nout be aece:sary for the bj..Ct wiiel I have in view. What I prupue to consider in tae rresetr stage of the : case-in the atseace of such inf.rntiation is this. wv-hat are general considerations t' hich ought to govern us in selecting a defensive line if it shouli be determined that is the pmper course of policy ? And this again, must he decided frorn the ob jects wich sutch a wvar has int view. lI Swill now-proceed to state what these gen eral considerations. in my opition, are. In the first place, it must be such us to effect the objects which we have in de claring war. It mtst tulfil its three con ditions-the repuhion of the enemy-tae dequisitiota of the whole country east of the Del Norte.-the establishment of that as our hourdary and an ample indemnity. But as far as these consideratious are con cerned., we ought not to go) an inch further. We ought by all means-by every consil ration-we ought to avoid the appearance of taking possession of any portion af the couutry as a cotuest-on the principle of a war of conquest. I shall now proceed to state the princi ples wich should govern our policy in this particular. The first and most important consideration in selecting a boundary is this: that it shall be such frots its oaturnl advantages and other considerations as shall involve the smallest sacrifice of men anid money-in onte word, which shall piossess all the natural advantaiges which such a boaundary ought to have for dlefence, and at the satme time be so situated that supplies of mnoney anid food can be dra wn readily to sutpport the line. if tassailed by Mexico. The next consideration, in any opintion, whi::b ought to goverta us in se lecting -the line is this: it ought to he schl as wvould be desirable for us to possess, it, in the ultimate ajustament of differences with Mexiao, that so established shall be comte the common bountdary between the two nations. -And I go further, it sliou'ld. be such as shall deprive Mexico of the samallest possible degree of her own proper resources and strength. Fur nhile we cotnsider our ownt anterests in establishaing a defenisive line, in nmy haunmble opiniont, we ought no: to overlook the considerationa of whaat is suited to Mexico as well as to ourselves. I hold that we ought to bejttst to Mexico, not only because, site is otir neighbor-not otnly because ihe is a sister republic-not only because she is emnulouas noaw, and ever has beetn, of following our exaample-not only because she is rte grea test paiwer 0n the continent, almost if nail qutite next to ouarselves, of all piortions of it Iwhich htave become subject to Europeani p 1ossessiohn. These are high consideraaionts whtich every American ought tao feel, aand whlich every generous atnd sym pathizintg heart will feel. But there are other conisidleratins oif piotential weight otn this point, whaich be long far more to ourselves aa to Mexico. Mexicoi is aiae of te greatest problemns contnected with our foreign relatins, anod in my huamble opinion our traue policy is neithaer to weaken nor depress her. Oat the cntrary, it is our interest toi see her respectable and strontg, and ctapable ofsus taining all the rebtaitos that ought to exist between the two nations, I hold that there is a mysterious conneetton between the fate of this couatry and Mexico, anid that her indepenadence, anti her respectability, nnd hcr cnnability of mnaintaining ~all these relations are almost as essential to us as to Mexico I hold Alexico to be forbidden fruit, and the day that we cousnme it, the penalty will lie almost the political death of our nation ! . The next consideration is, that the line should be such. if it should be established between us and Mexico flit ally, as would lead to a permanent peace hetweon the'two c ountries ; and finally, that it shouhd be such as would lead to as speedy peace as possible, and for that purpose it should be emineni!y coercive. Now, Mr. President, the <question is, what line best fulfils Pf1 these considera tions ? And here, again, I am not pre pared to pronot:1.ce. It requires a more exact knowledge of the counirv-lor I take it all our maps are more or less imperfect -moro thorough military knowledge on the subject than I possess. But while I 0.o not feel myself prepared with the no. cessarv information to pronounce upon this, I am prepated to suggest a line which, in my opinion, embraces most of those cinsiderations, and is as nearly per feet as, perhaps, could be decided upon ; and what specially recommends that line to me is. as I understand by the declara tions of the chairman of the Coiimittee on Foreign Relations, it is substantially the one which the Executive themselves think of establishing even should at often sive war be successfully conducted. The line I would suggest is this-beginuing at the mouth of the Rio del Norte and cou tinuing up to the Paso del Norte, or south eru boundary of New ;Mexico, which near ly coincide, and then due west t, the Gulf of Califernia, striking it according to the maps befotc us. nearly at its head. Now, Mr. President, I propose to turn round, and examine this line in reference to the considerations which I laid down as those which ought to govern us in the selection of a line. In the first plitce, it will enable us to secure all the objects for which the war was decl.red. The inva sion is already repelled. It will establish the Del Norte to be the western boundary of Texas from its mouth to.its source; and it will give us ample means ofindemi nity, even if tie cost of the war itself shall be t . :ideree. one of its objecis ; which, by-tL-by,.in my hiumble judgnent,-I am very far from being disposed to conuoten ut jlect nd r-i a itl y ilii o ta line, and that is, it wovulH involve the least sacritiee of mert and no:ey to tainian it. Atd heoe it has advattages. First, there is the Del Norte. a broad, rapid anti navi. gable river, of which w.e would have the commanun. In a-l ltion to that being near the settled parts of Texas where, in an emergency, the forces necess:ary to defend I it, may be readlily organized, and provis ions readily thrown in on this part of the line. I have consulted the opinions of military then of judgmten' and expericuce, and they :nform Inn that a suitable forti. fication would not require more tian four regimnente, and three forts, to put it in a complete state of defence-ono fort to be erected near the mouth of the Del Norte, another near Canargo, the third at tho Paso de Norte-which last has extraor - di cry advtitares. as it cotitands the tnly passage into New Mexico, and comn mnands the whole of that part of the coun try which we now have in our military occupation. Four regiments would be ample for this purpose aftrr the first year afier haring taken possession and erected the lfortiicationts. The other portion of the line could b, still more easily defended. ,'rotn the lo utains which separate the waters of the Del Norte front those which fall into the Gulf of California or the Col. orado, which is the sino thing, up to the upper end of the Gulf of California, is oc cup1ied bty a savage po;>ulation throug'h its wvhole extent, and requires 1n0 forts. Tuie remaining part is ctovered 'by the Gulf of California. A fe w small vesels-a single regiment-wvill lie ample-for its defence. Hlence five regiments with a small narval force, would be ample to effect all the ob> jects which we have in view in mnaitain inig this line against any power which iAlexico) could possibily bring against us. The next consideration is the conven ience of te country which tmay be coiv ered by the line. Here the advantages are tnt less striking. It is contiguous to us. It has one part upon the western biontn dary of Texas, and the mi-Idle on the southern boundary of Oregrin. But what gives it a. still greater advantage-whast ought to tmake it desirable ini the eyes:of Atrrericaus, and not at all valuable iu'thT estimation of Mexico, is the fact that ii is an uninihabited country. It covers an aera of six hundred thonsand siuar-e tailos. wvith a piopulation less than one hunidred thousand, of all comtplexions and atlI de scriptions of people. It is as little sett1d -less so, inidoed, than the counatry in pos session of our savage neighbor-s. If this country had the choice of two regions of the continent, the oneo inhabited and the other not-if we consulted the genius of our governmtent-if we consult the sue cnss ofour political government, we will vastly prefer the uninhabited to the irnhab ited region. What wye wvant is space for our growIng population. We do not want the addition oif other population. What we watnt is to grow, arid an ripen uninhtab ited country a bove all 'thters the one which best meets that great want, Weo are now iicreasing at the rate of six hundred lhou sand annaally. In a short time the ini crease will lie at thie rate of a mtillion an nually, or, to state it more strongly, we double once inl twenty-three years, we will tnmber forty mnillionsen.at itn anouter twenty-three years we will number eighty mailliotns. For this fasr growing ppopula lion we desire not a settled counutry. We desire not tnex population not homo geneous.ti ,' We desire open space for them to p to. This very reason makes thir countr 3ry.of very little advantage to M exico! " 'population is nearly sta liionary. scarcely advancing at all. al will no thin the tirpe that I have specified a3- in which our population wili have , c 'doubled, he probably more than two mi oansover which it is at pres. enr, . :.; Mr. Pr ' u, so far from being valua ble to Me fit is directly opposite. It is, in tihe.. place, exceedingly remote from her.= lifornia is as remote from New Orlda 1d. not much less distant than it is.. Vashington city. New Mexico is nearer to us than it is to the ,ettled . s f Mexico. It is a source of annoyat -her. It is a remarkable fact in the ty. of this, contineur, that for tie first the aborigines of the coun try press up e European occupants of the countryp a Indians are actually encroachig r the frontier of Mexico ; not but that; .Spaniards are brave, and capableofd qiing themselves with arms. h the jeal f..of the central government has disarme lthein, and they are at the mercy uf.th p ges.. I understand that nut less thai ee or four thousand cap tives of Ne Ieoxico are in thie-hands of the Camnap -s dline. Well then, we gain a most. jirhblo acquisition, and one of the most.. iking recommendations is, th-it we tako4a (tr fro n Mexico, what de prives herd of y resources, cither of men or means; tsrby of being named, while wo give it a- 1 ispjerity. which it never had since the da the revolution of Mexico to the pres me. The next considera. ton is, that' .sihe should be such, if es tabliahed, as ould he the foundation of a permanent eatetween us and Mexico. Now, ' hold atin this respect, it has re markable ad stages. In the nature of things, wec. ot keep our growing pop ulation from asing into an uninhabited country, whe tdro power of the owners is not sufliki' o, keep them out. They will go in. may pass all the laws you choose. o4mav heap up penalty upon penalt i t our pioneers will rush in the cou.r nless the party in posses. sion ara cu kefkeeping them out. 'Ex 'inni'** -. :/tbsocs'.' govern ent was no e" intruders out of the Indian country. We had to ahandon the elTrt, and from time to time remedy the evil by purchasing the lands from the Iadians. If we make a peace with Mexicom, and no provisions he miade for this natural 'teiency of our growin. population. in a few years we will be involved in another war. Another war would be most undesirable, as any war with ,lexico is undesirable. . And finally, Mr. President, for the pur pose of coercio'i, it possesses also sulmcient advuutages. It gives us ample means to lesecured in wh-it we have in our posses sion of the line, if Mexico herself should not be disposed to agree. While I would recommend this as a defensive line,or some very far from holding it absolutely. I would recommend it to be held as the means of negotia0ion. We ought to say to Mexico that we hold it subject to negotiation ; that if she is redly to negotiate, we are ready; and not only to negotiate and settle, but to settle justly, liberally, and fairly-to estab lisi a line which shall preserve peace on both sides if possible. And if any excess on our part, we are willing to meet it as we ought, by the necessary payment to Mexico. But I would go still further. 1 would hold all the ports of Mexico we have in possession, which could be held without too great a sacrifice of money and men. I would hold thea subject to tho same conditions as the territory which I propose to be0 covered by the line sugges ted. I would -lay a high rate of duty which shouldfaltOpon all, arid supply the means for flolditig possession of the couin try. I have conisulted with the p)roper au thnrit y on. that poinit, arid find that, for thart purpo'se. $2,200,000 duties wou d suffice. Trhat could be collected with advanitnges, riot only to us but to the whole civilized wairld, who ought to be admitted freely and readily at a small rate of duty trio M.exico. Sir, these measures combined, ini my opinion, 'vould give us the means of enforcing a sentiment at rno distant day. Now. I thinik I have shown that wve may cerainly mnaiutain this line, and bring! the war to a successful conclusion by. main taning it--that it wouldi at no cost iearcely of men or mousy, not' above our ordinary paeace establishment--that it ia-. volvyes no hazard or loss of reputation to us as a people-and,I may add, would lay the foundatiotn, I trust, when wye wvould comec to a final settlemet, if'we act witih tio spirit which we ought to act of a per manent peace between us arid Mexico. What will"6&e fruits of this policy ? Immiiediately a large portion of the war ex penses will be et toff. The whole of the voluinteer's tmighf he dismissed in the course of a few mouths, as soon as the position is occupied. It would be a savirig of fifteen or twenty millions during tihe war; further taxes would not be required; our credit wYoIldl he immediately restored. The measnre which so many of us on this sido have so much at.hedrr would be res cued--the measure of free trade-which in this dark period of its experience-I mean not so mtuch by our legislation as by that of Greac I4 itain-has showva itself to be the most frhilit6source of opulence anti prosperity that can posdibly lbe <levised. But it ma'y be said that Mexico will hold out. I thintk not-i thintk not. What reason woeuld site have to hold out ? She wonld see that ve bad undertaken a task which we could perfbrm-to which our strength is quite adequete-which we could go through witlh without hazard and with out difficulty.. She would see that she was a great loser, and she would see also, that if she obstinately persiQted, instead iof having a general settlement and compen seiion, she might lose the whale for noth ing. But in addition, Mr. President, the whole feeling of the people of iMexico will be turne'd.. It is now, in their mind, a war of races and religion. They are ex r:ired to the highest point. Ever.y nerve is braced ; every arm is strengthened. The resolution of the whole country is uni ted in a stern resistance to us, so far as we hav', information. If this defensive attiude be assumed, we wil! show that our object is not to sub. jugate the country-that its- races and re ligioo are not to be overthrown. The nat ural currents of feeling will take their course. The people will become more interested in the result. They will be come more regardful of ,their-internd al' fairs than of their external aficirs. In a short time, a state of things would be brought about which would. I think, ter minate in a happy peace between the.two countries, and that of the most permanent character. But. suppose in all this I am mistaken. Suppose Mexico still holds ut with obstinacy. What have we ? We have peace without the, expense of war. We have our population pouring in. ulti nately enabling us ton dispense with the email military establishrnent necessary in the first iustance. 'sir, it would go fur ther. It would put us ouce again on terra frma. It would enable us to. see light. It would enablo us to see our way to the vista before us, over which there now angs nu impenetrable veil. Mr.President, I have now stated the easeihs why I am in favor of taking a de cusive position. I have, 1 trust. success ully shown that we :can bring the war to. t certain termination, without great ex mense of ntcn and money-without haz ird of any description whatever. It now -emains to be shown what are-the grounds if my opposi:ion to the continuance of an. elensive war ; and, if I ant not .greatly mistaken. the arguments against it are as strong ts inaainatiou almost can conceive. lam.- posed to izi .onexvord-,Mr. uwsi, f the other; there is no certainty that it will bring the war to a termination. And te the next place, if it should bring it to a erminatiuon, even in the most favorable ircumnstances, it would he with a vast ex pense of men and money and with no in onsiderable h-izard of disastrous conse luences and loss of national re'putation. n dis:-ussing this branch of the subject, he first thing to-be done is to keep defiu tely in our mind what is the real and true abject of carrying on an oil'ensive war, for until that is understood we shall not be able to come to a:y decisive conclusion. And here I may premise that its ol ject is not conquest-the acquisition ofad itional territory-for that is disavowed. I may premise further, that it is nout so, because we have already, as1 have shown ample territory in our hands, and more than sufficient to effect all the objects of the war.. If, then, it is for neither one or lther of these objects, I ask why shall of. fesive operations be cart ied on? There is but otto answer given to that. It is to ibtain peace, or to use the language most commonly employed. to conquer war. [A Senator. Conquer peace.] . I have ex pressed it dill'erently. That is the propo shtion-to couquer peace. [low is peace uo be obtained, or.peace to be conquered? It can only be by treaty. War may be mane by one nation. Peace is always made by two. The object, then is to get a treaty. WVhat kited of a treaty ? A treaty that will suit Mexico? V ou can pet thatt at anly time. No. You wvant a treaty to suit us. And what is that I WVhy, sir, a trea ty that we shall dictate, compel Mexico to sign aned which shall secure to us the ends for which this war wvas de elred. And what were these eneds? I heqve already enumnorated themt.-Te es tablishmeer.t of the Del Norte as the beoun ldry, and amphle acquisitione for inedeetmity. The object of the whole war, then, is this -to compel Mexico to atcknowlet'ge that to be ours which we already hold ire pos session, and which we catn hold despie of her with almost neo sacrinice. Th~at is it, twist it atid turn it as you pileace; nceic her more nor less can be emadeeof it; that is the whole object of wvhat they call a vigtrous war of offetnce. I repeat it. It is to, com pel Mexico to acknowledge that to be urs which we now heold, aned hold in spite of leer. Now in this aspect of lthe questiotn, I put it hotme to the Soeate, is it worth while to pursue a War oef that des cription vigorously 1 Suppose it a mjatter of~ perfect certainty that you could reach cthe city of Mexico this very campaignl, andi beat hcemn into a treaty of peace ine the city of Mexico; what would be your sacrifce ? Thbe atrmy you propose to raise is 70,000 entn thte expense thirty milliotns of dollate-muche more likely thirty-fiue or forty milliotns. Suppose you leave 50,000 mete in thce field. Suppose the camtpaign is as successful as possible. What is the state of things at its close ? You have sacrificed in~ the first place thirty neillions of dollars to get possession oef the city of Mexico in whlich tondictate this peace, and you leave lost how many lives of or peco pe ? Sir hased upon the ~ calcula tionf the last campaignc which was comparive ly in a heealthy con':try one-thirid is to be lpnt downe as falling by sword, or worse than the sword-the pestilence of the cantn try. Sometheing like fixteene thoesatnd men na to bo at down as sacrificed in this campaign. 0'put 'it home to Sena tors, now is it worth while to sacrifice even thirty millions of dollars, or fifteen thou sand men for the purpose of getting Moxi co to acknowledge that to be oirs which is a ready urs ? :1 put a gruver question, and I appeil to the conscience ofevery mau here, can we, with any regard to the opin. ions and jodgment of a christian people, pursue that war 'vliich must end in such a result ? Is there any man here who will give for California, the lives of sixteen thousand of our people or thirty millions of dollars ? No sir! There is not one, and yet we propose to pursue a war which, if it terminate in one campaign, will produco that resul , in all probability. But I anm but touching the shell of this case. Is there stny certainy you wtill reach the city of Mexico :by the cd of this cam paign ? Or if you -reach Mexico, is thero any certainty that you can dictate then ?. These are the questions'which next de. manad our consideration. Mr. President this question involves very large conside rations. An offensive war looks ultimate; Iv to eubdtiing the country, and, taking that to be the object, we have scarcely commenced the Mexican wear. It is true we have acquired two-thirds of her terri ritory,alrcady,in our occupation; but let us renethber these two-thirds were adjacent to us.. Let us remember further, that in these - two thirdls of her territory which-to pre sent a-vivid picture to tne mind--comprise. an area larger than the whole miagnilicent valley of, the Mississippi, by about 'one hundired thnusauml square miles. There is in this immense space not nore than six hundred thousand inhabitants. We have overrun the adjacent country, of this vast extent, wvth such a population,- hardly a man of whom joined the regular forces of the enemy. and we have got possession. What has beetn the re'sult. Have we con ciliated ;he .Mlexicans in this vast region? Not at all.' On thi contrary, if accoun:s are to lie believed,,they.are more hostile to us titan at first-miore ready to take ad vantage of any misfortune which may be. fall us. Can we hold the country without alhrge force? .'No. We must take off' several thousands of our- bestrroops, to hold and defend the country. -.:ch, do her exterior '.provinces-hardly calTehl Mexico-scarcely belonging to Mexico as a State.. Mexico proper consists of those remarkable highlands of which the-city may be said to be the centre, and the hill region. ex.tending along the Gulf of Alexi. co, quite down to Yucatan, and the same region extending along the Pacific, and eastern side of the Gulf of California. Sir. within this narrow limit-one-third of all Mexico -'there are about seven million of peop.e, fully ten times as numerous as the whole country we occupy. Hiere is the. heart of her wealth and power. What. sort of etuntry is it ? It is mountainous region, as difficult almost as any in the world. It may be well compared toMouztt Atlas in Africa, or the Cauecasus, in Eu rope. It is full ol' the most narrow and dilicult defiles. This is the country we propose to conquer. Well, then, we are, to march forn ard. How are we to over come these difficulties? We arc first, it seems, to take the city*of Vera Cruz and. than march to.Mexico. What is the character of this hill country, ex tend'ng tlong the Gulf of Mexico down to Yu catan 7 It is, perhaps, of all regions of the. earth, one of the most sickly. It is the native home of the yellow fever, That disease is scarcely ever absent. During eight months.ot the year it prevails at all times, and not utn freqently during ten montths of one year. The. months which are free fiom the pestilence are. subject to the most violent storms. April it self is very sickly.-March it donbtful. We are tnw in Februtary-ntear the middle of the mtonth. We may have force to take Vera Cruiz; lbut I aippeal to senators on all sides, have we force e'nough,. or can we have foirce enough in, time to avoid the vornito. and match to the city of Mexico ? I will not 'say thtat we hav-e not. Bitt I say it is nomt certain that we have-it is uncertain. We mamy nomt. Now, if we have. not forc.e enmongh lt this caimpatgn. Mexico will be c couraged and we will be more irreso I ite ini goiing on ltit snapposo wveidearecch the city of Mlexico so as to dictate :i peden. with whom have we to del? A people-a rnero of all others renowned itt history lior their ab sti nancy anod powers of lnng-cioniued resis tance! A peo'ple whose hereditary pride it isi thazt they stand outton the uitmiost-a people who. warred with the Moors for upwards of seven. centuries-a people who for eighty years War red againist their mother country-a peop'je who w ould not recognise the indepenidencedo thicir colonies in twenty years ! Those are the penple we have to dealiwith, atnd is it presum, ahle that Mexico will at once yield to one terms? Is there any certainty-for I go.-on certaiatics non -:nore thant probabilities-can any genitlemtan see, any certaintty of Mexico yielding to any tea ins, event supposing tnis first camnpaigan shaoi1 lind us in the city ot Mexicol WVell, then. we mn~st have anttaner campaign. Now a solemtn question comets up-have we the means-cana we raise the money ? Remem-, her; it.tmist be uitch more costly thant either of the first. It will be carried on at a greater distantce, It wvill be of a character difierent Itomn the atheirs; lor if. we do not ..coitg- ter Mexico-if hecr goverunmt .withdraws,. and we can miake noa peace, we mns then have a mere Giuerilhi nar-suchi as exist, betweeni IFranice anid Algeria at time pre-enit .day-snael as existed betwveeni the :lussmuts .andl Circams sns, Snch is the ssention of war w~e uu haave.-Sliall we hamve. maeans.tz meet this etno: mons expenmse.2 Let me tell .yon. iii the first pilac, this camtipaigni over. .the spirit of vohian teeriiis giiue. :So many ment of brokan con-. stitntionis return-so many who went for glory, return with shattered health-so inany give such a desperate accountt of the alfair.~that we get no more voluntteems. We must depend npon the ordiinary recruicaug, .andit that might be -mificienit to give ags twenty thoiusand tmen Continued uton fourth vage.