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SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 19, 1834. PROTEST Of the President, addressed to the Senate of the United States. To the Senate op the United States; It appears by the published journal of the Se nate, that, on the 26th of December last, a reso lution was offered by a member of the Senate, which, after a protracted debate, was, on the twenty-eighth day of March last, modified by the mover, and passed by the votes of twenty six Senators out of forty-six,* who were pre sent and voted, in the following words, viz: — “ Resolved, That the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the pub “ lie revenue, has assumed upon himself autho « rity and power not conferred by the constitu |: tion and laws, but in derogation of both.” Having had the honor, through the voluntary suffrages of the American People, to fill the of fice of President of the United States during the period which may be presumed to have been re ferred to in this resolution, it is sufficiently evi dent that the censure it inflicts was intended for myself. Without notice, unheard and untried. 1 thus find myself charged on the records of the Senate, and in a form hitherto unknown in our history, with the high crime of violating the laws and constitution of my country. It can seldom be necessary for any Depart ment *)f the Government, w’hen assailed in con versation or debate, or by the strictures of the press or of popular assemblies, to step out of its ordinary path for the purpose of vindicating its conduct, or of pointing out any irregularity or Injustice in the manner of the attack. But w hen the chief Executive Magistrate is, by one of the most important branches of the Government; in its official capacity, in a> public manner, and by its recorded sentence,—but without precedent, competent authority, or just cause,—declared guilty of a breach of the laws and constitution, it is due to his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self-respect, that the officer thus de nounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been done. In the present case, moreover, there is even a stronger necessity for such a vindication. By an express provision of the constitution, before the President of the United States can enter on the execution of his office, he is required to take an oath, or affirmation, in the following words; “ I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will “ faithfully execute the office of President of the “ United States; and will, to the best of my abi “ lity, preserve, protect, and defend, the consti “ tution of the United States.” The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the integrity of the constitution, would indeed have resulted from the very nature of his office; but by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation, which, in this respect, differs from that of every other functionary, the founders of our Republic have attested their sense of its im portance, and have given to it a peculiar solem nity and force. Bound to the performance of this duty by the oath I have taken, by the strong est obligations of gratitude to the American People, and by the ties which unite my every earthly interest with the welfare and glory of my country; and perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of the above-mentioned resolution were not only unauthorized by the constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the rights secur ed bv it to other co-ordinate departments, I 4 deem it an imperative duty to maintain the su premacy of that sacred instrument, and the im munities of the department intrusted to my care, by all means consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of others, and with the genius of our civil institutions. To^his end, I have caused this, my solemn protest against the aforesaid proceedings, to be placed on the files of the Executive Department, and to be trans mitted to the Senate. It is alike due to the subject, the Senate, and the People, that the views wThich I have taken of the proceedings referred to, and which compel me to regard them in the light that has been mentioned, should be exhibited at length, and with the freedom and firmness w’hich are requir ed by an occasion so unprecedented and pecu liar. Under the constitution of the United States, the powers and functions of the various depart ments of the Federal Government, and their re sponsibilities for violation or neglect of duty, are clearly defined or result by necessary infe rence. The Legislative power, subject to the qualified negative of the President, is vested in the Congress of the United States, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives. The Executive power is vested exclusively in the President, except that in the conclusion of treaties and in certain appointments to of fice, he is to act with the advice and con sent of the Senate. The Judicial power is vest ed exclusively in the’Supreme and other Courts of the United States, except in cases of impeach ments, for which purpose the accusatory power 1s vested in the House of Representatives, and th it of hearing and determining, in the Senate. But although for the special purposes which have been mentioned, there is an occasional inter mixture of the powers of the different depart ments, yet with these exceptions, each of the three great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of action; and when it de viates from that sphere, is not responsible to the others, further than it is expressly made so in the constitution. In every other respect, each of them is the coequal of the other two, and all are the servants of the American People, with out power or right to control or censure each other in the service ol their common superior, save only in the manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed. The responsibilities of the President are nu merous and weighty. He is liable to impeach ment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and, on due conviction, to removal from office, and perpetual disqualification; and notwithstanding such conviction, he may also be indicted and punished according to law. He is also liable to the private action of any party who may have been injured by his illegal mandates or instruc tions, in the same manner and to the same ex tent as the humblest functionary. In addition to the responsibilities which may thus be enforc ed bv impeachment, criminal prosecution, or ♦ Yeas—Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuvsen, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith! Southard, SoragUe, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster—26. Nays—Messrs. Benton. Brown, Forsyth,Grun dy, Hendricks. Hill, Kane. King of Ala., King of* Ga., Linn, McKean, Moore, Morris, Robin son, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wil kins, Wrigbi—20. suit at law, he is also accountable at the bar of public opinion, for every act of his administra tion. Subject only to the restraints of Truth and Justice, the free People of the United States have the undoubted right, as individuals or col lectively, orally or in writing, at such times and in such language and foruyis they may think proper, to discuss his official conduct, and to express and promulgate their opinions concern ing it. Indirectly, also, his conduct may come under review in either branch of the Legisla ture, or in the Senate when acting in ^Execu tive capacity, and so far as the executive or le gislative proceedings of these bodies may re quire it, it may be examined by them. These are believed to be the proper and only modes, in which the President of the United States is to be held accountable for his official conduct. Tested by these principles, the resolution of the Senate is wholly-unauthorized by the con stitution, and in derogation of its entire spirit. It assumes that a single branch of the Legisla tive Department may, for the purposes of a pub lic censure, and without any view to legislation or impeachment, take up, consider, and decide upon, the official acts of the Executive. But in no pare of the constitution is the President sub jected to any such responsibility; and in no part of that instrument is any such power conferred on either branch of the Legislature. The justice of these conclusions will be illus trated and confirmed by a brief analysis of the powers of the Senate, and a comparison of their recent proceedings with those powers. The high functions assigned by the constitu tion to the Senate, are in their nature either Le gislative, Executive, or Judicial. It is only in the exercise of its Judicial powers, when sitting as a Court for the Trial of Impeachments, that the Senate is expressly authorized and necessa rily required to consider and decide upon the conduct of the President, or any other public officer. Indirectly, however, as has already been suggested, it may frequently be called on to perform that office. Cases may occur in the course of its Legislative or Executive proceed ings, in which it may be indispensable to the proper exercise of its powers, that it should in quire into, and decide upon, the conduct of the President or other public officers; and in every such case, its constitutional right to do so is cheerfully conceded. But to authorize the Se nate to enter on such a task in its Legislative or Executive capacity, the inquiry must actually grow out of and "terul to some Legislative or Executive action; and the decision, when ex pressed, must take the form of some appropriate Legislative or Executive act. The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed, not as a joint, hut as a separate resolution. It asserts no Legislative power; proposes no Legislative action; and nei ther possesses the form nor any of the attributes of a Legislative measure. It does not appear to have been entertained or passed, with any view or expectation of its issuing in a law or joint resolution, or in the repeal of any law or joint resolution, or in any other Legislative ac tion. Whilst wanting both the form and substance of a Legislative measure, it is equally manifest, that the resolution was not justified by any of the Executive powers conferred on the Senate. These‘powers relate exclusively to the consid eration of treaties and nominations to office; and they are exercised in secret session, and with closed doors. This resolution does not ap ply to any treaty or nomination, and was pass ed in a public session. Nor does this proceeding in any way belong to that class of incidental resolutions which re late to the officers of the Senate, to their cham ber, and other appurtenances, or to subjects of order, and other matters of the like nature—in all which either House may lawfully proceed, without any co-operation with the other, or with the President. On the contrary, the whole phraseology and sense of the resolution seem to be judicial.«• Its essence, true character, and only practical ef fect, are to be found in the conduct which it charges upon the President, and in the judg ment which it pronounces on that conduct. The resolution, therefore, though discussed and a dopted by the Senate in its Legislative capacity is, in its office, and in all its characteristics, es sentially judicial. That the Senate possesses a high judicial pow er, and that instances may occur in which the President of the United States will be amenable to it, is undeniable. But under the provisions of the constitution, it would seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor any other officer can be rightfully subjected to the opera tion of the Judicial power of the Senate, except in the cases and under the forms prescribed by the constitution. The constitution declares that“ the President, “ Vice President, and all civil officers ol the “ United States, shall be removed from office “ on impeachment for, and conviction of trea 11 son, bribery, or other high crimes and misde “ meanors”—that the House of Representat ves i “ shall have the sole power of impeachment”— | that the Senate “ shall have the sole power to | try all impeachments”—that “ when sitting for I that purpose, they shall be on oath or nffirma- j tion”—that “ when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside”— ■ “ no person shall be convicted without the u concurrence of two-thirds of the members : “ present”—and that u judgment sh ill not ex-; “ tend further than to removal from office, and u disqualification under the United States.” The resolution above quoted, charges in sub stance that in certain proceedings relating to the public revenue, the President has usurped authority and power not conferred upon him by j the constitution and laws, and that in doing so he violated both. Any such act couslitues a! high crime—one of the highest, indeed, which; the President can commit—a crime which just- 1 ly exposes him to impeachment by the House \ of Representatives, and upon due conviction, to removal from office, and to the complete and immutable disfranchisement prescribed by the Constitution. The resolution, then, was in substance an im peachment of the President; and in its passage, amounts to a declaration by a majority of the Senate, that he is guilty of an impeachable of fence. As such, it is spread upon the journals of the Senate—published to the nation and to the world—made part of our enduring archives —and incorporated in the history of the age.— The punishment of removal from office and fu ture disqualification, does not, it is true, follow this decision, if the regular forms of pro ceeding had been pursued, because the requi site number did not concur in the result. But the moral influence of a solemn declaration, by a majority of the Senate, that the accused is , guilty of the offence charged upon him, has I been as effectually secured, as if the like decla ; ration has been made upon an impeachment expressed in the same terms. Indeed, a great i er practical effect has been gained, because the ! votes given for the resolution, though not suffi cient to authorize a judgment of guilty on an impeachment, were numerous enough to carry that resolution. That the resolution docs not expressly alledge that the assumption of power and authority, which it condemns, was intentional and cor rupt, is no answer to the preceding view of its character and effect. The act thus condemn ed necessarily implies volition and design m the individual to whom it is imputed, and being unlawful in its character, the legal conclusion is that it was prompted by improper motives, and committed with an unlawful intent. The charge is not of a mistake in the exercise of sup posed powers, but of the assumption of powers not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both, and nothing is suggested to excuse or palliate the turpitude of the net. In the absence of any such excuse, or palliation, there is only room for one inference; and that is, that the intent was unlawful and corrupt.— Besides, the resolution not only contains no mitigating suggestion, but on the contrary, it holds up the act complained of, as justly obnox ious to censure and reprobation: and thus as distinctly stamps it with impurity of motive, as if the strongest epithets had been used. The President of the United States, there fore, has been, by a majority of his constitu tional triers, accused and found guilty of an im peachable offence; but in no part of this pro ceeding have the directions of the constitution been observed. j The impeachment, instead of being preferred j and prosecuted by the House of Representa- j fives, originated in the Senate, and was prose cuted without the aid or concurrence of the other House. The oath or affirmation prescri bed by the constitution, was not taken by the Senators; the Chief Justice did not preside; no notice of the charge was given to the accused; and no opportunity afforded him to respond to the accusation, to meet his accusers face to face to cross examine the witnesses, to procure counteracting testimony, or to be heard in his defence. The safe-guards and formalities which the constitution has connected with the power of impeachment, were doubtless supposed by the framers of that instrument, to be essential to the protection of the public servant, to the at tainment of justice, and to the order, impartial ity, and dignity of the procedure. These safe guards and formal ties were not only practical ly disregarded, in the commencement and con duct of these proceedings, but in their result, I find myself convicted by less than two thirds of the members present, of an impeachable of fence. In vain may it be alledged in defence of this proceeding, that the form of the resolution is not that of an impeachment, or of a judgment thereupon; that the punishment prescribed in the constitution does not follow its adoption, or that in this case, no impeachment is to be expected from the House of Representatives. It is be cause it did not assume the form of an impeach merit, that it is the more palpably repugnant to the constitution; for it is through that form on ly that the President is judicially responsible to the Senate; and though neither removal from office nor future disqualification ensues, yet it is not to be presumed, that the framers of the constitution considered either or both of those results, as constituting the whole of the punish ment they prescribed. The judgment of guilty by the highest tribunal in the Union; the stigma it w ould inflict on the offender, his family and fame; and the perpetual record on the journal, handing down to future generations the story of his disgrace, were doubtless regarded, by them as the bitterest portions, if not the very essence of that punishment. So far, therefore, as some of its most material parts are concern ed, the passage, recording, and promulgation of the resolution, are an attempt to bring them on the President, in a manner unauthorized by the constitution. To shield him and other offi cers who are liable to impeachment, from con sequences so momentous, except when really merited by official delinquencies,the constitution has most carefully guarded the whole process of impeachment. A majority of the House of Representatives, must think the officer guilty, before he can be charged. Two-thirds of the Senate must pronounce him guilty or he is deem ed to be innocent. Forty-six Senators appear by the journal to have been present when the vote on the resolution was taken. If, after all the solemnities of an impeachment, thirty of those Senators had voted that the President was guilty, yet would he have been acquitted; but by the mode of proceeding adopted in the pre sent case, a lasting record of conviction has been entered up by the votes of twenty-six Sen ators, without an impeachment or trial, whilst the constitution expressly declares that to the entry of such a judgment, an accusation by the House of Representatives, a trial by the Senate, and a concurrence of two-thirds in the vote of guilty, shall be indispensable pre-requisites. Whether or not an impeachment w'as to be expected from the House of Representatives, was a point on which the Senate had no consti tutional right to speculate, and in respect to which, even had it possessed the spirit of pro phecy, its anticipations w'ouid have furnished no ju>t grounds for this proceedure. Admitting that there w:as reason to believe that a violation of the constitution and laws had been actually committed by the President, still it w as the duty of the Senate, as his sole constitutional judges, to wait for an impeachment until the other House should think proper to prefer it. The members of the Senate could have no right to infer that no impeachment wras intended. On the contra ry, every legal and rational presumption on their part ought to have been, that if there was good reason to belive him guilty ol an impeacha ble offence, the House of Representatives would pei form its constitutional duty by arraigning the offender before the justice of his country. The contrary presumption would involve an impli cation derogatory to the integrity and honor of the Representatives of the People. But sup pose the suspicion thus implied were actually entertained, and for good cause, how can it jus tify the assumption by the Senate of powers not conferred by the constitution? It is only necessary to look at the condition in which the Senate and the President have been placed by this proceeding, to perceive its utter incompatibility with the provisions and the spi rit of the constitution, and with the plainest dic tates of humanity and justice. If the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is just ground for the censure pronounced upon the President, then will it be the solemn duty of that House to prefer the pro per accusation, and to cause him to be brought to trial by the constitutional tribunal. Bufin what condition would he find that tribunal? A majority of its members have already consider ed the case, and have not only formed, but ex pressed a deliberate judgment upon its merits. It is the policy of our benign system of juris prudence, to secure, in all criminal proceedings, and even in the most trivial litigations, a fair, unprejudiced, and impartial trial. And surely it cannot be less important that such a trial should be secured to the highest officer of the j Government. The constitution makes the House of Represen- j tatives the exclusive judges, in the first instance, j of the question, whether the President has com- j mitted an impeachable offence. A majority of, the Senate, whose interference with this preli minary question, lias, for the best of all reasons, been studiously excluded, anticipate the action of the House of Representatives, assume not only the function which belongs exclusively to that body, but convert themselves into accusers, witnesses, counsel,.and judges, and prejudge the whole xase. Thus presenting the appalling spectacle, in a free state, of judges going through ! a labored preparation for an impartial hearing and decision, by a previous ex parte investiga tion and sentence against the supposed offender. There is no more settled axiom in that go vernment whence we derived toe model of this part of our constitution than, that “the Lords cannot impeach any to themselves, nor join in the accusation, because they are judges.” Inde pendently of the general reasons on which this rule is founded, its propriety and importance are greatly increased by the nature of the im peaching power. The power of arraigning the high officers of government, before a tribunal whose sentence may expel them from their seats and brand them as infamous, is eminently a po pular remedy—a remedy designed to be em ployed for the protection of private right and public liberty, against the abuses of injustice and the encroachments of arbitary power. But the framers of the constitution were also un doubtedly aware, that this formidable instru ment had been, and might be abused: and that from its very nature, an impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, whatever might be its result, would in most cases be accompanied by so much of dishonor and reproach, solici tude and suffering, as to make the power of pre ferring it, one of the highest solemnity and im portance. It was due to both these considera tions, that the impeaching power should be lodged in the hands of those who, from the mode of their election and the tenure of their offices, would most accurately express the popular will, and at the same time be most directly and spee dily amenable to the People. The theory of these wise and benignant intentions is, in the present case.effectually defeated by the proceed ings of the Senate. The members of that body represent, not the People, but the States; and though they are undoubtedly responsible to the States, yet, from their extended term of service, the effect of that responsibility, during the whole period of that term, must very much depend upon their own impressions of its obligatory force. When a body, thus constituted, express es, beforehand, its opinion in a particular case, and thus indirectly invites a prosecution, it not only assumes a power intended for wise reasons to be confined to others, but it shields the latter from that exclusive and personal responsibility under which it was intended to be exercised, and reverses the whole scheme of this part of the constitution. Such would be some of the objections to this proceedure, even if it were admitted that there is just ground tor imputing to the President the offences charged in the resolution. But if, on the other hand, the House of Representatives shall be opinion that there is no reason for charging them upon him, and shall therefore deem it improper to prefer an impeachment, then will the violation of privilege as it repectsthat House, of justice as it regards the President, and of the constitution, as it relates to both, be only the more conspicuous and impressive. The constitutional mode of proceedure on an impeachment has not only been wholly disre garded, but some of the first principles of na tural right and enlightened jurisprudence, have been violated in the very form of the resolution. It carefully abstains from averring in which of “ the late proceedings in relation to the public “ revenue, the President has assumed upon him self authority and power not conferred by the “constitution and laws.” It carefully abstains from specifying what laws or what parts of the constitution have been violated. Why was not the certainty of the offence—“the nature and cause of the accusation”—set out in the manner required in the constitution, before even the humblest individual, for the smallest crime, can he exposed to condemnation? Such a specifi cation was due to the accused, that he might direct his defence to the real points of attack; to the People, that they might clearly understand in what particulars their institutions had been violated; and to the truth and certainty of our public annals. As the record now stands, whilst the resolution charges upon the President at least one act of usurpation in “the late Execu tive proceedings in relation to the public reve nue,” and is so framed that those Senators who believed that one such act, and only one, had been committed, could assent to it; its language is yet broad enough to include several such acts; and so it may have been regarded by some of those who voted for it. But though the accusa tion is thus comprehensive in the censures it im plies, there is no such certainty of time, place, or circumstance, as to exhibit the particular conclusion of fact or law, which induced any one Senator to vote for it. And it may well have happened, that whilst one Senator.believ ed that some particular act embraced in the re solution, was an arbitrary and unconstitutional assumption of power, others of the majority may have deemed that very act both constitu tional and expedient, or if not expedient yet still within the pale of the constitution. And thus a majority of the Senators may have been enabled to concur, in a vague and undefined ac cusation, (hat the President, in the course of “the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue,” had violated (he constitu tion and laws: whilst, if a senarate vote had been taken in respect to each particular act, in cluded within the general terms, the accusers of the President might, on any such vote, have been found in the minority. Still further to exemplify this feature of the proceeding, it is important to be remarked, that the resolution, as originally offered to the Se nate, specified, with adequate precision certain acts of the President, which it denounced as a violation of the constitution and laws; and that it was not until the very close of the debate, and when, perhaps, it was apprehended that a ma jority might not sustain the specific accusation contained in it, that the resolution was so modi fied as to assume its present form. A more strik ing illustration of the soundness and necessity of the rules which forbid vague and indefinite generalities, and require a reasonable certain ty in all judicial allegations; and a more glaring instance of the violation of thosejrules, has sel- 1 dorn been exhibited. In this view of the resolution it must certain- 1 ly be regarded, not as a vindication of any par ticular provision of the law or the constitution, but simply as an official rebuke or condemnato ry sentence, too general and indefinite to be easi ly repelled, but yet sufficiently precise to bring into discredit the conduct and motives of the Executive. But whatever it may have been in- i tended to accomplish, it is obvious that the vague, general, and abstract form of the reso ! lution, is in perfect keeping with those other de-. partures from first principles and settled im •! provements in jurisprudence, so properly the boast of free conntries in modern times. And it is not too much to say, of these proceedings, j that if they shall be approved and sustained by an intelligent People, then will that great contest with arbitrary power, which had established in ! mary of the views of the Executive in 7 ^ U! I them, should be here exhibited. respectI By the constitution, “ the Executive vested in a President of the United s!°.Vi Among the duties imposed upon him ph ' he is sworn to perform, is that of “tat; ”ic*!i that the laws be faithfully executedCare thus made responsible for the entire\ *•nt the Executive Department, it was hnt °n o: able that the power of appointing overZ^ and controlling those who execute the power in its nature executive—should r in his hands. It is, therefore, not only hi A?? but the constitution makes it his duly mi' minate, and by and with the adviceand mi u' of the Senate appoint,” all officers of tjie?v? ed States whose appointments are not in '!,/ I stitution otherwise provided for,” w[,|, ",e Coc sion that the appointment of inferior 0m°V1 nmy be vested in the President alone inT* Courts of Justice, or in the Heads of IW, ments. ' n* I The Executive power vested in the Senate neither that of “ nominating” nor “ appointir 7 l It is merely a check upon the Executive now? of appointment. If individuals are proposed f, appointment by the President, by them dee mi"' incompetent or unworthy, they may withhok their consent^ and the appointment cannot C made. They check the action of the Executive but cannot, in relation to those very subject? act themselves, nor direct him. Selections are still made by the President, and the negative O'-"--..IMS 1C sponsibiiity, furnishes an additional guurante. to the country that the subordinate executive, a well as the judicial offices, shall be tilled v:i! worthy and competent men. The whole Executive power being vested in the President, who is responsible for its exercise it is a necessary consequence, that he should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the performance of his duties, and to discharge them when lie is no longer willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict ac cordance with this principle, the power of remo val, which, like that of appointment, is anony. nal Executive power, is left unchecked by ti constitution in relation to all executive officer; for whose conduct the President is responsible! while it is taken from him in relation to judicia officers, tor whose acts he is not responsible, h. the Government Horn which many of the‘fun damental principles of our system are derived the Head of the Executive Department origi nally had power to appoint and remove at will all officers, Executive and Judicial. ITwas tc take the Judges out of this general power of re moval, and thus make them independent of the Executive, that the tenure of their offices wa» changed to good behaviour. Nor islt conceiv able, why they are placed, in our constitution upon a tenure different from that of all other officers appointed by the Executive, unless it be for the same purpose. But if there were any just ground for doubt oa the face of the constitution, whether all execu tive officers are removable at the will of the President, it is obviated by the eolemporaneous construction of the instrument, and the uniform practice under it. The power of removal was a topic of solemn debate in the Congress of 1769, while organiz ing the administrative departments of (he Go vernment, and it was finally decided, that the President derived from the constitution, the pow er of removal, so far as it regards that depart ment for whose acts he is responsible. Although the debate covered the whole ground, embrac ing.the Treasury as well as all the other Execu tive Departments, it arose on a motion tostnke out of the bill to establish a Department ot fo reign Affairs, since called the Department of State, a clause declaring the Secretary ‘‘to be removable from office by the President ol the United States.” A fter that motion had been de cided in the negative, it was perceived t: nt these words did not convey the sense ol the House of Representatives, in relation to the trm source of the power of removal, the avowed object of preventing any future inference that this power was exercised by the Pre>i<i' in virtue of a grant from Congress, when in that body considered it as derived from foe con stitution, the words which had been the of debate were struck out, and in lieu theie ^ a clause was inserted in a provision conceinn the Chief Clerk of the Department, winch dared that “ whenever the said principle onj “shall be removed from office by the *ie&l 1'i “of the United States, or in any other ca*. “ vacancy,” the Chief Clerk should, dunng- ■ vacancy, have charge of the papers of the ^ This change having been made for theexp • purpose of declaring the sense of Congi en - tile President derived the power of remowi the constitution, the act as it passed has a . been considered as a full expression of the > of the Legislature on this important nau <• American constitution. Here then we have the concurrent an • • of President Washington, of the Senate am House of Representatives, members of '. f| had taken an active part in the convention framed the constitution, and in the ventions. which adopted it, that the ^ n derived an unqualified power of rem0U that instrument itself, which is “he>o 1 reach of Legislative authority.” f Pon a(j. ciple the Government has now beenstca * ministered for about forty-five ) ea,s’,. niad»‘ which there have been numerous remo\ a *■ . _ by the President or by his direction, em every grade of Executive officers, Heads of Departments to the messenger The Treasury Department, in the a; of 1789, was considered on the same m the other Executive Departments, an j0 act establishing it, the precise wor“s ' tfre^. corporated indicative of the sense of ® n that the President derives his power to } the Secretary from the constitution,"