Alexandria gazette. [volume], April 19, 1834, Image 3

About Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974

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• in the act esulilisliiiig the Department of
ted i«n Affairs. An assistant Secretary of the
l°«sury was created, and it was provided that
Trehn«ld take charge of the books and papers
^ Department “whenever the Secretary
o ^ebeDremved from office by the President of
sh^ Itnited States.” The Secretary of the
Sveisury being appointed by the President, and
Jconsidered as constitutionally removable
it appears never to have occurred to
by; nne in the Congress of 1789, or since, until
vpcentlv, that he was other than an Execu
te1* officer the mere instrument of the Chief
^istrate in the execution of the laws, subject,
rra° ]j other Heads of Departments, to his su
rvision and control. No such idea as an offi
^rof the Congress can be found in the consti
fnLn or appears to have suggested itself to
hose who organized the Government. There
^officers of each House, the appointment of
hich is authorised by the constitution, but all
fficers referred to in that instrument, as coming
\jJhm the appointing power of the President,
bother established thereby or created by law.
^ “officers of the United States.” No joint
^ower of appointment is given to the two Hous
- of Congress nor is there any accountability
mthem a* one body, but as soon as any office
•-created by law, of whatever name or charac
ter the appointment of the person or persons to
fi'i’it devolves by the constitution upon the Pre
'dent, with the advice and consent of the Se
nate unless it be an inferior office, and the ap
pointment be vested by the law itself “in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”
But at the time of the organization of the
Treasury Department, an incident occurred
which distinctly evinces the unanimous concur
rence of the first Congress in the principle that
the Treasury Department is wholly Executive
in its character and responsibilities. Amotion
was made to strike out the provision of the bill
making it the duty of the Secretary “ to digest
and report plans for theimprovement and man
agement of the revenue, and tor the support of
public credit,” on the ground that it would give
the Executive Department of the Government
too much influence and power in Congress.—
The motion was not opposed on the ground that
the Secretary was the officer of Congress and
responsible to that body, which would have
been conclusive, if. admitted, but on other
grounds which conceded his Executive charac
ter throughout. The whole discussion evinces
an unanimous concurrence in the principle, that
the Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an Ex
ecutive officer, and the struggle of the minority
was to restrict his power as such. From that
time down to the present, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Treasurer, Register, Comptrol
lers, Auditors, and Clerks, who fill the offices of
IVinirtmpnl haro in thn r»f thr»
lilt*v .fcfvj/v. ——-7 - * — —~ r--—
Government, been considered and treated as
on the same footing with corresponding grades
of officers in all the other Executive Depart
ments.
The custody of the public property, under
such regulations as may be prescribed by legis
lative authority, has always been considered an
appropriate function of the Executive Depatt
ment in this and all other Governments. In ac
cordance with this principle, every species of
property belonging to the United Slates, (ex
cepting that which is in the use of the several
co-ordinate Departments of the Government,
as means to aid them in performing their appro
priate functions,) is in charge of officers appoin
ted by the President, whether it be lands, or
buildings, or merchandise, or provisions, or
• clothing, or arms and munitions of war. The
superintendents and keepers of the whole are
appointed by the President, responsible to him,
and removable to his will.
Public moneys is but a species of public
property. It cannot be raised by taxations or
customs, nor brought into the treasury in any
other way, except by law; but whenever or how
ever obtained, its custody always has been,
and always must be, unless the constitu
tion be changed, intrusted to the Executive
Department. "No Officer can be created by
Congress for the purpose of taking charge of
it, whose appointment would not, by the consti
tution, at once devolve on the President, and
who would not be responsible to him for the
faithful performance of his duties. The legisla
tive power may undoubtedly bind him and the
President, by any laws they may think proper
to enact; they may prescribe in what place par
ticular portions of the public money shall be
kept, and for what reason it shall be removed;
as they may direct that supplies for the army or
navy shall be kept in particular stores; and it
will be the duty of the President to see that the
law is faithfully executed—yet will the custodv
remain in the Executive Department of the Go
vernment'. Were the Congress to assume, with
or without a legislative act the power of ap
pointing officers independently of the President,
to take the charge and custody of the public pro
perty contained in the miltary and naval arsen
als, magazines, and storehouses, it is believed
that such an act would be regarded by all as a
palpable usurpation of Executive power, subver
sive of the form as well as the fundamental
principles of onr Government. But where is
the difference in principle, whether the public
property be in the form of arms, munitions of
war, and supplies, or in gold and silver, or
banknotes? None can be perceived—none is
believed to exist. Congress cannot, therefore,
take out of the handsof the Executive Depart
ment, the custody of the public property or mo
fiey, without an assumption of Executive pow
er* and a subversion of the first principles of the
institution.
The Concrrp** nf th*» TTmtpd States have re
'er passed an act imperatively directing that
lbe public moneys shall be kept in any particular
piace or places. From the origin of the Govern
ment to the year 1S16, the statute book was
wnoliy silent on the subject. In 17S9 a Treasur
created, subordinate to the Secretary of
li Treasury> and through him to the President,
ie was required to give bond, safely to keep,
and faithfully to disburse the public moneys,
without any direction as to the manner oi pla
ces in which they should be kept. By reference
° the practice of Government, it is found, that
romthe first organization, the Secretary of the
'easury, acting under the supervison of the
^sklent, designated the places in which the
pubbc moneys should be kept, and specially di
j^cted all transfers from place to place. This
Practice was continued, with the silent acqui
a c,ence °f Congress, from 1789 down to 1816;
pu although many banks were selected and
^charged, and although a portion of the mo
. ys were first placed in the State Banks, and
ae?m the former bank of the United States,
tra r^0n th® dissolution of that, were again
^ State Banks, no legislation
s thought necessary by Congress, and all the
.^rations were originated and perfected by
xecutive authority. The Secretary of the
reasury, responsible to the President, and with
' aPProbation, made contracts and arrange
relation to the whole subject matter,
^.mcn was thus entirely committed to the direc
l«Kt° *^e President, under his responsibili
0 the American People, and to those who
were authorized to impeach and punish for any ,
breach of this important trust.
The act of 1816, establishing the Bank of the
United States, directed the deposites of public
money to be made in that bank and its branch
es, in places in which the said bank and branch
es thereof may be established, “unless the Se
cretary of the Treasury should otherwise order
and direct,” in which event, he was required to
give his reasons to Congress. This 'was but a
continuation of his pre-existing powers as the
Head of an Executive Department, to direct
where the deposites should be made, with the su
peradded obligation of giving his reasons to
Congress for making them elsewhere than in
the Bank of the United States and its branches.
It is not to be considered that this provision in
any degree altered the relation between the Se- j
cretary of the Treasury and the President, as ■
the responsible Head of the Executive Depart-1
ment, or released the latter from his constitu- j
tional obligation to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.” On the country, it increas
ed his responsibilities, bv adding another to the
long list of laws which it was his duty to carry
into effect.
It would be an extraordinary result, if, be
cause the person charged by law with a.public
duty, is one of the Secretaries, it were less the
duty of the President to see that law faithfully
executed, than other laws enjoining duties up
on subordinate officers or private citizens. If
there be any difference, it would seem that the
obligation is the stronger in relation to the for
mer, because the neglect is in his presence, and
| the remedy at hand.
It cannot be doubted that it was the legal du
ty of the Secretary of the Treasury to order and
! direct the deposites of the public money to be
made elsewhere than in the Bank of the United
States, whenever sufficient reasons existed for
making the change. If, in such a case, he neg
lected or refused to act, he would neglect or re
fuse to execute the law. What then would be
the sworn duty of the President? Could he say
that the constitution did not bind him to see the
law faithfully executed, because it was one of
his Secretaries, and not himself, upon whom the |
service was specially imposed? Might he not j
be asked whether there was any such limitation
to his obligations prescribed in the Constitu
tion? Whether he is not equally bound to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, whe
ther they impose duties on the highest officer of
State, or the lowest subordinate in any of the
Departments? Might he not be told, that it was
for the sole purpose of causing all executive of- j
fleers, from the highest to the lowest, faithfully J
tn nurfnrm Inn co*-vir>oa runnimrl nf thorn Ktrlnxir
that the People of the United States have made
him their Chief Magistrate, and the constitution
has clothed him with the entire Executive pow
er of this Government? The principles implied
in these questions appear too plain co need elu
cidation.
But here, alsn, we have a cofemporaneous
construction of the act, which shows that it was
not understood as in any way changing the re
lations between the President and Secretary of
the Treasury, or as placing the latter out of Ex
ecutive control, even in relation to the deposites
of the public money. Nor on this point are we
left to any equivocal testimony. The docu
ments of the Treasury Department show that
the Secretary of the Treasury did apply to the
President, and obtain his approbation and sanc
tion to the original transfer of the public depo
sites to the present Bank of the United States,
and did carry the measure into effect in obedi
ence to his decision. They also show that trans
fers of the public deposites from the Branches of
the Bank of the United States to State Banks,
at Chilicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in
1819, were made with the approbation of the
President, and by his authority. They show,
that upon all important questions appertaining
to his Department, whether they related to the
public deposites or other matters, it was the con
stant practice of the Secretary of the Treasury
to obtain for his acts the approval and sanction
of the President. These acts, and the princi
ples on which they were founded, were known
to all the departments of the Government, to
Congress, and the country; and, until very re
cently, appear never to have been called in
question.
Thus was it settled by the constitution, the
laws, and the whole practice of the government,
that the entire Executive power is vested in the
President of the United States; that, as incident
to that power, the right of appointing and re
moving those officers who are to aid him in the
execution of the laws, with such restrictions on
ly as the constitution prescribes, is vested in the
President; that the Secretary of the Treasury is
one of those officers; that the custody of the
public property and money is an executive func
tion, which, in relation to the money, has al
ways been exercised through the Secretary of
the Treasury and his subordinates; that in the
performance of these duties, he is subject to the
supervision and control of the President, and in
all important measures having relation to them,
consults the Chief Magistrate, and obtains his
approval and sanction; that the law establish
ing the Bank did not, as it could not, change the
relation between the Piesident and the Secre
tary—did not release the former from his obli
gation to see the law faithfully executed, nor the
Tatter from the President’s supervision and con
trol; that afterwards, and before, the Secretary
did in fact consult, and obtain the sanction of,
the President, to transfers and removals of the
public deposites; and that all departments of
the Government, and the nation itself, approv- j
ed or acquiesced in these acts and principles, |
as in strict conformity with our constitution and
laws.
During the last year, the approaching termi- j
nation, according to the provisions of its char-!
ter, and the solemn decision of the American
People, of the Bank of the United States, made
it expedient, and its exposed abuses and corrup
tions, made it, in my opinion, the duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury to place the moneys
of the United States in other depositories. The
Secretary did’ not concur in that opinion, *and
declined giving the necessary order and direc
tion. So glaring were the abuses and corrup
tions of the Bank—so evident its fixed purpose
to persevere in them—and so palpable its de
sign, by its money and power, to control the
Government, and change its character—that I ,
deemed it the imperative duty of the Executive j
authority, by the exertion of every power con- j
tided to it by the constitution and laws, to check
its career, and lessen its ability to do mischief,
even in the painful alternative of dismissing the j
Head of one of the Departments. At the time |
the removal was made, other causes sufficient to
justify it existed; but if they had not, the Secre
tary would have been dismissed for this cause
only.
His place I supplied by one whose opinions j
were well known to me, and whose frank expres
sion of them, in another situation, and whose
generous sacrifices of interest and feeling, when
unexpectedly called to the station he now occu
pies, ought forever to have shielded his motives
from suspicion,and his character from reproach.
In accordance with the opinions long before ex
pressed by him, he proceeded, with my sane
tion, to make arrangements for depositing the
moneys of the United States in other safe insti
tutions.
The resolution of the Senate, as originally
framed, and as passed, if it refers to these acts,
presupposes a right in that body to interfere
with this exercise of Executive power. If the
principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to
perceive where it may end. If, by a mere de
nunciation, like this resolution, the President
should ever be induced to act, in a matter of of
ficial duty, contrary to the honest convictions
of his own mind, in compliance with the wishes
of the Senate, the constitutional independence
of the Executive Department would be as effec
tually destroyed, and its power as effectually
transferred to the Senate, as if that end had
been accomplished by an amendment of the
constitution. But if the Senate have a right to
interfere with the Executive powers, they have
also the right to make that interference effect
ive; and if the assertion ofthe power implied in
the resolution be silently acquiesced in, we may
reasonably apprehend that it will be followed,
at some future day, by an attempt at actual en
forcement. The Senate may refuse, except on
the condition tiiathe will surrender his opinions
to theirs, and obey their will, to perform their
own constitutional functions; to pass the neces
sary law's; to sanction appropiations proposed
by the House of Representatives, and to confirm
proper nominatiens made by the President. It
has already been maintained (and it is not con
ceivable that the resolution of the Senate can
be based on any other principle) that the Secre
tary of the Treasury is the officer of Congress,
and independent ofthe President; that the Pre
sident has no right to control him, and conse
quently none to remove him. With the same
propriety, and on similar grounds, may the Se
cretary of State, the Secretaries of War and the
Navy, and the Postmaster General, each in suc
cession, be declared independent of the Presi
dent, the subordinates of Congress, and remov
able only with the concurrence of the Senate.
Follow'ed to its consequences, this principle will
be found effectually to destroy one co ordinate
department of the Government, to concentrate
in the hands of the Senate the whole Executive
power, and to leave the President as powerless
as he would be useless—the shadow of authority,
after the substance had departed.
The time and the occasion which have called
forth the resolution of the Senate, seem to im
pose upon me an additional obligation not to
pass it over in silence. Nearly forty-five years
had the President exercised, without a question
as to his rightful authority, those powers, for the
recent assumption of which he is now denounc
a d 4 ii /•! f r\ n /I «i» n U o /I n f
C.U* JL 11V V IvlOOllUUv/C1 V I |S\.C4V/Vs UUU »» WI HUU WW
tended our Government; violent parties, watch
ful to take advantage of any seeming usurpa
tion on the part of the Executive, had distracted
our counsels; frequent removals or forced re
signations, in every sense tantamount to remo
vals, had been made, of the Secretary and other
officers of the Treasury; and yet, in no one in
stance, is it known, that any man, whether patri
ot or partizan, had raised his voice against it
as a violation of the Constitution. The expedi
ence and justice of such changes, in reference
to public officers of all grades, have frequently
been the topics of discussion; but the constitu
tional right of the President to appoint, control,
and remove the Head of the Treasury, as well
as all other Departments, seems to have been
universally conceded. And what is the occa
sion upon which other principles have been first
officially asserted? Tiie Bank of the U. States,
a great monied monopoly, has attempted to ob
tain a renewal of its charter, by controlling the
elections of the People and the action of the Go
vernment. The use of its corporate funds and
power in that attempt, was fully disclosed; and
it was made known to the President that the
corporation was putting in train the same course
of measures, with tiie view of making another
vigorous effort, through an interference in the
elections of the People, to control public opinion
and force the Government to yield to its de
mands. This, with its corruption of the press,
its violation of its charter, its exclusion of the
Government Directors from its proceedings, its
neglect of duty, and arrogant pretensions, made
it, in the opinion of the President, incompatible
with tiie public interest and the safety of our in
stitutions, that it should lie longer employed as
the fiscal agent of the Treasury. A Secretary
of the Treasury, appointed in the recess of the
Senate, who had not been confirmed by that
body, and whom tiie President might or might
not at his pleasure nominate to them, refused to
do what his superior in tiie Executive Depart
ment considered the most imperative of his du
ties, and became, in fact, however innocent his
motives, the protector of the Bank. And on this
occasion it is discovered, for the first time, that
those who framed the Constitution misunder
stood it; that the first Congress and all its suc
cessors have been under a delusion; that the
practice oi near forty five years is but a continu
ed usurpation; that the Secretary of the Trea
sury is not responsible to the President; and that
to remove him is a violation of the Constitution
and laws, for which the President deserves to
stand forever dishonored on the journals of the
Senate.
There are also some other circumstances con
nected with the discussion and passage of the
resolution, to which I feel it to be, not only my
right, but my duty, to refer. It appears by the
journal of the Senate, that among the twenty
six Senators who voted for the resolution on its
final passage, and who had supported it in de
bate, in its original form, were one of the Sena
tors from the State of Maine, the two Senators
from New Jersey, and one of the Senators from
Ohio. It also appears by the same journal, and
by the files of the Senate, that the Legislatures
of these States had severally expressed their
opinions in respect to the Executive proceedings
drawn in question Delore tne senate.
[Here follow the Resolutions passed by the
Legislatures of Maine, New Jersey, and Ohio,
instructing their Senators in Congress to vote
against the recharter of the U. S. Bank and the
restoration of the Deposit.es.]
It is thus seen that four Senators have declar
ed by their votes that the President, in the late
Executive proceedings in relation to the reve
nue, had been guilty of the impeachable offence
of “assuming upon himself authority and pow
“er not conferred by the constitution and laws,
“but in derogation of both,” whilst the Legisla
tures of their respective States had deliberately
a iproved those very proceedings, as consistent
with the constitution, and demanded by the pub
lic good. If these four votes had been given in
accordance with the sentiments of the Legisla
tures, as above expressed, there would have
been but twenty-four votes out of forty-six for
censuring the President and the unprecedented
record of his conviction could not have been
placed upon the journals of the Senate.
In thus referring to the resolutions and instruc
tions of the State Legislatures, 1 disclaim and
repudiate all authority or design to interfere
with the responsibility due from members of the
Senate to their own consciences, their constitu
ents, and their country. The facts now stated
belong to the history of these proceedings, and
are important to the just development of the
principles and interests involved in them, as
well as to the proper vindication of the Execu
tive Department; and with that view, and that
view only, are they here made the topic of re
mark. *
The dangerous tendency of the doctrine which
denies to the President the power of supervis
ing, directing, and removing the Secretary of
the Treasury, in like manner with the other Ex
ecutive officers, would soon be manifest in prac
j tice, were the doctrines to be established. The
President is the direct representative of the
American People, but the Secretaries are not.
i If the Secretary of the Treasury be indepen
dent of the President in the execution of the
. laws, then there is no direct responsibility to
' the People in that important branch of this Go
vernment, to which is committed the care of
the national finances. And it is in the power
of the Bank of the United States, or any other
I corporation, body of men, or individuals, if a
! Secretary shall- be found to accord with them in
| opinion, or can be induced in practice to pro
j mote their views, to control, through him, the
j whole action of the Government, (so far as it is
exercised by his Department,) in defiance of
the Chief Magistrate elected by the People and
responsible to them.
But the evil tendency of the particular doc
trine adverted to, though sufficiently serious,
would be as nothing in comparison with the per
nicious consequence which would inevitably
flow from the approbation and allowance by
the People, and the practice by the Senate, of
the unconstitutional power of arraigning and
censuring the official conduct of the Executive,
in the manner recently pursued. Such proceed
ings are eminently calculated to unsettle the
foundations of the Government; to disturb the
harmonious action of its different Departments;
and to break down the checks and balances by
which the wisdom of its framers sought to en
sure its stability and usefulness.
The honest differences of opinion which oc
casionally exist between the Senate and the
President, m regard to matters in which both
are obliged to participate, are sufficiently em
barrassing. But if the course recently adopt
ed by the^Senate shall hereafter be frequently
pursued, it is not only obvious that the harmo
ny of the relations between the President and
the Senate will be destroyed, bnt that other and
graver effects will ultimately ensue. If the cen
sures of the Senate be submitted to by the Pre
sident, the confidence of the People in his abi
lity and virtue, and the character and useful
ness of his administration, will soon be at an
end, and the real power of the Government
wll fall into the hands of a body, holding their
nffippe fnr lnntr tprmc nnf plppfprl hv flu1 Ppo
pie, and not to them directly responsible. If, on
the other hand, the illegal censures of the Se
nate should be resisted by the President, colli
sions and angry controversies might ensue, dis
creditable in their progress, and in the end
compelling the People to adopt the conclusion,
either that their Chief Magistrate was unwor
thy of their respect, or that the Senate was
chargeable with calumny and injustice. Either
of these results would impair public confidence
in the perfection of the system, and lead to
serious alterations of its frame work, or to the
practical abandonment of some ot its provisions.
The influence of such proceedings on the
other Departments of the Government, and
ore especially on the States, could not fail to
be extensively pernicious. When the judges in
the last resort of official misconduct, themselves
overleap the bounds of their authority, as pre
scribed by the Constitution, what general disre
gard of its provisions night not their example |
be expected to produce? And who does not
perceive that such contempt of the Federal con
stitution, by one of its most important Depart
ments, would hold out the strongest temptation
to resistance on the part of the State sovereign
ties, whenever they shall suppose their just
rights to have been invaded? Thus all the in
dependent Departments of the Government, and
the States which compose our confederated
Union, instead of attending to their appropriate
duties, and leaving those who may offend, to be
reclaimed or punished in the manner pointed
out in the constitution, fall to mutual crimina
tion and recrimination, and give to the People,
confusion and anarchy, instead of order and
law; until at length some form of aristocratic
power would be established on the ruins of the
constitution, or the States be broken into sepa
rate communities. •
Far be it. from me to charge, or to insinuate,
that the present Senate of the United States in
tend, in the most distant way, to encourage such
a result. It is not of their motives or designs,
but only of the tendency of their acts, that it is
my duty to speak. It is, if possible, to make Se
nators themselves sensible of the danger which
lurks under the precedent set in their resolution;
and at any rate to perform my duty, as the re
sponsible Head of one of the co-equal Depart
ments of the Government, that I have been
compelled to point out the consequences to
which the discussion and passage of the resolu
lution may lead, if the tendency of the measure
be not checked in its inception.
It is due to the high trust with which I have
been charged; to those who may be called to
succeed me in it; to the Representatives of the
People, whose constitufionul prerogative has
been unlawfully assumed; to the People and to
the States; and to the constitution they have
established; that I should not permit its provi
| sions to be broken down by such an attack on
the Executive Department, without at least some
effort “to preserve, protect, and defend* them.
With this view, and for the reasons which have
1 , . 1 T 1 _ 1_I_ r. ^ r-o.
Uttfli McUCUj l owi^r-iTjnuj i nvw^i
against the aforementioned proceedings of the
Senate, as unauthorized by the Constitution;
contrary to its spirit and to several of its express
provisions; subversive of that disti ib ition of the
powers of government which it has ordained
and established; destructive ol the checks and
safeguards by which those powers were intend
ed, on the one hand, to be controlled, and on the
other to be protected; and calculated, by their
immediate and collateral effects, by their char
acter and tendency, to concentrate in the hands
of a body not directly amenable to the People,
a degree of influence and power dangerous to
their liberties, and fatal to the Constitution of
their choice.
The resolution of the Senate contains an im
putation upon my private as well as upon my
public character; and as it must stand forever
on their journals, I cannot close this substitute
for that defence which 1 have not been allowTed
to present in the ordinary form, without remark
ing, that I have lived in vain, if it be necessary
to enter into a formal vindication of my char
acter and proposes from such an imputation.—
In vain do I bear upon my person, enduring |
memorials of that contest in which American
liberty was purchased—in vain have I since per
iled property, fame, and life, in defence of the
rights and privileges so dearly bought in vain
am I now, without a personal aspiration, or the
hope of individual advantage, encountering re-1
sponsibilities and dangers, from which, by mei e ;
inactivity in relation to a single point, I might,
have been exempt—if any serious doubts can i
be entertained as to the purity of mv purposes
and motives. If I had been ambit, on ;
have sought an alliance with that ;j <•
stitution, which even now a zures i<> . j
empire. If I had been venal, I snou.o ::
myself to its designs—had 1 preferre d
comfort and official ease io die perform
my arduous duty, I should have ceased .
lest it. In the history of conquerors and u
pers, never, in the tire of youth, nor in the v a e
of manhood, could I find an attraction to lure
me from the path of duty; and now, I shall
scarcely find an inducement to commence th r
career of ambition, when gray hairs and 3. de
caying frame, instead of inviting to toil ild bat
tle, call me to the contemplation of other -mi'lds,
where conquerors cease to be honore , and
usurpers expiate their crimes. The only ambi
tion I can feel, is to acquit myself to him to whom
I must soon render an account of my steward
ship, to serve my fellow-men and live respected
and honored in ttie history of my country.
No; the ambition which leads me on, is an
anxious desire and a fixed determination, to re
turn to the people, unimpaired, the sacred trust
they have confided to my charge—to heal the
wounds of the constitution and preserve it from
further violation; persuade my countrymen, so
j tar as I may, that it is not in a splendid Govern
ment, supported by powerful monopolies and
aristocratical establishments, that they will find
; happiness, or their liberties protection; but in a
j plain system, void of pomp—protecting aii, and
1 granting favors to none—dispensing its bles
| sings like the dews of Heaven, unseen and un
! felt, save in the freshness and beauty they con*
! tribute to produce. It is such a Government
j that the genius of our People requires—such
an one only under which our States may rema n
for ages to come, united, prosperous and free. If
the Almighty Being who has hitherto sustained
and protected me, will but vouchsafe to make
my feeble powers instrumental to such a result,
I shall anticipate with pleasure the place to be
assigned me in the history of my country, and
die contented with the belief, that l have contri
buted, in some small degree, to increase the
value and prolong the duration, of American
Liberty.
To the end that the resolution of the Senate
may not be hereafter draw n into precedent, with
the authority of silent acquiesence on the part
of the Executive Department; and to the end,
also, that my motives and views in the Execu
tive proceedings denounced in that resolution,
may be known to my feliow-citizens,to the world,
and to all posterity, I respectfully request that
this Message and Protest may be entered at
length on the Journals of the Senate.
m •> « r . t 4 r.r\ j a nr r\ v % 11? t a /n rr tr
Siprii lorn. io.h. vv
tCr3 The President’s Pi uiest sent to the Senate
on Thursday, a document which “ opens a new
chapter in the history of our country,” and will
be eagerly sought for and read, excludes, by its
length, all other matter. News articles, adver
tisements, &c., not inserted to-day, shall be at
tended to in our next.
H3* The Whigs in New' York had a great ce
lebration on Tuesday last. Particulars here
after.
- . -■■■ ■ ■■ ■■■ ■■ i ■ ■ i ■
Latest from Europe.—By the packet ship
Normandy, Captain Pell, from Havre, we have
our file of Paris papers to the loth Mai cl . The
ship Zephyr, Pope, from Portsmouth, brings ad
vices from London of the 19th of March, four
days later than previous advices. The intelli
gence by these vessels is not of an important
character to the American reader. Nothing ltr
ter from Portugal, except a report that the ML
gueliteshad made another attack on Don Pe*
dro’s troops, in which they were repulsed. The
accounts from Madrid are to the 9th ultimo at
which period that capital wras considerably agi
tated.—N. V. Com.
The London papers are chiefly occupied w ith
long debates in Parliament, of no particular in
terest to our readers.
CONGRESS.—Yesterda , in the Senate, Mr
Leigh took the floor on the subject of the Presi
dent’s Protest, and spoke in a most animated
and eloquent manner against it. Towards the
close of his speech, he paid Mr. Clay a beautL
ful compliment. A burst of applause followed
Irom the galleries, which were ordered to be
cleared. When the order was about to be exe
cuted, so high w?as the excitement, that several
round* of appplausc again burst forth. The
galleries were cleared; and after Mr. Leigh fin
ished, Mr. Ewing took the floor, and the Senate
adjourned to Monday.
We omit a fuller report for want of room; but
shall notice several occurrences here left out in
our next.
The House w’as engaged in private business.
VIRGINIA ELECTIONS.—Nansemond: RL
chard D. Webb elected (Anti-Jackson.)—North
ampton: Severn E. Parker elected (Anti Jack.)
ALEXANDRIA MARKET, Apr. 19.-Flocr,
$4 25 a 84 35.—Yesterday the wagon price of
Flour opened at 84 25; subsequently it w as 4 30
a 4 35. It is held at 84 50 to 84 62$ from stores.
We were not advised of any sales from stores; if
any weremude, we think it was at 84 37$.
ALEXANDRIA MARINE LIST.—Arrived.
April 18, Schr Joseph Stewart, Wood, Patux
ent River; tobacco to H. Daingerfield. Passed
off Nominy, a topsail schr. with S. F. in her top
sail, the schr. Sophronia, Atwood, from Bangor,
lumber, spars and Mercer potatoes io J. Yeaton.
ht____ _■_i__i_ i▲
mtinunAnun.-Kjuijj ojaj^miiu waft ft|Ui|\i:ii, lai.
41, long. 54$, by the Mary Butler, at New York.
Brig Tribune, Smith, hence lor New Orleans,.
sailed from Norfolk 13th.
£3* Extra copies of this morning’s Gazette
may be had at the Counting Room.
D3* DRY GOODS SALE, by Geo. White,
on King street, next to McKenzie & Co.’s, clos
es This Evening. Bargains may be expected.
£3“ The Drawing of the Virginia State Lot
tery, for the benefit of the Dismal Swamp Canal
Company, Class No. 7 for 1834, will take place
This Day, at 2 o’clock, P. M., at West End.
(Alexandria, Virginia.)
apr 19—It YATES & McINTYRE, Man’s.
£3=*Nro. 34 59 61, a Prize of ONE THOU
SAND DOLLARS, in the Grand Consolidated
Lottery, Class No. 8, w'as sold at RIORDAN’S
office on Thursday, to a gentleman of Occoquan. f
IEFdRAWS THIS DAY—Virginia State
Lottery, No. 7—Capital Prizes §30,000!! §10.000!
§5,000! §3,000! 10 of§2.000! 10 of$1,500! &c. &c. ■■
Tickets $10; to be had at J. RIORDAN’S, J.
CORSE’S, and J. W. VIOLETT’S offices. '
CUBA COFFEE.
*| Bags prime Cuba Colfee, just received
lv and for sale by
apr 19 WILLIAM N. McVEIGH