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CD V I It vr VOLUME nr. DOWAGIAC, CASS COPTY, MICHIGAN, THURSDAY, .FEBRUARY.-21,. 1861. NUMBER 44. - r ii i Ay W V , . Is Published eTery .Thursday, At Dowagiac, Cass County Michigan. BxW.IL CAMPBELL. .! OFFICE: m G. C. Jones & Co.'s New Brick Block. Terms of Subscription. To office and mail subscribers 91 ,00 per annum, tXTAKIABLY Ilf AdYANCB. When leflbr the Carrier, Fifty Cents additional Vill be charged on regular rates. '. - Rate of Advertising. (Twelre lines or less considered as a Square.) 1 w.3w 4w. 3m. 6 m. 1 1 yr. TJne Square.. 601 1.00 1 1.25 2.50 3.50 5.00 ma.. 100 2.50 3.00 6.00 Too 8.00 T2T00 15.00 Culumn.. 8.00 1 8.75 j 4.50 4.00 1 5.00 1 6.00 20.00 X Column., 10.00 15.00 25.00 iToE 00 1 7.00 1 8.00 15T00 25.00 j 60.00 The priTileges of yearly advertio?r will be con fined rigidly to their business, and 11 other adrer tisements not pertaining to their regular business, to be paid for extra. -All legal adrertisements charged at the statute prices. All transient adrertisements to be paid for in adrance. tTHt ASOYB TkRXS WILL BE. STBJCTLT AD- KftED TO. JosWok erery description neatly exe cuted with promptness, on the most , favorable terms. Orders solicited. .. - PROi'KSSIOITAIi , : C. M. O'DELL, M. D. Homeopathic Physician. Surgeon and Obstetrician. Haring bought out Da. Bakxes and taking his Practice, feels happy to say to the citizens of Dowagiac ' and ricimty, that he is prepared to Practice his Profession in all its branches. Be - also keeps Medicines by the ease or single phial for sale and Family Guides. Office at the former ' residence of Dr. Barnes. Dowagiac, January 28th, 1861. jan31-41yl GEO. W. FOSDICK, M. D. . Office orer Mr. Bates' Proriairn Store, Front " Street, Dowagiac uot22-31t1 M. PORTER, M. D. rilYSICSt AJN" & SURGEON. Office at Al ward's Book Store, Denison Block, . Front Street. Residence first door below the Methodist Church, Commercial St., Dowagiac, Mich. V. E. CLARKE, M. D. Physician k Surgeon. Office at his residence, on Division Street, directly north of the Methodist Church, Dowagiac, Mich. ' W. II. CAMPBELL, Notary Public. Will attend to all kinds of Con veyancing Republican Office." Dowagiac. Mich. . JUSTUS GAGE, , Notary Public and general Agent for the exchange and transfer of Village Lots, and sale of real . Estate. Agent for the Manhattan and Irving " Insurance Companies, of New York, Office with James Sullivan, front room, second floor, Jones' Brick Block. CLARKE &. SPENCER, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, and Solicitors in Chancery. : Office in G. C. Jones & Co.'s ; Block, Dowagiac, Michigan. Especial attention given to collections throughout the North-west. Jostra B. Clabkb. James M. Spencer. JAMES SULLIVAN, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, and Solicitor in Chancerr. Dowagriac. Mich. Office on Front Street. D. II. WAGNER, Justice of the Peace and Collecting Agent, Dowag iac, Mich. Office on Front Street. CLIFFORD SIIANAI1AN, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, and Solicitor in Chancery, Cassapolis, Cass county, Mich. CHARLES W. CLISBEE, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, Solicitor in , Chancery, and Notary Public, Cassopolis, Cass - Co., Mich. Collections made, and the proceeds " promptly remitted. . MERCHANTS. C. D. DAVIS, "' Watchmaker and Engraver, ' Dowagiac, Mich. Particular attention paid to all ... kinds of Watch, Clock and Jewelry repairing, and Letter Engraving. Shop in Griswold's ". Grocery Store. ' - 1. B. All work warranted. nov8-29tf ' .11. B. MACKJN, Tailor, Dowagiac, Mich. Shop second door east of Alward's bookstore. Cutting and making done on short notice. All work warranted. TUTHILL & STURGIS, Dealers in Dry Goods, Groceries, Boots and Shoes, llats and Caps, Clothing, Crockery, Ac, Ac Dowagiac, Mich., . . -rCracs f cthill. . ' Wm. R. Stcrgis. . GEORGE SMITH, Tailor. Shop over Brownell's Hardware Store. Cutting ana Making done to order, and warran - ted to fit. ';." ' A. If. ALWARD, General Dealer in Books, Stationery, Periodicals, Wall Paper, Window Shades, Wrapping Paper, . Pocket Cutlery, Ac. Dennison Block, Dowagiac, Mich. . . , - . r G. C. JONES & CO., . ealers in Dry Goods. Groceries. Boots and Shoes, Crockery, Glassware, Hats and Caps. Front 'Street, Dowagiac, Mich. DANIEL LARZELERE, IDealer In Drv Goods. Groceries. Boots and Shoes. Crockerr. Hats and Caps, Glassware. Paints and Oils, Hardware, Ac, Ac. Front Street, Dowag- iacj Mich, Mammoth Stor, ; - ".. : n. jj. Dl2NMAi?r"r '" CJankinir and Exchange Office. Dowasiac, Mich. Buy and sell Exchange, Gold, Bank -Notes, and Land Warrants.-. Pav interest on School and .Swamp Lands, and Taxes in' all parts of the State. - DOWAGIAC NURSERY. 33EELEY A COLE, having established themselves in me Purser v xuiucsb m mis Tuiaze, wui iur nish to order Fruit and Ornamental -Trees. Law. - ton Blackberries, Cherry Currants, Grape Vines, t Evergreens, and everr variety of Shrubbery. 1ST" Office on the corner 01 commercial st., near thePost Office. T. P. SEELEY, M. D. WM. P. COLE. -; : ' P. D. BECKWITH, Machinist and Engineer.. Foundry and Machine Shop at the foot of Front street, near the rail- ruau vitmtc, uywiu alien. FJnc Pocket Knives ' ' ' ' AT ALWARD'S BOOKSTORE. CASH FOK EAGS ; ; AT ... AWARD'S BOOKSTORE. SCGAR, TEA, COFFEE, SODA, CANDLES, SOAP.FISH, RAISINS, FIGS, at the Bakery A- O. T0WNSEND. Twin Pictures. BT A. H. A. Gaily dawned the bright'ning morning, And the youthful day was glad : Hazy shadows came at mid-day, And the olden day was sad ; Soon the misty vapors falling, Trickle down the weeping sky, Till the golden sunset's purple Tolled the mid-day shadows by; While the clouds which darkened over, As they wane and fade away, Seem but mountains, heaven tinted Bluffs along the trail of day. Thus has life its cloudless dawnings,- Till the mists of grief arise ; Thus has life its clouded noon-day, Gath'ring tear-drops, weeping skies. But with every tear-drop falling. Fade the darkest shades away, Till the beck' mug beams of evening Tint the clouds with golden ray ; And the misty sorrows over - - Lighted up with heav'nly love Show the track where mortals travel . To the land of light above. The Personal Liberty Laws. Majority Report of the House Judi ciary Committee: In the Honse of Representatives of this State, on Friday last, Mr. Pringle, from the majority of the committee on the Judiciary, reported adversely on the bill to repeal certain sections of the act to protect the rights and liberties of the inhabitants of Michigan. The fol lowing is the report : : The majority of the Committee on Judiciary, to whom, was referred a bill to repeal sections two, three, and tour, of an act entitled " An act to protect the rights and liberties of the inhabit ants of this State," approved February 13, 1855, have had the same under con sideration, and have endeavored care fully to consider all the reasons which may be offered for and against the bill. In view of the importance which this subject has assumed in the public mind, and the fact that those who have thought it worth their while to argue the legal questions involved have, for the most part, seemed to lose sight of certain considerations and legal rules which are believed to fully sustain the law as a constitutional enactment, it has been deemed proper to set forth somewhat at length, the reasons which have influenced a majority of the com mittee. The sections which it is proposed to repeal contain the following provisions: 1st. That all inhabitants of this State, arrested and claimed as fugitive slaves, shall be entitled to all the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus and of the trial by jury. 2d. That if the writ be sued out in vacation and the alleged fugitive be not discharged, he 6ball be entitled to an appeal to the Circuit Court for the county, on furnishing reasonable bail. 3d. That, on the trial of the issue be fore the officer or the court, either party may demand and have a trial by jury of the questions of fact. 4th. That, in case of costs being charged against the alleged fugitive, the State shall pay them. The latter provision is one to which the claimants of fugitive slaves are not likely to object, it being to their benefit. It is, perhaps, more liberal than the cir cumstances of the' case demand, or than is required for a faithful compli ance with the clause of the constitution relating to the rendition of persons es caping from service or labor, but it is believed to be better to retain it, at least for the present, than to render the State liable, by its repeal, to the charge, however unjust, of " unfriendly legis lation." The important inquiry, as to the ob ject and purpose of the law 01 185a (including the sections proposed to be repealed), must be answered by a con sideration of the statute itself, of other enactments and judicial decisions, and also of certain . rights guaranteed by the Federal constitution. It must be construed for the purpose intended in accordance with such rules of construe tion as are adopted in the courts of law, and by such rules the question of its validity must be determined. The title of the act indicates in so many words a purpose " to protect the rights and liberties of the inhabitants of this State and the title of an act, as well as its preamble, may be used to explain its meaning or object, whenever necessary. The constitution of Michi gan (sec. 20, art. 4) provides that " No law shall embrace more than one ob ject, which shall be expressed- in its title." This clause, it is submitted, renders imperative upon courts the rule to construe the act first and only for the purpose indicated in its title. This aet, therefore, only relates to the pro tection of those dwfllinsr permanently in this State, for 6uch is the meaning of the word "inhabitants," used both in the title and act itself. It must also have a construction limited to the pro tection of the legal rights and liberties of the class of persons mentioned. Sections 6 and 7 of the act prescribing penalties for violation of the rights of free men afford also a strong implica tion as to the general object of the law, While the fact undoubtedly is that the law was enacted principally on account of the obligation of the State to pro tect free blacks and persons of color re siding in it from being carried into slavery by any summary process, it may also be said to be strictly within the rule indicated by Justice Wayne in the case of r ngg vs Jrennsylvania 16 Peters' Reports, 650, "That Iegisla tion may be confined to that end and made effectual without making such a remedy applicable for the rendition of fugitive slaves," ft may, perhap?, he granted that, in the practical operation of the act, those who are fugitive slaves may be sometimes brought before the courts, but that is the incidental effect and not the" intention of the law, T it may be construed in accordance with its title, our State constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States applicable to the subject The case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in January . 1842, has been often cited to show the unconsti tutionality of these three sections of our law of 1855. Inasmuch as the volume containing it is not ordinarily accessible, it may be well to give a brief history of the case, of the question be fore the court, and of the decision made, with a glance at the opinions ex pressed, which were in no sense im portant to the, judgment rendered. Edward Prigg was indicted in York county, Pennsylvania, " for leaving, with force and violence, taken and carried away from that county, to the State of Maryland, a certain negro woman, named Margaret Morgan, with a design and intention of selling and disposing of and keeping her as a slave or servant for life, contrary to a statute of Pennsylvania passed on the 26th of March, 1826, arid convicted on a spec ial verdict by the Court of Oyer and Terminer. On a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the judgment was affirmed, and the case was then brought on a second writ of error to the. supreme uourt 01 tne United States. The Pennsylvania act of 1826, entitled " An act to give effect to the provisions of the constitution of the United States relative to fugitives from labor, for the protection f free people of color, and to prevent kidnap ping," is set forth in the special verdict, and provides penalties for any person taking and carrying away from any part of the State, to another State, any negro or mulatto, with the intent that such negro or mulatto shall be sold as a slave or servant for life, and also a mode for the rendition of fugitive slaves somewhat similar to the Federal law of 1793, and well calculated to be effective for that purpose. The. special verdict also finds that Margaret Morgan was the slave for life of Margaret Ashmore, who resided in the State of Maryland, and that the defendant Prigg was duly appointed the agent and attorney of the owner of the slave, and in that ca pacity took the negro woman, without any process of law authorizing him so to do, from the county of York to the State of Maryland, and delivered her to her mistress. The law of" Pennsyl vania evidently contemplated that all persons should be subject to the penal ties for kidnapping who did not at first procure an order tor the return of the fugitive in accordance with the law for that purpose. Upon this state of facts the court reversed the judgment of guilty ex pressly upon the ground that, " In vir tue of the constitution, the owner of the slave is clothed with the authority by himself or agent, in every State of the Union, to seize ana recapture tns slave wherever he can do it without breach of the peace or illegal violence." It was only necessary to the decision made that the Pennsylvania statute should be declared void in so far as it provided for the punishment of those who, as owners or agents, took and carried away slaves from that Common wealth to another, without the warrant of a proper magistrate. In so far as the Court went in deciding that the clause of the constitution relating to the rendition of persons held to service or labor gave to the masters of escap ing slaves the right of recapture in all the States, and thus might u properly be said to execute itself," the decision is evidence of law, and is to be received as such in all courts and places, equally with other authoritative rulings of the highest judicial tribunals. Uut, in so far as , the court assumed to deliver opinions unnecessary to determine the question. of the guilt or innocence of Edward 1 nsrg, the conclusions 01 the court are of no binding force upon that or other courts. Yet, inasmuch as the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania had sneciallv authorized their ablest counsel to appear at the bar of the court, and inasmuch as other questions were, apparently bv consent, argued before the Judges, it is eonceded that the opinions placed on record have more than usual weight, and are euti- tled to be respectfully considered. 1 he obiter dicta of this case are no more to be regarded than those of many others, aptly characterized,: in some instances, as " the idle gabble of a judge. Incidently a majority of the Judges declared that the power to legislate for the rendition of fugitive slaves belongs exclusively to Congress, and hence that all State laws enacted for that purpose were absolutely void and of no effect From this opinion three of the Judges dissented, and the very able opinions of Chief Justice Taney and Justice Thompson are sufficient to raise some doubt as to the ultimate decision of the question. It was also declared by majority of the Judges in substance, that the fugitive slave law of 1793 was only constitutional in so far as it author ized proceedings before a Circuit ; or District Judge of the United States, and that the magistrates of counties, eities and townships had no authority to carry it into effect, although required to do so by the terras of the old statute. In accordance with these opinions, the non-slaveholdin? States generally re pealed their laws for the rendition of fugitive slaves, and suel as had not previously don eo withdrew, by repeal ing their laws the consent which had been supposed previously to give valid ity to the delegation of power to local magistrate by the act of 1793. The event proving somewhat disastrous to the " peculiar institution," and led to the enactment of the supplementary fugitive slave, law of 1850, by which it was attempted to give to Commission ers the power previously and still pos sessed by the Federal Judges, and to deny the writ of habeas corpus in cer tain cases where a fugitive had been arrested. . - Although a majority of the court pretty emphatically say that the fugi tive slave clause of the constitution " manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive unqualified ; right on the part of the owner, of the slave which no State law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control or re strain," it is to be remarked that the general police power of the State is conceded, and that they " possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain run- awry slaves and . remove them from their borders, and otherwise secure themselves against their depredations and evil examples," and that the States may punish them for crime like other subjects : and, although it appears evi dent that such measures might some times facilitate and somewhat delay or wholly prevent the return of a fugitive. the court says, " The rights of the own ers :. of fugitive slaves are in no just sense interfered with or regulated by such a course." The court distinctly enough declares that any law designed to regulate or interfere with the rendi tion of fugitive slaves would be uncon stitutional, but would allow the exer cise of proper State authority to pro tect its inhabitants, although the inci dental but undesigned effects might be to hinder or delay the owner of this kind of property. " It is also to be re marked that in none of the lengthy opinions is there any intimation that the writ of habeas corpus shall be de nied to the fngitive, or that Congress has any power to deny it to him. The constitution of the United States sec. 9, art. 1) recognizes a subsisting right, -in these words: " The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not. be suspended, unless when in. case of rebellion or invasion the public sefety may require it." j lhe language can hardly be mis understood, and certainly will not allow the free men of Michigan to be denied this privilege, held in so great estima tion from the day when Magna Charta was wrested from King John. It is believed by a majority of the commit teo that the fugitive slave law of 1850 is unconstitutional and void, in so far as it attempts to deny the writ of habeas corpus. Another clause of the Federal con stitution (sec. 1, art. 3), seems to be equally capable of misconstruction : " lhe judicial power of the United Stales shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to lime ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good be havior; and shall, at stated times, re ceive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The majority of the committee be lieve that, however inhuman and sum mary the proceedings may be made; however much ordinary rules of evi dence may be overturned in the mode of trial; still that the act by which the united btatcs Commissioner determ ines that the fugitive slave law be given up to a claimant is and must be in its character judicial, and hence, to be lawful, must be exercised eilhcr by the Supreme Court or by inferior courts established by. Congress. "Any such courts are to be presided over by iudges holding office during good behavior, and receiving salaries not to be dimin- shed during their continuance in office. The adjudication of the Commission er is pretty certainly not the judgment of the Circuit or District Court, for these are courts of record, having their own judges; nor can the act of 1850 be held to constitute new courts to be holden by the Commissioners or to make them judges, for neither in their modes of appointment, in the tenures of their offices, or in the compensation they receive, do they correspond to the constitutional requirements of judges vi interior couns. 11 me majority 01 the committee are right in the conclu bion to which they have arrived, the attempted delegation of power by Con gress to Commissioners is utterly void, and the District Judge. is the only offi cer, resident m this State, authorized to issue valid process for the seizure, or adjucato the return, ; of a fugitive slave. Practically, the slave-owner is thus left almost entirely to depend upon his right to seize and recapture, af firmed by the court in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania. The temptation is much greater than if regular tribunals were established -at all the principal towns to seize either directly or through the illegal instrumentality of Commissioners and carry into slavery those who are really free. The act of 1855 was passed a few months after lhe repeal of the Missouri compromise by a majority then first coming to political power; it was evidently drafted by some one accus tomed to the work which he undertook, but at the same time it bears evidence, in the opinion of the undersigned, of a desire to keep strictly within the re quirements of the Federal constitution, as expounded by the Federal courts. It does not provide, as it might law fully have . done, a long and difficult mode of trial to protect the liberties of its inhabitants, but, on the contrary, adopts the simplest and most summary process known to the common law to have their rights adjucated. It does not strip this writ of the difficulties at tending its procurement in ordinary cases, but leaves statutes operative in all other . cases of illegal detention of individuals to operate in this. A large part of chapter 134 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 (Comp.'Laws, pp. 1, 371 to 1,389) . relates to the writ of habeas corpus.. It is to be granted on petition, and that the petition must state in substance : . . That the person for whom the writ is sought is illegally imprisoned . or re strained by some other person. 2. That such person is not detained by virtue of any : process, judgment, decree, or execution of the courts of the United States or of this State. 3. The cause of the confinement or restraint according to the . best knowl edge or belief of the petitioner. 4. If the confinement be by virtue of any warrant, order, or process, a copy thereof must be annexed, unlsss a copy was refused, or a demand could not be made. 5. If the imprisonment be alleged to be illegal, it must be shown in what the illegality consists. 6. It must specify the nghtdemanded. 7. It must be verified by the oath of the petitioner. These various requirements can ordi narily be easily complied with in behalf of a person entitled to freedom, but not so readily in behalf of one who is legally detained in the custody of an other. - A petitioner whose main alle gation is false is not permitted merely to swear to a legal conclusion; but must run such a gauntlet of specifications as is likely; to involve him to perjury. Under this wriu, the judge cannot in quire into the justice or illegality of any prooess issued by any court of the the United States or any judge thereof, or as to the justice or legality of any legal process, civil or' criminal, upon which any person is convicted or in ex ecution, i. et it was competent for the Legislature, in its discretion, to have lessened the requirements preliminary to the issue of. this writ, and the power to grant it and to make adjucations upon its return might have been con ferred upon every Justice of the Peace in the State, instead of remaining lim ited to a few Judges and Circuit Court Commissioners. The practical result has been thut, while for nearly six years no claimant of fugitive slaves has been at all delayed or hindered by this act, or on the other hand no free person has been kidnapped as a slave within the Stale of Michigan, although this is not a very unfrequent occurrence in some of the States which have no such statutes. Does it not, as we examine it, become abundantly evident that this statute was passed for the purpose in dicated by its title, and not for the pur pose of regulating the rendition of fu gitive slaves? Can it, " in any just sense," be properly said to interfere with, hinder, or delay the right of the slaveholder? It is provided in section 3, that either party may demand and have a trial by jury of the question of fact arising in the case, but this circumstance does not change the summary character of the proceeding. If the person to whom the writ is addressed can show that he holds his prisoner upon any valid pro cess or order, no question of the fact will arise in the case, but the person detained will be remanded upon deter mination ' of the question of law. If questions of fact are contained in the issue formed by the petition, the return to the writ, and the details under oath whicli may be made by waywf reply, either party may demand a jury, and, inasmuch as the proceeding 4s a sum mary one, the jury provided for will have to be summoned from among the by-standers or citizens who are legal jurors, and on the trial none but ques tions of tact are left to their determin ation. , It is to be noted that while in all trials, and in all civil cases deter mined before Justices of the Peace, the jury may judge of and decide all questions of law, as well as of fact, in volved in their verdict, there is here no such extension of the power of a jury, All questions of law are. to be 'deter- mined'by a responsible public officer, required to possess legal qualifications. and trnsted by the people to administer the law without fear or favor. ; An appeal is also authorized by the person detained to the Circuit Court of the county in case he shall be remand ed by tbe Judge or Commissioner, at a hearing in vacation, upon his giving satisfactory bail. It has been asked why an appeal has not been allowed to the claimant ; The opinions announced in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania perhaps give a sufficient answer. . The prosecution of such an appear by the owner of a slave, in order to procure his rendition as a fugitive, would be for the same purpose as he would have if he proceeded under the acts of Con gress, and the court has declared such proceedings under State laws to be void. The character and purpose of the proceedings will have been wholly changed from what this act contem plates if an appeal by the master of a slave be allowed. He will not be loser, however, by this denial of an ap peal for the tribunals opened to him by the fugitive slave laws cannot be closed against him by state- legislation, lhe appeal allowed to the defendant is more fully to assure his liberty if free, and can in " no just sense" be said to bin der or delay the owner of a slave, in asmuch as he may still, pending such appeal, resort at will to the ordinary means of obtaining the rendition of such property, .fit is, moreover, tem porarily secure against the escape of his chattel by the bail given, and, if he succeeds at the hearing, the State pays the costs. In tbe view of the matter taken by the majority of the committee, the only question of consti tutional authority : arising npon this statute is as to the legal right of a State court or judge to issue or allow the writ of habeas corpus, the trial of questions of fact by a jury and the appeal author ized beinz only incidents, . careful! v guarded, of such alleged legal right It is an extraordinary featare of our jurisprudence that while for the trial of a case . involving but six cents, a jury and an appeal are allowed, yet that no provision has been made in case involv ing the liberty of a citizen, or the pos session of a child, for either, except by this law of 1855. An independent State must surely have the power so to provide in any or all cases, and that it has been , done by this law can consti tute no legal objection to it". It is. be lieved that, instead of the supposed larking intent to convert the hearing on the writ into a proceeding to regu late the rendition of persons escaped from service or labor being found in this law, we can only, in fact and in law, hnu a summary proceeding, strict ly limited to the object declared in the title of the act . ! The Pennsylvania statute of 1826, before considered, and the New York statute of 1830, which provided tor the arrest of fugitive slaves in a manner in some "respects diffierent from the law of Congress, and for suit similar to a replevin suit by the negro for his free dom, suspending during its pendency all. proceedings for his recapture or re moval, even after a finding that he was a slave, and the granting of a certificate tor his rendition under the act of Con gress of 1793, have been declared un constitutional and void. ?They ! were so declared before 1855, and our prede cessors appear to have taken' care to avoid even a seeming conflict with the judicial and extra-judicial opinions de clared in making these decisions. : . Our law, instead of being in conflict with these ' decisions, as has been often as serted, appears to be in entire conformi ty to them. It ought, if lor no ther reason, to the opinion of a majority of the committee, to remain upon the stat ute books as a monument of the wise moderation of the Legislature of 1855. The clause of the Federal Constitu tion affirming the right of the writ of I habeas corpus has been already cited. and the . construction given to this clause by the statute in question ap pears to be not very different from that given in the year 1858 by th6 Supreme Court 01 the United States, m the case of Ableman vs. Booth, reported in 21 Howard s Keports, p. 505. In decid ing that case the court say, among otb er things : We do not question the authority of a State court or judge who is au thorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to issue it in any case where the party is im prisoned within the territorial limits, provided it does not appear when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the au thority of the . United Slates. -The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the pris oner is confined within the territorial limits of the State Sovereignty. And it is the duty of the Marshal, or other person having the custody of the pris oner to make -known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authori ty by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire by process of Jtabeas corpus, and the duty of officers to make a return, grow necessarily out of the complex character of our gov eminent, and the existence of two dis tinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its power, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the constitution of the United States, in dependent of the other." - . It has been already shown that by necessary construction of the act of 1855, with the law regulating the, writ of habeas corpus, tbe writ allowed by the former would be authotized in any case where it should appear that the prisoner was held on valid pro cess; and conceding, as the majority of the committee do, that under the decision in Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, the owner of a fugitive slave has a right to recapture him without process in a free State, it follows that, in case it appears from the petition for the writ that the prisoner is claimed as a fugitive slave, it must also appear by a statement on oath that he is not a fugitive slave, or else that the claimant has no right to hold him, before the writ can issue. The necessary construction is, that all free persons not legally arrested, and claimed as fugitive slaves, shall be enti tled to the benefits of the writ' , But it is urged that the sections pro posed to be repealed may beTunder- stood in a broad 6ense, bringing them in confliot with the adjucations of the courts and the constitutional enact ments of the general government It is not -believed that they will bear such a construction, for reasons already shown ; but, admitting, for the sake Jf argument, that they will, what is the necessary legal enect? It is surely this : that they must be construed with reference to the superior; law, and bv held valid in so far as they do not eon: flict If any given statute forbids, by the general language, an hundred dif ferent things, and it be discovered that one of the hundred is allowed; by the superior law of the constitution, does it follow that the forbidding, of the ninety and nine js "unconstitutional? A case determined by the Supreme Court of Michigan will illustrate this rule. - We have a statute in which it is provided (sec. 2, 191 of complied laws), in substance, that every chattel mort gage not accompanied by delivery and actual and continued possession of tbe goods mortgaged shall be absolutely void as against. creditors' and' subse quent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless it, or a copy, shall be filed in the office of the Township or City Clerk." Congress has power under . the constitution to regulate commerce," and, exercising that powerj in the year 1850, euacted that"No mortgage of any vessel of the United States ph all be valid against any persorf other than the mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actu al notice thereof, i unless such mortgage is recorded in the office of Collector of Castoms where snch vessels' is regis tered or enrolled A case arose where a schooner enrolled at the port of De troit, mortgaged to secure a sum of money, and the mortgage dulv record ed in the custom-house, but not filed in the City Clerk's office, was levied upon' and seized in execution, at tbe in-' stance of a judgment creditor, by the United Mates Deputy Marshal, where-' upon the mortgagor, after demand and refusal, replevied the yessel in - the Wayne Circuit ; Court, and, upon - re served: questions submitted to ths Su preme Court, it, was decided "that the. act of Congress in reference to the rev cording of mortgages npon enrolled aud licensed vessels.' supersedes' to muh f the State statute as refers to' the recording of similar mortgages in the lownship or City Clerk a office." Robbinson vs. Rice & Moore, 3 Gibbs R., 235. This decision was upon the; ground that Congress had exclusive: jurisdiction, over the matter regulated" by the laws oi 1850, and hence that: State LegMation could impose no ad-' ditional requirement to the validity of the chattel mortgage. Yet, in a gen eral sense," our statute is a constitution J al enactment; its repeal is- not agitated and, by reason of the application to it of the rules a legal construction, there ix no necessity tor amendment. It is already as though it read : Every mort gage of ' goods and chattels, except. mortgages of enrolled or licensed ves sels of the united States shall be abso-i lutelv void," &c. So of the statute now in question. It wan, the 'dav it was approved, by necessary legal con-- ftruetion, as though it read: All per sons arrested and claimed as fugitive laves, in iciose behalf can and shall be made the petition specifird in section 11 of clmpter 134 of the llevised Stat-: utes of 1846, shall be entitled to all the benefit h of the writ ol habeas corpus tc. -Even were it established (as it is not) that-at some point this act comes in direct conflict with the superior law. of Congres, yet it would not thereby be determined to be uncon titulional in a general sense, so long as there were cases to which it might belegally applied. - In this view, the simple, con; sideration that there are several thou sand JVee colored people within the State entitled to protection from our laws, and each of them liable to be il legally seized and carried into hopeless slavery, seems sufficient to justify at once the constitutionality and the pio priety of this enactment The policy of this law needs no la bored defense. .The consideration' just' stated, the alarm whieh would seizo' upon the negro population were the law now repealed, the scandal and shame; which . is to be brought upon' Michigan if, . under the influence of threat, her representatives abandon what is demonstrably her right, are suf ficient, in the opinion of & majority of the committee, to. justify their recom mendation that the bill do not pass. V All of which ia respectfully nubmitted. . EUGENE PRIXGLE. W. T. HOWELL. "'. ; ; GILBERT E.I'BATT.: Uhion Conundrums. Why is this Union like the Great JZastem steam ship ? Because it's a big thing," but poorly officered. . . Why is the new Secretary, of the Treasury very popular, among the; masses ? Because Dix he is ("Dixie" is.) ' Why is this. Union like a piece of Western land covered with beech tim-, ber? Because it has lots of treas-ou (treason), but no good old Hickory." ' Why is this ; Republic like a . child learning to walk? . Because yoti must stand by it, or it will fall.. Why are the people of this Confed eracy like a married couple being di vorced ? Because their untied states are being dissolved. WThy is the Unin like a crab-apple ? Because to be worth anything, it must be preserved ? . ; " , - C3f A country girl who had lived in a small farin-house' where bells were unknown, went to live as a parlor maid in a gentleman's family. The bell was rung, whicli it was her duty to answer," and as she did not rise to go, a fellow said, Why Mary, don't you answer the bell; don't you. know missus wants you ? 'No;' replied the girl, 'if her wants me why don't her holler r '.. A tiiend of onrs says' that it i his will to hp ak the plain truth, and nothing else about nu n and things. Jfc. is our will too, and what is better, our wont. - '" 82? A' saucer., lull of chloride of lime, nuiisieued with a few drops of vinegar and water, . will purity the atmosphere of "u nickroom in a levy, minutes. V 1