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THREB DOLLA'RS "that government is best which govkkns least." IN ADVANCE . Volume I. CAItltOLLTO, MISSISSIPPI, TUESDAY NOIil.X;, IHX IlHLIt II, 1811. a hi i r The Mississippi Democrat, j PUBLISHED WEEKLY Vt F. C. JONES & J. DIIIDIA . TERMS : Thru Dollars per annum, payable invariably in advance, or Two Doixjri for six months. No subscription taken for a le time than six i menllu. single copies, on a dime, ' Advertisements inierteil at the rate of One Dollar per square of ten lines or less, for & tbe first insertion, and Fifty Cents for each j. continuance. All advertisements must be marked with the number of insertions requir- v ed, or they will be published until forbid, and r cnargea aocoruingiy. (jr-Political circulars, er notice! for the benefit of individuals or companies, charged as adver tisements. Articles of a perional nature. V when adoiiisable, at double the above rates, and payment required in auvance. . 1 CONTRACTS Rr THE year. Ten lines, or less, renewable at pleasure, $15 Not exceeding thirty lines, " 30 " ' sixty lines, " 50 ETANniNQ ADVERTISEMENTS. For ten lines or less, si months, - $10 " twelve months, 15 Each additional square, six months, - 7 " twelve months, - 10 4 Q- Announcing candidates Ten Dollarb lor ! Htate, and Five Dollars for County offices, t to be paid in advnnoe. i No Job Printing delivered until paid for, except t to thoae with whom we nave regular dealings I (ttNo variation from the abova rates, in any case tvnaiever. frV- Letters to the Editor or Publishers, on bu siness of the office, must be post-paid. Post masters are authorised to frank letters enclos ing; money for subscription to a newspaper. Decision of Judge Thaclicr. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Hinds County. Ex Parte Walter Hickev. This is an application for- a discharge under tho writ of Habeas Corpus ad sub jiciendum. The facts of the case are in brief as follows: The petitioner, as editor of a nuhlic innrnal. called th Vielrfihiirir Sen- 1 PI 4 tinel and Expositor, published an article 1 in his paper reflecting upon the judicial E.J conduct of tho Judge ot the circuit court ot Warren county, pending a capital trial. An attachment for contempt was issued against him, and upon interrogatories ad dressed and answered, (he petitioner was, by the court, ordered to be imprisoned for the term of five months, fined five-hundred dollars, and remnin in custody until the fine was paid. The petitioner then I prayed the executive clemency, which was 5 extended to him to the amount ot botitm ? and imprisonment, by virtue of which lie was discharged from custody by the She- rill ot Warren county, subsequently to this discharge, the circuit court of said county issued its bench warrant for the ar rest of the petitioner, as an escaped priso ner, by virtue whereof he is now arrested and detained. This writ is sued out by him for his liberty. Uoon the threshold of (his investiga tion, counsol have suggested a doubt of the power of a single nidge ot (he lligh Court of Errors and Appeals to issue and act under this writ. To resolve this, we must ascertain what was the writ at com mon law, and what it is under the consli tution, statutes and common law of this State. Personal liberty, by the laws of England, was considered a strictly natural right, and not to be abridged without suf ficient cause, nor at the mere discretion of the magistrate without the explicit permis. fcion of tho laws. Magna Charta doclares that no freeman shall be taken or impri soned, but by the lawfui judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. (Mng. C. c. 29.) When any person was re strained of his liberty, by order or decree .of any illegal court, or by tho command of the Kiiif's maiostv in person, or bv warrant of the council board, or of any ol the privy council, he was entitled, on de- imand, to the writ of habeas corpus, to Siave judgment upon the justice of hie Jcommitment. English writers in com jmenting upon tho British constitution, ex press themselves in the warmest terms up lon what is in that country called "the jsubjects1 nrit of right." "Of great im. Tportance," they say, "to the public is the ,preservationof this personal liberty, for if once it were lell in the power ol any, ino Jlnghest magistrate to imprison arbitrarily, henever hs or his otlicers thought pro- er, there would soon be an end ot an n.hn i,itia nr. A i mmn n 1 1 i pi. Parannnl ... . ..... aiberty ought not to be abridged in any 1 ' . w . . - . jcase without special permission ol law and the glory of the English law consist in clearly defining the limes, the causet, nd the extent, when, wherefore, and 'n what degree, the imprisonment of the sib jct may be lawful. Nevertheless, shfts and devices, not very creditable lot lie judgos of the time9, were made use f to securo to the King the power toconmit by his special command, and othorswere farced into practice, which from tine to frne have been checked by parliiminlary ipactmcnts." Toml. L. D. litWHnb. (jor. Sir W. Blackstone has said, "hat the principal aim of society is to prsectin ijviduals in the enjoyment of thJr abso lite rights which were investedin them ' t the immutable laws f nacre, and I anco it follows, that the first anprimary t'Ul of human aws is to maintasVnnd rcg- ulate these absolute rights of individuals. Bla. Com. 1, 125. This high prerogative writ is issuable from the courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer and Chancery, in term time, and before a sin gle judge of cither in vacation. An ciently, no one in any case could contro vert the return l a habeas corpus, upon which alone the court or judge decided upon the legality of the commitment or detainer. But "by virtue of 56 G. 3 c. 100, S. 4, a prisoner brought up under a habeas corpus issued at common law may controvert the truth of the return. The judgment of tho court or judge II final. Thus it is seen that this writ is founded on the common law, and gradually improved and extended in England by statutes to carry into actual and practical utility the free privileges of the subjects secured to them by Magna Carta and the constitution. It creates a jurisdiction, distinct, sepa rate, and independent, and though courts, and judges of those courts, are nominated by law to exercise it, they do so, not by virtue of their o'herwise judicial charac ter, authority and jurisdiction, but by the actual grant of power to net in this par- ticulnr, This writ has been transplanted to this country, and assuredly it has lost nothing ot those virtues so lauded by foreign wri ters because of its removal lo a land en joying far more enlarged and enlightened sentiments upon personal rights and fran chises. Both the present and the former constitution ot this state guarantee to its citizens the benefit of tho writ of Habeas Corpus. Uuder the first constitution, the mode of issuing and the proceedings un der the writ were regulated by statute, June 11, 1822. The power to issue the writ was deposited wiih the Supreme, the Circuit and the Chancery courts, in term time, or any judge of either in vacation. The present constitution established the High Court of Errors and Appeals with jurisdiction such as properly belongs at law to a court of that name. By law, H. 11.531, S. 0, the several acts for the or ganization of the Supreme court, not re pugnant lo tho constitution or inconsistent with the act establishing the High Court of Errors and Appeals, were declared to be in full lorce for the government ol the High Court of Errors and Appeals. By the constitution, Const. Sched. s. 4, all aws then in force, not repugnant to it, wore continued in operation. Then, that through tho lorce of the constitution, iiio statutes and the common law, tho judges of. the High Court ol Errors and Appeals, which is now the Supremo Court of this Stale, possess a fall jurisdiction, and one greatly enlarged by the statutes beyond that of the writ at common law, over this writ, but in theirindividual capicity alone, seems plain an! obvious, but that they have not power to act thereon, in the first resort as a court, seems equally plain and palpable. Th statute, II. I. (164, s. 7, gives to any pirty to the judgment on the writ, aggriovel thereby, the right to a writ of error, which could only be returnable into the Hijh Court of Errors and Ap peals, thus iivolving, if the court must act in tho first iislance, the solecism and ab surdity of an appeal from a court to itself. It is alwa proper to give such a con struction aid interpretation to a statuto as will make it consistent with itself and the end to beattained by it. Withoit directing attention to tho ques tions of tie sufficiency of the bench war rant, or to other technical objections, which, whether ill or well taken, are swallowed up in the more important ques tions involved in this examination, 1 will proceed at once to the discussion of the leading and prominent points that stand forth if this interesting controversy." Thf power of courts to imprison for contenpts is declared by English writers and st quoted by writers on this side of the Atl'nlic It has been repentodly doaidsd in tbe English courts, and thosesdecisions folliwed in the courts of this country, to bo of immemorial usage and practice, since thf law itself was known. It is claimed tote a vitally essential attribute and con sqence of the administration of the law iscii, without which it dies, becomes a lead letter, A command without obedience, a judgment without execution. It is held (to have arisen from the necessity of the 'iX.'.nr - '..unlf a nr fkn.w.K n..f until Irifnf limn.1 '"-" ;-;"B" n.L nlm .nn tf .a an.. I f.i ha ira tttl.nmt. legislated upon, it is said to have become the law of the land coeval with the period when the administration of the law was established in the shape of courts and other tribunals. It is in this point ol view that it is insisted by Blackstone, 4, 237, to have been confirmed by the sta tule of Magna Charta when it requires that "no freeman (hull be imprisoned and con demned, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land? Now this charter bears dato the 15th June, A. D. 1219, being the 17th year of the reign ol King John . The first enactment upon the subject of contempts was that of the statute of Westm. 13 Ed. 1, c. 39, being seventy years al'tor the date of Magna Charta. This statuto has reference to con tempts in resisting the process of the King's courts. This species of contempts is classed by Blackstone 4, 235, among those of consequential contempts. II then the power to punish the class of con sequential contempts constituted a part of 'the law ol the land so long anterior to the date of Magna Charta as to have become at that early day a very maxim ol law, where was the necessity for the legislation upon the subject? Why should Parlia ment have legislated upon an individual instance of consequential contempt, un less the evil were then first discovered, and a remedy then, for the first time sought? To what extreme tho courts had extended their jurisdiction over contempts, up lo the timo of Magna Charta, wo have no actual knowledge, it is but conjee ture, but that seventy years afterwards, Parliament, for the first time, legislated upon the subject, we do liavo proof; and we have further proof from the language of the statute and the grant of power to the courts, that such was, in its nature, an enlarged power, which consequently pre sumes its non existence until the passage of that act. The phraseology of the pro amble of that statute most strongly furti- fies this position. The reason for the en actment is given in the following language, and Lord Cocke says the preamble of a statute is a good means to find out the it). tenlioa of it: "Forasmuch as Justices, to whose office it beloi.geth to minister jus. tice to all that sue before them, are many times disturbed in due execution of their qffice,"&.c. This, at tho present day, would be deemed a consequential contempt of court, and if it were so before Magna Charta, and the power dwelt in tho courts then to punish and check it, the statute was certainly uncalled for legislation j but if so, it is a solitary and isolated in stance of such at that early period. It was by a train of similar reasoning, I imngine, that a very learned author, as ho isstylcd by Ulucksone. 4,2j7, see Uilb Hist. C. P. C. 3, was inclined to deduce the present doctrine of contempts cxclu- sively from this statute, and to allow it no greater antiquity. How much then ol tho present doctrine in England owes its origin lo that and subsequent legislation, and how much to judicial assumption of power, it is lioro unnecessary to enquire, but in stating the historical argument, all that with fairness can bo said, ie, llmt Magna Charta conferred lo the courts the power to preserve themselves,and no more, and not that it necessarily recognized as Vio Uw ol tKo InnH. ihn many kind nf contempts now known to court and Judges, For bo far as the newspapers publication ol a libel upon a court is concerned, case of the kindcould not have occurred until the time of Queen Elizabeth, when newspapers were first established, which was three hundred and forty three years after the dato of Magna Charta. The proposition which is thus laid down is, that the doctrine of consequential contempts in Hs present broad understanding was unknown to and not confirmed by the ear liest constitutional law of England, Mag na Charta. We must next lest this doctrine of con. tempts by the touchstone of the Consti tution of the state. 1 his is the only pro per, legal ana shio criterion uy wnicn it can be judged and decided upon. In do ing so, we must be careful to allow no hy pothetical interpretations or equivocal de finitions of the explioit text of this instru ment. It is a compact between the poo. te and their officers. There are re straints placed upon both. Power logo. vein has been confided, but it has also been limited and restricted. It remains then to examine whother tho exercise ol power in the case now under considera tion, is within tho Constitution and laws ot this State. - Immedi'.'cly upon the adoption of our Con stitution and before the enactment of any statutory law, so much of what is gnnreal ly termed "the common law," and which is also strictly in accordance with that con stitution, was likewise necessarily adop ted. For instance, the Constitution es tablished and erected courts of justice. It gave them the jurisdiction ol courts ol justice as the same were belore under stood, less so much power and authority as trenched on that Uonstilution which crer- tod them. To carry on these courts, cer tain machinery is necessary, and that machinery must be without clog, hin dronco or interference. This was neces sary to the ends of their creation, for the exercise of the functions cnlrusted to them, and indispensable to serve and vindicate the interest and dignity ol the govern ment, which has been built up by the people. Is then the case in hand, the use of a power vested in our courts either di rectly or by implication, ana is tne act tor which the petitioner is now impiisoncda clog upon tho wheels of courts of justice? 1 shall endeavor to snow wny tney are not. What is a contempt of count Besides the various classes of contempts which were known to the common law of Eng land and particularly described, besides these relating to officers and others connected with the courts, concerning which the law is plain and explicit, there are many which are claimed to lie exclu sively within the discretion of tho courts 1 lio bcliet in the existence of such is alone in tho breast of the court. They may be construod to spring from a gesture, a word or a look. Thus the court is con stituted the judge ol Ins own privileges and the vindicator of his own wrongs, whother real or supposed, and his jurisdic tion in this particular is without measure The ofibnee is without specification and without definition ; nnd though legally viewed, it is said to refer solely to the functionary, it necessarily touches and stimulates tho individual, who finds it hard to soparnto himself from the office and station. It may thus becoino an ofience of opinion, of feeling or of prejudice an offence which has no other legislation than the impertuctioDS ol human nature. Wind ed and misled by tho circumstancos of the moment, notions of caprice and Ihe improper bias of passion; or by those powerful, but imperceptible inlluences irom which the most upright and enlight ened m' d8 cannot bo considered or trus ted lo bo wholly exempt. The powor of punishing may bo extended lo a degree ilespoic, and, as it is extended in a judi cial capacity, it is irresponsible and may therefore be used regardless ol conse quences. Under such a state of things, liberty and properly may become preca rious and there is no protection against oppression. Tho rights and privileges which our Constitution has retained and reserved lo its citizens tuny thus bo des potically abridged or wholly refused, and their "remedy by duo course of law de nied1' or at least "delayed," until vindica ted and restored by tho slow process of Ihe proverbially sluggish channels of juris prudence. Many cases of the infiingc mcnt ol conslitulional rights could be conceived and enlarged upon to illustrate in strong relief 1 1, is position, but the mere admission of llio principle of entire and complete powor, without responsibility, to adjudicate fur the time being upon those riglitB and privileges will suggest them to all freemen who are acquainted with, and jealous of what of right belongs to them us their inheritance under our torm of go vernment. It i3 a legal motto, full of meaning and not too strong in expression which declares that, " Mipcra ect vtrvllus, utu lex t vnga nut incerta." And certainly in no codo of laws, can bo pointed out one more obnoxious to this reproach, than dial of a supposed ofience which finds us enactment, its tribunal und its punishment inono and the same source As wo have already seen, history loachos us that the origin of this doctrine grew out ol a stato ot things happily unknown and unrecognized by us. Anciently, in England, the King presided in some of the courts and sat himself in judgment. Tho insult, as it was considered there, was ad dressed to his Majesty in person, and was, in the spirit ot such a government, mot with prompt and often mortul punishment. Death and forfeiture of lands and titles were alone sufficient to atouo for the of fended dignity ol the throne. But as a better rennon grew up among men, and liberty was either enlarged or ils charac ter belter understood in England, this among other severities, passing through various stages of lessor cruelty and hard chip, became modified and ameliorated, until it found its present limit nnd extent. It were not a bad argument then to insist that in introducing such a princiiilo into our especially free government, it needs must receive a correspondent abatement of those of its features which are at war wilh the nature of tho constitution and laws into which it has been admitted. Surely the same principle should be allow ed to hold in a country which rests upon the love, as in one which is enforced from the fears of its people. For in this coun- try, thero is no majesty save the maicsty of the law, and the office of that majesty is to guarantee to the sovereign citizen his constitutional liberties. It has been before admitted that there have been in England and in this coun try, judicial decisions establishing in that country and in some States in this, Ihe legitimacy of the exercise of power in cases like tne one under consiuurauon. Eilher that power is derived ex necessi tate rex, or it is the growth of legislation and judicial praciice. In the last event, as bv the circumstances of this case it seems to be, it can bo claimed only by virtue of Us being one of Ihe linesmen's of the common law in England. In what position do this country and this State stand in relation to that common law? The United Stales have not taken, in all respect', the common law ol England. So much only of its general principles are claimed and adopted which is applica ble lo our situation, institutions and form of government. Van Ness. v. Pncard, 2 fclcre, 14 1. IN or is there any such thing as a common law of the United States. The constitution and laws of the Union prevail as the authority ol law throughout the Union, but each independent Slate may have its own common law which may not so be considered in another. Wheat, ct al. t. fetors, ct al. n I'eiers 0!i8. When, therefore, a common law power is asserted, wo must look to the constitution and laws of the Stato in which the controversy originated. Tho consli. tution and Inws of Mississippi jealously guard tho freedom and rights of ils citi zens. Tho 11th section of its Declara. lion of Rights declares that no person sball bo accused, arrested or detained, ex cept in cases ascertained by law, and ac cording to the form which the same lias prescribed; and no porson shall be pun ished but in virtuo of a low established itnd promulgated prior to tho offence and legally applied. Its Kith section declares that oxcossivo fines shall not bo imposed nor cruel punishmont inllicled. Tho 10th, that no citizon sball to deprived of his iiib, noeriy, w property, but by duo course of law. Yet by the doctrine of contempts, as insisted upon, there oxists an offonco not only undescribed and undefined in na ture and charnctor, and one whose very exislenco is dependent upon the opinion and discretion of a judge, but a punish ment, to use the words of Senator Clinlon in Yates v. the people, 0 John, 467, "un limited, uncontrolled, indefinite, arbitrary and omnipotent." "It is lo be remem bered," ho adds, "lliat summary convic- ions are against the genius and spirit of our institutions, and in derogation of civil inorty. I lie judge is without check und ihe accused without tho usual guards of ireedom. llioro is no grand jury lo ac cuse, no petty jury to try, but his property anu noeriy depend upon the fat ol the court. Here, then, is a case whoro tin unjust and tyrannical judgo may, at pleas ure, imprison an innocent man for life, nnd being a judicial act for which he can not be questioned, thus pluco punishment at defiance. A doclrine pregnant with Bueh horrible results enn novor be in uni son with tho letter or tho spirit of a frne and enlightened system of jurisprudence" These views of Senator Clinlon, even if considered in the light of argument only, nre most valuablo nnd worthy of weight, not nniy as being those ol a man of great poiiiicai Knowledge and anient patriotism, but from llio fai t of his removal and dis- anco from any of those peifish feelings timt might uo supposed to mlliience a ju dicinl functionary, keonly jealous and to nirmiis nt his snlf mnstitulnd privileges, powers and immunilios. For this is a quasi political quesiion, as all such are, winch involve tho liberty of a citizen, ros. trnined upon grounds not palpably and clenrly rcslublishcd and defined by law, Tho argument dorived from Ihe possible duration ol the punishment of an indefi- nite ollenco presents tho doctrine of con slructivc, consequential nnd implied con tempts in hostile opposition to Ihe consti tution, it cannot bear the collision It is a maxim of law that whero a dis cretion is allowed courts in the punish ment oi uetinea otlenceB, that discretion must bo regulated by law. But in this in stance, Ihe law as claimed, sets to itself no bounds, and under the influence of strong passions, punishment mav be in dieted lo a crued, an unusual and exces sive degree, 'llio records of tha Eng lish courts are not without glaring exam ples, under this authority, which might be nence quoteu as precedents for imitation. 1 here are no guards then against a ro. sort lo the most tyrannical licentiousness, und it is not an unreasonable jealousy to distrust men clothed wilh arbitrary pow er. It is cortainly better thai the freedom of the citizen should bo conlrolled by fix ed and plain laws, than to bo left depend ant upon the uncertain moderation ol those in power. Tho authority to punish at pleasure and during pleasure, is indeed more consonant anil agreeable to a throne, without responsibility, than to tribunals of justice erected upon free and equal laws. it is to oe noted that our constitution, unlike some others of iho Stales of the Union, doea not contain a recognition, in so many words, ol a "law of the land" presupposed lo exist. As wo have seen, it is upon the Blight foundation of (his phrase, (hat the doctrine of constiuctive contempts is claimed to have been recog. nized .and re-enacted by Magna Charta, and upon the same principle to be in force in those States whero this term makes its appearance in their constitutions. For these words, in tho constitution of Missis sippi, has been supplied (he language, "due course of law." A practice of (lie courts, however remarkable for its anti quity, however far back into a remote po. riod it looks for ils origin, even to a peri od whereto the memory of man runneth not, even though evidence by published works upon jurisprudence carefully pre served from the carliost times of extant printing or manuscripts, claims no respect or veneration, when it is shown to be un essential to the existence, utility or pres ervation of those courts, but, on the coo-. trary, (o be the fruitful source of ma'Yy 0f CYIIB C A mOUO WHICH ft HP J 'y.lnm of government and an in;,,-0.;ed code of uw, nave ueen Mulshed. We have before our eyes bo 0i()ence of (ie needlessi.es- f ,ny ,uch authority ,0 ,e. curJ '.j courts (hose essential nda their (exiience, their utility, and their prcser valion. It is in tho established law, by statutory onaclmonts upon this subject of llio United Stales and of some of our sis ter States. We nro thus presented with a complete practical refutation of tho whole argument which would attempt to vindicate llio propriety of tho claim lo this power by the courts upon tho basis of expediency and necessily. The act of Congress, of March 2d, 1N31, c. 03, limit ed and defined tho power ovor all con toinpts of courts of Ihe United Stales, by duclaring that Ihe puwer lo issue attach ments and inllict summary punishments for contempts of courts, shall not bo con strued lo extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person in tho pres ence of the court, or so near thereto as ti obstruct Iho administration of justice; and iho misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said courts In thoir official transac tions; and tho ilisobodience or rosislanco by any officer of said courts, parly, juror, witness, or any other person, to any law ful writ, process, order, rule, docroo or command of the said courts. A similar statue has b- n onnctcd in Ohio, with tho further roslric ion thut iho accused shall bo heard in his defence by himself or counsel. In tho "system of penal law, prepared for Ihe Slate of Louisinna," in 1821, by Edward Livingston, Esq., con tempts could only do committed in pres ence of tho court, nr in pleadings or wri tings addressed to the judges in ponding cases, and Ihcss were tried by indictment, whereby a jury found Iho fuel. The civ il code of Pennsylvania, in 1H35, confined the power of imprisonment lo contempts committed in open court. No publication out of court, respecting the conduct of the court, or any of its officers, jurors, wit nesses, or parlies in any causo ponding in court, exposes the party lo summary punishment, and iho only remedy for Iho porsons aggrieved is by indictment or ac tion nl law. In Stales, then, established upon tho same republican principles as our own, having conrls of juslino of simi lar jurisdiction und like authority, Deeding the same inherent capacity for self pres ervation anil the same influence over the public mind to render them efficacious lor the ends of their creation, nnd beneficial to tho interests and purposes of their gov ernment and their people, the common law power of tho judges over contempts is found lo be unnecessary and useless. From this it is therefore fairly and irre sislably dcduciblc, that ihe mnlivo for ar rngnting a claim lo an authority if this kind being Ink en away, and the cluiin bo. ing predicated upon that motive, the au- thoriiy must go with it, or, in llio language of llio legal motto, "cessante ratione, ces sat et ipsa lex? But our own Legislature has passed a law upon this subject in thoso words: "The courts shall have power to fine and imprison any person who may be guilty of a contempt of the court while sitting, either in the presence or hearing of such court: Provided, that such fine shall not exegnd one hundred dollars, and no person, lor such contempt shall be imprisoned for a longer period than Ihe term of the court nt which the contempt shall liavn been commuted." 11.11.4110,20. The same w, it is to be remarked, is made appli cable to the circuit, the chancery, and tho high court of errors and appeals. This statuto describos clearly the offence and affixes for it a limited, terminable and def inite punishment. Upon what principle can the Legislature be supposed to have overlooked the existence, if any such could bo imagined under our constitution, ol a power unlimited, ungranted and nn- defincd, lo punish contempts of courts without thoir walls, acts unaffocling tho decorum or respect of their prcsonce! A greater ofience is thus made subject to circumscribed chastisement, and a lesser is lolt liable lo an infinite degree of pun- isbmont. The sense, spirit, scoao and incentiou of a statute are In be regarded in ils construction, and judges aro so to construe it as to suppress a mischief or advance a remedy. Dwarris. 718. Is not the power of punishing implied con lompts mischievous, should it not be romodied? Our statute, by this rule of interpretation, should be pronoonced de claratory of the law upon tho subject of contempts flo lar as they aro committed by general persons. A common sense survey of tho statute creates t forcible im plication that its language details '.'no cir cumstances which can alone c.,n9tjti,0 a contempt of our courts. O Jt "leai8iu(or,, frame tho laws, acknowledging lIie cousti. tution as the highest ar.j t10 ony authori. ly on earth for.tlKiirVjide irl ,hllpin ,em I hoy found ,nfrAi instrument no such pr.nc.pie ...is doc,,,,,, of Cori8,ruc,ive contempts w0U j establish, but rather a precedent and paramount auihoriiv lo din. oey ' 'hey l.ave, in consequence, command.jfl the subject of contempts of f ouju, pot to bo governed, to quote Ihe Words of Lord Cocke, "by iho crooked cord of Ihe discretion of the judges," but lo be "mea'ured by the golden mctwand of the law." The shield which -our constitution throws around tho press has been held up si i 11 I ?