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| min xim |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | cially or geographically. If the struygle is waged to the point of exhaustion, as now seems probabie, the consequences |  |  |  |  |
|  | are sure to be world-wide, extending to Asia and Africa if not to the Amerian cost With the leading |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \%ex | if not to the American continent itself. With the leading European powers so depleted and impoverished in men, i |  |  |  |  |
|  | not in money, that decades will not restore their lost vigor, what, for instance, will be the attitude of Japan? While we |  |  |  |  |
|  | are closer to Eurrone than to the Far East, the future course of Nippon and the problems involved in our relations of the broad Paeific are likely to be of more concern to the United |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| tors | to the United States than all other problems growing out of the present |  |  |  |  |
|  | world war. We are told that even at this time all Japan is in a grum- |  |  |  |  |
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|  | of present dissatisfaction is that the field of Japanese naval activity has been limited, and the orakn Manichi, a leading daily, criticises Great Britain for placing Japan in |  |  |  |  |
| an mix |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tox | have been stopped much earlier than was the case, and trade routes on the ocean |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | and en be buesesed that the infuenee of Great Britain and the United States in constraning the Japanese govern- |  |  |  |  |
|  | ment to limetitsateostrol of German teritory monen the is- |  |  |  |  |
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|  | lands of the Pacific and on the Chinese coast taken by the |  |  |  |  |
|  | United Stas ater the dapaese seizure of the Merathal and |  |  |  |  |
|  | man vessels in the Pacific, the length of time the cruiser |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Geier was allowed to remain at Honolulu being cited as an illustration and proof. |  |  |  |  |
|  | All this is not so important in and of itself as for what it presages with reference to the future. If Japan has be- |  |  |  |  |
|  | gun to maniest this attitud new, while Great birtain, her auly, is still able to dominate the sea as well as much of the |  |  |  |  |
|  | land in all quarters of the globe, what may we expect when Kitchener's predicted three years' struggle has wrought |  |  |  |  |
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|  | havoc with all the European powers including England? Here we have a recognized power among the nations |  |  |  |  |
|  | of the world, armed to the teeth |  |  |  |  |
|  | most of the American nations would avoid hostilities. Not only that but the Japanese premier has just urged a policy ofincreased armament, including a greater navy as well as a |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | larger standing army. Why is it? <br> When we contemplate this spectacle, it seems almost in |  |  |  |  |
|  | credible that it is only a little over a half a century since <br> the long isolation of Japan from all the world was broken as |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  |  |  | kaleidos |
|  | the emperor from President Pierce to obtain admission to Japanese ports and establish trade relations. |  |  |  |  |
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|  | opened two ports to American ships for shelter in stress of veather, for procuring supplies, for certain privileges of |  |  |  |  |
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|  | trade, and for resident American consuls. England made haste to obtain similar treaty privilezes the same year, as |  |  |  |  |
|  | did other nations, and thus ended the seal of seclusion under which Japan had existed for two centuries and a half. |  |  |  |  |
|  | zation and the arts and sciences in both peace and war dur- |  |  |  |  |
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|  | eountry neading our missionaries during the middle of thelast century, is considered to-chat the chiet menace to our |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | abiding peace; and as one of the most progressive countries in the whole world. |  |  |  |  |
|  | dealing with the countries of South and Central America and |  |  |  |  |
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|  | commercilly than we are todidy, but we must make the best of our present situation. How to do this is the problem |  |  |  |  |
|  | which challenges American statesmanship. |  |  |  |  |
|  | excusable policies have led to a war involving all Europe.Are we to be any wiser in our generation than our European |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | neighbors? Is there any really sound reason why rela- tions between the United States and Japan should not con- |  |  |  |  |
|  | tinue friendly as they were during the half-century in which the Japanese regarded Americans as their greatest benefac |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | sochil himbins |
|  | ognizing certnin rights on the part of citizens of the United States regardless of race or color, why should we deny to a |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | or a red man, and why should we hold prejudice azainst one color alone? |  |  |  |  |
|  | a degree and unquestionably more jealous of their positionthan they would be had their present civilization existed for |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | centures. We eat proft from the fact that from 1855 to |  |  |  |  |
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|  | apt pupils and grateful as well. When the excitement arose |  |  |  |  |
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|  | moval of the possibility of trouble. It has kept its laborersfrom coming to the United States; it has invited American |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | business men and pubic servants to visit Tokio and eulti-vate frimaly relationsIn respone we sent our deet to |  |  |  |  |
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|  | Japanese waters; a voice was raised even in Congress predict-ing war with Japan as a means of getting a larger navy, and it must be admitted that if peace is ever broken between |  |  |  |  |
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